Bhuneshwari Kashyap Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2025:CGHC:49629

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PAWAN KUMAR JHA Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR JHA

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPS No. 10297 of 2025

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NAFR

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Bhuneshwari Kashyap D/o Late Shri Bharat Lal Kashyap, Aged About 37 Years R/o Behind Shiv Temple, Padum Nagar, Bhilai - 3, Tehsil And District - Durg, Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioner

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary, Department of Higher Education, First Floor, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.

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Commissioner, Department of Higher Education, Having Its Office At Higher Education Directorate, Block - 03, Second / Third Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Chhattisgar

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Assistant Director, Department Of Higher Education, Having Its Office At Higher Education Directorate, Block - 03, Second / Third Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Chhattisgar

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Additonal Director, Higher Education, Regional Office, Durg, Chhattisgarh

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Principal, Dr. Khoobchand Baghel Government P.G. College, Bhilai - 3, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner : Mr. Anmol Sharma, Advocate For Respondent-State : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge

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ORDER ON BOARD

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06/10/2025

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Learned counsel for petitioner submits that he is pressing this writ petition only on the ground that the authorities are not taking decision on the suspension of petitioner even after lapse of 90 days of passing of order of suspension. He submits that the issue of keeping government employee under suspension beyond 90 days was considered by Hon’ble Supreme

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Court in case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and another reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 , wherein it is observed that any government employee cannot be kept under suspension for inordinate period. It is only the respondents -authorities to pass orders for extention of suspension period, which has not been done so far. He submits that direction be issued to respondents to consider claim of petitioner for revocation of order of suspension, in light of above judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Learned State counsel submits that the allegation against petitioner is of committing financial irregularities for which charge-sheet has already been served upon him and a departmental enquiry is pending consideration. He submits that the petitioner has not submitted any application before the appropriate authority seeking revocation of order of suspension. If such an application/ representation is submitted by petitioner, it will be considered in accordance with law.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties.

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The main grievance raised in this writ petition is that even after lapse of 90 days from the date of passing of order of suspension, respondentsauthorities have not reviewed the order of suspension and passed any order extending the period of suspension beyond 90 days, of petitioner. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) has held as under:

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“ 20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Cr.P.C. of 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 to moderate Suspension

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Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal.

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21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.”

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In the aforementioned decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is held that the Government servant cannot be kept under suspension for inordinate period beyond 90 days.

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In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Respondents No. 1 & 2 are directed to consider the claim of petitioner with respect to review of order of suspension dated 30.04.2025 in accordance with law, keeping in mind the

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decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) .

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