Gulabchandra Samual Vs Manish Sharma ( Dead) through Jyoti Sharma W/O Late Manish Sharma

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2026:CGHC:8983-DB

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AFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SHYNAAJAY Digitally signedby SHYNA AJAYDN: cn=SHYNAAJAY,o=PERSONAL,st=Chhattisgarh,c=IN

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WP227 No. 216 of 2026

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Gulabchandra Samual S/o Shri Samual Joseph, Aged About 77 Years, Proprietor of Shanti Metal Store, Sadar Bazar, Raipur, Tahsil And Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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Manish Sharma (Dead) Through Jyoti Sharma W/o Late Manish Sharma Through General Power of Attorney Rajendra Sharma, R/o Sharma Building, Gokulchandra Mandir Road, Budapara, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)

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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vivek Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate

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DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Agrawal & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

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Order on Board 19/02/2026

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Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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By way of this petition, the petitioner/tenant seeks to challenge the order dated 8.1.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur in Miscellaneous Appeal No.20/2025. The petitioner further seeks the allowance of his application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC, whereby he has sought leave to implead the legatees/beneficiaries of the ‘Will’ dated 12.8.1997 as necessary and proper parties.

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The petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs in the petition :

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“(i) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records concerning the case of the petitioner from the possession of the Courts below for its kind perusal.

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(ii) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside/quash the impugned order dated 8.1.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by learned CG Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur in Misc. Appeal No.20/2025 and consequently allowing application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC of the petitioner, permit him to implead the legatee/ beneficiaries of the Will dated 12.8.1997 as necessary party to the suit.

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(iii) That this Hon'ble Court may also kindly be pleased to grant any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case to the petitioner including cost of the petition.”

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Brief facts of the case are that deceased respondent - Manish Sharma (now represented by respondent-Jyoti Sharma) filed a suit under Section 12(2), Schedule II of the CG Rent Control Act, 2011 (in short “the Act”). The deceased-respondent averred that he owned property at Sadar Bazar, Ward No.39, Raipur (Shop No.538/1 to 4, Old No. 11/536 to 11/539), which is about 80 years old. The respondent purchased the said property from the legal heirs of late Abed Ali and his wife late Jahra Bai Bee through different sale-deeds and obtained possession thereof, a fact well within the knowledge of the petitioner/non-applicant. The petitioner/non-applicant had originally taken on lease two ground floor shops and one first floor hall from Abed Ali and Jahra Bai at a monthly rent of Rs.4000/-, where he has since been conducting business. After the demise of Abed Ali on 10.6.1974 and Jahra Bai Bee on 7.2.1998, the respondent/applicant, through his counsel, issued a registered notice dated 9.3.2018 to the petitioner seeking vacant possession of the suit premises and payment of outstanding arrears. However, despite expiry of six months from the date of receipt of the said notice, the petitioner failed to vacate the premises or clear the arrears, which led to filing a suit before the Rent Controller, Raipur, by the respondent. The petitioner, in his written statement, denied the averments in the plaint and contended that he has been conducting business under the name and style of ‘Shanti Metal Stores’ since 1971. He was originally inducted as a tenant by Abed Ali S/o Gulam Abbas

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at a monthly rent of Rs.150/- pursuant to a ‘Leave and License Agreement’ dated 15.12.1970. The petitioner further asserted that he has maintained and repaired the suit premises at his own expense and holds the electricity connection in his own name. The petitioner further contended that no rent agreement was ever executed with the respondent, thereby disputing the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship. During pendency of this suit, the petitioner filed an application on 8.8.2025 under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, averring that late Zehra Bee had bequeathed the property to Shafina, Salma Bee, Jainam Bee, Sara Bee, Nafisa, Sugra Bee, Asgar Ali, and Farida Bee through a ‘Will’ executed on 12.8.1997. The Rent Controller, Raipur, upon examining the application, observed that the petitioner had filed the same only to delay the proceedings. Consequently, vide order dated 12.8.2025, the Rent Controller rejected the application and closed the petitioner’s opportunity to lead further evidence. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed MA No.20/2025 under Section 13 of the Act before the CG Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed WP(227) No.1227/2025 before this Court challenging the order dated 25.9.2025 passed by the CG Rent Control Tribunal. The said order had dismissed the petitioner’s appeal which sought permission to lead the Will dated 12.8.1997 as secondary evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Subsequently, the said petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 3.12.2025. However, the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur was directed to expedite and

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conclude the proceedings as early as possible, preferably within a period of 4 months. Ultimately, vide the impugned order dated 8.1.2026 (Annexure P/1), the CG Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur dismissed the appeal (MA No.20/25), observing that there is no illegality or factual infirmity in the order passed by the trial Court and the petitioner had failed to prove his case. Being aggrieved by this dismissal, which ignores the necessity of impleading the legatees for a proper adjudication of the dispute, the petitioner has preferred this instant petition.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is perverse, illegal and contrary to the material on record. He submits that the ‘Will’ dated 12.8.1997, executed by Jahra Bee in favour of her children, specifically acknowledges the petitioner’s tenancy under the name and style of ‘Shanti Metal Stores’ and contains a direction that the rental income be utilized for religious activities after the death of both Jahra Bee and Abed Ali. He submits that though the petitioner made several attempts to secure the original ‘Will’ from the children of Jahra Bee and Abed Ali, but they have purportedly alienated the suit property in direct contravention of the terms of the said Will. Therefore, the petitioner is unable to produce the original document before the trial Court, making the impleadment of the beneficiaries essential to establish the truth. He also submits that the petitioner, after exhausting all efforts to obtain the original ‘Will’, moved an application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act for leave to lead secondary evidence in respect of the said document.

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However, the same was mechanically rejected without due appreciation of the facts. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to implead the legatees/beneficiaries of the said Will, as their presence is crucial for a just and proper adjudication of the dispute. However, both the Rent Controller and the CG Rent Control Tribunal rejected this prayer. Furthermore, the Rent Controller closed the petitioner’s right to lead evidence on the mere assumption of dilatory tactics. Such an order entails drastic consequences and was passed without recording cogent reasons or considering the prejudice caused to the petitioner. He further submits that when the landlord-tenant relationship is seriously disputed and the derivative title of the respondent is under a cloud, the impleadment of legatees becomes indispensable for a complete and final adjudication of the cause. Failure to implead the beneficiaries of the subject ‘Will’ not only prejudices the petitioner’s defence but also risks a multiplicity of proceedings. Hence, the impugned order is arbitrary and liable to be set-aside.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the dispute raised by the tenant could not, and cannot be, raised in an application for eviction filed by the landlord. The Court is only required to determine the existence of a landlordtenant relationship, which must be adjudicated solely for the limited purpose of eviction proceedings. In the present matter, the petitioner/tenant entered into tenancy with the previous landlord since 15.12.1970. Since then, he has been paying the rent; the last-fixed rent was Rs.4000/- per month. The present

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respondent /landlord, after purchasing the said property, sent a notice to the tenant on 9.3.2018 under Section 12(2) of the Act demanding the payment of arrears and for vacation of the shop. Despite this notice, the tenant did not liquidate the dues and a total sum of Rs.9,08,000/- remains outstanding till date. The petitioner/tenant vide a letter dated 28.9.2018 sent a Cheque bearing No.837740 (dated 28.7.2018 drawn on State Bank of India, Kacheri Branch) for a sum of Rs.28,000/- to the landlord. The issuance of the payment, alongwith the letter dated 28.9.2018, constitutes a clear attornment by the tenant to the landlord. He submits that the tenant, in a calculated bid to prolong the eviction proceedings, is now attempting to mislead the Court by filing a vexatious application that is entirely irrelevant to the adjudication of the matter. He further submits that it is trite law that in eviction proceedings, the dispute in respect of title, ownership, or any other matter extraneous to the landlord-tenant relationship cannot be adjudicated. The tenant is attempting to obfuscate the proceedings by challenging the respondent’s ownership through a mere photocopy of the subject ‘Will’. He submits that the tenant’s application to bring this photocopy on record was rejected by both the Rent Controller and the CG Rent Control Tribunal. This rejection was subsequently challenged before this Court in WP227 No.1227/2025, which was dismissed vide order dated 3.12.2025, as withdrawn. However, this Court directed the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur to expedite and conclude the proceedings preferably within a period of 4 months. Now, the

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petitioner/tenant in order to frustrate the aforesaid direction passed by the Division Bench, has adopted a dilatory tactic to hinder the proceedings by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. Through this application, the tenant sought to implead the purported beneficiaries of the ‘Will’ dated 12.08.1997 namely Sakina Bi, Salam Bi, Jainab Bi, Sara Bi, Nafisa, Sugra Bi, Asgar Ali and Farida Bi as party respondents. He submits that this is a transparent and improper attempt to transform an eviction proceeding into a complex title of dispute by questioning the landlord’s ownership. He submits that the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur has rejected the said application, holding that the question of ownership cannot be decided in a landlord-tenant dispute and consequently, such persons are neither necessary nor proper parties to the proceedings. Against the rejection of the impleadment application, a Misc. Appeal has been preferred before the CG Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur, which was also dismissed. Eventually, the present Writ Petition has been filed. He submits that this petition is wholly misconceived and represents a clever attempt to frustrate the direction previously passed by this Court to conclude the eviction proceedings within four months.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed with the petition with utmost circumspection.

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From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the tenant has sought to raise questions of title and ownership which falls entirely outside the purview of summary eviction proceedings. It is a

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settled position of law that in an eviction suit, the question of title, disputes regarding ownership and other ancillary matters are not required to be examined. The Court’s enquiry is strictly confined to the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.

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Admittedly, the petitioner is a tenant of the suit property, while the respondent having purchased the said property, legally steps into the shoes of the previous owner by virtue of derivative title. Furthermore, on receipt of the notice demanding arrears of rent, the tenant expressly acknowledged the landlord-tenant relationship by issuing a cheque of Rs.28,000/- in favour of the respondent. Having thus attorned to the new landlord, the tenant is now legally estopped from challenging the respondent’s title or raising extraneous disputes. Such a reversal of stand at this stage is not at all permissible in law.

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In a judgment rendered by the Ho’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra Vs. Stanter Parker Jones reported in (2006) 3 SCC 91 , it was held that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of settlement then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows :

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“13. The underlying policy of Section 116 is that

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where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.

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14. The principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord should not be allowed to launch his landlord in some inequitable situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppel is attracted.

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15. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time.

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Furthermore, in a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Kanaklata Das Vs. Naba Kumar Das reported in (2018) 2 SCC 352 , it was held that in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (Landlord) against the defendant(Tenant), the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties and the

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question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below:

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“ 11.1. First, in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (landlord) against the defendant (tenant) under the State Rent Act, the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties. In other words, in a tenancy suit, only two persons are necessary parties for the decision of the suit, namely, the landlord and the tenant.

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11.3. Third, the question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The reason being, if the landlord fails to prove his title to the suit premises but proves the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises and further proves existence of any ground on which the eviction is sought under the Tenancy Act, the eviction suit succeeds. Conversely, if the landlord proves his title to the suit premises but fails to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises, the eviction suit fails. (See Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [ Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal , (1995) 6 SCC 580].

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11.4. Fourth, the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person

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can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. (See Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee [ Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee , (2005) 8 SCC 140].

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11.6. Sixth, if there are co-owners or co-landlords of the suit premises then any co-owner or co-landlord can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. In other words, it is not necessary that all the owners/landlords should join in filing the eviction suit against the tenant. (See Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan [ Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan , (2016) 3 SCC 296 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 331].

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13. In our considered opinion, Respondent 1, who claims to be the co-sharer or/and co-owner with the plaintiff-appellants herein of the suit property is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the eviction suit of the appellants against Respondents 2 to 5. In other words, such eviction suit can be decreed or dismissed on merits even without the impleadment of Respondent 1.

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In the matter of Tribhuvanshankar vs Amrutlal reported in

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(2014) 2 SCC 788 , the following was held in para 28 & 29 :

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28. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to the principles stated in Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [(1995) 6 SCC 580] . In the said case the Court was dealing with the case instituted by the landlord under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for eviction of the tenant who had disputed the title and the High Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff seeking eviction. While adverting to the issue of title the Court in Ranbir Singh [(1995) 6 SCC 580] ruled that in a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship between the litigating parties.

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29. In the said case the learned Judges referred to the authority in LIC v. India Automobiles & Co. [(1990) 4 SCC 286] wherein the Court had observed that: ( Ranbir Singh case [(1995) 6 SCC 580] , SCC pp. 585-86, para 9)

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“ 9 . … in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the

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applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant's contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case.”

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Furthermore, in a judgment rendered by the Rajasthan High Court in the matter of Smt. Kamla Devi Bohra and Others v. Bhagvan Das Bhatia, reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 2570 , the following was held :

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3 …...Such delays destroy the confidence of the litigating public in the administration of injustice and belittles the rule of law. No doubt that the tenant has a right to file applications but has no right to file frivolous applications. The Code of Civil Procedure except to the very limited extent set out in the Act of 2001, does not attract to proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. Only principles of natural Justice have to be complied with by the Rent Tribunal/Appellate Rent Tribunal. There is thus no conceivable reason as to why repeated applications without a substantial cause should be filed before the Rent Tribunal to defeat the object and purpose

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of the Act of 2001.

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4 …..In the aforesaid legal philosophy relating to adjudicatory mechanism of the courts with which I fully affirm, repeated miscellaneous applications in the course of trials more particularly in the course of summary trials such as under the Rent Control Act, 2001 are an unacceptable obstruction to the public service of adjudication. In a similar term, the Apex Court has staled in State of U.P. v. Chhotey Lal [(2011) 2 SCC 550] that when adjournments become routine, justice is a casualty. Consequently, it is directed that the eviction petition laid by the landlord before the Rent Tribunal be finally disposed of within a period of three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. Miscellaneous applications when filed be disposed of within three days of filing and with costs when warranted. The Rent Tribunal shallialso have the discretion to decide any miscellaneous application it deems fit alongwith the final order in the eviction petition.

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Recently, in a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jyoti Sharma vs. Vishnu Goyal and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1956, the following was held in paragraph 9 :-

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9. True, the proceedings for probate was itself initiated in the year 2015 after the appeal was decided on remand by order dated 13.10.2009. The order in probate was issued when the matter was pending before the High Court. It is pertinent, as seen from the order of the trial court that the deceased Ramji Das had left behind other legal heirs also,

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his wife, three daughters and the wife and children of a deceased son. None of them had challenged the Will when the matter was pending before the trial court. One of the grounds taken by the trial court to suspect the Will was that though it is mentioned in the Will that the daughters of the testator were married of with their shares and even the wife and children of the deceased son had no interest in the property, nothing was kept aside for the wife. The finding of the trial court that it is not natural that a person would not keep in mind the interest of his own wife, according to us, is not a valid ground to suspect the intentions of the testator or the probity of the bequest made. In any event, when an order of probate was produced, which is not mandatory, the claim of the plaintiff through a Will attains a legal sanctity which could not have been brushed aside by the High Court. It is trite that in a suit for eviction, the proof of ownership of the tenanted premises is not to be strictly looked at as in a suit for declaration of title.

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Reverting to the facts of the present case, applying the principles laid down above to the facts of the present case, it is evident that disputes regarding title, ownership or the specific shares of any owner cannot be adjudicated within the scope of a landlord-tenant relationship, particularly where the application is for eviction and arrears of rent.

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For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered opinon that the Rent Controlling Authority, Raipur and the CG Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur have correctly dismissed the petitioner/tenant’s application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. Moreover, a tenant is not entitled to question the title or ownership of the respondent in a proceeding under Section 12(2) of the Act.

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