State Vs Siyaram and Ors.

1.Since both these appeals arise out of the same impugned judgment dated 07.03.2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sessions Division, Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.171/2006, they are being decided by this common judgment.

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2.At the outset, it is reported that during the pendency of these appeals, accused persons namely Siyaram and Radheshyam have expired, therefore, the appeals, in so far as they relate to accused Siyaram and Radheshyam, stand abated.

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3.By the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused persons of the offences punishable under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 of Indian Penal Code (in short, ‘IPC’), but convicted them under Sections 148, 452/149, 323/149 (five counts) and 325/149 (two counts) IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of Rs.500/- under Sections 148, 452/149 and 325/149 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 323/149 IPC, with all the sentences directed to run concurrently.

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4.Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that there was a prior dispute between the complainant party and the accused

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persons regarding reconstruction of a house at Village Rogada. On 13.05.2006 at about 11:00 a.m., when construction work was going on and the family members were present inside the house, all the accused persons allegedly formed an unlawful assembly and arrived armed with lathis, rods and other weapons. It is alleged that they forcibly entered the dwelling house, abused the complainant party and assaulted them. PW-4 Kapil was beaten on the head and fell unconscious. PW-6 Resham sustained fracture injury on his arm, PW-1 Anita sustained fracture of tibia, and other family members sustained simple injuries. After the incident, FIR (Ex.P-17) was registered at Police Station Nawagarh against the accused persons.

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5.During investigation, the spot map was prepared vide Ex.P18. The injured persons were medically examined vide Exs. P-1 to P-7. Vide Ex.P-19, an iron rod was seized from accused Siyaram; vide Ex.P-20, an iron axe was seized from accused Cholaram; and vide Ex.P-21, a club was seized from accused Raju. The accused persons were thereafter taken into custody.

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After due investigation, accused persons were chargesheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in

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accordance with law, in which, accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the aforesaid offences.

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7.In order to bring home the offences, prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses and brought on record 37 documents vide Ex.P/01 to P/37. However, in their defence, accused persons have exhibited three witnesses i.e. DW-1 to DW-3 and exhibited 7 documents.

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8.The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment, acquitted the accused persons of the offences under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 IPC, but convicted and sentenced them for the offences mentioned in paragraph 2 of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused persons and the State have filed the present separate appeals respectively.

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9.Learned counsel for the appellant/State, while assailing the acquittal of the accused persons under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 of IPC, submits that the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the ocular as well as medical evidence available on record. It is argued that the testimony of the injured witnesses clearly establishes that the accused persons were armed with deadly weapons and assaulted the

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complainant party indiscriminately. Particular emphasis is laid on the evidence of PW-4 Kapil, who sustained injury on his head and became unconscious at the spot. It is contended that injury on a vital part of the body, coupled with the number of assailants and the manner of assault, clearly indicates intention and knowledge sufficient to attract Section 307 IPC. He further submits that fracture injuries sustained by injuredResham and Anita stand proved by medical evidence and, therefore, the offence ought to have been held to fall under Section 326 IPC instead of Section 325 IPC. According to him, the trial Court erred in extending undue benefit of doubt despite consistent and reliable evidence of injured eyewitnesses corroborated by independent witnesses and medical reports. It is, therefore, prayed that the acquittal recorded under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 IPC be set aside and the accused persons be convicted accordingly.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the accused persons supports the impugned judgment to the extent of acquittal and challenges the conviction and sentenced recorded by the trial Court. It is submitted that there existed longstanding land and property dispute between the parties and, on account of such enmity, the accused persons have been falsely implicated. It is argued that all the material

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witnesses are related and interested witnesses belonging to the complainant side and their testimony suffers from exaggerations and contradictions regarding the role attributed to each accused and the specific weapons allegedly used. Counsel for the respondents points out that there are discrepancies between the ocular version and the medical evidence, particularly with regard to the nature of weapons and the injuries caused. It is further contended that injuredKapil was admitted to the hospital after three days of the incident and there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, which creates serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution case under Section 307 IPC. He also submits that the prosecution has failed to establish common object as required under Section 149 IPC and that mere presence at the spot would not attract vicarious liability. It is also argued that the alleged weapons were not conclusively connected with the injuries and no forensic evidence has been brought on record. According to him, the trial Court has erred in placing implicit reliance upon interested witnesses without independent corroboration. In the alternative, without prejudice to the above submissions, learned counsel for the accused persons submits that the incident is of the year 2006 and almost two decades have passed. The accused persons are first offenders, some

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of them are elderly, and they have faced the agony of criminal proceedings for a long period. It is submitted that they have not remained in custody during the pendency of the trial and appeal and have not misused liberty granted to them. Therefore, even if the conviction is maintained, the substantive sentence deserves to be reduced and a lenient view be taken in the matter of sentence. Thus, while the State seeks reversal of acquittal and enhancement of conviction to graver offences, the accused persons pray for setting aside of conviction and, in the alternative, for reduction of sentence.

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11.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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12.The question that now arises for consideration is whether the accused persons are the authors of the crime in question.

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PW-1 Anita is an injured eyewitness and her testimony constitutes a material part of the prosecution case. She deposed that on the date of incident, i.e., 13.05.2006 at about 11:00 a.m., she was present in her house at Village Rogada along with her family members, where construction/repair work was in progress. At that time, all the accused persons came together, armed with lathis, iron rods and tangia, abused the family members and forcibly entered the house premises. Thereafter, they assaulted the inmates indiscriminately. She

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stated that PW-4 Kapil was assaulted on his head and became unconscious, PW-6 Resham sustained injuries on his hand and shoulder, and she herself suffered injuries on her leg and hand, while other female members were also beaten. After the incident, the injured persons were taken for medical examination and she was medically examined; she also proved her injury report and stated that she had sustained a fracture in her leg. She further stated that the incident occurred inside their dwelling house and the accused persons had no right to enter and assault them. In her cross-examination, she admitted the existence of a prior land dispute between the parties. Though minor inconsistencies were elicited regarding the specific role and weapon attributed to each accused, but she remained consistent on the core aspect that all the accused persons had entered the house together and assaulted them. She denied the suggestions that they were the aggressors, that the injuries were caused due to fall during construction work, or that the accused were falsely implicated due to previous enmity. Her testimony, being that of an injured witness, clearly establishes her presence at the place of incident and supports the prosecution case that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly, entered the house and caused injuries, including grievous injury.

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14.PW-2 Chandrika, an injured eyewitness, corroborated the prosecution case and deposed that the accused persons forcibly entered the dwelling house and assaulted the inmates. She also sustained simple injuries in the said incident.

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PW-4 Kapil is also an injured witness. He stated that on 13.05.2006 at about 11:00 a.m., the accused persons came armed with lathis and rods and entered their house where construction work was going on. They started beating him and other family members. He specifically stated that he was assaulted on his head and due to the blow he fell down unconscious. He regained consciousness in the hospital. He further stated that Resham sustained fracture injury on his arm and Anita also sustained fracture in her leg. He identified the accused persons in Court. In cross-examination, he admitted that he was admitted in hospital after a few days of the incident but denied the suggestion that his injuries were fabricated. He also denied that he was the aggressor or that the accused were falsely implicated.

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16.PW-4 Kapil is also an injured witness. He deposed that on 13.05.2006 at about 11:00 a.m., when construction work was going on in their house, the accused persons came armed with lathis and iron rods, entered the house and started assaulting him and other family members. He specifically stated that he

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was assaulted on his head, as a result of which he fell unconscious and regained consciousness in the hospital. He further stated that PW-6 Resham sustained a fracture injury on his arm and PW-1 Anita also sustained a fracture in her leg. He duly identified the accused persons in Court. In crossexamination, he admitted that he was admitted to the hospital a few days after the incident but denied the suggestions that his injuries were fabricated, that he was the aggressor, or that the accused persons were falsely implicated.

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17.PW-5 Khikhlal deposed that at the time of the incident he was present in the house where construction work was in progress. He stated that the accused persons came together armed with sticks and rods, entered the house and assaulted the inmates, causing him simple injuries. He further stated that immediately after the incident he went to Police Station Nawagarh and lodged the report, and he proved the FIR, stating that it was read over to him and found correct. In cross-examination, he admitted the existence of a prior dispute but denied the suggestion of false implication. Nothing material was elicited to discredit his testimony, particularly regarding the prompt lodging of the FIR.

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18.PW-6 Resham is a grievously injured witness. He deposed that the accused persons entered their house and assaulted

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him with sticks and rods. He sustained injury on his left arm and shoulder. He stated that his arm was fractured and he remained admitted in hospital for about 24 days for treatment. He supported the version that PW-4 Kapil was assaulted on the head and that PW-1 Anita also sustained fracture injury. He identified the accused persons in Court. In cross-examination, he denied that he was the aggressor or that injuries were caused due to fall during construction work. He remained firm that the injuries were caused by the accused persons.

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PW-8 Savita and PW-9 Rameshwari also supported the prosecution story and stated that the accused entered their house and assaulted them.

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20.PW-7 Baijnath Kashyap and PW-10 Ramvaran, independent mason witnesses, stated that at about 10–11 a.m., the accused persons came armed with sticks and rods, entered the house and started assaulting the complainant party.

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21.PW-3 Dr. S.K. Dwivedi examined the injured persons on the date of incident and proved their injury reports. He stated that injured- Khikhlal, Chandrika, Savita and Rameshwari sustained simple injuries caused by hard and blunt object. PW-1 Anita had swelling and injury on her leg and on X-ray fracture of tibia was detected. PW-6 Resham had lacerated wound and swelling on left arm and shoulder and X-ray

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revealed fracture. He opined that all injuries were caused by hard and blunt object. In cross-examination, he admitted that such injuries may be caused by fall on hard surface but did not state that the injuries in the present case were accidental.

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22.PW-15 Dr. H.S. Chandel proved the hospital admission and treatment records. He stated that PW-6 Resham was admitted from 13.05.2006 to 29.05.2006 for treatment of fracture injury. He also stated that PW-4 Kapil was admitted from 16.05.2006 to 29.05.2006 and that he had sustained fracture of ulna bone. He confirmed that the injuries of PW-6 Resham were grievous in nature. In cross-examination, he admitted the date of admission of PW-4 Kapil but could not state where he remained prior to admission.

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23.Thus, the evidence of injured witnesses, corroborated by independent eyewitnesses and medical testimony, establishes that the accused persons entered the dwelling house and voluntarily caused simple as well as grievous injuries to the complainant party.

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24.The Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 held as under:-

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“26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated

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by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:

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(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.

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(b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.

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(c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

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(d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.

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(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence.

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(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded.

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(emphasis supplied)”

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25.Section 149 IPC says that every member of an unlawful

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assembly shall be guilty of the offence committed in prosecution of the common object. Section 149 IPC is quite

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categorical. It says that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of committing of that offence, is a member of the said assembly; is guilty of that offence.

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26.In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 11 SCC 237 , the Supreme Court while examining Section 149 IPC held as follows:-

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“20. It is now well-settled law that the provisions of Section 149 IPC will be attracted whenever any offence committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or when the members of that assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, so that every person, who, at the time of committing of that offence is a member, will be also vicariously held liable and guilty of that offence. Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. This principle ropes in every member of the assembly to be guilty of an offence where that offence is committed by any member of that

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assembly in prosecution of common object of that assembly, or such members or assembly knew that offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.

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21. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant, where the accused is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The relevant question to be examined by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took active part in the crime or not.”

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27.Thus, this Court held that Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. By application of this principle, every member of an unlawful assembly is roped in to be held guilty of the offence committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant when an accused is roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The question which is relevant and which is required to be answered by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took part in the crime or not.

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As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court in Vinubhai

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Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel reported in (2018) 7 SCC 743 has reiterated the position that Section 149 IPC does not create a separate offence but only declares vicarious liability of all members of the unlawful assembly for acts done in common object. The Supreme Court has held:

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20. In cases where a large number of accused constituting an “unlawful assembly” are alleged to have attacked and killed one or more persons, it is not necessary that each of the accused should inflict fatal injuries or any injury at all. Invocation of Section149 is essential in such cases for punishing the members of such unlawful assemblies on the ground of vicarious liability even though they are not accused of having inflicted fatal injuries in appropriate cases if the evidence on record justifies. The mere presence of an accused in such an “unlawful assembly” is sufficient to render him vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for causing the death of the victim of the attack provided that the accused are told that they have to face a charge rendering them vicariously liable under Section 149 IPC for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Failure to appropriately invoke and apply Section 149 enables large number of offenders to get away with the crime.

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22. When a large number of people gather

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together (assemble) and commit an offence, it is possible that only some of the members of the assembly commit the crucial act which renders the transaction an offence and the remaining members do not take part in that “crucial act” — for example in a case of murder, the infliction of the fatal injury. It is in those situations, the legislature thought it fit as a matter of legislative policy to press into service the concept of vicarious liability for the crime. Section 149 IPC is one such provision. It is a provision conceived in the larger public interest to maintain the tranquility of the society and prevent wrongdoers (who actively collaborate or assist the commission of offences) claiming impunity on the ground that their activity as members of the unlawful assembly is limited.

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34. For mulcting liability on the members of an unlawful assembly under Section 149, it is not necessary that every member of the unlawful assembly should commit the offence in prosecution of the common object of the assembly. Mere knowledge of the likelihood of commission of such an offence by the members of the assembly is sufficient. For example, if five or more members carrying AK 47 rifles collectively attack a victim and cause his death by gunshot injuries, the fact that one or two of the members of the assembly did not in fact fire

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their weapons does not mean that they did not have the knowledge of the fact that the offence of murder is likely to be committed.”

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29.Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court in Yunis alias Kariya v. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 1 SCC 425 , no overt act is required to be imputed to a particular person when the charge is under Section 149 IPC and the presence of the accused as part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction.

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When the present case is examined in the light of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court and the evidence available on record, this Court finds that the testimonies of the injured witnesses are cogent, consistent and trustworthy. Their presence at the place of occurrence stands firmly established and their version inspires confidence. The same is duly corroborated by the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses as well as by the medical evidence on record. From the evidence adduced, it is clearly proved that the accused persons, in furtherance of their common object, formed an unlawful assembly, forcibly trespassed into the dwelling house of the complainant party and assaulted the inmates. The ocular evidence regarding the manner of assault is in consonance with the medical reports, which show that PW-6 Resham and PW-1 Anita sustained fracture injuries, thereby

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attracting the offence punishable under Section 325/149 IPC, whereas the injuries sustained by the other injured persons are simple in nature, attracting the offence under Section 323/149 IPC.. No material contradiction or omission has been brought on record to discredit the core prosecution version. The defence plea of false implication due to prior dispute has remained unsubstantiated. In view of the consistent and reliable evidence of the injured witnesses, duly supported by medical and other evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly held the accused persons guilty of the offences under Sections 148, 452/149, 323/149 (five counts) and 325/149 (two counts) IPC. The findings of conviction recorded by the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or illegality, and therefore warrant no interference.

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As regards the question of sentence, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, particularly that the incident is of the year 2006, the accused persons are first offenders and they have not remained in custody during the pendency of the trial and the present appeals, this Court is of the view that some reduction in the substantive sentence is warranted.

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32.Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction, the substantive sentence awarded under Sections 148, 452/149 and 325/149

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IPC is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for six months each in place of two years each. However, the fine amount is enhanced from Rs.500/- each to Rs.5,000/- each for each of the accused persons. In default of payment of the enhanced fine, each accused shall undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months. The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months each awarded to the accused persons under Section 323/149 IPC is maintained. All the sentences shall run concurrently.

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Upon deposit of the fine amount, the same shall be disbursed to the injured victims under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after due verification and identification by the trial Court. The fine amount, if any deposited, shall be adjusted accordingly.

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In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 316 of 2008 is partly allowed to the extent indicated above and stands abated in respect of accused-Siyaram and Radheshyam.

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The remaining accused persons are directed to surrender before the trial Court within six weeks from today to serve out the remaining sentence and deposit the enhanced fine amount, failing which the trial Court shall take necessary steps in accordance with law.

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So far as acquittal appeal (ACQA No.397/2010) filed by the State under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 IPC is concerned, the Supreme Court in the matter of Constable Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand¹ , whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:

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“ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149

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1 (2025) 5 SCC 433

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“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42

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42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of

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an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ”

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40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate

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jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for

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reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka² has held in para 36 as under:-

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2 (2024) 3 SCC 544

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"42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given

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by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.

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Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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In the present case, the medical evidence on record indicates that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by hard and blunt objects. There is no clear and convincing medical evidence to establish that any of the injuries were caused by a sharp-edged weapon so as to attract the offence punishable under Section 326/149 IPC. The nature of injuries, as reflected in the medical reports, does not support the prosecution case to that extent. Further, so far as the charge under Section 307/149 IPC is concerned, there is no categorical medical opinion to show that the injury sustained by PW-4 Kapil was

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sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The evidence only indicates that he sustained a head injury and fell unconscious, but the requisite intention or knowledge to cause death, as well as the severity of injury necessary to bring the act within the ambit of Section 307 IPC, is not established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court has meticulously appreciated the oral and medical evidence and has assigned cogent reasons for acquitting the accused persons of the offences under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 IPC. The view taken by the trial Court is a reasonable and plausible view based on the evidence available on record. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, illegal or wholly unsustainable, the appellate Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal. In this case, the findings recorded by the trial Court do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or material infirmity. Therefore, the acquittal of the accused persons of the offences under Sections 326/149 and 307/149 IPC does not call for any interference in the appeal against acquittal.

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Accordingly, Acquittal Appeal No. 397 of 2010 filed by the State against the acquittal of the accused persons for the aforesaid offences stands dismissed .

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Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

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Judge Judge

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Vishakha

State v. Siyaram and Ors.

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