Disposed

John Francis Anthony Gonsalves and Anr. v. Colin M. Rebello

Bombay HC15 Oct 2013S/465/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A family member permitted by his grandmother to occupy flats without consideration was held to be a gratuitous licensee on the plaint averments. The court upheld the jurisdictional objection, returned the plaint for presentation to the proper court and rejected the notice of motion as not maintainable.

What did the court decide?

Plaint returned for presentation to the proper court.

John Francis Anthony Gonsalves and Anr. Vs Colin M. Rebello — Landlord and Tenant | Bombay HC (2013)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

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SUIT NO. 465 OF 2011 WITH NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 787 OF 2011 IN SUIT NO. 465 OF 2011

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1 John Francis Anthony Gonsalves of Mumbai Indian Christian, the Executor named in the last Will of John Frederick Gonsalves, No.1 residing at Annette Apartment 2, 35, St. Paul's Road, Bandra (W), Mumbai – 400 050.

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2 Charles Willibroad Gonsalves of Mumbai Indian Christian, the Executor named ikn the last Will of John Frederick Gonsalves, No.2 at Flat No. 701, Joanna Premises, Co-op.Hsg.Society Ltd., Manuel Gonsalves Marg, Bandra (W) Mumbai -400 050. … Plaintiffs.

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Vs.

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Colin M Rebello of Mumbai Indian Christian Residing at Flats 501 and 502, Joanna Premises Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., 10 Manuel Gonsalves Marg, Bandra (W), Mumbai -400 050 … Defendant ---

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Mr.Joaquim Reis, Senior Advocate a/with S.F. Rego i/b N. J. D’Monte, for the Plaintiffs. Mr.Pradeep Sancheti, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Mayur Khandeparkar a/with Mr. Mitesh Naik i/b M/s. Dhru & Co., for the Defendant.

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CORAM : N. M. JAMDAR, J.

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Jt. Reserved on : 21 AUGUST, 2013 Jt. Pronounced on : 15 OCTOBER,2013

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JUDGMENT :

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1 A question that arises in the Suit is whether the defendant, who according to the plaintiff was allowed to use the premises as a family member, can be termed as a gratuitous licensee, so as to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. The issue of jurisdiction is to be tried as a preliminary issue.

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2 The plaintiff No.1 and 2 are brothers. They are sons of one John Frederick Gonsalves. Julia was the wife of John Frederick Gonsalves and the mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs had a sister named -Agnes Mary Conception Rebello. The defendant is the stepson of Agnes.

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3 John F. Gonsalves expired on 3 January 1983 leaving his last will and testament dated 1 April 1979. The will inter-alia dealt with two flats bearing no.501 and 502 in Joanna premises Cooperative Housing Society, Bandra Mumbai. The deceased bequeathed the two flats in the Will as under :

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“I own and possess Flats No.501 and 502 in the Joanna Premises Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., I hereby give devise and bequeath my Flat No.502 to my said son Charles Willibroad Gonsalves absolutely. So far as Flat No.501 is concerned I direct that so long as my wife Julie

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is alive she shall have the right to reside in the said Flat. After her death, my Executors to sell the said Flat No.501 and distribute net sale proceeds equally among my children including my grandson Colin M Rebello who takes the share of his mother Anne”.

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4 Plaintiff filed a petition No.519 of 1990 for grant of a Probate in this Court. The citation was served upon the heirs of the deceased. Agnes - the caveatrix, filed a Caveat objecting to the grant of Probate. The petition was then converted into Suit No.10 of 1991. Agnes challenged the execution of the Will contending that the Will was not the last Will of the deceased and that the deceased died intestate, and his estate is divisible equally.

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5 The trial Judge refused to issue a Probate by an Order and Judgment dated 27 March 2001. An appeal was filed by the Plaintiffs against the order dated 27 March 2001. The appeal was allowed, directing issuance of Probate in favour of the executors as per the Will of deceased John Frederick. The defendant thereafter filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 6 May 2009. Probate of the last Will of deceased John Frederick ws issued in favour of Plaintiffs on 16 November 2009. The plaintiffs addressed a letter dated 24 August 2009 to the Caveatrix requesting for a meeting on 6 September 2009. The Caveatrix stated that suit filed by her bearing O.S No.1131 of 1998 is pending. The said O.S No.1131 of 1998 was dismissed on 19 October 2010. The executors approached the defendant, grandson of the deceased and requested him to cooperate in giving effect to the

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Will. In view of his non-cooperation, the plaintiffs have filed the present Suit.

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6 It is the case of the plaintiffs that after the death of John Frederick, his wife Julia, plaintiffs’ mother, allowed her grandson, the defendant to live with her and thus, the defendant lived with his grandmother as a member of her family. It is the case of the plaintiffs that inspite of the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition and grant of Probate in favour of plaintiffs, defendant has refused to cooperate and therefore, there was no option but to file the present suit.

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7 The defendant has filed a Written Statement. In the Written statement stand is taken that flat nos. 501 and 502 have always been treated as single flat and on the plaintiffs own showing the defendant is a co-owner of the suit flats. It is also submitted that the defendant is a gratuitous licensee in respect of the suit flats and has continued to be so since 1986. The defendant has contended that he was put in possession on the basis of understanding that he would continue to have life interest in the suit flats and would be entitled to exclusively use the suit flats for himself. It is contended by the defendant that the grandmother Julia permitted defendant to reside in the flats and the suit flat was construed to be exclusive property of Julia and after Julia expired on 21 December 1987 defendant continued to reside in the suit flats. The defendant has also raised a contention that in view of this fact the defendant is a gratuitous licensee and this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit.

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8 On 4 May 2012, following order was passed framing a preliminary issue.

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“ The Defendants in his written statement dated 21 December 2011 in para 3.2 has raised the issue of jurisdiction.

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2. By consent, following issue is framed :- “Whether Defendant proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this suit ?”

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3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs has no objection if this court tries this issue under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as preliminary issue.

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4.By consent of both the parties Mr. Chirag Shah is appointed as a Commissioner for recording evidence on the preliminary issue.

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5.The Commissioner is directed to record evidence of the Defendant and/or his witnesses and also plaintiffs and/ or his witnesses and to submit report on or before 31 July 2012. Fees of the Commissioner shall be borne by the parties equally. Notice of Motion is adjourned to 24 August 2012.”

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9 By order dated 8 March 2013 it was recorded that the defendant did not file evidence and that in view of the conduct of the defendant, an order deserved to be passed against the defendant disallowing filing of any evidence. By way of indulgence time was

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granted upto 18 March 2013. The defendant has not filed any evidence.

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10 Attempts were made to amicably resolve the dispute. The matter was adjourned from time to time to enable the parties to arrive at a settlement. In spite of best efforts of the learned counsels the matter could not be resolved. The matter is thus taken up for hearing.

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11 As far as the preliminary issue is concerned, Mr. Reis, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the defendant has not chosen to lead any evidence. The learned counsel submitted that perusal of the plaint clearly shows that the defendant was permitted to use the premises only as a member of the family and therefore no question of any gratuitous licensee. The learned counsel submitted that in the proceedings for grant of Probate the mother of the defendant Caveatrix had opposed the grant of Probate and over-ruling the objections Probate was granted. The learned counsel submitted that in the Notice of Motion No.2332 of 1995 in Suit No.10 of 1991 and T & I J Petition No.519 of 1990 the defendant and the Caveatrix had filed affidavits in respect of the claims of the defendant and Caveatrix and no such stand as regards gratuitous licensee was taken. The learned counsel submitted that the perusal of the plaint shows that as far as the flats are concerned as per the Will one of the flats will be sold and sale proceeds will be distributed. Thus, for one of the flats, as per the defendants, the defendant will have to be termed as a co-owner and therefore, there

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is no question of any claim of gratuitous licensee. The learned counsel submitted that if it is the case of the defendant that it is the part of arrangement that the defendant was permitted to stay in the premises then it will require leading of evidence which the defendant had chosen not to do. The learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ajit Baburao Sawant and others v. General Manager, BEST Undertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others - 1985 Mh.L.J. 527 and decision of the Division bench in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs N.A.Qureshi reported in BCR-1986-2-315, in furtherance of his proposition that the defendant who was treated as a member of family has no independent right and cannot claim to have license in his favour.

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12 As far as the Notice of Motion is concerned, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the defendant was only allowed to use the premises as a member of the family and after the grant of Probate in favour of the plaintiffs instead of cooperating with the executors has refused to hand over the premises. The learned counsel submitted that the occupation of the defendant was only along with his grandmother and he cannot possibly claim any independent right. The learned counsel submitted that the Will was executed in the year 1979. The Will had only created a life interest in favour of wife Julia of deceased and the parties are litigating since the year 1980. The learned counsel submitted that defendant has continued to hold on to the premises without any semblance of right,

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and the plaintiffs who have acquired a right under the Will have been kept out of the premises. The learned counsel submits that the defendant is in possession of two flats having four bedrooms in a prime locality. Both flats admeasure around 2000 sq.ft and without paying any amount whatsoever the defendant has continued to use the premises. In the circumstances relief prayed for in the Notice of Motion deserves to be granted. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and others - ( 2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 370.

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13 Mr. Sancheti, learned senior counsel for the defendant on the preliminary issue submitted that on the bare perusal of the plaint itself shows that this Court does not have jurisdiction. The learned counsel submitted that the grandmother Julia had permitted the defendant to reside in the flats and after the death of Julia, the defendant has continued residing in the said flats. The learned counsel submitted that the Will of the year 1979 was sought to be probated in the year 1990 and when the grandmother Julia was in rightful possession of the premises she created a life interest in favour of the defendant. The learned counsel submitted that for a gratuitous licensee a consideration in lieu of license is no longer a requirement of law and a family member can also be considered as gratuitous licensee. The learned counsel relied on the decision of a Division bench in the case of Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra V Indravati Dwarkadas Mehra - AIR 2001 Bombay 470 and decision of the Full bench in the case of Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha &

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anr. Vs. Manharbala Jeram Damodar – 2007 (5) Bom.C.R.1 and the decision of the learned Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 67266727 of 2013 dated 13^th August, 2013 : Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. Vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr.. The learned counsel also relied upon decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others Vs Brigadier Sukhjit Singh – (1993) 3 Supreme Court Cases 459, to contend that payment of license fee is not essential for subsistence of license. The learned counsel submitted that thus, from the bare perusal of the plaint itself case of gratuitous licensee is made out and therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction as the Small Causes Court will have jurisdiction to decide the suits in respect of gratuitous licensee.

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14 As far as the Notice of Motion is concerned, the learned counsel for the defendant submitted that flat No.501 and 502 are one flat. They appear in the Society record as one flat and one share certificate and one nomination has been issued in respect of both the flats. The learned counsel submitted that the defendant was permitted to reside in the flat by the grandmother Julia on an express understanding that life interest will be created in favour of the defendant. The learned counsel submitted that the defendant is in possession since the year 1986 and even after the death of grandmother Julia in the year 1987 he was permitted to continue by the plaintiffs. The learned counsel submitted that by Notice of Motion final relief of possession is sought which is not to be granted at an interlocutory stage. The learned counsel submitted that the Probate proceedings have no bearing as regard to the claim of

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gratuitous licensee raised by the defendant. The learned counsel submitted that this issue will have to be considered at the time of trial. The learned counsel submitted that by Notice of Motion the plaintiffs were seeking to take possession of the premises without going through the full trial only on the basis of Probate being granted without giving an opportunity to the defendant to substantiate its case as regards the gratuitous licensee. The learned counsel has relied upon decision of the Apex Court in the case of Metro Marins and another V. Bonus Watch Co.Pvt. Ltd. and others . - AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1444, to contend that interim order directing handing over possession would amount to decreeing suit even before trial.

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15 By virtue of Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code (as applicable in Maharashtra), a preliminary issue will have to be taken up before the notice of motion is finally heard. Section 9-A reads as under :

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“9-A : Where at the hearing of application relating to interim relief in a suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as a preliminary issue. ---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay, injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the

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order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of the suit.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction.”

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16 The preliminary issue framed in the Suit is as under :

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“Whether Defendant proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and dispose of this suit ?

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17 The defendant in his written statement had raised an issue of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had given their no objection for the court to try this issue as a preliminary issue under section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. By consent of the parties, a commissioner for recording evidence on preliminary issue was appointed. On 8 March 2013 the suit was placed along with the notice of motion before the court and the court noted that the defendant has not filed his evidence. By way of last opportunity, time was granted till 18 March 2013 to the defendant to file his evidence as well as documents before the Commissioner. The defendant has failed to do so. The learned counsel for the defendant submitted that it is true that the defendant failed to file the evidence and therefore, the order disallowing the evidence at this stage has

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come into operation. The learned counsel submitted that, however, the defendant has relied on the averments made in plaint itself to show that the court has no jurisdiction. Furthermore the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the defendant did not raise the issue of gratuitous licensee in the probate proceedings, has not merit. In the probate proceedings the issue was whether the Will was valid, there was no question of the nature of occupation in the premises being decided. In any case it is on the averments in the plaint that will be material for determining the issue of jurisdiction, without reference to the defence.

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18 The facts that emerge from the plaint are as under : The plaintiffs are the sons of John Frederick Gonsalves. They are executors of the Will of John Frederick. By virtue of the said Will, having been probated, the proceedings taken out by the defendant, challenging the grant of probate, have been concluded against the defendant. Julia i. e. the plaintiffs' mother allowed her daughter's step - son i.e. the defendant to use the premises as a family member. The grand-son used the premises with his grand -mother as member of her family. Even after her death, the defendant continued to use the flat as a member of her family. During the testamentary proceedings, the defendant continued his occupation in the flat as member of the family. At no time, payment was sought nor did he make payment for his continued stay in the flat. Even after disposal of the appeal, the defendant has continued to use the said flat. The defendant has come to use the said flat through kindness of his grand- mother. The defendant was treated

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as member of her family. The grand -mother had only life interest in the suit flats. Under the Will one flat had to be sold and sale proceeds to be distributed.

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19 These are the basic averments. Thus the gist of the plaint is that the mother of the plaintiffs, who had only life interest in the property, permitted the defendant to use the premises with her out of kindness and that the defendant has continued to use it even after her death without there been any rights of whatsoever in his favour and without paying any amount.

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20 Though, according to the plaintiff one flat is to be sold and sale proceeds are to be distributed, what is essentially sought by the defendant is the possession of the flats. The defendant has been permitted to use the flats as a family member. As on today, the defendant is using the premises. Though relief of injunction is sought, in essence what is sought is a relief of possession. There was a permission to use the premises or in general parlance, a licence. There was no consideration involved. The question, therefore, arises is whether the use of the defendant can be termed as a 'gratuitous licensee'. The cumulative reading of the plaint shows that the defendant is permitted to use the premises out of kindness. Therefore, it is the theory of a license and not of a coowner. If that be so whether the defendant should be excluded from the definition of a 'gratuitous licensee' for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the civil court to order possession of the premises.

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21 The suit for possession from a licencee has to be filed in the Small Causes Court as per the provision of Section 41 of the Bombay Presidency Small Causes Act. Section 41 reads as under

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“41. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act [** **] but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Court of Small Causes shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in Greater Bombay, or relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent therefor, irrespective of the value of the subject matter of such suits or proceedings.

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(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to suits or proceedings for the recovery of possession of any immovable property, or of licence fee or charges or rent thereof, to which the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act [the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 or any other law for the time being in force, apply]”

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22 Before this issue raised in the suit is addressed to, the decision of this court and the apex court as regards gratuitous licensee and jurisdiction of the civil court need to be considered. In those judgments legislative policy is enunciated, which will have direct bearing on the question at hand.

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23 On the issue of gratuitous licensee and the jurisdiction of the civil court, there have been series of decisions of this court. There were several decisions of the single Judges of this court. Some of them were in conflict with each other. This culminated in a reference to the division bench, thereafter, in a reference to a full bench of this court and finally an appeal to the Apex Court.

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24 First, the decision of the Division bench of this court in reference in the case of Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra (supra) needs to be analyzed. A notice of motion taken out in the suit along with the Letters Patent Appeals, were directed to be placed before the division bench by an order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, in exercise of the powers under Rule 28 of the High Court of Judicature Original Side Rules, 1980, as common question of law arose in all of them. The division bench formulated the following question :

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“whether a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 or should such a Suit be filed before the Civil Court ?”.

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25 The division bench took review of the legislative history of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter called as “the Small Cause Courts Act”), the Bombay Rent Act and and various decisions of the learned single Judges of this court. Particular relevant for the current controversy was the decision of the learned single Judge of this

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court in the case of Vishwanath Sawant vs. Gaudabhai Kakabhai , reported in 1990 Mah. LJ 1145. In that case learned single Judge held that when a permission is accorded to occupy the premises not as of right but as of grace or by way of incidental or ancillary reasons such as a family arrangement, then it would not amount to a 'licence' under section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. The Division Bench, however, did not approve of this decision, as the division bench found that these observations were directly contrary to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Brig Sukhjit Singh, reported in 1993 (3) SCC 459. The learned counsel for the defendant has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sukhjit Singh (supra). The division bench observed as under :

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“22. In Vishwanath Sawant v. Gandabhai Kikabhai, 1990 Mah. LJ 1145, a learned single Judge of this Court, analyzing the nature of a licence, took the view that licence could be of two kinds, namely, a bare licence which is a matter of personal privilege and a licence coupled with a grant or interest. While a bare licence without anything more is always revocable at the will and pleasure of the licensor and is not assignable, a licence coupled with grant or interest cannot in general be revoked so as to defeat the grant to which it is incidental. The learned single Judge referred to the definition of the expression “licence” in S.52 of the India Easements Act and then observed : “In my judgment, it is only when a licence is created as of right that it can be covered under the provisions of S.52. When a permission is afforded not as of right but as of grace or where a permission is afforded, it is incidental of ancillary to say a family arrangement, an arrangement of employment or the like, the same would not amount to a

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licence under S. 52. The transaction has to partake the nature of a commercial transaction for valuable consideration before it can partake the nature of a right envisaged by S. 52 of the Indian Easements Act.” We notice that this observation is directly contrary to the view of the Supreme Court in Brig. Sukhjit Singh's case (supra). In Brig. Sukhjit Singh (supra), the Supreme Court in categorical terms has held that payment of licence fees is not an essential attribute for the subsistence of a licence.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Thus the observation that there cannot be licence by matter of grace or family arrangement was specifically disapproved. The learned single Judge in the case of Vishwanath Sawant (supra) also held that the Small Cause Court will have no jurisdiction in case of a gratuitous licensee. The learned single Judge held that a person who was inducted in the premises initially as a 'licensee' and whose 'licence' has been terminated, will have to be treated as a mere trespasser. The Division Bench did not approve these observations as well. The Division Bench found that they were contrary to the decision of the another Division Bench of this court in the case of Nagin Mansukhal Dagli vs. Haribhai Manibhai Patel , reported in AIR 1980 Bom 123.

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26 The Division Bench also took a note of an another decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Conrad Dias vs. Joseph Dias, reported in AIR 1995 Bom. 210. In this case, the learned single Judge took a view that a person residing with parents cannot claim a legal character much less the

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character of the licensee but would be residing simplicitor as a member of the family and nothing more, nothing less. The Division Bench doubted this proposition also and held that the 'licence' to reside with the family may not be supported without any material consideration, but arising out of the love and affection, however, it would be far from saying that such licence would not be fall within the meaning of section 52 of the Easements Act. The Division Bench reiterated that section 52 does not ruled out a licence being granted for a consideration other than material. The division bench observed as under :

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“25. Conrad Dias v. Joseph Dias, AIR 1995 Bombay 210, follows the decision in Vishwanath (supra) and takes the view that a person residing with parents in the house cannot claim any legal character, much less a character of 'licensee' , as defined in S.52 of the Indian Easements Act, but would be residing simpliciter as a member of the family and nothing more and nothing less. We have our doubts on this proposition also . A member of a family undoubtedly has a licence to reside with the family, albeit that the licence may not be supported by any material consideration, but arising out of familial relationship, love or affection. This is a far cry from saying that such a licence would not be one within the meaning of S.52 of the Easement Act. We have already pointed out that S. 52 in turn does not rule out a licence being granted for consideration other than material.”

(emphasis supplied)

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The view taken by the learned single Judge that a family member can never be a licencee has been clearly doubted by the Division Bench.

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27 The Division Bench thereafter, proceeded to consider the effect of the amendments carried out in the relevant legislation in the year 1963 by the Maharashtra Act XLI of 1963. By this amendment, section 42A was added to the Presidency of Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. Section 41 of the Small Causes Courts Act was amended by Maharashtra Amendment Act XIX of 1976. Thereafter, section 15A was added to the Bombay Rent Act, giving protection to 'lincesee' who is occupying specific premises as on the cut off date i. e. 1 February 1973.

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28 After noticing these amendments and implications thereof, the division bench observed in paragraphs 39 and 55 as under :

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There is another consideration on which we are inclined to take the view that the "licensee" contemplated under Section 41 is not a bare gratuitous licensee, but must be licensee whose license is supported by material consideration. The principle Noscitur a sociis demands that words must take colour from words with which they are associated. Reading of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. 1882 shows that it is equally applicable to proceedings between "a licensor and a licensee" or "a landlord and a tenant" relating to the recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in Greater Bombay or relating to the recovery of "license fee or charge or rent therefore". We are of the view, that clubbing of "licensor and licensee" with

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"landlord and tenant", and the clubbing of causes relating to recovery of possession with recovery of license fees or charge or rent, is not merely accidental. There is close association and this is a case where the principle Noscitur a sociis would clearly be applicableWe are, therefore, of the view that the expressions "licensor and licensee" used in Section 41 derive their colour from the expression "landlord and tenant". The latter is a relationship based on material consideration; the same concept must, therefore, colour and permeate the expression "licensor and licensee". Further, the use of the expression "license fee, charge or rent" in close juxtaposition is also not without reason, and must colour the expression "licensor and licensee" used in the Section. The observations of Supreme Court in The State of Bombay and others v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, (vide paragraph 9) and in M. K. Ranganathan and another v. Govt. of Madras and others, (vide paragraphs 21 and 22) and in M/s. Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda, (vide paragraphs 12) support this canon of interpretation of the statute.

¶150

55. Thus, considered from all points of view, we are of the view that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 invests jurisdiction in the Small Causes Court to entertain proceedings between licensor and licensee only where the license is not gratuitous, i.e. it is for a consideration other than material.

¶151

The division bench thus concluded that the expressions 'licensor' and 'licensee' used under section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act will have the same meaning as in section 5(4A) of the Bombay Rent Act and found that both the Acts are pari materia and therefore, expression 'licence' not having been defined under the provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act must derive its meaning from the

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expression 'licensee' as used in Section 5(4A) of the Bombay Rent Act. The Division Bench held that the expression 'licensor' or 'licensee' used in section 41 derive their colour from the expression 'landlord' and 'tenant' and since this relationship is based on material consideration, the same may be extended to 'licensor' and 'licensee'. The division bench placed heavy reliance on the marginal notes of the section. The Division Bench ultimately held that section 41 of the Presidency of Small Causes Courts excludes jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to entertain proceedings between the 'licensor' and 'licensee' when the 'licensee' is gratuitous.

¶157

29 After the decision of the division bench in case of Ramesh Dwarkadas (supra) was rendered, a learned single Judge of this court found that there was a divergence in the views of two Division Benches. Conflict was noticed between the decision of Ramesh Dwarkadas (supra) and the decision of another division bench in the case of Bhagirathi Lingawade vs. Laxmi Silk Mills in Letters Patent Appeal No. 129 of 1993, on the issue of jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court as regards a gratuitous licence. In the case of Ramesh Dwarkadas (supra), the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the expression 'licensee' as used in section 5(4A), does not cover a 'gratuitous licensee' and the suit will have to be filed in civil court. In the case of Bhagirathi Lingawade's case (supra), the Division Bench took a view that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act are not relevant for interpreting the scope and ambit of section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act. In view of conflicting interpretation made by the

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Division Benches, the learned single Judge made a reference to a larger Bench.

¶163

30 Accordingly, the Hon'ble Chief Justice constituted a Full Bench to decide the issue, which rendered its decision in the case of Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Anr. Vs. Manharbala Jerman Damodar, reported in 2007 (5) Bom. CR-1. The Full Bench formulated the following questions :

¶164

i) Whether the expression “Licensee” used in section 41(1) in Chapter VII of PSCC Act, not having been defined therein, would derive its meaning from the expression “licensee” as used in sub-section (4-A) of section 5 of the Rent Act and/ or whether the expression “licensee” used in section 41(1) of PSCC Act is a term of wider import so as to mean and include a “gratuitous licensee” also ?

¶165

ii) Whether a suit by a “licensor” against a “gratuitous licensee” is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under section 41 of PSCC Act?.

¶166

31 The Full Bench considered the relevant provisions. The Full Bench analyzed and language and scheme of section 41 of the Act. The Full Bench disapproved the reliance placed by the division bench on the marginal notes to construe the section. The Full Bench came to the conclusion that marginal notes to the section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the meaning of section when the language of the section is plain and simple. The Full Bench held that the function of a marginal note is only as a brief indication of the contents of the section and if the language

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employed in the section is clear, a contrary interpretation need not be placed upon by relying upon the marginal note. The Full Bench held that sub-section (1) of section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act is clear. The disjunctive 'or' used in sub-section (1) indicates that Small Cause Court will have jurisdiction to entertain all suits and proceedings between 'licensee' and 'licensor'. The Full Bench has held that the legislation has not used any conjunctive in sub section (1) of section 41, purposefully making its intention clear. The Full Bench categorically held that the provisions of section 41(1) does not specifically exclude 'gratuitous licensee'.

¶172

32 As far as the expressions 'licensee' and 'licensor' is concerned, as regards any consideration in respect thereof, it will be fruitful to reproduce the observations of the Full Bench in this regard in paragraphs 43 and 43 as under :

¶173

As opposed to this, the expression "licence", as defined under section 52 of the Indian Easement Act, provides that where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license. Section 52 does not require any consideration, material or non material, to be an element of the definition of licence, nor does it require that the right under the licence must arise by way of contract or as a result of a mutual promise. Thus, licence as defined in section 52 of the Indian Easement Act can be a unilateral grant and unsupported by any consideration. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs.

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Brig Sukhjit Singh 1993(3) SCC 459 has observed that, "payment of licence fee is not an essential attribute for subsistence of licence".

¶179

Let us see as to how the expressions "licence" and "licensee" are understood, used and spoken in common parlance. It is often said that a word, apart from having the meaning as defined under different statutes, has ordinary or popular meaning and that a word of everyday usage it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. A "licence" is a power or authority to do some act, which, without such authority, could not lawfully be done. In the context of an immovable property a "licence" is an authority to do an act which would otherwise be a trespass. It passes no interest, and does not amount to a demise, nor does it give the licensee an exclusive right to use the property. (See Puran Singh Sahani Vs Sundari Bhagwandas Kriplani (1991) 2 SCC 180). Barron’s Law Dictionary has given the meaning of word "licensee" to mean "the one to whom a licence has been granted; in property, one whose presence on the premises is not invited but tolerated. Thus, a licensee is a person who is neither a customer, nor a servant, nor a trespasser, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted expressly or implidly to go thereon usually for his own interest, convenience, or gratification". Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Sixth Edition, Vol.2, provides the meaning of word "licensee" to mean "a licensee is a person who has permission to do an act which without such permission would be unlawful. (See Vaughan C.J., in Thomas Vs Sewell, Vaugh at page 330, at page 351, quoted by Romour, J, in Frank Warr & Co. Vs. London County Council (1940) 1 K.B. 713)." In Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, the word "licence" means "a revocable permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful" and the word "licensee" means

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"one to whom a licence is granted or one who has permission to enter or use another’s premises, but only for one’s own purposes and not for the occupier’s benefit." Thus, it is seen that even in popular sense the word "licence" is not understood to mean it should be on payment of licence fee for subsistence of licence. It also covers a "gratuitous licensee", that is, a person who is permitted, although not invited, to enter another’s property and who provides no consideration in exchange for such permission.

¶185

(emphasis supplied)

¶186

33 The Full Bench also observed that the primary object of the legislature was to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in different courts and consequent waste of public time and money. The Full Bench noted that if a defendant raises a question of his status and on the basis thereof an issue of jurisdiction is raised, then the landlord will have to get the issue of jurisdiction decided first and then to proceed on merits before the court which has jurisdiction. The Full Bench accordingly give a wider meaning to the term 'licensee'. The Full Bench observed in paragraph 47 as under :

¶187

47. In our opinion, the legislature in its wisdom has neither defined the word "licensee" in any of the definitions of the Act nor has clarified it. The primary object of the Act is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in different Courts and consequent waste of public time and money and unnecessary delay, hardship and expense to the suitors, and to have uniformity of procedure. It was considered expedient to make the required supplementary provisions in PSCC Act so that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a

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tenant or a licensor and a licensee for recovery of possession of premises or for recovery of rent or licence fee, irrespective of the value of the subject-matter, should go to and be disposed of by the Small Cause Court, either under PSCC Act or the Rent Control Act. In these circumstances, therefore, the word "licensee", in our opinion, obviously has been used by the legislature in general sense of the term as defined in the Indian Easement Act, which is the statute that governs all the licence of immovable properties. In other words, the word "licensee" being a term of well known legal significance having well ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to define it separately.

¶193

(emphasis supplied)

¶194

34 Accordingly the Full Bench concluded that the legislation had intended to bring 'all suits' between landlord and tenant and licensor and licensee whether under the Rent Act or under the Presidency Small Causes Court Act under one roof. The Full Bench concluded that any other interpretation would not fit in the legislative scheme and looking at the phraseology employed by the legislature, there is no reason as to why 'gratuitous licensee' is also not covered within the meaning of the expression 'licensee' in sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the PSCC Act. The reference was accordingly answered by the Full Bench. Thus all the suits even where the licence is stated to be gratuitous will have to be filed in the Small Causes Court.

¶195

35 The decision of the Full Bench was challenged before the Apex court. Before the Apex Court it was argued by the appellants therein that the term 'licensee' contemplated under

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section 41 of the Presidency of Small Causes Court Act excludes the 'gratuitous licensee'. The Apex Court in its decision rendered on 13^th August, 2013 in Civil Appeal No. 6726-6727 of 2013 in the case of Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors . vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr., agreed with the reasoning of the Full Bench.

¶201

36 The Apex Court held that the definition of 'licensee' under the Act will include a gratuitous licensee. The Apex Court emphasised that all suits relating to licencee should be under one umbrella to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and held that a liberal construction will have to be given to the meaning of expressions 'licensor and licensee' under section 41 (1) of the Small Causes Court Act. The Apex court emphasised the object of the legislation that all the suits and proceedings between the landlord and tenant and licensee and licensor should go to and dispose of by the Small Cause Court. The Apex Court in paragraphs 50 to 53 observed as under :

¶202

“50 We are of the considered view that the High Court has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expression “licensor and licensee” with “landlord and tenant” in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between the “landlord and tenant” and the “licensor and licensee” under one umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits between “landlord and tenant” and “licensor and licensee” whether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult to accept

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the proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well as the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move from the one court to the other not only on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.

¶208

51 We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act.

¶209

52 We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression 'licensee' in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expression 'licensee' used in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expression 'licensee' as used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well.

¶210

53 We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs.”

¶211

(emphasis supplied)

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37 In the backdrop of the decisions of the Full Bench in Prabhudas Damodar (supra) and the Apex Court in Prabhudas Damodar (supra), the question whether a family member need to be excluded from the definition of gratuitous licencee for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, needs to be considered.

¶217

38 However, it needs to be clarified that in the case of family members there could be various fact situations. There could be cases where sons and / or daughters who are residing in the premises since birth, are sought to be evicted by the parents. Wife, daughter -in -laws, son-in-laws are sought to be evicted. There could be cases where a distant relative is given permission to come and reside in the premises and so on. In the present case, I am not considering an absolute proposition whether all family members in all situations can be called as a gratuitous licensee or not. I am considering the question on the fact situation of the present case. Facts of the present case are that the defendant, step son of the daughter, was allowed to use the flats by his grandmother with her, who only had a life interest in the flats.

¶218

39 The learned counsel for the plaintiff relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this court in the case of Ajit Baburao Sawant vs. General Manager, Best Undertaking, reported in 1985 Mh. L.J. 527 and of the division bench in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. N.A. Qureshi,

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reported in BCR-1986-2-315 to contend that a family member, living in the premises or residing as a family member will have no independent right or interest. In this decision a question arose as to whether, before ordering eviction of an allottee from the municipal premises under section 105-B of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, it was incumbent on the Municipal Corporation to issue notice in writing to all the persons residing with the allottee. The learned single Judge considered the provisions of Section 105-B, which provide for summary proceedings, and held that the members of the family need not be given a notice as they reside with the allottee and not in their own right.

¶224

40 There is no comparison with this fact situation and the fact situation at hand. In Ajit Baburao's case (supra), the court was only considering the necessity of a notice and came to the conclusion that it is enough if the notice is given to the occupant. The court was considering the aspect of the family members having no independent rights only in the context of their entitlement to a separate notice. The decision of the division bench in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant confirmed the view taken by the learned single Judge. Before the Division Bench again section 105-B was in question and the Division Bench confirmed the decision of the learned single Judge. Both the decisions are of no assistance to the plaintiff, for considering whether the defendant can be excluded from the definition of gratuitous licensee.

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41 In the case of Vishwanath Sawant (supra) the learned single Judge had taken a view that a family member cannot be considered as 'gratuitous licensee' The Division Bench in the case of Ramesh Dwarkadas (supra) specifically disapproved the view of the learned single Judge. The Apex Court in the case of Sukhjit Singh (supra) has held that exchange consideration is not a criteria for licence. The Division Bench also doubted the view taken by the learned single Judge in the case of Conrad Dias, where learned Judge held that a family member will not be a gratuitous licencee. The division bench did not approve the distinction between a family member and a stranger regarding the gratuitous licensee. The division bench noted that the member of the family undoubtedly has a licence to reside, but it cannot be said that it would not be one under section 52 of the Easement Act, as Section 52 does not rule out consideration other than material. Though thereafter, the division bench went on to construe the language of section 41 as amended, to hold that 'gratuitous licensee' is not included in the definition of licensee and that decision was reversed by the Full Bench, the observation of the Division Bench that a family member cannot be excluded from the definition of the gratuitous licencee, was not disturbed.

¶230

42 The Full Bench while construing the expression 'licence' gave it a wide meaning, keeping in mind the object of the legislature. The legislative policy behind the enactment is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to invest one court with jurisdiction to try all cases regarding licensees and tenants. To borrow the

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phrase from the decision of the Apex court that is the 'One Umbrella Policy'.

¶236

43 Thus the object of the legislation is to give wide meaning to the word 'licensee' occurring in Section 41 of Small Causes Court Act. The term 'licensee' includes 'gratuitous licensee' and consideration is not the criteria for bringing a person within ambit of 'gratuitous licensee'. For the purpose of the Act, the word 'licensee' has to be understood in general sense. That is to say a person who is permitted to enter upon a property who may not provide consideration for such permission. Such person is neither a customer, servant or trespasser. The word 'licence' is used in common parlance as such.

¶237

44 This being the broad definition of 'licence', it is difficult to exclude cases such as the present case. In fact such exclusion will be contrary to the legislative policy. The defendant was permitted to use the premises and he continued to do so. No consideration was exchanged. Defendant is neither a servant, customer or a trespasser. The distinction sought to be made that even though defendant otherwise fits the criterion of a gratuitous licencee, he cannot be held so as he was permitted as a member of family, has no legal basis. The only distinguishing factor in respect of the defendant is that he was related to the licensor. Once a consideration is not a criterion for treating a person as gratuitous licencee, then such occupation can be for variety of

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reasons such as love and affection, member of the family, being some of them.

¶243

45 The need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and that the litigation should come to an end at the earliest is more true in case of a dispute between family members. When a family member continues to reside in the premises in spite of the objection of others such dispute needs to be resolved at the earliest. Such family strife over the premises affect all, not only in respect of the property rights but emotionally as well, which may lead several undesirable consequences. Such family dis-harmony is not in the interest of the society. The purpose of giving a broader meaning to the term 'license' and to invest the Small Cause Court with exclusive jurisdiction so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings applies with more force in case of family members. It is not possible to carve out the case of the defendant out of the definition of gratuitous licensee. If a defendant who is permitted to enter and use the premises fits the criterion to be called gratuitous licensee, then excluding jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court only on the ground that he was a member of the family, will defeat the legislative policy of investing wide jurisdiction to the Small Causes court in the matter of all licencees. The anxiety of the legislature is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, does not warrant such micro classification, on the contrary applies with more force in cases such as the present one.

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46 In the result, I am of the opinion that in the present case where the defendant, who was permitted to use the premises will have to be considered as a 'gratuitous licensee' on the basis of the averments made in the plaint itself. Once this conclusion is reached, the Small Cause Court being the only court to try all such suits against gratuitous licensee, the civil court will not have jurisdiction. The preliminary issue which is framed will have to be answered in favour of the defendant. Accordingly, it is held that the defendant has proved that this court has no jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit. In view of the decision on the preliminary issue, the notice of motion filed by the Plaintiffs cannot be taken up. Notice of Motion is accordingly rejected, as not maintainable.

¶249

47 The plaint is accordingly returned to be presented to the proper court.

¶250

(N.M.JAMDAR, J.)

¶251

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John Francis Anthony Gonsalves and Anr. v. Colin M. Rebello

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John Francis Anthony Gonsalves and Anr. v. Colin M. Rebello

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