Prem Narayan Sinha Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2024:CGHC:42075-DB

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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CRMP No. 237 of 2021

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1. Prem Narayan Sinha S/o Late Sonuram Sinha Aged About 30 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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2. Gitesh Kumar Sinha S/o Late Sonuram Sinha Aged About 29 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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3. Avinash Kumar Sinha S/o Late Sonuram Sinha Aged About 36 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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4. Smt. Prateema Sinha W/o Late Sonuram Sinha Aged About 58 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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5. Kaajal Kiran Sinha D/o Late Sonuram Sinha Aged About 38 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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6. Smt. Girja Sinha W/o Avinash Kumar Aged About 28 Years R/o Radhaswami Nagar, Bhatagaon Chowk, Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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... Petitioners

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versus

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1. State of Chhattisgarh Through SHO, Police Station Dhamtari, District Dhamtari Chhattisgarh.

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2. Anju Sinha W/o Prem Narayan Sinha Currently Residing At Resai Para, Paschim Nagar, Dhamtari Chhattisgarh.

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...Respondents

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Digitally signed by BRIJMOHANMORLE BRIJMOHANMORLEDate: 2024.10.25 16:54:15 +0530

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For Petitioners : Mr. Amit Soni, Advocate. : For Respondent/State Mr. Malay Jain, Panel Lawyer. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Samir Singh, Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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24. 1 0 .2024

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1. Heard Mr. Amit Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Malay Jain, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Samir Singh, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2/complainant.

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2. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the CrPC with following prayer:-

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“It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition and quash the First Information Report bearing Crime No. 504 of 2019 and charge-sheet dated 10.01.2020 for commission of an offence under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and that no further action shall be taken against the petitioners on the basis of the FIR dated 18.11.2019 bearing Crime No. 504 of 2019, in the interest of justice.”

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the the marriage of petitioner No. 1/husband was solemnized with respondent No.2/complainant on 04.02.2018 in accordance with Hindu Rites and Customs. The petitioners No. 2 & 3 are brother-in-law, petitioner No. 4 is the mother-in-law and petitioners No. 5 & 6 are sister-in-law of the respondent No. 2/complainant. It is alleged by the respondent No.2/complainant that she was subject to harassment for demand of dowry by the petitioners as a result of which the FIR bearing Crime No. 504 of 2019 was registered against the petitioners at Police Station Dhamtari, District Dhamtari for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 498(A) of the IPC and upon investigation Police filed a charge-sheet dated 10.01.2020 before the competent Court.

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4. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent No. 2/complainant left the matrimonial house on 20.02.2019 and has been living at her maternal home in Dhamtari since, then after getting tired of making the efforts of calling respondent No.2/complainant back to matrimonial home, the petitioner No. 1/husband had moved an application for grant of decree of divorce under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 09.04.2019, which is pending before the Family Court, Raipur (C.G.). He also submits that the respondent No. 2/complainant also made an appearance before the concerned Court for the first time on 14.11.2019.

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5. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that thereafter, on 18.11.2019, the respondent No. 2/complainant preferred a written complaint before the concerning Police Station and allegation against petitioners is in respect of demand of dowry and of harassment in

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pursuance of FIR bearing Crime No. 504 of 2019 was registered at Police Station Dhamtari. On the basis of above FIR, investigation has been done and charge-sheet has been filed.

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6. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that an application under Section 437 of the CrPC was preferred by the petitioners before the trial Court, whereby the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari (C.G.), was kind enough to allow the bail application of the petitioners. He also contended that the aforesaid facts and circumstances patently makes evident that the petitioners are innocent and have not demanded any dowry as alleged by the respondent No.2/complainant. The petitioners have been implicated merely on the basis of bald allegation which seems to suggest the anxiety of the respondent No. 2/complainant to rope in as many of the husband relatives as possible.

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7. Learned counsel for the petitioners further states that an act to constitute offence, the allegation should demonstrate the intention and act of the present petitioners towards the respondent No. 2/complainant, as the petitioners have never done any such act which falls under definition of Section 498A/34 of the IPC and even if entire case of the prosecution would be taken in its own face value than also the ingredients of Section 498A/34 of the IPC would not made out against the petitioners. He further states that no specific act of the petitioners have been attributed in the FIR and the petitioners have been implicated in crime in question only on the basis of vague, general and omnibus type statement of the respondent No. 2/complainant with intent to harass the petitioners, therefore, allowing the continuation of criminal case against them would amount to abuse of

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process of law and thus, the impugned FIR, charge-sheet as well as criminal proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari as Criminal Case No. 77 of 2020, but till date no charges have been framed and the same is deserves to be quashed. He also submits that petitioners No. 2 & 3 are brother-in-law, petitioner No. 4 is the motherin-law and petitioners No. 5 & 6 are sister-in-law of the respondent No. 2/complainant have been roped in the crime by alleging absolute vague allegation, which is no manner constitutes any offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC.

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8. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that considering the material available on record, it cannot be held that no prima facie case against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out. He would further submit that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC is extremely limited as FIR cannot be quashed particularly when there is sufÏcient material available on record.

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9. Learned counsel, appearing for respondent No. 2/complainant, would submit that there are serious allegations against the petitioners for treating respondent No. 2/complainant with cruelty. He would further submit that all submissions raised on behalf of the petitioners relate to question of fact, that can be considered during the course of trial and that cannot be considered at this stage and that too in proceeding under Section 482 of the CrPC, as such, it is the case where the petition deserves to be dismissed.

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10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their

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rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the records with utmost circumspection.

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11. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the Police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

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12. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Others¹ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him.

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13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal & Others² laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: -

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

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1 (1998) 5 SCC 749

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2 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

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support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

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motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

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103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice. ”

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14. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) has been followed recently by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited vs. Visaka Industries³ , Ahmad Ali Quraishi & Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another⁴ and Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra & Others⁵ . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and “that too in the rarest of rare cases” as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report.

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15. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition 3 (2020) 4 SCC 162

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4 (2020) 13 SCC 435

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5 (2019) 18 SCC 191

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relating to quashment of FIR, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned FIR, three petitioners have been charged for the offence under Sections 498-A/34 of the IPC.

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16. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:-

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“ 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman

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subjecting her to cruelty .—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—

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(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

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17. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order

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to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish,

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(i) That, woman must be married;

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(ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and

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(iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband.

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18. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security.

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19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh &O Others vs. Shyam Ji Sahai⁶ considered the issue of delay in lodging the

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6 (2008) 8 SCC 232

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complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:-

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“8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken.

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9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1.”

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20. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of

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Tamil Nadu⁷ delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and

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7 (2009) 14 SCC 244

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Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed.

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21. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process.

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22. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others vs. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others⁸ their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out.

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23. Recently, in the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of 8 (2018) 14 SCC 452

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:-

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“24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

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25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped

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in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants.....”

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24. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR as it is, offence under Sections 498A/34 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners ?

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25. In the complaint so made, the complainant has only made omnibus and general allegations against the petitioners without being full particulars about date and place that the petitioners No. 2 to 6 including the petitioner No. 1/husband treated her with cruelty for not bringing sufÏcient dowry at the time of marriage. There is no specific allegation regarding anyone of the petitioners except common and general allegations against all the petitioners that they have demanded cash amount.

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26. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no specific allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus allegations have been made against the petitioners No. 2 to 6, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that prima facie no offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out for prosecuting petitioner No. 2- Gitesh Kumar Sinha , petitioner No. 3- Avinash Kumar Sinha , petitioner No. 4- Smt. Prateema Sinha , petitioner No. 5- Kaajal Kiran Sinha and petitioner No. 6- Smt. Girja Sinha for the above-stated offence and the prosecution against them for the aforesaid offence is covered by Category 1, 3 & 7 of paragraph 102 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and as such, liable to be quashed.

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27. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis, FIR registered in Crime No. 504 of 2019 and charge-sheet No. 12 of 2020 dated 10.01.202408 filed by the Police Station Dhamtari, District Dhamtari (C.G.) for the offence punishable under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is hereby quashed to the e xtent of petitioner No. 2- Gitesh Kumar Sinha, petitioner No. 3- Avinash Kumar Sinha, petitioner No. 4- Smt. Prateema Sinha, petitioner No. 5- Kaajal Kiran Sinha and petitioner No. 6- Smt. Girja Sinha . Prosecution against husband/petitioner No. 1 – Prem Narayan Sinha shall continue. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners herein-above and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter and concerned trial Court will decide criminal case pending against husband/petitioner No. 1 – Prem Narayan Sinha strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any of these observations made herein-above and shall conclude the trial as expeditiously.

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28. The petition under Section 482 of the CrPC is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No cost(s).

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Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice

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Brijmohan

Prem Narayan Sinha v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Prem Narayan Sinha v. State of Chhattisgarh

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