Second appeal against dismissal of suit for possession and damages. This Court held that no substantial question of law arose. The first appellate court's finding based on preponderance of probabilities was not perverse. Appeal dismissed at admission stage.
The second appeal fails and is dismissed at the admission stage.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
L’éi‘?
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BILAspUR LCHHATTISGARH) "'5‘3/[2004 s.A. No. ml'eRem”: SECOND'APPEAL U/S. 100 OF C.P.C.
Bhuwan Sahu, S/o. Kawal Aged 32 years,
APPELLANTS / Bhuwan Sahu, S/o. Kawal LAINTIFFs Aged 32 years, 2. Hulas, S/o. Kawal, aged 28 years Both R/o. Village Chikhili Tahsil Dhamdha, District Durg (C.G.)‘
VERSUS
RESPONDENTS Z Uttam, S/o. Hira Mahar Q’l. I KEFENDANTS Aged 29 years Rama, S/o. Pati‘r’am <sup></sup> a Aged 35 years, Pati Ram, S/o. Hagru Aged 6 5 years,‘ No. 1 to 3 R/o. vill. ‘aQ‘v Tahsil and District 4. State of Chhattisgarh / Through the Collector Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
Lk‘aQ‘v
AGAINST THE JUSGMENT AND DECREE DATED 12711.2003 PASSED. BY SHRI T.C. YADUfDISTRICT JUDGE RAJNANDGAON DISTRICT RAJNANDGAON IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 385Al2001 PARTIES UTTAM AND OTHERS VERSUS BHUWAN AND OTHERS
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Sinqle Bench: Hon’ble Shri Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra Second Appeal No.75 of 2004 Bhuwa n Suah and another verSUS 1 Uttam and others ORDER Post for “*‘4-3-201 0 Sd/— Prash’antKumarMishra Judge
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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Single Bench: Hon’ble Shri Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
Second AQQeal No.75 of 2004
Aggellants
Bhuwan Sahu and another
verSUS
Reshondentq
Uttam and others
. ... Present: , Shri Barag Kotecha with Shri Anand Shukla, counsel for the appellants. Shri N.P.Koshta, counsel for respondents No.1 to 3. No one appears for the State/respondent No.4.
e
‘under Second Appeal
Section 100 of the Coderof Civil Procedure
ORDER
(Passedon 04*“ March, 2010)
The instant second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred 6y the plaintiffs, whose suit for . possession and damages was decreed by the trial Court, however, on appeal by respondents No.1, to 3/defendants No.1 to 3, the first appellate Court has allowed their appeal and consequently the suit filed by‘the plaintiffs stood dismissed. ‘
- The plaintiffs preferred a suit with respect to land bearing Khasra No.324 area 20 dismil on the pleadings that defendants No.1 to 3 have illegally recovered possession of the suit land and have raised construction of a house thereon. Defendants No.1 to 3, in their written statement, denied the plaipt'allegations and stated that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit land, which was always in Tpossessionofthefatherofdefendant No.1 for last more than 31 years
farm" M "
and, thus, the plaintiffs’ suit is barred by limitation. It was stated in the written statement that Hira, the father of defendant No.1 had purchasedlandbearingKhasra No.784/3 from Raghunandan Das, son of I‘ndaldas by sale-deed dated 16-3-1966. After d'eath of Raghunandan Das, his son Virendra Das has effected transfer of this very‘land to the plaintiffs;whichwasre—numbered as Khasra No.324 during Chakbandi proceedings. Defendants No.1 to 3 raised plea of adverse possession in their written statement. 1
‘The 3. trial Court allowed the suit by judgment and decree dated 13-9-2001. On appeal by defendants No.1 to 3, the first appellate . Court allowed the appeal and, thus, dismissed the suit preferred by the plaintiffs. 4. In the first appellate Court, it was argued by defendants No.1 to 3 that the trial Court conducted the trial without framing proper issues and decided the suit without ordering for demarcation to verify the suit land and its khasra number, etc. The first appellate court found that the vendor of the earlier sale-deed, namely, Raghunandan Das, was the father of the vendor of the subsequent sale-deed, which was t executed by Virendra Das and both the sale—deeds were executed for the same land. The appellate Court also observed that the plaintiffs have not filed and exhibited the maintenance khasra of the land to prove their possession. After appreciating the statements of Shivnandan P.W.—2, UttamKumar D.W.-1 and lsmail Beg D.W.-2, the ‘ learned appellate Court found that on the basis of the principle of preponderance of probabilities, the evidence adduced by defendants No. 1 to 3 appear to be more convincing and, thus, found that the land
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of both the khasra numbers are same and due to Chakbandi proceedings,theland,earlierbearingKhasraNo.784/3, is now Khasra No.324 and, therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court for ' decreeing the suit was set aside by the first appellate Court.
l 8. The question as to what is a substantial question of law has , been dealtwithand pronounced in by the Hon’ble SupremeCourt in l State Bank of Indiaandothersvs.S.N.Goyal, (2008)8SCC92 in
~4,
paragraph13ofthereport. Applying the said principle in the present case, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises for determination in this appeal. The present second appeal, thus, fails and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage. /r
/’ /, ‘ SdlKumarMishra Prash‘ant Judge
(i
Gopal
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the first appellate court's finding on adverse possession raises a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC
Whether the second appellate court can re-appreciate evidence under Section 100 CPC
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State Bank of India and others vs. S.N. GoyalReferred¶38
(2008) 8 SCC 92 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Bhuwan Sahu and another
Uttam and others
Prashant Kumar Mishra
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
