Smt. Shashi Daga Vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Naya Raipur Development Authority, Through The Chief Executive Officer, Naya Raipur Development Authority, New Rajendra Nagar, Opposite Vijeta Complex, R. D. A. Building, Govind Sarang, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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--- Respondents

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For Petitioner : Mr. Ankur Agarwal, Advocate

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For Respondent No.1 to 3 : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Dy. Advocate General. For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu

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Order on Board

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06/10/2025

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Petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the award

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dated 31.12.2015, Annexure P-1, passed by respondent No.3

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thereby ordering for acquisition of petitioner’s land situated in village Nawagaon, PH No.75/10, Tehsil Arang, District Raipur.

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Facts of case, in brief, are that respondent No.3 SubDivisional Officer-cum- Land Acquisition Officer, Aarang / Abhanpur issued notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (henceforth ‘the Act of 1894’), which was published in daily newspaper on 23.3.2013. Thereafter, notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was published. During pendency of land acquisition proceeding, new act namely “The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘the Act of 2013’) came into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. After following procedure as prescribed under the Act of 2013, award under Section 23 of the Act of 2013 came to be passed on 31.12.2015, Annexure P-1, by respondent No.3 computing compensation to be paid against acquisition of land of petitioner along with others under the land acquisition proceeding.

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Petitioner has filed this writ petition primarily on the ground that after notification and coming force of the Act of 2013 on 1.1.2014, even if the land acquisition proceeding initiated under the old Act i.e. the Act of 1894, continued, it has to be completed within period of 12 months from the date of publication of declaration under Section 19 of the Act of 2013.

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Award was not passed within twelve months, hence proceeding lapsed after twelve months. The award passed is therefore no award. It is also contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the Collector has not conducted inquiry as contemplated under Section 23 of the Act of 2013. Had the inquiry was conducted by the Collector, petitioner could have an opportunity to raise objection in accordance with law. It is also contention of learned counsel for petitioner that compensation as computed by Land Acquisition Officer is not in accordance with provisions of the Act of 2013, which provides for determination of market value of land by the Collector as envisaged under Section 26 of the Act of 2013. It is also contended by learned counsel for petitioner that for the purpose of this writ petition, he is pressing upon the ground that due to non-passing of the award within prescribed period of 12 months the entire land acquisition proceeding initiated has lapsed. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon decision rendered in case of State of West Bengal vs. Anup Kumar Mondal & anr, reported in 2022 SCC Online Cal 4149; Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs. Mahesh and others, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 772; Vitthal Rama Pawar (Katkari) and others vs. Deputy Collector (Acquisition) Raigad-Alibag and others, reported in

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2024 SCC Online Bom 149 and order of Division Bench of this Court dated 25.7.2024 in WA No.30/2019 (NRDA vs Gaukaran & others).

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3- State while opposing submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner, submits that award was passed in accordance with provisions under the Act of 2013, computation of compensation is based on market value as provided under Section 26 of the Act of 2013. As there was no recent sale deeds, guidelines issued by the Collector was taken into consideration and taking note of provisions of Sections 26 (1) & 30 of the Act of 2013, the compensation was computed and award was passed. Petitioner is having alternate remedy as envisaged under Section 51 of the Act of 2013 of raising his grievance before the Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority. He vehemently denied submission of learned counsel for petitioner that compensation was computed as per old Act of 1894 and submits that amount of compensation is computed in accordance with provisions contained in Section 23 of the Act of 2013. He also contended that award was passed, possession was taken and therefore, the proceeding of land acquisition proceeding under the Act of 2013 would not lapse. In support of his submission, he places reliance on decision in case of Delhi Development Authority

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vs. Bhagwat Singh and others , reported in (2022) 10 SCC 213 .

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.4NRDA opposing submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, would submit that main contention of petitioner is with regard to seeking enhancement of amount of compensation and therefore, he is having efficacious alternate remedy as provided under the Act of 2013. It is also contended that respondent No.4 NRDA has deposited the amount as computed and demanded by the Land Acquisition Officer within appropriate time. As during pendency of land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894, the Act of 2013 came into force, therefore, proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 continued under the Act of 2013 and as such, the delay in passing of the award cannot be attributed to respondent No.4. He submits that writ petition is having no merit and the same are liable to be dismissed.

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Heard learned counsel for respective parties and perused documents on record.

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It is not in dispute that pursuant to proposal made by respondent NRDA for acquisition of total 41.68 hectare land for public purpose i.e. for development of Naya Raipur, initially the proceeding of land acquisition, subject matter of writ petition and impugned award, was initiated under the Act of

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1894 by publishing Notification on 23.3.2013 under Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1894. After considering the objections filed by concerned land owners, declaration under under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 came to be issued on 18.3.2014, which was published in daily newspaper on 23.3.2013. Notices under Section 9 (1)(2) of the Act of 1894 to the persons interested in the land were also issued. Thereafter, on 31.12.2015 the award in question has been passed.

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Admittedly, during pendency of land acquisition proceeding under the Act of 1894, the Act of 2013 was notified on 19.12.2023 in official gazette and it came into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. Chapter-IV of the Act of 2013 deals with Notification and Acquisition. Section 11 of the Act of 2013 talks of publication of preliminary notification and power of officers thereupon. This section is akin to Section 4 of the Act of 1894. Section 19 of the Act of 2013 talks of publication of declaration and summary of rehabilitation and resettlement. This section is akin to section 6 of the Act of 1894. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 talks of situation when land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 reads thus:-

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“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition

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proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,-

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(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

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(b)where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

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Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

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A bare reading of Section 24 (1) (a) would make it clear that in case where acquisition proceeding was initiated under the Act of 1894 and no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 has been made, then all provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to determining of compensation shall apply. In view of aforementioned specific provision incorporated under the Act of 2013, the provision of Section 25 of the Act of 2013 is attracted which provides for the period within which award shall be made. Section 25 of the Act of 2013 is extracted below for ready reference:-

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“25. Period within which an award shall be made .- The Collector shall make an award within a period of twelve months from the date of publication of the declaration under section 19 and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:

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Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the power to extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion, circumstances exist justifying the same:

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Provided further that any such decision to extend the period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority concerned.”

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As per section 25 of the Act of 2013, period of limitation for making an award by the Collector or competent authority is 12 months from the date of publication of declaration under Section 19. Section 19 of the Act of 2013 is similar to Section

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6 of the Act of 1894. Therefore, declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 has to be treated declaration under Section 19 of the Act of 2013. However, the Act of 2013 came into force w.e.f 1.1.2014, therefore, period within which award shall be made will start from the date of coming into force of the Act of 2013 because the proceedings have to be concluded under the Act of 2013, thereafter.

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As per first proviso to Section 25 of the Act of 2013, the statute provides power to the State Government to extend period of 12 months, if in its opinion circumstances exist justifying the same. In second proviso it is provided that any such decision to extend period of 12 months shall be recorded in writing and the same shall also be notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority concerned. Respondent State in its reply to writ petition has not made any specific pleading that the State Government has extended period of limitation at any point of time following the procedure as provided under Section 25 of the Act of 2013 of recording it in writing, notifying and uploading on the website of the authority concerned. If the government has not decided and initiated any proceeding to extend the period, then period for passing an award, for the purpose of this writ petition, has to be treated as 12 months from the date of publication of declaration that the lands notified are needed for public

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purpose. Respondent State along with its reply has not submitted any document in this regard nor any submission is made during the course of arguments.

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In case of Mahesh (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering provision under section 6 of the Act of 1894, held that declaration under Section 6 and declaration under Section 19 of the Act of 2013, are not different, both serve the same purpose. It was observed as under:-

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“29. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for making of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894 Act, which is twofold: (i) to give sufficient time to the authorities to determine compensation payable under the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section 11-A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in cases where the declarations were issued within

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twelve months of the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in determination of compensation and the need to issue notification under Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice to arrive at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the legislative intent.

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A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on 1-12014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intention and reckon the starting point. In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.

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13. In case of Vitthal Rama Pawar (Supra), the Division Bench of

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Bombay High Court has held thus:

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“21. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are unable to accept the submission of Ms. Bane that the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra) has impliedly overruled its decision in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra). This is more so when one take into consideration that the said judgment in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) has been specifically referred to in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (in paragraph 9 thereof), and the same has not been overruled, either expressly or by necessary implication. Another factor that persuades us to take this view is that one of the Judges in both the matters was the same (A. M. Khanvilkar, J. as he then was). If the Supreme Court, in Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited wanted to overrule its judgment in Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra), it would have expressly done so. We therefore find that the argument of Ms. Bane is wholly misplaced and so is the reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case

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of Haryana State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (supra).

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As mentioned earlier, this point is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation (supra) which clearly stipulates that in cases falling under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for passing an Award would commence from 1st January, 2014 and the same would have to be passed within a period of 12 months thereafter, subject to any stay being granted by any Court. In other words, the period during which the stay was operating would have to be excluded for the purposes of calculating the period of 12 months. This has admittedly not been done in the present case. Therefore, on this count also, the entire acquisition proceedings are bad and the Awards passed pursuant thereto, are also unsustainable.”

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In W.A. No.30/2019 (supra), the Division Bench of this Court placing reliance upon decision in case of Deepak Agrawal (Supra), Mahesh (supra) and Vittham Rama Pawar (supra), has observed in Para-14 as under:-

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“14. The issue involved in this case has already been set at rest by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, this Court cannot take a different view in the case having similar issue to that of Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited case (supra) and The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,

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Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation case (supra). The learned Single Judge has rightly considered Section 25 of the new Act of 2013 that if the award has not been passed within 12 months, the entire proceeding for acquisition of the land shall lapse and liberty was given to the respondents to draw fresh proceedings of land acquisition if they still require any land for public purpose and thus, even if the old land acquisition proceeding has been lapsed/quashed the respondents/State have every right to initiate fresh land acquisition proceeding under the new Act of 2013 if they still requires any land for public purpose.”

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If the facts of present case are considered in light of decisions referred above, it is apparent that Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1894 was published on 21.3.2013. Notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was published in official gazette on 18.3.2014 and in daily newspapers on 23.3.2014. The Act of 2013 came into force w.e.f. 1.1.2014. However, the impugned award was passed on 31.12.2015, whereas period of 12 months was expired on 22.3.2015. Thus, in the light of decisions referred above and in totality of facts and circumstances of case, I am having no hesitation to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated had lapsed for want of non-passing of award within period of 12 months as provided under Section 25 of the Act of 2013. Therefore, impugned

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award, Annexure P-1, is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed.

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Accordingly, writ petition is allowed. Impugned award dated 31.12.2015 is hereby quashed. Since the impugned award is quashed only for the reason that award was not passed within prescribed period of limitation of 12 months from the date of publication of notification under Section 19 of the Act of 2013 / Section 6 of the Act of 1894, it will be open for respondents to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 2013, if they still want to acquire land, which is subject matter of this writ petition and impugned award, for public purpose.

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Sd/(Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge

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roshan/-

Smt. Shashi Daga v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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Smt. Shashi Daga v. State Of Chhattisgarh

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