Atmaram Sonwani Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2025:CGHC:25464

ASHOK SAHU

NAFR

Digitally signed by ASHOK SAHU Date: 2025.06.19 16:37:36 +0530

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRA No. 613 of 2022

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{Arising out of judgment dated 04.03.2021 passed in Sessions Trial No.05/2020 by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Kanker, District North Bastar Kanker}

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Atmaram Sonwani, S/o. Koduram Sonwani, Aged About 52 Years, R/o. Village Telawat, Police Station Korar, District - North Bastar Kanker (Chhattisgarh)

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... Appellant

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versus

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State Of Chhattisgarh, Through District Magistrate, North Bastar Kanker (Chhattisgarh)

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... Respondent

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: For Appellant Mrs. Indira Tripathi, Advocate : For Respondent Mr. Pankaj Singh, Panel Lawyer

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(Single Bench)

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

Judgment on Board

(1 8.06.2025)

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Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

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This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.03.2021, passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Kanker in Sessions Trial No.05/2020, by which the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine amount of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, 3 months’ additional rigorous imprisonment.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 05.12.2019, at 10:30 to 11:00 A.M. at village Telawat, Police Station- Korar, District North Bastar Kanker, the appellant herein assaulted Kapur Kumar Yadav (now deceased) by firewood, by which he has suffered grievous injury and died; thereby, the offence has been committed. The matter was reported to the police by Kejuram (PW-1), father of the deceased, pursuant to which, FIR was registered vide Ex.P-2, Merg Intimation was registered vide Ex.P-19, Inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-4 and dead body of deceased Kapur Kumar Yadav was subjected to post-mortem, which was conducted by Dr. Ashutosh

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Gangrale (PW-5), who proved the post-mortem report Ex.P14, according to which, cause of death was stated to be haemorhagic shock due to vital organ damage leading to excessive internal bleeding and death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P-10), the weapon of offence i.e. firewood was recovered at the instance of the appellant vide Ex.P-11. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law in which the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.

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During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 26 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document.

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The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, held the death to be homicidal in nature and further held that the appellant had no

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intention to cause death but he must have had knowledge that the injury caused by him is likely to cause death and proceeded to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C., against which the present appeal has been preferred.

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Mrs. Indira Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that the prosecution has failed to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the appellant is entitled for acquittal. In alternative, she would further submit that, if the case of the prosecution is taken as it is, the appellant be sentenced to the period already undergone for the offence under Sections 304 Part-II of I.P.C. as he was in custody from 06.12.2019 to 25.02.2025 i.e. more than 5 years & 2 months and the appeal be allowed in part. She would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Anbazhagan v. The State Represented by the Inspector Of Police1 wherein their the Supreme Court has reduced the sentence from 10 years rigorous imprisonment to 5 years rigorous imprisonment.

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Mr. Pankaj Singh, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been

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1 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2023 INSC 632

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able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence. He would further submit that it is not a fit case where the appellant be sentenced for the period already undergone and, as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record, I am of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court, considering the evidence available on record, that the appellant is guilty of offence under Section 304 Part-II is well merited and warrants no interference.

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It is true that the trial Court has proceeded to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. as the appellant had no intention to cause death, but he must have had knowledge that the injury caused by him is likely to cause death. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Anbazhagan (supra) may be noticed herein.

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“60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-

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(1) ...xxx...xxx… (2) ...xxx...xxx… (3) ...xxx...xxx…

(4) ...xxx...xxx…

(5) ...xxx...xxx…

(6) ...xxx...xxx...

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

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(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular

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injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

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(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

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(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

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(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

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(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

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Looking at the overall evidence on record, we find it difficult to come to the conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with the weapon of offence, he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The weapon of offence in the present case is a common agriculture tool. If a man is hit with a weed axe on the head with sufficient force, it is bound to cause, as here, death. It is true that the injuries shown in the post mortem report are fracture of the parietal bone as well as the temporal bone. The deceased died on account of the cerebral compression i.e. internal head injuries. However, the moot question is – whether that by itself is sufficient to draw an inference that the appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient to cause death. We are of the view that the appellant could only be attributed with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause the death. It is in such circumstances that we are inclined to take the view that the case on hand does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC.”

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Coming to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that, there was no previous dispute between the appellant and deceased, the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased by firewood, by which he suffered multiple abrasion and rupture of spleen and other body parts, which was proved by Dr. Ashutosh Gangrale (PW-5). Furthermore, the incident is said to have occurred in the house of the appellant wherein the appellant was taking his mill and the deceased came there and both (appellant & deceased) were in state of intoxication and started quarreling in the house of the appellant itself and the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased by firewood, which is not a dangerous weapon. In that view of the matter, the appellant is entitled for reduction of sentence in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Anbazhagan (supra).

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In view of the above, the sentence awarded to the appellant to undergo 10 years rigorous imprisonment is reduced to 5 years which the appellant had already undergone. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed. The appellant is already on bail, he need not surrender; however, his bail bond shall

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remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.

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