Partly allowed

Nohru Mandavi @ Nohar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh HC9 Sept 2025CRA/661/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Conviction appeal for murdering wife with a single axe blow during a sudden domestic quarrel over sale of paddy. Holding death homicidal and accused the assailant, the High Court found absence of premeditation and only knowledge of likely death, altered conviction from murder to culpable homicide and reduced sentence to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.

What did the court decide?

Conviction under S.302 IPC set aside; appellant convicted under S.304 Part II IPC and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.

Nohru Mandavi @ Nohar Singh Vs State of… — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Chhattisgarh HC (2025)

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2025:CGHC:46126-DB

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Digitally signed by ANURADHA ANURADHA TIWARI TIWARI Date: 2025.09.11 10:34:37 +0530

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 661 of 2022

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Nohru Mandavi @ Nohar Singh S/o Devilal Mandavi Aged About 33 Years R/o Gidhali, Police Station Mohla, District - Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh.

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... Appellant

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versus

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State of Chhattisgarh Through - Station House Officer, Police of Police Station - Mangchuwa, District - Balod Chhattisgarh.

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... Respondent

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

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For Appellant : Mr. Anil Gulati, Advocate For Respondent : Ms. Soumya Sharma, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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10.09.2025

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1. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant-accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “Cr.P.C.”) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2022, passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Balod, District- Balod (C.G.) in

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Sessions Trial No. 12/2019, whereby the appellant-accused has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 30 days.

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2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the incident occurred on 10.12.2018 in village Hitapathar within the ambit of Police Station Mangchuba, District Balod. The accused Noharu Mandavi had been residing with his wife Rupabai and his mother-in-law Jhariyo Bai at his in-laws’ house for about eight months prior to the date of occurrence. On the fateful day, a dispute arose between the accused and his wife over the issue of selling the paddy crop belonging to his in-laws. Rupabai objected to the accused selling the paddy in the village shop, which led to a heated altercation between them. In the course of this quarrel, the accused picked up an axe kept in the house and attempted to assault his wife. In order to save herself, Rupabai ran towards the veranda of Devprasad’s house, but the accused chased her and dealt an axe blow on her, causing grievous bleeding injuries. Immediately after the assault, the accused fled from the spot carrying the weapon.

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3. On receiving information about the incident, Police Station Mangchuba registered a rural complaint (Ex. P-33) on the statement of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), the mother of the deceased, and

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on its basis, a formal First Information Report (Ex. P-35) was lodged. The injured Rupabai was taken to the hospital, where she was declared dead. On the same day, a Merg intimation (Ex. P-2) was also recorded. At the spot of the incident, the Investigating Officer seized blood-stained soil, plain soil, broken bangle pieces of the deceased, her blood-stained bangles, one earring, and a blood-stained shirt under seizure memo (Ex. P-8). A site map (Ex. P-34) of the place of occurrence was prepared and statements of material witnesses including Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) were recorded.

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4. On the next day, i.e., 11.12.2018, the inquest proceedings (Panchanama Ex. P-19) were conducted and the body of deceased Rupabai was sent for post-mortem examination. The postmortem was carried out by the Medical Officer, who opined that the death was homicidal in nature, caused by sharp-edged weapon injuries. During investigation, the accused was apprehended and his memorandum statement (Ex. P-4) was recorded under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. On his disclosure, the axe used in the commission of the offence was recovered in the presence of witnesses and seized vide seizure memo (Ex. P-6). The blood-stained clothes of the accused, i.e., his shirt and pant, worn at the time of occurrence, were also seized. All seized articles were forwarded for forensic/chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur and as per FSL report (Ex. P-30), a blood stains were found on the seized axe, but the group was disintegrated.

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5. Upon completion of investigation, it was revealed that the accused had committed the murder of his wife Rupabai and had attempted to destroy evidence. Accordingly, a charge-sheet under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dondilohara, District Balod (C.G.), who thereafter committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial.

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6. During the trial, charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC were framed and read over to the accused, to which he abjured guilt and claimed to be tried. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the accused denied the allegations and pleaded false implication. No evidence in defence was adduced by him.

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7. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses, namely: Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), Lagnibai Salame (PW-2), Shyam Kumari Salame (PW-3), Kirti Kumar (PW4), Sukaro Bai (PW-5), Sukhnandan Salame (PW-6), Vishnu Prasad (PW-7), Dr. N.S. Mandari (PW-8), Beni Singh Rajput (PW9), Umesh Kumar Netam (PW-10), A.K. Nirmalkar (PW-11), Mrs. Pramila Bai (PW-12), Gaukaran Yadav (PW-13), Hemnarayan Kokila (PW-14), Police Sub-Inspector Yogendra Kumar Verma (PW-15) and Assistant Sub-Inspector H.S. Thakur (PW-16) and exhibited 42 documents i.e. Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-42. In defence, the accused-appellant has not examined any witness, but exhibited 4

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documents i.e. Ex. D-1 to Ex. D-4. The documentary and material evidence were also brought on record to establish the guilt of the accused. When the accused was presented in defence, he expressed that he would not give defence evidence.

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8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 18.01.2022, convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.

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9. Mr. Anil Gulati, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment and inebriated condition. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, in inebriated condition, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that: (a) there was no premeditation; (b) the incident ensued during a sudden domestic quarrel; (c) the appellant was inebriated; (d) the assault consisted of a single

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blow; and (e) intention to cause death is absent; at best knowledge can be imputed. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.

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10. On the other hand, Ms. Soumya Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly attacking her with an axe due to which, she succumbed to her injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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12. The first question for consideration would be whether the death of the deceased namely Rupabai was homicidal in nature ?

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13. In this regard, as per the statement of Dr. N.S. Bhandari (PW-8), on 11.12.2018, when the dead body of deceased Rupabai, wife of accused Noharu Ram Mandavi was brought for postmortem examination by Constable No. 35 Luman Sahu of Police Station Mangchuwa, he conducted the autopsy. On external and internal examination of the body, he found the following injuries:

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A cut wound measuring 2 x 0.5 x 1 cm below the right ear on the right side of the neck.

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Another cut wound on the right side of the neck measuring 3 x 1 x 1 cm.

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A cut wound on the chin measuring 2 x 0.5 x 1 cm.

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A lacerated wound on the left parietal region of the head, measuring 4 cm long and 2 cm wide, deep into the brain.

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A fracture of the left parietal bone, size 4 cm.

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An internal wound in the brain measuring 4 x 1 x 1 cm, with blood clots present near the brain.

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14. The doctor opined that all the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. He specifically opined that death occurred due to coma resulting from the head injury sustained on the parietal region,

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which was caused by a sharp-edged object. The time since death was within 24 hours from the postmortem examination. According to him, the nature of death was homicidal.

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15. Dr. N.S. Bhandari (PW-8) further proved the postmortem report (Ex. P-11) prepared by him regarding the deceased Rupabai, bearing his signatures at points A to C. His testimony with respect to the injuries found on the body of the deceased, the duration of those injuries, and the opinion that the death was homicidal, remained unchallenged in cross-examination.

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16. Supporting his version, Assistant Sub-Inspector A.K. Nirmalkar (PW-11) deposed that on 11.12.2018, he had directed Constable No. 35 Luman Sahu to get the postmortem of deceased Rupabai conducted, for which a duty certificate (Ex. P-20) was issued under his signatures at point A to A. He also stated that he had prepared the application for postmortem examination (Ex. P-11), which bore his signatures at points D to D and E to E. The statement of this witness has also gone unchallenged in crossexamination. He further deposed that on 10.12.2018, on receipt of telephonic information, he proceeded to village Hitapathar, where he came to know that accused Noharu Mandavi had assaulted his wife, Rupabai, with an axe. On reaching the spot, he found Rupabai lying in the verandah of one Devprasad Salam. At that point of time, Rupabai was alive but unconscious, having sustained a deep incised wound on her head, and was breathing

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faintly. H.S. Thakur (PW-16) immediately called the 108 Ambulance service and arranged to send her to Government Hospital, Dondilohara, for medical treatment. It is further deposed by this witness that near the place of occurrence, he found Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), the mother of the deceased, from whom he inquired about the incident. On the basis of the information furnished by her, he recorded Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P-33) and thereafter prepared the site map of the incident (Ex. P-34) after inspecting the spot and surrounding situation as shown by Jhariyo Bai (PW-1). In the said map, the place of occurrence was marked as “A” and the surrounding features. Thereafter, upon returning to the police station, he reduced the Dehati Nalishi into a formal First Information Report (Ex. P-35) on the same day. This witness has further identified and proved his signatures appearing on the Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P-33), part “A” of the site map (Ex.P-34), and parts “A” and “B to B” of the FIR (Ex.P-35).

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17. PW-1 Jhariyo Bai has also corroborated the version of H.S. Thakur (PW-16), stating that the police had made inquiries from her in connection with the incident. Being illiterate, she affixed her thumb impression on the document. She further stated that the police had visited near her house for investigation purposes.

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18. From the depositions of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses, coupled with the medical evidence of Dr. N.S. Bhandari (PW-8), it clearly emerges that deceased Rupabai had sustained a deep

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incised wound on her head on 10.12.2018. The doctor, who conducted the postmortem examination, has categorically opined that the injury was ante-mortem, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and was caused by a hard and sharpedged weapon like an axe. The ocular version of PW-16 H.S. Thakur, who found Rupabai unconscious with a grievous cut injury and struggling for life, further corroborates the medical testimony.

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19. The nature, seat and severity of the injury, as described by the medical officer, rule out the possibility of accidental or suicidal cause. There is nothing on record to suggest that the injury could have been self-inflicted. On the contrary, the evidence unmistakably points towards an intentional assault.

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20. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Rupabai was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding.

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21. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question.

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22. The prosecution has relied upon the testimony of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), mother of the deceased, who has claimed herself to be an eyewitness to the incident. According to her, on the date of

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occurrence she, her daughter Rupabai, and the accused Noharu had taken lunch together. She was about to go to attend a funeral when the accused took out paddy from the house to sell it. On the advice of her daughter, she returned home. The accused again took out a sack of paddy and went to sell it, where she followed him and admonished him not to sell the paddy kept for his wife and children. Thereafter, the accused returned home and informed her that he had sold the paddy for a sum of Rs.1,011/-. On this, Rupabai protested, saying that if the accused continued to act in this manner, he would ruin the family. At this stage, the accused climbed onto the roof, then broke open the lock of a room, and brought out an axe which he had concealed. PW-1 cautioned her daughter that the accused was approaching with an axe. Rupabai, on seeing this, ran out of the house. The accused chased her and near the shed of neighbour Devprasad’s house, assaulted her on the head with the axe. Rupabai fell unconscious on the spot. PW-1 further deposed that when she rushed to save her daughter, the accused also attempted to assault her, but she managed to escape towards the lane. By that time, villagers gathered and an ambulance was called, but Rupabai succumbed on the way to the hospital.

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23. In her cross-examination, Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) has admitted that except for the accused, no male member resided in her house. She has also admitted that her son-in-law used to thresh and sell the paddy of her house, and the accused would generally sell

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paddy for household expenses. However, she clarified that on the date of occurrence, she had not asked him to sell the paddy. She has denied the defence suggestion that whenever she went out, the accused used to sell the paddy without her permission.

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24. The defence has further suggested to Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) that on the morning of the incident, she had left for village Pidiyal to attend a funeral and was therefore not present at the scene. She has denied this suggestion, clarifying that she had only gone a short distance, about four to five houses away in the lane, and had returned home upon her daughter’s call. She has specifically denied that her daughter was already unconscious when she returned or that she had no knowledge about the assailant.

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25. From the above, it is evident that the testimony of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), being an eyewitness, directly attributes the fatal blow to the accused. Despite lengthy cross-examination, her version regarding the actual assault remains unshaken and no material contradiction has been elicited to discredit her presence at the spot.

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26. The testimony of Lagni Bai Salame (PW-2), a neighbour, lends further corroboration. She has deposed that on the date of incident, at about 12:45 p.m., while threshing paddy near her house, she heard quarrelling between the deceased and the accused over the issue of selling paddy. Shortly thereafter, she saw the accused chasing Rupabai with a tangia and near her

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shed he struck her on the head. Out of fear, she ran away with her child and informed the shopkeeper Mannuram Salame. On returning with him, she saw Rupabai lying unconscious. In crossexamination, she admitted that she could not see what happened inside the house of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), but she consistently maintained that she saw the accused chase and assault the deceased. She has also denied the defence suggestion that Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) was away attending a funeral, and has clarified that at the relevant time Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) had returned home.

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27. The statement of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) thus finds corroboration in material particulars from testimony of Lagni Bai Salame (PW-2), especially with respect to the presence of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1) at the spot and the assault made by the accused upon Rupabai.

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28. Further corroboration is available from the evidence of Shyam Kumari Salame (PW-3), who has deposed that on the date of occurrence, at about 11:45 a.m., while returning home after taking bath at the pond, she saw the accused running from the back side of the house with a bag on his shoulder and a tangia in his hand. On reaching home, she found Rupabai lying near the shed in an unconscious condition. Although her previous police statement (Ex.D-3) does not mention some details, her deposition that she saw the accused fleeing from the scene with a tangia in his hand has remained unchallenged.

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29. Thus, the evidence of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), being an eyewitness, is trustworthy and stands corroborated by Lagni Bai Salame (PW-2) and Shyam Kumari Salame (PW-3) in material particulars. The consistent version of these witnesses, coupled with medical evidence, leaves no manner of doubt that it was the accused Noharu Mandavi who inflicted the fatal blow with a tangia upon his wife Rupabai, causing her death.

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30. According to the statement of Investigating Officer H.S. Thakur (PW-16), on 11.12.2018, in the presence of witnesses Vishnu Prasad Salame (PW-7) and Sukhnandan Salame (PW-6), a white lined floral sleeve shirt and half pants having blood stains were recovered from the accused. A blue coloured bag was also seized, which contained a light yellow coloured floral sleeve shirt and jeans half pants. A seizure memo (Ex. P-7) was prepared in this regard. Though both seizure witnesses did not fully support the statement of the Investigating Officer, Sukhnandan Salame (PW-6) has admitted that on the next day of the incident, the police had seized the blood-stained clothes worn by the accused. Vishnu Prasad (PW-7) has also clarified that a pithu bag was seized from the accused, and supporting the Investigating Officer’s statement, has stated that the said seizure was effected in village Gighali when the accused was apprehended. Further, as per the statement of Investigating Officer H.S. Thakur (PW-16), the accused Noharuram @ Nohar Singh Mandavi was apprehended on 11.12.2018 from village Gidhali near village

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Hitapathar and brought to Hitapathar. In the presence of witnesses Sukhnandan Salame (PW-6) and Vishnu Prasad Salame (PW-7), his memorandum statement (Ex.P-4) was recorded, wherein he disclosed about the weapon used in the crime. On his disclosure, the axe was recovered from a bush near Kantagudra and a seizure memo (Ex.P-6) was prepared. Both the independent witnesses Sukhnandan Salame (PW-6) and Vishnu Prasad Salame (PW-7) have supported the seizure and memorandum proceedings, thereby corroborating the Investigating Officer’s testimony.

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31. The defence has attempted to argue that the place of recovery was an open area where cattle grazers could roam and that an axe is a common article found in every farmer’s household; therefore, the seized axe could not be conclusively connected with the accused. This contention, on careful scrutiny, is not convincing. According to seizure memo Ex.P-6, it was the accused himself who led the police to the spot and produced the axe from the bushes, a fact within his exclusive knowledge. This circumstance strengthens the prosecution’s case. Furthermore, the FSL Report (Ex.P-30) confirms that blood was detected on the axe. Thus, the memorandum (Ex.P-4) and seizure memo (Ex.P-6) stand duly proved.

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32. Sukaro Bai (PW-5) deposed that on the date of the incident, she had gone to village Pidiaal for a funeral, where her brother-in-law

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Mannu informed her that Noharu had killed Rupabai. Similarly, Lagni Bai Salame (PW-2) has testified that immediately after the accused assaulted Rupabai, she ran to the shop out of fear and narrated the incident to Mannuram Salame.

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33. Sukaro Bai (PW-5) further deposed that while returning with Mannu Salame on a motorcycle, she came across the ambulance carrying Rupabai. She boarded the ambulance and during the journey, before reaching Bhanwarmara, Rupabai regained consciousness and asked for water, disclosing that Noharu had assaulted her. Although in cross-examination, she admitted that Rupabai was unconscious when she entered the ambulance, she firmly denied the defence suggestion that no conversation took place. Her statement that Rupabai implicated Noharu finds corroboration in her police statement.

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34. Smt. Pramila Bai (PW-12) also corroborated the occurrence, stating that around 12:45-01:00 p.m., upon returning home she saw Rupabai lying injured near the house with a bleeding head injury. On inquiry, Rupabai disclosed that her husband Noharu had beaten her and thereafter fainted. She was then taken to the hospital in an ambulance, where she succumbed. Though the police statement of this witness does not specifically mention Rupabai’s disclosure, her testimony lends assurance to the prosecution version and also confirms the presence of Jhariyo Bai (PW-1), the mother of the deceased, at the scene of occurrence.

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35. Head Constable Beni Singh Rajput (PW-9) proved that on 10.12.2018, based on hospital memo Ex. P-16 brought by Ward Boy Kirti Kumar (PW-4) from CHC Dondilohara, the death of Rupabai was registered at Police Station Dondilohara as death No. 0/18. The case was subsequently transferred to Police Station Mangchuwa where it was registered as Crime No. 13/18 (Ex. P- 24). The chain of information from hospital to police station has thus been duly established.

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36. The seizure of the axe vide Ex. P-6 and its subsequent examination has been corroborated by Dr. N.S. Bhandari (PW-8) and the Investigating Officer (PW-16). The medical and forensic evidence thus connects the weapon with the crime.

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37. In view of the above discussion, it stands proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 10.12.2018 at about 12:45 p.m., in village Hitapathar, the accused Noharu Mandavi @ Nohar Singh Mandavi assaulted his wife Rupabai with an axe, causing fatal injuries, resulting in her death. The prosecution has successfully established its case by cogent ocular, documentary, and scientific evidence.

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38. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned

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counsel for the appellant ?

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39. The distinction between intention and knowledge in the context of Section 299 and Section 300 IPC is crucial in determining the culpability of the appellant. Intention denotes a conscious desire to bring about a particular result, whereas knowledge implies awareness that a particular consequence is likely to ensue. In the present case, while the appellant's actions were undoubtedly culpable, the circumstances suggest that he did not intend to cause the death of his wife. However, it is evident that he knew that his actions were likely to cause harm.

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40. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the following facts are salient:

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No premeditation or prior motive has been

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proved by the prosecution.

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The incident occurred inside the home following

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a sudden quarrel late at night.

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There was one fatal blow with a household

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tangi; there is no evidence of repeated assault or pursuit.

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41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. The State Rep. By The Inspector of Police, 2023 INSC 632 , readily held when a case would fall under Section 304 Part II of the IPC rather than Section 302 of the IPC, emphasizing that Part II applies where “murder is never established” and only knowledge (not intention) is attributable; it also surveys classic “single blow”

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cases altering Section 302 to Section 304 Part II (e.g., Jawahar Lal, Camilo Vaz, Jai Prakash, Kulwant Rai, Hem Raj, Pulicherla Nagaraju) and ultimately converts the conviction to Section 304 Part II. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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“20. The word "intent" is derived from the word archery or aim. The "act" attempted to must be with "intention" of killing a man.

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21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-

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1. The nature of the weapon used.

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2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.

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3. The nature of the injuries caused.

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4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.

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22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990, Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word 'intent. The relevant observations are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are

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as under:-

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"The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery, and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.”

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23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-

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"6. Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had led to a certain amount of confusion.”

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24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J. in Reg. v.

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Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:-

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"The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off. without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?"

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25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to

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cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that 'intent' and 'knowledge' cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes, if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent may be presumed. But it will not mean that 'intent' and 'knowledge' are the same. 'Knowledge' will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent.

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26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'intention' is aptly explained. It is as under:-

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"Knowledge and intention must not be confused.

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17. …… Every person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act until the contrary is proved. It is therefore necessary in order to arrive at a decision, as to an offender's intention to inquire what the - natural and probable consequences of his acts would be. Once there is evidence that a deceased person, sustained injuries which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the person who inflicted them could be presumed to have intended those natural and probable consequences. His offence would fall under the third head of sec.

¶125

¶126

300, I.P.C.

¶127

18. …..A man's intention has to be inferred from what he does. But there are cases in which death is caused and the intention which can safely be imputed to the offender is less grave. The degree of quilt depends upon intention and the intention to be inferred must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes an act is committed which would not in an ordinary case inflict injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but which the offender knows is likely to cause the death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention.

¶128

19. ...Under sec. 299 there need be no proof of knowledge, that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause death. Before deciding that a case of culpable homicide amounts to murder, there must be proof of intention sufficient to bring it under Sec.300. Where the injury deliberately inflicted is more than merely likely to cause death' but sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the higher degree of quilt is presumed."

¶129

It has been further observed therein as under:-

¶130

"26. ... Where the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention, to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death the accused can be held guilty under the second part of sec. 304, I.P.C. The contention that in order to bring the case under

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¶132

the second part of sec. 304. I.P.C. it must be brought within one of the exceptions to sec 300, I.P.C. is not acceptable."

¶133

27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or knowledge must be imputed to the accused when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the IPC designedly used the two words 'intention' and 'knowledge', and it must be taken that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge, he "must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow." (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40).

¶134

28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a

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¶136

purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-

¶137

"To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the noun 'intention' in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his conduct........ It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed......... Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it."

¶138

29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:-

¶139

"In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word "intention" is used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to achieve a particular end at which he aims............ Differing from intention, yet closely resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word "recklessness". In each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with

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¶141

the intention of thereby attaining an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this secondary result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the harmful result should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur."

¶142

30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved by the prosecution. It must be proved that the accused aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example, when under Section 299 it is said "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death" it must be proved that the accused by doing the act, intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly, when it is said that "whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death" it must be proved that the accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

¶143

31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with

¶144

¶145

regard to intention may be satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result in death.

¶146

32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC?

¶147

SECTIONS 299 AND 300 OF THE IPC:-

¶148

33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of 'culpable homicide' and 'murder', respectively. In terms of Section 299, 'culpable homicide' is described as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression 'intention' while the latter upon 'knowledge'. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in 'culpable homicide', that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it

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would be 'culpable homicide'. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with 'murder', although there is no clear definition of 'murder' in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, 'culpable homicide' is the genus and 'murder' is its species and all 'murders' are 'culpable homicides' but all 'culpable homicides' are not 'murders'. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289)

¶151

34. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences, held as under:-

¶152

"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' is species. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not viceversa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment. proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the

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¶154

second part of Section 304."

¶155

35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. 'Culpable homicide' may or may not amount to 'murder', in terms of Section 300 of the IPC. When a 'culpable homicide is murder', the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence is 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishment would be dealt with under Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively, stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with that aspect of the case in any further detail.

¶156

36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section 300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. 'culpable homicide' and 'murder' respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections. This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of these

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¶158

sections.

¶159

37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:-

¶160

*Section 299*	*Section 300*
A person commits	Subject to certain culpable
culpable homicide if the	homicide is murder if the
act by which the death	exceptions act by which the
is caused is done-	death is caused is done-
IN	*TENTION*
(a) with the intention of	(1) with the intention of causing
causing death; or	death; or (2) with the intention of causing
	such bodily injury as the
	offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person
(b) with the intention of such causing bodily	to whom the harm is caused; or
injury as is likely to	(3) with the intention of causing
cause death; or	bodily injury to any person and

¶161

	3	1 the bodily injury intended to be
	KN	inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or *OWLEDGE*
(c) with the	knowledge	(4) with the knowledge that the
that the act	is likely to	act is so imminently dangerous
cause death		that it must in all probability
		cause death or such bodily
		injury as is likely to cause
		death, and commits such act
		without any excuse for
		incurring the risk of causing
		death or such injury as is
		mentioned above.

¶162

42. Recently, in Velthepu Srinivas v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 107 , the Supreme Court converted a Section 302 of the IPC conviction to Section 304 Part II for one accused, sentencing him to 10 years, where the role and circumstances evidenced lack of intention but knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

¶163

“28. Even though, A-3 might not have had the common intention to commit the murder, nevertheless, his participation in the assault and the wielding of the stone certainly makes him culpable for the offence that he has committed. While we acquit A-3 of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he is liable

¶164

¶165

for the offence under 304 Part II IPC. The law on Section 304 Part II has been succinctly laid down in Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC 1, where it was held that:

¶166

14. This section is in two parts. If analysed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1) if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused….

¶167

29. In the past, this Court has considered factors such as lack of medical evidence to prove whether the act/injury was individually sufficient to cause death 1, a single blow on head with a hammer2 and lack of cogent evidence of the eye-witnesses that the accused shared a common intention to commit murder 3 as some factors to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC.

¶168

30. Returning back to the facts of the case, there is certainly no escape from coming to the conclusion that A-3 should have had the knowledge that the use of a stone to hit the head of the deceased is likely to cause death. However, as demonstrated 1 Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 754. 2 Sarup

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¶170

Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 16 SCC 479. 3 Ghana Pradhan & Ors. v. State of Orissa, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 451. before, the evidence is insufficient to deduce a conclusion that he shared a common intention with the other accused to commit the murder of the deceased. Considering the role that A-3 has played, we hold him guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC.

¶171

31. The perusal of the evidence would reveal that it is not the case of the prosecution that A-3 was along with the other accused while the deceased was dragged to the house. The deposition would reveal that after the other accused assaulted the deceased with sword, A-3 came thereafter and assaulted the deceased with stone lying there. We, therefore, find that the prosecution has not been in a position to establish that A-3 shared the common intention with the other accused to cause the murder of the deceased.

¶172

32. For the reasons stated above, we uphold the conviction and sentence of A-1, A-2 and A-4 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and dismiss their Criminal Appeal No. 2852 of 2023 against the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in Criminal Appeal No. 308 of 2005 dated 26.04.2022. We acquit A-3 of the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 and convict him under Section 304 Part II and sentence him to undergo imprisonment for 10 years. To this extent, the appeal of A-3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. ”

¶173

43. A deep neck cut on a vital part is undoubtedly sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But the question is not

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¶175

capacity of the injury; it is whether, in these circumstances, we can safely infer intention to cause death or that very particular injury. Given the heat-of-passion domestic quarrel, lack of preplanning, intoxication, and single blow, we are not persuaded the prosecution has crossed the threshold to prove intention beyond reasonable doubt.

¶176

44. At the very least, the appellant knew that striking the neck with a tangi was likely to cause death. That maps squarely attracting Section 304 Part II.

¶177

45. The record satisfies the Chronological four-part test: (i) sudden quarrel; (ii) no premeditation; (iii) heat of passion; (iv) no evidence of undue advantage or cruelty (there is no repetition of blows; the weapon appears to be available in the house ; the assault was momentary). Thus, Exception 4 is attracted; the offence cannot be murder.

¶178

46. So far as recovery and medical consistency are concerned, the recovery of the tangia (Ex. P-6) on the appellant’s disclosure and the medical opinion (Ex. P-11) that the said weapon could have caused the injuries sustained by the deceased, undoubtedly, fortify authorship and connect the accused with the assault. These circumstances lend assurance to the prosecution version. However, such factors, by themselves, cannot automatically elevate the offence to murder punishable under Section 302 IPC, particularly when the surrounding circumstances demonstrate that

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¶180

the incident occurred during a sudden quarrel and was confined to a single blow.

¶181

47. On careful consideration of the ocular and medical evidence, it is evident that the incident was not a pre-planned or premeditated act. The occurrence arose out of a domestic altercation concerning the sale of paddy, in the heat of passion, and the appellant was under the influence of liquor at the relevant point of time. In such a setting, it would not be proper to ascribe to him the intention of causing death or of inflicting that very particular injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The single blow on the vital part of the head, however, certainly warrants imputation of knowledge on the part of the appellant that his act was likely to cause death. Therefore, while intention is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, knowledge is clearly attributable, and the case squarely falls within the ambit of Section 304 Part II IPC.

¶182

48. In view of the above, this Court holds that the appellant is guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC. His culpability is writ large from the fact that he inflicted the fatal blow with a tangia upon his wife, Rupabai, which ultimately resulted in her death. Nonetheless, the attendant circumstances, namely the absence of premeditation, the occurrence being in the course of a sudden quarrel, and the appellant’s inebriated condition, justify the alteration of conviction

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¶184

from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC.

¶185

49. As regards sentence, this Court is mindful of the need to strike a balance between deterrence and proportionality. While the act of the appellant cannot be condoned and calls for societal censure, the mitigating features, particularly the fact that the incident was not a cold-blooded or calculated act of murder but arose spontaneously, must also weigh in sentencing. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years under Section 304 Part II IPC would meet the ends of justice. Such a sentence would adequately punish the appellant, serve as a warning against resort to violence in domestic disputes, and yet not be unduly harsh in the peculiar facts of the case.

¶186

50. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant is in jail since 11.12.2018 and has completed more than more than 6 years and 9 months of jail sentence. As such, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 07 years. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above.

¶187

51. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.

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¶189

52. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellants are undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

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53. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.

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Sd/- Sd/-

¶192

(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

¶193

Anu

Nohru Mandavi @ Nohar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Nohru Mandavi @ Nohar Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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