State of Chhattisgarh Vs Chitranjan Patel @ Santu

This appeal against acquittal has been preferred by the appellant/State against the judgment dated 17.12.2019 passed by the 5^th Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh, C.G., in Sessions Case No.52/2017, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges under Sections 498-A and 313 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) on the basis of benefit of doubt.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that marriage of complainant/PW-1Sunita Patel was solemnized with respondent-accused on 12.07.2016 according to social customs. After marriage, she initially stayed at her

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matrimonial home in village Gobarsingha and thereafter came to reside with accused-respondent at Raigarh, where he was employed. It is alleged that about fifteen days after marriage, the accused-respondent started demanding Rs.2,00,000/- and 5 tolas of gold as dowry, abused and assaulted complainant- Sunita Patel and subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. It is further alleged that during her stay with accusedrespondent at Raigarh, she became pregnant. Upon coming to know of the pregnancy, the accused-respondent allegedly did not want the continuation of pregnancy and on 10.10.2016, forcibly administered an abortion pill to the complainant against her will, as a result of which, she suffered a miscarriage on 11.10.2016. According to the prosecution, the complainant informed her parents telephonically about her ill health, whereupon her parents came to Raigarh, took her to the police station and thereafter brought her to their village. On 12.10.2016, a written complaint was lodged by the complainant at Police Station City Kotwali, Raigarh. On the basis of the said report, FIR (Ex.P-3) was registered against the accused-respondent and investigation was commenced.

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After completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused/respondent before the competent trial Court. The accused/respondent denied the allegations, pleaded not guilty and prayed for a trial.

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The trial Court, after hearing counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent herein of said charges leveled against him.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned trial Court is not justified in acquitting the accused/respondent of the said

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charges by recording perverse findings. He further submits that the learned trial Court has committed an error in disbelieving the testimony of the complainant (PW-1), which clearly establishes that complainant/PW-1 was subjected to demand of dowry by the accused/respondent. He also submits that the medical evidence on record establishes miscarriage and that the sole testimony of the complainant was sufficient to prove the offence under Section 313 of the IPC. Despite such cogent and clinching evidence available on record, the learned trial Court, without appreciating the material evidence in its proper perspective, committed a grave error in acquitting the accused/respondent. Thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused/respondent supports the impugned judgment and submits that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of both offences beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that most witnesses are interested and hearsay witnesses and that the medical evidence does not support the allegation of forcible abortion. Therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is well-reasoned and calls for no interference by this Court.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala¹ has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether

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1 (2022) 8 SCC 440

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the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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To attract the provisions of Section 498-A of the IPC against the accused/respondent, the following ingredients, as contained therein, are required to be examined, which read as under:-

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“ 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation .—For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"—

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(a) anywilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

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In the light of the above enunciation of law, the facts of the present case are required to be examined minutely.

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It is not in dispute that the marriage between the complainant/PW-1 and the accused/respondent was solemnized on 12.07.2016. It is also not disputed that after marriage the complainant/PW-1 resided initially at her matrimonial village and thereafter came to live with accused/respondent at Raigarh where he was employed. The prosecution case is that after about fifteen days of marriage the accused started demanding dowry and subjected the complainant to cruelty and later forcibly administered a pill to her, causing miscarriage.

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So far as the allegation of cruelty and demand of dowry is concerned, complainant (PW-1) has stated in her deposition that accused/respondent demanded a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- and 5 tolas of gold and subjected her to abuse and assault. However, this allegation does not find specific mention in the written report (Ex.P-1). Neither the time nor the date of the alleged demand has been stated therein, nor does the written report (Ex.P-1) disclose as to when and on which particular occasion such demand was allegedly made by the accused/respondent. In her cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that the marriage between her and the accused/respondent was solemnized smoothly and that there was no dispute or demand of dowry at the time of marriage. She further admitted that after the marriage, she resided in her matrimonial home for about three months and during this entire period, she did not lodge any report against the accused/respondent and her relations with accused/respondent were cordial. She also admitted that when her parents took her to their native village, they merely informed the police about taking her away and no information regarding any alleged incident was given at that time. She also admitted that she took back all her marriage belongings from the house of the accused/respondent as she did not wish to live with him. She also admitted that a settlement was proposed to the accused/respondent subject to payment of Rs.2.5 lakh, which the accused/respondent’s side did not arrange. This apart, PW-4 father of the complainant, also admitted that the accused/respondent did not demand any dowry and that he did not lodge any complaint against the accused/respondent before any police station, community forum, or panchayat in that regard.

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Thus, from perusal of the above evidence, it is evident that there are material inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant and that her

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evidence does not corroborate with the contents of the written report (Ex.P-1) and the other evidence available on record. Furthermore, the complainant (PW-1) and her father (PW-4) admitted that no complaint was made by them to any authority, relative, neighbour, or social forum during the complainant’s stay at her matrimonial home or during the period she lived with the accused/respondent at Raigarh in connection with any alleged demand of dowry by the accused/respondent. That apart, it has also come in evidence that the accused/respondent was employed with Jindal Company and that his family was financially well placed and rather it appears that the complainant herself was not willing to live with the accused/respondent. No specific incident, date or continuous conduct of harassment constituting cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC has been proved. The evidence led by the prosecution is general, vague and omnibus in nature and does not satisfy either explanation to Section 498-A IPC. The learned trial Court, after evaluating the evidence available on record, has rightly held that mere allegations without independent corroboration are insufficient to bring home the charge of cruelty for dowry. This Court finds no perversity or illegality in the finding recorded by the learned trial Court.

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With regard to the allegation under Section 313 IPC, the medical evidence and the sonography report (Exhibit P-6) establish that the complainant suffered a miscarriage. However, the crucial question is whether the miscarriage was caused by the accused/respondent by forcibly administering a pill without her consent. PW-1 though in her deposition has stated that on 10.12.2016, accused/respondent forcibly administered tablets to her, as a result of which, she suffered a miscarriage on 11.12.2016 and thereafter she informed her parents that her health is not

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well, however, she did not disclose to them that the accused/respondent had forcibly administered any medicine to her. She has further stated that on 11.12.2016, while taking her from Raigarh to their native village, her parents merely informed Police and that no medical examination was conducted on that day. She has also stated that while going to her native place, the entire road from Jute Mill Chowk to Chandrapur was damaged due to excavation and construction of a new road. She has also stated that she did not mention in her report or in her statement the date or time when the accused/respondent allegedly administered the pill. In her crossexamination, she admitted that she did not inform her elder father or any other person about the alleged forcible administration of the pill by the accused-respondent.

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Thus, from the above evidence, it is apparent that there is no cogent and clinching evidence available on record to establish that the accused/respondent administered any pill to complainant. The complainant herself admitted that she did not inform anyone about the alleged forcible administration of pill by the accused/respondent. Further, the complainant could not specify the nature of the pill allegedly administered. Apart from this, the Investigating Officer (PW-7 Santara Chouhan) admitted that no signs of force or injury were found on the complainant’s body. Moreover, Dr. Sonam Agarwal (PW-9) has categorically stated that no report, other than the sonography report, relating to the complainant’s pregnancy or miscarriage was produced before her. She has further stated that she did not personally conduct any investigation and was unable to give any definite opinion regarding the cause of miscarriage. Likewise, Dr. Arun Kedia (PW-6) has stated that he found retain product of conception in the complainant’s uterus, which could occur either due to intake of a pill or as a

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result of a natural abortion, however, he could not ascertain the exact cause of the miscarriage. There are material contradictions regarding the duration of pregnancy and the timing of the miscarriage. The complainant’s version does not align with the medical evidence, thereby creating serious doubt.

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It has also come on record that despite the alleged miscarriage on 11.12.2016, the complainant was not immediately taken to any hospital. Instead, she was taken to the police station and thereafter travelled by road to her parental village, even though the road was under construction. Such conduct appears unnatural and improbable, particularly in the case of a woman allegedly suffering miscarriage due to abortion. The prosecution version that information was given to the police on 11.12.2016 is contradicted by the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-7 Santara Chouhan), who has categorically denied receiving any such information on that date. This contradiction further weakens the prosecution case. The possibility of a natural miscarriage during early pregnancy, particularly in view of travel, physical exertion and absence of immediate medical care, cannot be ruled out.

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The offence under Section 313 IPC being a serious one, the law requires strict and cogent proof. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the miscarriage was caused by the accused/respondent by forcibly administering any pill and without the consent of the complainant. The learned trial Court has meticulously analysed the oral and documentary evidence on record and has assigned cogent reasons for disbelieving the prosecution case. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of

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evidence and do not suffer from perversity or misreading of material on record.

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It is well settled that an appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, should not interfere unless the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court are wholly unreasonable or perverse. No such circumstance is made out in the present case.

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Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges under Sections 498-A and 313 IPC against the accused/respondent beyond reasonable doubt, and the learned trial Court has rightly extended the benefit of doubt to him.

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The appeal filed by the appellant/State, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.

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Sd/Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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Akhilesh

State of Chhattisgarh v. Chitranjan Patel @ Santu

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State of Chhattisgarh v. Chitranjan Patel @ Santu

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