Dee Vee Projects Limited Vs Chhattisgarh Housing Board

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2025:CGHC:46435-DB

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Digitally signed by JYOTI JYOTI SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2025.09.12 10:20:14 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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WPC No. 1004 of 2020

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Dee Vee Projects Limited (A Company Duly Incorporate Under The Relevant Provisions Of The Companies Act, 1956) Having Its Office At First Floor, Vikas Complex, P. H. Road, Korba, District Korba, Chhattisgarh., District : Korba, Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1. Chhattisgarh Housing Board Through Commissioner, Head Office, Sector -19, Paryavas Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 492002, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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2. The Deputy Commissioner Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Circle - Bilaspur, Nehru Nagar, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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3. Executive Engineer Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Division Bilaspur, Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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4. Assistant Engineer Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Division Bilaspur, Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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WPC No. 2673 of 2021

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Dee Vee Projects Limited (A Company Duly Incorporate Under The Relevant Provisions Of The Companies Act, 1956) Having Its Office At First Floor, Vikas Comples, P. H. Road, Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh

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--- Petitioner(s)

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Versus

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1. Chhattisgrarh Housing Board Through Commissioner, Head Office, Sector 19, Paryavas Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur Chhattisgarh 492002

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2. The Deputy Commissioner Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Circle Bilaspur, Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh

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3. Executive Engineer Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Division Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh

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4. Assistant Engineer Chhattisgarh Housing Board, Division Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from CIS)

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For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Vaibhav Shukla and Himanshu Yadu, Advocate
For C.G. Housing	: Ms. Hamida Siddiqui, Advocate
Board
For respective	: Mr. Yashkaran Singh on behalf of Mr. Amrito
respondent	Das, Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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11/09/2025

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Heard Mr. Vaibhav Shukla and Himanshu Yadu, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. Hamida Siddiqui and Mr. Yashkaran Singh on behalf of Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel for the respective respondents.

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Since in both the petitions common grounds involved, they are being considered and decided by this common order.

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WPC No. 1004 of 2020 has been filled for following reliefs:-

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10.1) The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to subject contract. 10.2) The Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to issue a writ / order / direction of appropriate nature, dated quashing the impugned communication 26.11.2019 (Annexure P-1), since the same is false, frivolous and vexatious in its contents.

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10.3) The Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to issue a writ / order / direction of appropriate nature, directing the Respondent authorities to pay a sum of Rs. 2,54,34,246/- pending towards the final settlement, which is more or less admitted but for the impugned communication. Also the said amount be paid within such stipulated time along with an interest rate, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in the interest of justice.

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10.4) Cost of the petition may also be granted to the Petitioner.

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10.5) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the Petitioner, in the interest of justice.

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WPC No. 2673 of 2021 has been filled for following reliefs:-

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i) That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/order/direction of appropriate nature, directing the Respondents to release the outstanding/balance payment of Rs. 1,04,00,000/within such stipulated time along with an interest rate, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, in the interest of justice.

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(ii) Pass any other order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.

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Facts of the case in nutshell of WPC No. 1004 of 2020 is that:-

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(A) The Respondent Board issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) calling upon request for proposal by the contractors for construction of 12 HIG Type-II, 47 MIG Sr. Type-11, 57 MIG Jr. Type-II, 150 LIG Type-II and 272 EWS Type-11 house for Atal Vihar Yojana at Chilhati Phase-I, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur (CG). The petitioner's bid was accepted by the Respondent Board and was called upon vide letter dated 05.06.2014 to deposit the stamp for execution of the contract along with performance guarantee of Rs. 61,61,000/-.

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(B) Thereafter, a formal agreement was executed on 30.07.2014, wherein the various terms of the NIT, General Conditions of the Contract and special conditions of the contract were included to form the part thereof.

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( C) The contents of the Contract would show that the contract has categorically and extensively defines the scope of work, specification and drawings pertaining to the construction to be carried out pursuant to the subject tender. Thereafter, the entire process of execution of the contract is defined and regulated by the aforesaid tender documents and drawings.

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(D) However, the petitioner was served with a letter dated 23.06.2016, which was received on 06.07.2016, wherein the petitioner was informed that they have to construct the compound wall for all the houses except for EWS. It was further asserted in the said letter that the construction of boundary wall has been contemplated and provided for in the contract itself. The petitioner immediately on receipt of the aforesaid letter brought to the notice of the Respondent No.4 that the construction of compound wall is not within the scope of subject contract. Since under the subject contract, an in-house mechanism has been provided for resolving the dispute between the parties pertaining to the meaning of the specification, designs and drawings. The petitioner wrote a letter dated 12.09.2016 raising their grievance before the Respondent No.2, which was duly received by them on 20.09.2016.

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(E) The petitioner apart from raising their grievance before the

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Respondent No.2, also informed Respondent No.3 that the construction of compound wall is beyond the scope of work and the same if directed can be executed on chargeable basis. The Petitioner successfully completed construction in accordance with the subject contract and a 'Completion certificate' in terms of Clause 1.20 of the General Conditions of the Contract was issued by the concerned Respondent authorities and after the successful execution of the subject contract, the Petitioner claimed the outstanding to be paid towards the final settlement of the petitioner. In the meanwhile, the defect liability period which was up to 30.03.2019 also expired and the Respondent did not find any defect in the construction carried out by petitioner.

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(F) However, the petitioner was shocked to receive the impugned communication, whereby the petitioner was informed that the outstanding of the petitioner has been withheld for nonconstruction of the compound wall pursuant to the subject contract.

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Facts of the case in nutshell in WPC No. 2673 of 2021 is that:-

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(A) The Petitioner was awarded the work of construction of 37 MIG, 26 Sr. MIG and 90 Jr. MIG houses at Village-Parsada, Kumhari, Distt. Durg (C.G.) under Atal Vihar Yojna by the Respondent authorities for which agreement was executed on 0403-2014. The Petitioner successfully completed the work on 3010-2015 as per specifications of the NIT and 15-02-2016 by the was given work completion certificate Respondents. Thereafter,

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the defect liability period of two years also expired on 30-10-2017 but despite successfully completion of work, issuance of work completion certificate and expiry of defect liability period, the Respondents authorities have not released the balance payment of Rs. 1,04,00,000/- on the ground that the Petitioner has not constructed the compound wall for all the houses.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioners have successfully completed the work and have been issued the ‘work completion certificate’. He further submits that construction of the compound wall for the houses is beyond the scope of specification, drawings and designs and non releasing of balance payment on this ground is completely vexatious and frivolous. To buttress his submission he relies in the case of M/s Mahavir Coal and Transport Vs. South Eastern Coalfields Lmt. & Ors, ARBR No. 24 of 2022 .

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents oppose the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the writ petitions as framed and filed is not maintainable as the disputed question of facts cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the learned counsel for the respondent the respondent authorities after verifying the proper facts have release the payments to the extent of work done by the petitioner. He would submit that while accepting the said payment of final bill, the petitioner company did not raise any objection against

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withholding of payment in respect of construction of boundary wall. The petitioner has not completed the work of construction of boundary wall despite the fact that the same was already included in the work of contract.

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We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ petition.

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It is settled law that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when it raises disputed question of facts.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Grid Corpornation of Orissa Ltd. (GRIDCO) and others v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and another, (1999) 7 SCC 298 was dealing with the question of whether the High Court had made an error in entertaining a writ petition filed seeking compensation for the death of a person due to electrocution, which had allegedly been caused due to the negligence of the authorities. The Supreme Court in the said case observed as under:

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"6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the appellants, that "admittedly/prima facie

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amounted to negligence on the part of the appellants". The High Court failed to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and negligence was required to be established firstly by the claimants. The mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the deceased had come in contact with the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995."

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(emphasis supplied)

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The aforesaid judgment has been relied/ reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P.S. Rathore v. State of Haryana and others, (2005) 10 SCC 1 wherein it observed as follows:

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"16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543] it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there, it

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cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied)

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Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shubhas Jain v.

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Rajeshwari Shivam, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 562 has held as under:

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"26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable."

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Subsequently, in Union of India Vs. Puna Hinda, (2021) 10

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SCC 690 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed:

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"24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallised. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of joint survey report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take

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place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e. arbitration and not by the writ court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads."

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Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 703 , while dealing with the issue of exercise of writ jurisdiction by a Court in matters arising out of a contract, has stated:

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"82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit." (emphasis supplied)

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A reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that it is

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well settled proposition of law that when there are disputed question of facts involved in a case, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been held that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not be proper.

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From perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the petitioner by way of these petitions is seeking a direction towards the respondent authorities to pay a sum of Rs. 2,54,34,246/- (in WPC No. 1004 of 2020) pending towards the final settlement which is more or less admitted and to release the outstanding/ balance payment of Rs. 1,04,00,000/- (in WPC No. 2673 of 2021) along with interest.

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In the instant case according to the learned counsel for the respondent the respondent authorities after verifying the proper facts have released the payments to the extent of work done by the petitioner. He would submit that while accepting the said payment of final bill, the petitioner company did not raise any objection against withholding of payment in respect of construction of boundary wall. The petitioner has not completed the work of construction of boundary wall despite the fact that the same was already included in the work of contract. The relief sought for by the petitioner is contingent upon the resolution of the disputed question of facts raised, and these facts cannot be adjudicated under Article 226 of the Constitution

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of India. In view of the aforesaid, it would not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the instant writ petitions as there are disputed questions of fact involved.

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Considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, further considering the disputed questions of facts involved in these writ petitions, the relief sought by the petitioner and in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), we do not find any good ground to entertain these writ petitions.

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Accordingly, both the writ petitions being devoid of merit are liable to be and are hereby dismissed . However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to other alternate remedies available to the petitioner under the law. No

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cost(s).

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Sd/- Sd/(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Jyoti

Dee Vee Projects Limited v. Chhattisgarh Housing Board

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Dee Vee Projects Limited v. Chhattisgarh Housing Board

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