Sonbarsa Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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1

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NAFR

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Digitally VISHAKHA signed by BEOHAR VISHAKHA BEOHAR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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ACQA No. 71 of 2013

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1 - Naresh Kumar Khandekar S/o Fekulal Khandekar Aged About 29 Years R/o Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur, Ps Civil Line, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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--- Appellant/Complainant

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The SHO, PS Takhatpur, Distt. Bilaspur C.G. , Chhattisgarh

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2 - Sonbarsa S/o Late Kanshiram Khandekar Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G.

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3 - Ramprasad Khandekar S/o Late Kanshiram Khandekar Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Ravidas Khandekar S/o Late Kanshiram Khandekar Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Bhagwati Khandekar S/o Late Kanshiram Khandekar Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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6 - Smt. Supela Bai D/o Kanshiram Khandekar Aged About 60 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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7 - Smt. Dhankunwar D/o W/o Bhagwati Khandekar Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Araibandh, Ps Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondents CRA No. 1168 of 2013

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1 - Sonbarsa S/o . Late Shri Kashiram Khandekar Aged About 36 Years R/o. Vill. Araibandh, P.S. Takhatpur, Civil And Rev. Distt. Bilaspur C.G., Chhattisgarh

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--Appellant/Accused

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Versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Bilaspur C.G., Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent

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For Complainant :- Mr. Basant Dewangan, Advocate For Accused persons:Mr. Sunil Sahu, Advocate For State :- Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. A.G.

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Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal and Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, JJ. Judgment on Board

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12.02.2026

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Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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1. These two above-captioned appeals arise out of the common judgment dated 29.11.2013 passed by the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 172/2012. By the impugned judgment, accusedSonbarsa was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years with a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 307 IPC, and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months with a fine of Rs.500/for the offence under Section 324 IPC, with a direction that both the sentences shall run concurrently. However, the accused- Sonbarsa was acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 148, 294 and 506-B of IPC. The remaining accused persons, namely Ramprasad, Ravidas, Bhagwati, Supeta Bai and Dhankunwar, were acquitted of all the charges under Sections 147, 148, 149, 506-B and 307 read with Section 149 of IPC.

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2. Aggrieved thereby, complainant- Naresh Kumar Khandekar has preferred Acquittal Appeal No. 71 of 2013 challenging the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 to 7 as well as seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to accused No. 2- Sonbarsa, whereas accused- Sonbarsa has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2013 challenging his conviction and sentence for the aforesaid offences.

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3. Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment dated 29.11.2013 passed by the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 172/2012, they are being decided by this common judgment.

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4. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 12.08.2012, at about 6:00 PM, on account of a dispute relating to the digging of a lane in village Araibandh, accused- Sonbarsa was excavating the passage. PW-7 Fenkulal objected to the said digging, whereupon it is alleged that accused- Sonbarsa abused him and assaulted him with a spade ( kudali ), causing injuries to his wrist and hand. On hearing the commotion, PW-3 Narendra reached the spot to intervene. It is further alleged that accused- Sonbarsa also assaulted PW-3 Narendra with the spade on his head, as a result of which, he sustained a grievous injury. The other accused persons are alleged to have subsequently reached the spot and assaulted

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the victims by hands and fists. Thereafter, FIR (Ex.P-17) was lodged on the next day at Police Station Takhatpur against the accused persons.

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5. During investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-2 and the, injured persons, namely, PW-3 Narendra and PW-7 Fenkulal were medically examined at Community Health Centre, Takhatpur by PW-11 Dr. Nikhlesh Gupta. PW-3 Narendra was found to have sustained a lacerated wound measuring approximately 3 inches by 1 inch, bone deep, on the mid-parietal region of the head and swelling on the left arm. He was referred to CIMS, Bilaspur, where CT scan revealed fracture of the right parietal bone with collection of blood beneath it. PW-7 Fenkulal sustained lacerated injuries on his left wrist and little finger. Vide Ex.P-5, spade was seized from the possession of the accused- Sonbarsa.

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6. After due investigation, accused persons were chargesheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused persons abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they have not committed the aforesaid offences.

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7. In order to bring home the offences, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and brought on record

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24 documents vide Ex.P/01 to Ex.P/24. The accused persons, in their defence, examined none, but exhibited two documents vide Ex.D/01 and Ex.D/02. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence on record, pleaded innocence, and alleged false implication.

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8. The learned trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence available on record, by judgment dated 29.11.2013, acquitted all the accused persons of the aforesaid offences; however, it convicted accused Sonbarsa for the offences under Sections 307 and 324 of the IPC and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the complainant as well as accused Sonbarsa have preferred separate appeals.

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9.CRA No. 1168/2013 : Learned counsel for the appellant/accused- Sonbarsa assailed the impugned judgment contending that the learned trial Court has erred both on facts and in law in convicting and sentencing the appellant under Sections 307 and 324 of IPC. It is submitted that the incident arose out of a trivial and sudden dispute regarding digging of a village lane and there was no

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premeditation. The initial altercation was with PW-7 Fenkulal, while PW-3 Narendra reached the spot only after hearing the commotion, and thus there was neither motive nor intention to cause his death. It is further contended that only a single blow is attributed to the appellant and no repeated assault was made, which negates the essential ingredients of intention or knowledge required under Section 307 IPC. Though the injury was on the head, but the medical evidence does not state that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and the doctors have only opined that complications could have arisen in the absence of timely treatment. The weapon used was a spade (kudali), an agricultural implement, and not an inherently deadly weapon. Learned counsel also pointed out material contradictions and omissions in the testimonies of PW-2 Ahilya, PW-3 Narendra and PW-7 Fenkulal, and submitted that the possibility of false implication due to prior dispute cannot be ruled out. In the alternative, it is argued that even if the prosecution case is accepted, the offence would at best fall under Section 324 of IPC and not under Section 307 of IPC. In the alternative, it is argued that even if the prosecution case is accepted in its entirety, the offence would at best fall under Section 324 of IPC and not under Section 307 of IPC. It is further urged that

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the appellant has no criminal antecedents, the incident is of the year 2012, and he has already undergone a substantial period of incarceration and has faced the ordeal of trial and appeal for more than a decade. Therefore, a lenient view on the question of sentence is also prayed for. On these grounds, it is prayed that the conviction of the appellant under Section 307 IPC be set aside and he be acquitted of the said charge and he be sentenced to the period already undergone for the offence under Section 324 IPC.

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10. On the other hand, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court, after due appreciation of the evidence available on record, has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant, which calls for no interference by this Court.

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11. ACQA No.71/2013- Learned counsel for the

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complainant submits that the trial Court erred in acquitting accused Nos. 2 to 7 despite clear evidence of their participation. It is argued that injured witnesses PW-3 Narendra and PW-7 Fenkulal have specifically stated that all the accused persons reached the spot and assaulted them, and their testimony is corroborated by PW-2 Ahilyabai. It is contended that minor contradictions and omissions ought not to have been made the basis for acquittal, particularly when

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the evidence of injured witnesses carries great evidentiary value. The trial Court is said to have adopted an overly technical approach, resulting in miscarriage of justice. Therefore, it is prayed that the acquittal of accused persons be set aside and they be convicted and sentenced in accordance with law.

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12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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13. Now, the question is, whether the trial court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 307of the IPC?

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14. At this state, it would be appropriate to notice Section

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307 of the Indian Penal Code which states as under :-

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"307. Attempt to murder. - whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to

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imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

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Attempts by life-convicts.- When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death."

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15. The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 of the IPC are:-

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"(i) that the death of a human being was attempted:

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(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and

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(iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as: (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excused for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury."

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16. The Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh and others reported in 1988 4 SCC 551 has held that under Section 307 of the IPC what the court has to

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see is, whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the provision. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of "attempt to murder". Under Section 307 the intention precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not merely from the consequences that ensue. It has been further held that the nature of the weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention.

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17. Similarly, in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao and others reported in (2003) 10 SCC 434 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that for the application of Section 307 of the IPC, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 of the IPC. It has been observed by their Lordships in para 21 of the report as under: -

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"21. In offence under Section 307 all the ingredients of the offence of murder are present except the death of the victim. For the application of Section 307, it is not necessary that the injury capable of causing death should have been actually inflicted. The injuries sustained, the manner of assaults and the weapons used clearly make out a case of Section 307 IPC. But since sentence and fine have been maintained, alteration of conviction notwithstanding no modification of sentence need be made. ..."

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18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Parsuram Pandey and others v. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 13 SCC 189 has also held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 of the IPC, two ingredients of the offence must be present:

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(a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the report as under: -

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"15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present:

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(a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and

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(b) the doing of an act towards it.

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For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the

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consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of (2004) 13 SCC 189 (CRA No. 2047 of 2022) causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307, there can be no offence "of attempt to murder". Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. ..."

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19. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jage Ram and others v. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366 has laid down the ingredients of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC and held as under: -

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"12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon

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the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.

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14. Having regard to the weapon used for causing the head injuries to Sukhbir, nature of injures, situs of the injury and the severity of the blows, the courts below recorded concurrent findings convicting the second appellant under Section 307 IPC. In our considered view, the conviction of the second appellant Rajbir @ Raju under Section 307 IPC is unassailable."

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20. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of principles law laid down by their Lordships of Supreme Court in above cited judgments for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC, it is quite vivid that PW-3 Narendra, the injured

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witness, has stated that on hearing the quarrel between his father Fenkulal (PW-7) and accused- Sonbarsa regarding digging of a lane, he reached the spot to intervene. According to him, appellant- Sonbarsa assaulted him once on the head with a spade (kudali), due to which, he fell down and became unconscious. He has not stated that multiple blows were inflicted upon him by appellant- Sonbarsa. His testimony shows that the incident occurred during the course of a sudden quarrel. Further, PW-7 Fenkulal has deposed that the initial dispute was between him and appellant- Sonbarsa over digging of land. He stated that after he was assaulted, his son PW-3 Narendra came to rescue him and at that time appellant- Sonbarsa assaulted PW-3 Narendra on the head with the spade. His testimony also indicates that the quarrel was sudden and arose out of a land dispute. He has not deposed about any prior enmity of such gravity as would suggest premeditated intention to kill. Moreover, PW-2 Ahilyabai has also supported the version that appellantSonbarsa assaulted PW-3 Narendra on the head with a spade. However, none of these witnesses have stated that after PW-3 Narendra fell down, appellant- Sonbarsa continued the assault or attempted to inflict further injuries. This apart, the medical evidence is proved by PW-11 Dr.

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Mithilesh Gupta, who found a lacerated wound approximately 3 inches × 1 inch, bone deep, on the mid-parietal region of PW-3 Narendra’s head and swelling on his arm. He referred Narendra for radiological examination. PW-14 Dr. R. Jitpure proved the CT scan report showing fracture of the right parietal bone with underlying hematoma. PW-12 Dr. Santosh Uddesh stated that PW-3 Narendra remained admitted in hospital and that the injury was grievous in nature. He further stated that if timely treatment had not been given, complications could have arisen. Thus, from the medical evidence, it is clear that the injury was grievous and was on a vital part of the body, namely the head. However, none of the doctors have categorically stated that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The opinion that complications might have arisen in absence of treatment does not, by itself, establish that the injury was imminently fatal. The evidence also reveals that only a single blow is attributed to the appellant. There is no evidence of repeated assault, persistence of attack, or any conduct indicating determination to ensure death. The incident admittedly arose out of a sudden quarrel over digging of a lane. PW-3 Narendra was not the original participant in the dispute but came later to intervene. There is no evidence of prior

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planning or premeditation. While the use of a spade and targeting of the head are relevant circumstances, intention cannot be presumed solely on that basis. In cases of single blow inflicted during a sudden quarrel, courts have consistently held that unless there is clear evidence of intention to cause death, conviction under Section 307 IPC would not be justified.

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21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sivamani and Anr. vs. State represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 1581 has held in paras 9 to 11 which read as under:-

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“9.9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that '... The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.' The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC

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366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life- threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, 'The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.

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10. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is convinced that the Impugned Judgment of the High Court requires to be interfered with. Admittedly, there is no allegation of repeated or severe blows having been inflicted. Even the injuries on PW1 and PW2 have been found to be simple in nature, which is an additional point in the appellants' favour.

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11. We are further inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that from the materials on record, only offences under Sections 323 and 324 of the IPC can be made out. As such, the conviction under Section 307, IPC is unsustainable.

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22. Thus, in the light of aforesaid decision of Supreme Court coupled with the testimonies of PW-2 Ahilya, PW-3 Narendra and PW-7 Fenkulal along with the medical evidence of PW-11 Dr. Nikhlesh Gupta, PW-12 Dr. Santosh Uddesh and PW-14 Dr. R. Jitpure, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved that the appellant caused grievous injury on the head of Narendra. However, it has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that such act was done with the intention to cause death or with the knowledge that it was so imminently dangerous that death would, in all probability, result. Therefore, the essential ingredient of intention or knowledge required under Section 307 IPC is not established. Consequently, the conviction of the appellant under Section 307 IPC cannot be sustained.

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23. So far as the conviction of the appellant under Section 324 IPC is concerned, the same is duly supported by the evidence available on record. The injured witnesses, PW-3 Narendra and PW-7 Fenkulal, have consistently deposed that the appellant assaulted them with a spade (kudali), and their testimonies inspire confidence and stand duly corroborated by the medical evidence of PW-11 Dr. Mithilesh Gupta, who noticed corresponding injuries, as well as by the CT scan report proved by PW-14 Dr. R. Jitpure and the evidence of

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PW-12 Dr. Santosh Uddesh. The seizure of the spade has also been proved by the Investigating Officer. A spade, when used as a weapon of assault, is an instrument likely to cause death and squarely falls within the meaning of a dangerous weapon for the purposes of Section 324 IPC. There are no material contradictions or omissions which go to the root of the prosecution case against the appellant. Accordingly, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant voluntarily caused hurt by means of a dangerous weapon, and therefore, his conviction under Section 324 IPC is wellfounded and calls for no interference.

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24. As regards the sentence, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into account that the accused Sonbarsa has remained in custody for about 11–12 days and has been facing the lis since August, 2012, i.e., for more than thirteen years, and that he has no criminal antecedents, this Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be adequately met if, while maintaining his conviction under Section 324 IPC, the substantive sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone. However, the fine amount of Rs.500/- is enhanced to Rs.50,000/-. The default stipulation imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. Upon deposit of the fine

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amount, the same shall be disbursed to the injured persons/victims as compensation, after due verification, in accordance with law.

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25. In the result, Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2013 is partly allowed . The conviction of the appellant Sonbarsa under Section 307 IPC is set aside and he is acquitted of the said charge. However, his conviction under Section 324 IPC is affirmed and the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him thereunder is reduced to the period already undergone by him.

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26. So far as acquittal appeal bearing No.71/2013 filed by the appellant- State is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State of Kerala reported in ( 2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of interference in Appeal against acquittal, which reads as under:-

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“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the

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appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters.”

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27. The Supreme Court in the matter of Constable Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand reported in (2025) 5 SCC 433 , whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under:

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“ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149

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“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42

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42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not

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disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ”

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40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can

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be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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28. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka reported in 2024 (3) SCC 544 has held in para 36 as under:-

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"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a

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contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.

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29. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. In the present case, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence available on record, this Court finds that the role attributed to accused/appellant Sonbarsa stands on a distinct footing and is supported by consistent ocular testimony, duly corroborated by the medical evidence, which justifies his conviction under Section 324 IPC. However, insofar as the remaining accused persons,

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namely Dhankunwar, Supetabai, Bhagwatiprasad, Ravidas and Ramprasad, are concerned, the evidence regarding their participation is neither consistent nor free from doubt. The prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of any common object or their collective participation in the alleged offence. The independent witnesses do not fully support the prosecution version regarding any unlawful assembly or concerted assault, thereby creating a reasonable doubt in favour of the acquitted accused persons. The appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court demonstrates a careful and judicious evaluation of the contradictions, omissions and the overall probability of the prosecution case. The findings recorded by the trial Court cannot be termed as perverse or contrary to the material available on record; rather, the view taken is a plausible and legally sustainable one based on proper scrutiny of the evidence.

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30. In these circumstances, this Court finds no perversity, illegality, or material infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference in an appeal against acquittal. Since two views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record and the Trial Court has adopted one such permissible view, the acquittal of the respondents deserves to be respected in

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keeping with the well-established principles governing appellate review of acquittals.

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31. For the foregoing discussions, the acquittal appeal (ACQA No.71/2013) filed by the complainant-Naresh Kumar Khandekar against the acquittal of respondents No.2 to 7, being without any substance, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed .

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32. Resultantly, Criminal Appeal (CRA No. 1168/2013) filed by the appellant/accused Sonbarsa is partly allowed , whereas the Acquittal Appeal (ACQA No. 71/2013) preferred by the complainant Naresh Kumar Khandekar is hereby dismissed .

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33. Appellant-Sonbarsa is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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34. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record

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along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge

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Vishakha

Sonbarsa v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Sonbarsa v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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