Dismissed

Resham Singh v. Steel Auhthority of India Ltd. and Anr.

Chhattisgarh HC10 Apr 2014WPL/2172/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A writ petition challenging the Industrial Court's dismissal of a 19-year-old appeal as time-barred was filed by a former driver. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding the petitioner guilty of utter negligence and suppression of facts, and affirmed the dismissal as barred by limitation.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed as time-barred and devoid of merit.

Resham Singh Vs Steel Auhthority of… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Chhattisgarh HC (2014)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR \m’G» . “€\‘;?’Z/ WRIT PETITION %o. 1 /2011

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I^“ PETITIONER : Resham Singh

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S/o Dillip Singh

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Aged about 65 years EX—Driver, Bhilai Stee! Ptant

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Personal No- 21755, Plant- Vehicle Pool, R/o 131A Camp No-1, P.O.— Supela Bhilai, Dist- Durg (C.G)

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Versus

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RESPONDENTS 1) Steel Authority of India Ltd., Bhilal' Ispat Sanyantra Through its Managing Director Bhilai Steel Plant, PIO- Bhilai Dist— Durg

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Labour Court, Rajnandgoan Through Presiding Officer

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Dist~ Rajnandgoan (C.G)

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WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 227/226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA FOR ISSUANCE OF A SUITABLE WRIT ORDER OF DIRECTION TO DO JUSTICE IN THE MATTER.

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mm: nmm’r OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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S.B.: Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.K.^Agarwal

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w.p.(L) No.2172 of 2011

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PETITIONER Resham Singh

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Versus

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RESPONDENTS Steel Authority^{ofIndiaLtd.and} another

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WRIT PETITION UNDER^{ARTICLE227/226OF THE} CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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Appearance :

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Mrt H.S. Ahluwalia,^{Counselforthe} petitioner. Mr. PR. Patankar, Counsel^{respondentNo.1.} ORAL ORDER

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(10.04.2014)

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Heard.

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(2) By way of this petition,^the petitioner^{isassailingthe} order dated 14.03.2011 passed by the Industrial Court, Raipur in Civil Appeal No.57/C.G.I.R.A./A/2010, dismissing the petitioner‘s^{appealastimebarred.}

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(3) The facts, in brief, necessary for disposal of this petition^arethat : the petitioner was working^asdriverin Steel Authority of India Ltd., Bhilai Steel Plant. He was prosecuted^{forcommissionofanoffenceunderSection379} of IPC. He was tried by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, and was convicted^{andsentencedtoundergoRIfor6}

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months together with a flne of Rs.500/in default. However, the appeal preferred there—against aby the petitioner^{beforetheSessionsCourt,Durgwasallowedand} the petitioner^{wasacquittedfrom} all charges.^Againstthe said judgment, the State preferred^an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh bearing Criminal^Appeal No.4l6/1999. The same^{WasdismissedbytheHighCourt} of Madhya Pradesh vide order dated 29.09.1994. Meanwhile, independent Departmental Enquiry proceedings^{wereinitiatedagainstthepetitionerandasa} consequence^{ofthedepartmentalenquiry} proceedings,^his services were terminated vide order dated 17.02.1988. Challenging the above order, the petitioner preferred an application before the Labour Court. The Labour^Court vide order dated 16.02.1991 dismissed the^sameas time barred. The petitioner^{didnotpreferanyappealagainst} the said order and instead after his acquittal, preferred W.P. No.1599/1995 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for his reinstatement^{basedonhisacquittalinthe} criminal case. The High Court of Madhya^Pradesh vide order dated 19.09.1995 held that the petitioner was terminated independent of the charge of conviction, the ground of reinstatement^on the basis of his acquittal in appeal is not sufficient as the disciplinary proceedings were independent of the criminal proceedings and while

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rejecting the petitioner's prayer, granted^{himlibertytofile} an appeal before the appropriate^authority. Thereafter, the appeal was preferred^bythe petitioner, and as the same was not decided by the competent^{authority,the} petitioner ,y preferred^WP. No.3492/ 1996 before this Court. In the said petition, the petitioner^was allowed to withdraw the petition^{withadirection} to respondent No.1 to dispose of the appeal filed by the petitioner in October 1995 in u accordance with law Within^a period^{of2monthsfromthe} date of receipt of the copy of the^order. Accordingly, vide order dated 03.01.2006, the appeal was dismissed and again, WP. No.582/2006 was filed by the petitioner, in which, the following order has been passed^bythisCourt on 12.07.2010:

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“Shri H.S. Ahluwalia, Counsel for the petitioner. Shri Brijesh Singh, Counsel appears^onbehalfof Shri A.S. Gaharwar, counsel for respondents.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the petitioner had earlier preferred a petition before the Labour Court, Durg, which was dismissed on^16.02.1991. This fact was however not disclosed.

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Respondents in their return have stated that the petitioner^had earlier approached Labour Court and his petition was dismissed and this fact was suppressed while filing this petition.

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While approaching this Court^{underArticle226of} the Constitution of India,^{itisexpectedthatthe} petitioner to come with clean hands and disclosing all relevant facts. The fact that the petitioner^{hadearlierchallenged} the order of dismissal before^{theLabourCourt,oughtto} have been disclosed by the petitioner in this petition‘ However, taking into consideration^thatthe petitioner^was working as a Driver, this Court inclined to accept the prayer^{oflearnedcounselforthepetitionerforwithdrawal} s of the petition‘ He submits that the petitioner may^be granted^{libertytotakesuchremedyasmaybeavailable} to him against the order earlier passed by the Labour Court.

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Prayer is allowed.

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Accordingly, the petition is dismissed as withdrawn. The petitioner^is at liberty^{totakesuchother} remedy as may be available to him against^theorderof the Labour Court. It is however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion^{onthemeritsofthe} case.”

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(4) It is after this, the appeal before the Industrial^Court challenging the order dated 16.02.1991 has been filed by the petitioner, after a period of 19 years and^thesamehas been dismissed vide the order impugned holding^thesame as hopelessly barred by limitation. Hence, this petition.

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/^/._ ~ 2 ) /, Q25 ¢

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(5) Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel for the petitioner, placing^{hisrelianceuponthejudgment} of the Supreme Court in the matter of^{TheStateofthe} Wesl'_ Bengal vs. The Adminsitrator, Howrah MuniciQalityL and others etc., AIR 1972^S.C. 749, would submit that the Industrial Court has^{wronglydismissedthe} petitioner's appeal as time barred, inasmuch as, the petitioner has assigned sufficient cause^{fornotfilingtheappealintimeas} he was pursuing different remedy^{beforethisCourtandhe} was also waiting for the result of the criminal case. Reliance has also been placed by him on the judgment^of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Gopaldas Agarwal v. Phoolchand Gary, (1990)^MPLJ_ 440.

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(6) Per contra, Mr. Patankar, learned counsel for respondent No.1, supported the order impugned and submitted that the petitioner did^{notfileanyappealagainst} the order passed by the Labour Court and allowed the same to attain finality. He was not pursuing his remedy against the order of the Labour Court before the wrong forum but was claiming reinstatement on^{thebasisofhis} acquittal. Such petitions filed by the petitioner were dismissed. Even the petitions^were filed suppressing the fact that the petitioner‘s petition has already been

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. ...

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dismissed by the Labour Court and therefore, the inordinate delay of more^than19 years^{cannotbesaidtobe} bonafide and therefore, the Industrial Court has rightly dismissed the petitioner's^{appealastimebarredl}

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(7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused^the paper^book.

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(8) Indisputably, the Labour Court has passed in the order in the year 1991. Before 1995, the petitioner^neither preferred^{anappealnoravailedanyotherremedy.} Even in the year 1995, he has filed the petition for his reinstatement based on^{hisacquittalinthecriminalcase.} In that petition also, he suppressed the fact that his application of reinstatement^{hasalreadybeendismissedby} the Labour Court. The other petitions preferred by the petitioner were also dismissed. This Court has also granted^{libertytothepetitionertofileanappealvideorder} dated 12.07.2010 in^{WP.No.582/2006withoutexpressing} any opinion on the^{meritsofthematter.}

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(9) Law regarding condonation^{ofdelayunderSection5} of the Limitation Act^{isnowwellsettled.} The courts in this country, including the Supreme Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the^{applicationforcondonationof} delay on the ground^{ofsufficientcauseunderSection5of} the Limitation Act. However, the concepts^{suchas“liberal}

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, Ni^.w

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“justice “substantial approach”, oriented approach”, justice”^{cannotbeemployedtojettisonthesubstantiallaw} of limitation. Especially, in cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and^unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers,^havetobe h. exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the lavv‘ The discretion has to be^{exercisedinasystematicmanner} informed by reason. Whims or fancies, prejudices or cannot and should not form the basis of predilections exercising discretionary powers. Once a valuable right^has accrued in favour of^one party^{asaresultofthefailureof} the other party to explain the^{delaybyshowingsufficient} cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable^totake away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, when the delay is directly a result of particularly negligence, default or inaction^ofthat party. Justice must be done to both parties equally (Please see Lanka_ Venkateswarlu (deadl by LRs v. State of Andhra_ Pradesh and others, (201 1)^4SCC363).

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(10) The Supreme Court in the case^{ofManibenDevraj_} Shah vs. Municipal Comoration of Brihan Mumbai,_ (2012) 5 SCC 157, has held that a distinction must be

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made between a case^{wherethedelayisinordinateanda} case where the delay is of few days^andwhereas in the former case the^{considerationof} prejudice^{totheotherside} will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises.

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N ......

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‘The Supreme Court in the case of State of West (11) Bengal (supra) has held that if a party^had acted in a particular manner on wrong advice given by his Legal Adviser, he cannot^beheld guilty^{ofnegligencesoastodis—} entitle the party^to plead^{sufficientcauseunderSection5} of the Limitation^Act.

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(12) This is not the case here. In the instant^case, the petitioner did file any appeal against the order of the Labour Court and^{allowedthesametoattainfinalityand} even after his acquittal^{incriminalcase,hesuppressedthis} fact in the writ petition^{beforethisCourt.} It is also not^the case of the petitioner^thathewas pursuing^wrongremedy or other remedies^{onwrongadviseofthecounsel.} (13) Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 confers power^to condone delay if the applicant is successful in showing that he was prevented from preferring the appeal for sufficient cause. It is the sufficient cause^which gives to a court to condone the delay. Normally, jurisdiction after the expiry of the period^{righttosueextinguishesand} the other side acquires^{rightwhichnormallyshouldnotbe}

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disturbed. Only in case of proving a sufficient cause the applicant is entitled to continue the litigation further. Even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the concerned party. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation8 is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly [glease see_

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Balwant Singh (Dead! v. Jagdish Singh and others,_

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AIR 2010 S.C. 3043).

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(14) Considering the above aspect^ofthematter, in my opinion, the petitioner is guilty^{ofutternegligenceandhe} also has suppressed the fact regarding the order of the Labour Court. The delay of‘ more than¹⁹ years^occurred is also inordinate and therefore, the Court below has rightly dismissed the appeal^{asbarredbylimitation.}

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(15) For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition being devoid of merits is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.

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x ‘shyna

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Sd/N.K. Agrawal Judge

Resham Singh v. Steel Auhthority of India Ltd. and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

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Resham Singh v. Steel Auhthority of India Ltd. and Anr.

Case brief

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