Partly allowed

Raju Ranjan Singh @ Guddusingh Thakkur v. the State of Maharashtra

Bombay HC24 Aug 2006APPLN/2884/2006

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Dr. on the detention of an apparent juvenile pending age enquiry in a murder case. The court directed immediate transfer from jail to an observation home with a timeline for the enquiry completion and trial conclusion.

What did the court decide?

Applicant to be shifted from custody to an observation home in Pune within one week. Age enquiry to conclude within eight weeks. Trial to conclude by 31st January, 2007.

Raju Ranjan Singh @ Guddusingh Thakkur Vs the… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Bombay HC (2006)

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[1]

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 APPELLATE JURISDICTION

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 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2884 OF 2006.

¶4

 Raju Ranjan Singh
 Alia Guddusingh Thakur .. Applicant.
 V/s

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 The State of Maharashtra ..Respondent.

¶6

 Mr. S.K. Chaurasiya i/b Mr. A.M. Saraogi for the
 applicant.

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 Mr. P.A. Pol, A.P.P. for the State.

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CORAM : S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J.
DATE : 24TH AUGUST, 2006.

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 P.C.

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 . The present applicant has been arrested pursuant
 to the FIR lodged on 24th January, 2005, being FIR No.
 31/2005.

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 2. The same was initially registered alleging
 offence under section 307 of Indian Penal Code. Later
 on, the injured succumbing to the injuries, the FIR was
 modified and section 302 was invoked.

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 3. It is unfortunate that the Courts below are not
 aware of the mandate of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
 Protection of Children ) Act, 2000. The applicant has
 specifically contended that he was born on 11th July,

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[2]

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 1987. On 24th January, 2005, when the incident took
 place he had completed 17 years of age. Unfortunately,
 the applicant who has been detained from 24th January,
 2005 in custody was not treated in accordance with the
 provisions of the above Act, but was dealt with like any
 other accused who has crossed the age of 18 years.

¶15

 4. Criminal Application No.2902 of 2005 was filed
 in this Court and argued on the basis that the applicant
 cannot get protection of the above Act. In such
 circumstances, and considering the gravity of the
 offence, this Court proceeded to reject the application
 on 3rd May, 2005. The result is that the applicant is
 languishing in custody.

¶16

 5. The applicant was produced before the Court/Board
 and was treated as an apparent juvenile. It appears
 from the record that the Sessions Court by an order
 dated 12th August, 2005 directed the Chief Judicial
 Magistrate, Pune to ascertain the age of the applicant
 and if the accused/applicant is found below 18 years,
 the case was to be sent to the Juvenile Court or Board.
 The learned APP points out that this enquiry has till
 not been concluded.

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[3]

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 6. Be that as it may, the applicant preferred the
 bail application being No.5259705/2005 on the basis that
 he is juvenile in conflict with law. The application
 was filed on July 2, 2005 and once again the applicant
 specifically contended that his date of birth is 11th
 July, 1987. In para 4 and 5 applicant contended thus:-

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 " (4) For ready reference, the applicant-accused
 invites kind attention of this Hon’ble Court to
 clause 2(iv) which read "To prescribe a uniform
 age of 18 years for both boys and girls" and
 this has not been done by the prosecution and
 also the Police and also the then Advocate
 appearing on behalf of the accused-applicant".
 It is submitted that the prosecution and also
 the Advocate of the accused have misled the
 Hon’ble Court in the wake whereof and in
 particular the reference about the age of the
 accused-applicant who was juvenile not being
 brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Court
 applications for bail were rightly rejected."

¶20

 (5)The accused-applicant as stated above was a
 juvenile on the date of the alleged incident
 i.e. 24th January, 2005 and still he is
 juvenile. Hence, it is just and fair, in the
 light of circumstances stated above, to
 designate the applicant-accused as being
 juvenile and to be sent to the Juvenile Court.
 In support of the said contention as produced
 herewith the Certificate of Birth Date of the
 applicant-accused issued by Smt. Usha Singh,
 Pradhan of Grampanchayat Manikpur, Tahsil
 Bansdih, District Balia (U.P.) and School
 leaving certificate is already in case file."

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 This application was placed before the Chief Judicial

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[4]

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 Magistrate, Pune, who rejected it by his order dated
 15th December, 2005.

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 7. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has
 treated the application as being made by the juvenile in
 Conflict with law. The learned Judge without
 application of mind and mechanically observed that the
 applicant cannot be released on bail because there is a
 possibility that he will continue such type of activity
 in future and he will involve himself with bad company.

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 8. It is pertinent to note that no material was
 placed by the prosecution in support of its alleged
 request not to release the applicant on bail because of
 a possibility that he will indulge in such type of
 activities in future. Today also the application is not
 opposed on this ground. The entire affidavit filed is
 silent to this vital aspect.

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 9. Yet, it is unfortunate that the learned

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 Magistrate rejected the application only by holding that
 the applicant is involved in serious offence.

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 10. The agony of the applicant does not end here

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[5]

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 because he was advised to file a criminal appeal against
 the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pune.
 The appeal was purportedly filed under section 52 of the
 Juvenile Justice Act.

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 11. The appeal was also dismissed despite holding
 that the age of the applicant/appellant at the time of
 alleged incident was 17 years. The learned Sessions
 Judge also did not apply his mind to a vital aspect,
 although he has referred to section 12 of the Act.

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 12. In paragraph 9 and 10 of the Sessions Court
 order this what has observed.

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 " (9) Admittedly, the appellant has been
 juvenile in conflict with law and his case is
 also pending before the Court of Chief Judicial
 Magistrate, Pune, for hearing. The age of
 appellant, at the time of alleged incident, was
 17 years. Moreover, he is not residing in
 Maharashtra. It is important to note that as
 per observations of the learned Chief Judicial
 Magistrate, Pune, that the present juvenile in
 conflict with law assaulted deceased by means of
 iron pipe, due to which the deceased sustained
 head injury and succumbed to it. The nature of
 the offence is serious one and if he is enlarged
 on bail, there is possibility that he will
 continue such a type of activity in future and
 he will involve with the bad company."

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 "(10) It is an admitted fact that the appellant
 has not completed his age of 18 years on the
 date of alleged incident. The certified copy of

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[6]

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 charge-sheet very well shows that the juvenile
 in conflict with law has committed non-bailable
 offence of committing murder, which is
 punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
 Code. No doubt, as per the provisions of
 Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
 Protection of Children ) Act, 2000, when any
 person accused of bailable or non-bailable
 offence, and apparently a juvenile is arrested
 or detained, he be released on bail with or
 without surety, but he shall not be so released
 if there appear reasonable grounds for believing
 that the release is likely to bring him to
 association with any known criminal or expose
 him to moral, physical or psychological danger
 or that his release would defeat the ends of
 justice."

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 13. Thus, aggrieved by the orders dated 15th
 December, 2005 and 7th March, 2006 the present

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 application for bail has been filed by the applicant.

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 14. Mr. Chaurasiya appearing for the applicant

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 contended that once the applicant is held to be a

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 juvenile in conflict with law and his application is
 dealt with as such then none can ignore the mandate of

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 section 12 of the Act. He invites my attention to
 section 12 and submits that this Section is at par with
 the earlier section 18. In other words, the repealed
 Act of 1986 contained identical provision. He pointed
 out that a bare reading of the same would indicate that

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 it overrides General law, and when it comes to a

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[7]

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 juvenile the mandate is that he is to be released on

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 bail however, if there are reasonable grounds for
 believing that the release is likely to bring him into
 association with any known criminal or expose him to
 moral, physical or psychological danger or that relief
 would defeat the ends of justice, then bail can be
 refused. It is contended by Mr. Chaurasiya that no
 such material was ever produced save and except the bare
 words and that is how the orders under challenge read.
 He submits that the learned Sessions Judge has not found
 that bail would defeat the ends of justice and therefore
 he should not be released.

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 15. The learned A.P.P. supports the impugned orders
 and contends that there is no absolute right of release
 on bail and section 12 has to be read accordingly.
 Hence, considering that the enquiry into the age of the
 applicant being pending, this is not a fit case where
 this court should consider the request for enlarging the
 application on bail. Accordingly he submits that the
 application be rejected. He further submits that the
 applicant has suppressed from the learned Magistrate
 that the enquiry into the age of the applicant was
 directed by the learned Sessions Judge, which enquiry is

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 inconclusive. In such circumstances, no discretion be
 exercised in favour of the applicant and application be
 dismissed.

¶50

 15A. A Juvenile has been defined in Section 2 (k) to
 mean a person who has not completed eighteen year of
 age. "Juvenile in conflict with law" is a term defined
 in section 2(l) to mean a juvenile who is alleged to
 have committed an offence.

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 16. In the instant case, the Courts below have
 failed to appreciate that section 3 of the Act permits
 continuation of inquiry in respect of juvenile who has
 ceased to be juvenile. So also, the provisions of
 Section 49 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 contemplate
 an enquiry but it should be conducted expeditiously.
 The applicant is in custody although, he is asserting
 that his age is 17 years on the relevant date and he
 continues to be a Juvenile. He is neither released from
 custody nor the enquiry is conducted expeditiously.

¶52

 17. Chapter II deals with Juvenile in conflict with
 law. After setting out provisions pertaining to
 constitution of Board, section 7 provides for procedure

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 to be followed by a Magistrate not empowered under the

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 Act. Section 7 reads thus:-

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 "(1) When any Magistrate not empowered to
 exercise the powers of a Board under this Act is
 of the opinion that a person brought before him
 under any of the provisions of this Act ( other
 than for the purpose of giving evidence), is a
 juvenile or the child, he shall without any
 delay record such opinion and forward the
 juvenile or the child and the record of the
 proceeding to the competent authority having
 jurisdiction over the proceeding.

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 (2) The competent authority to which the
 proceeding is forwarded under Sub-section (1)
 shall hold the inquiry as if the juvenile or the
 child had originally been brought before it."

¶58

 18. Section 12 of the Act with which the Courts
 below were concerned reads as under;-

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 "(1) When any person accused of a bailable or
 non-bailable offence, and apparently a juvenile, is
 arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a
 Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything
 contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ( 2 of
 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force,
 be released on bail with or without surety but he shall
 not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds
 for believing that the release is likely to bring him
 into association with any known criminal or expose him o
 moral, physical or psychological danger or that his
 release would defeat the ends of justice.

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 (2) When such person having been arrested is not
 released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Officer in
 charge of the police station, such officer shall cause
 him to be kept only in an observation home in the
 prescribed manner until he can be brought before a
 Board.

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 (3) When such person is not released on bail under
 sub-section (1) by the Board it shall, instead of
 committing him to prison, make an order sending him to

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 an observation home or a place of safety for such period
 during the pendency of the inquiry regarding him as may
 be specified in the order."

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 19. Sub-Section (1) provides that when any person

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 accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence and

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 apparently a juvenile, is arrested or detained or

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 appears or is brought before a Board,. such person

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 shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
 Criminal Procedure, or in any other law for the time
 being in force, be released on bail with or without
 surety but he shall not be so released, if there appear
 reasonable grounds for believing that the release is
 likely to bring him into association with any known
 criminal or expose him to moral, physical or

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 psychological danger or that his release would defeat
 the ends of justice. In this case such a material is
 not placed before the Court nor on the basis of

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 allegation made such an inference can be drawn straight
 way, without any even prima facie material in that
 behalf. However, no general rule can be laid down, and
 it must ultimately depend on the facts and circumstances
 of each case.

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 20. However, it is of some importance to note that
 even if a person is arrested and not released on bail

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 [11]

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 under Sub-Section (2) and (3) the mandate is that
 Officer-in-charge of Police station shall cause him to
 be kept only in an observation home in the prescribed
 manner until he can be brought before a Board.
 Sub-Section (3) provides that when such person is not
 released on bail under subsection (1) by the Board it
 shall, instead of committing him to prison, make an
 order sending him to an observation home or a place of
 safety for such period during the pendency of the
 inquiry regarding him as may be specified in the order.

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 21. After noticing the observations in the orders
 under challenge it is clear that the Courts below have
 proceeded on the basis that at the relevant time the age
 of juvenile in conflict with law was 17 years. That he
 has been dealt with as such is clear from the above
 reproduced observations and findings. In such
 circumstances, and when the learned Sessions Judge was
 aware of the provisions, the Courts below could not have
 directed that the applicant be kept in custody. In para
 12 and 13 of the order the learned Session Judge
 concludes that the applicant has no permanent residence
 in Maharashtra State or particularly, in Pune. He has
 no relatives in Maharashtra. The applicant does not

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 [12]

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 dispute this position. However, the learned Sessions
 Judge observed that the offence is serious and
 mechanically reproduced the subsequent wordings of
 section 12 without there being any material placed on
 record and rejected the appeal. Consequently, the order
 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is confirmed.
 Resultantly, the applicant continues to be detained in
 custody.

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 22. These are not satisfactory state of affairs at
 all. Section 12 does not permit detention even if the
 inquiry into the age is pending. Even if the person is
 a apparent juvenile the provisions are applicable.
 Adherence to these provisions does not mean that the
 Board/Court is helpless in the matter. Even while
 sending a apparent juvenile to an Observation Home the
 Board can issue such further directions as would not
 hamper investigations so also ensure that the juvenile
 is available for enquiry and trial. The Observation
 Home can be directed along with investigating machinery
 to take such precautionary measures as are provided in
 law and ensure protection of juveniles and their
 attendance for enquiry and trial. The provisions of the
 Act which are meant to protect and safeguard the

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 interest of children and specially juveniles so also
 juvenile in conflict with law ought to receive an
 interpretation which would advance its object and
 purpose and not defeat it. All concerned ought to be
 aware that while dealing with juveniles there is
 responsibility and duty to see that they are not
 encouraged to take to crime even if they are guilty,
 prima facie, of commission of a serious offence. The
 Supreme Court in the Case of Sheela Barse V. Union of
India reported in AIR 1986 SC 1773 has observed as

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 under:-

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 "We made an Order on 12th July, 1986 issuing a
 various directions in regard to physically and
 mentally retarded children as also abandoned or
 destitute children who are lodged in a various]
 jails in the country for "safecustody". We also
 directed the Director General of Doordarshan as
 also the Director General of All India Radio to
 give publicity seeking co-operation of
 non-governmental social service organisations in
 the task of rehabilitation of these children.
 We were extremely pained and anguished that
 these children should be kept in jail instead of
 being properly looked after, given adequate
 medical treatment and imparted training in
 various skills which would make them independent
 and self-reliant. Some years ago we came out

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 with a National Policy for the Welfare of
 children which contained the following
 preambulatory declaration:-

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 "The nation’s children are a supremely important
 asset. Their nurture and solicitude are our
 responsibility. Children’s programmes should
 find a prominent part in our national plans for
 the development of human resources, so that our
 children grow up to become robust citizens,
 physically fit, mentally alert and morally
 healthy, endowed with the skill and motivations
 needed by society. Equal opportunities for
 development to all children during the period of
 growth should be our aim, for this would serve
 our large purpose of reducing inequality and
 ensuring social justice."

¶85

 If a child is a national asset, it is the duty
 of the State to look after the child with a view
 to ensuring full development of its personality.
That is why all the statutes dealing with
children provide that a child shall not be kept
in jail. Even apart from this statutory
prescription it is elementary that a jail is
hardly a place where a child should be kept.
 There can be no doubt that incarceration in jail
would have the effect of dwarfing the
development of the child, exposing him to
baneful influences, coarsening his conscience
and alienating him from the society. it is
 matter of regret that despite statutory

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 provisions and frequent exhortations by social
 scientists, there are still large number of
 children in different jails in the country as
 now evident from the reports of the survey made
 by the District Judges pursuant to our order
 dated 15th April, 1986. Even where children are
accused of offences, they must not be kept in
jails. It is no answer on the part of the State
to say that it has not got enough number of
remand homes or observation homes or other
places where children can be kept and that is
why they are lodged in jails. It is also no
answer on the part of the State to urge that the
ward in jail where the children are kept is
separate from the ward in which the other
prisoners are detained. It is the atmosphere of
the jail which has a highly injurious effect on
the mind of the child, estranging him from the
society and breeding in him aversion bordering
on the hatred against a system which keeps him
in jail. We would therefore like once again to
impress upon the State Governments that they
must set up necessary remand homes and
observation homes where children accused of an
offence can be lodged pending investigation and
trial. On no account should the children be
kept in jail and if a State Government has not
got sufficient accommodation in its remand homes
or observation homes, the children should be
released on bail instead of being subjected to
incarceration in jail."

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 The problem of detention of children accused on
 an offence would become much more easy of
 solution if the investigation by the police and
 the trial by the Magistrate could be expedited.
 The report of survey made by District Judges
 show that in some places children have been in
 jail for quite long periods. We fail to see why
 investigation into offences alleged to have been
 committed by children cannot be completed
 quickly and equally, why can the trial not take
 place within a reasonable time after the filing
 of the charge-sheet. Really speaking, the trial
 of children must take place in the Juvenile
 Courts and not in the regular criminal Courts.
 There are special provisions enacted in various
 statutes relating to children providing for
 trial by Juvenile Courts in accordance with a
 special procedure intended to safeguard the
 interest and welfare of children, but, we find
 that in many of the States there are no Juvenile
 Courts functioning at all and even where there
 are Juvenile Courts, they are nothing but a
 replica of the ordinary criminal Courts, only
 the label being changed. The same Magistrate
 who sits in the ordinary criminal Court goes and
 sits in the Juvenile Court and mechanically
 tries cases against children. It is absolutely
 essential, and this is something which we wish
 to impress upon the State Government with all
 the earnestness at our command, that they must
 set up Juvenile Courts, one in each district,
 and there must be a special cadre of Magistrate

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 who must be suitably trained for dealing with
 cases against children. They may also do other
 criminal work, if the work of Juvenile Court is
 not sufficient to engage them fully, but they
 must have proper and adequate training for
 dealing with cases against juveniles, because
 these cases require a different type of
 procedure and qualitatively a different kind of
 approach."

¶92

 23. In my view, therefore, the approach of the
 Courts below cannot be sustained. The continuous
 detention of the applicant is, prima facie, illegal.
 However, without remitting the matter back for fresh
 consideration of the application and since prima facie
 observations have now been made with regard to the age
 of the applicant, interest of justice would be
 subserved, if the applicant is directed to be shifted
 from custody to an observation home in Pune. The
 applicant shall be shifted within a period of one week
 from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The
 applicant shall be shifted and kept at the observation
 or shelter home till the conclusion of the enquiry after
 which it would be open for the Courts below to pass such
 orders as per permissible in law.

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 24. However, Shri Pol learned A.P.P. request that

¶95

 some time frame be determined for conclusion of the
 pending enquiry into the age of the applicant. This
 request is reasonable and the said enquiry be completed
 by the competent authority/board as expeditiously as
 possible and within a period of eight weeks from the
 date of receipt of this order. None dispute that the
 enquiry is crucial. It is upon the outcome of the same
 that all further proceedings would depend. In a
 decision reported in AIR 2000 SC 2264(Arnit Das V.
State of Bihar) the Supreme Court while construing
 similar provisions under the old Juvenile Act observed

¶96

 thus:-

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 "There are several provisions in the Act which
 provide for first appearance of the person
 before the competent authority, Competent
 Authority has been defined in clause (d) of
 Section 2 to mean, in relation of neglected
 juveniles, a Juvenile Welfare Board constituted
 under Section 4 of the Act and, in relation to
 delinquent juveniles, juvenile Court and where
 no such Board or Juvenile Court has been
 constituted, includes any Court empowered under
 sub-section (2) of Section 7 to exercise the
 powers conferred on board or Juvenile Court,
 Under sub-section (2) of Section 7 where no
 Board of Juvenile Court has been constituted for
 any area, the powers conferred on the Board or
 the Juvenile Court by or under the Act shall be
 exercised in that area by the District
 Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or
 any Metropolitan or Judicial Magistrate of the
 First Class, as the case may be. The powers
 conferred on the Board or Juvenile Court may

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¶99

 also be exercised by the High Court and the
 Court of Sessions when the proceedings comes
 before them in appeal, revision or otherwise."

¶100

 "The use of the word ’is’ at two places in
 sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Act read in
 conjunction with ’a person brought before it’
 also suggests that the competent authority is
 required to record the finding by reference to
 an even in praesenti before it, i.e. by
 reference to the date when the person is brought
 before it and not by reference to a remote event
 i.e. the date on which the offence was
 committed.

¶101

 During the course of hearing the Court posed a
 question to Shri U.R. Lalit, the learned Senior
 Counsel for the appellant- What happens if a boy
 or a girl of just less than 16 or 18 years of
 age commits an offence and then leaves the
 country or for any reasons neither appears nor
 is brought before the competent authority until
 he or she attains the age of say 50 years? If
 the interpretation suggested by the learned
 Senior Counsel for the appellants were to be
 accepted, he shall have to be sent to juvenile
 home, special home or an observation home or
 entrusted to an after-care organisation where
 there would all be boys and girls of less than
 16 or 18 years of age. Would he be required to
 be dealt by a Juvenile Welfare Board or a
 Juvenile Court? The learned Senior Counsel,
 with all the wits at his command, had no answer
 till the end and had to give up ultimately. We
 are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the
 procedure prescribed by the provisions of the
 Act has to be adopted only when the competent
 authority finds the person brought before it or
 appearing before it is found to be under 16
 years of age if a boy and under 18 years of age
 if a girls on the date of being so brought or
 such appearance first before the competent
 authority. The date of the commission of
 offence is irrelevant for finding out whether
 the person is a juvenile within the meaning of
 clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act. If that
 would have been the intendment of the

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¶103

 Parliament, nothing had prevented it from say so
 specially."

¶104

 "Section 3 of the Act also provides a clue to
 the legislative intent. It provides for an
 enquiry initiated against the juvenile being
 continued and orders made thereon even if such
 person had ceased to be a juvenile during the
 course of such enquiry. There would have been
 no need of enacting section 3 if only the age of
 the juvenile would have been determinable by
 reference to the date of the offence".

¶105

 All this exercise would have been avoided if
 only the Legislature would have taken care not
 to leave an ambiguity in the definition of
 juvenile and would have clearly specified the
 point of time by reference to which the age was
 to be determined to find a person a juvenile.
 The ambiguity can be resolved by taking into
 consideration the Preamble and the Statement of
 Objects and Reasons. The Preamble suggests what
 Act was intended to deal with. If the language
 used by Parliament is ambiguous the Court is
 permitted to look in to the preamble for
 construing the provisions of an Act (M/s
 Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. and M/s East Indian
 Coal Co. Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC
 954). A preamble of a statute has been said to
 be a good means of finding out its meaning and,
 as it were, the key of understanding of it, said
 this Court in A Thangal Kunju Musliar V. M.
 Venkatachalam Potti, AIR 1956 S.C. 246. The
 Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative
 intent. If the words employed in an enactment
 may spell a doubt as to their meaning it would
 be useful to so interpret the enactment as to
 harmonise it with the object which the
 Legislature had in its view. The Legislative
 aims and objectives set out in the earlier part
 of this judgment go to show that this
 Legislation has been made for taking care of the
 care and custody of juvenile during
 investigation, inquiry and trial, i.e. from a
 point of time when the juvenile is available to
 the law administration and justice delivery
 system; it does not make any provision for a

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 [21]

¶107

 person involved in an offence by reference to
 the date of its commission by him. The long
 title of the Act too suggests that the content
 of the Act is the justice-aspect relating to
 juveniles."

¶108

 "We make it clear that we have not dealt with
 the provisions of Chapter VI dealing with
 special offences in respect of juveniles. Prima
 facie, we feel that the view which we have taken
 would create no difficulty even in assigning
 meaning to the term juvenile as occurring in
 Chapter VI (Sections 41 to 45) of the Act
 because a juvenile covered by any of these
 provisions is likely to fall within the
 definition of neglected juvenile as defined in
 Clause (1) of Section 2 who shall also have to
 be dealt with by a Juvenile Board under Chapter
 III of the Act and the view taken by us would
 hold the field there as well. However, we
 express no opinion on the scope of Chapter VI of
 the Act and leave that aspect to be taken care
 of in a suitable case. At any rate in the
 present context we need not vex our mind on that
 aspect. Section 2 which defines ’juvenile’ and
 ’neglected juvenile’ itself begins by saying
 that the words defined therein would have the
 assigned meaning unless the context otherwise
 requires. So far as the present context is
 concerned we are clear in our mind that the
 crucial date of determining the question whether
 a person is juvenile is the date when he is
 brought before the competent authority."

¶109

 25. The trial has been already expedited by this

¶110

 Court. Shri Chaurasiya makes a serious grievance that
 the trial ought to have been concluded within a period
 of 6 months, as stipulated in this Courts order. The
 period of more than a year has lapsed from the date of
 this Court’s order but there is no progress. The

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¶112

 Juvenile Justice Board or the Court which is seized of

¶113

 the case shall decide the same as expeditiously as
 possible and in any event by 31st January, 2007, failing
 which this Court will proceed to hold that there is
 breach of direction issued earlier as well as today and
 take such action as is permissible in law against all
 concerned.

¶114

 26. It is clarified that if the enquiry results in a
 finding that the applicant is entitled to the protection
 of the Juvenile Justice Act then the said enactment must
 apply. Otherwise, the provisions of General Law
 (Cr.P.C.) will apply with full force. I have not
 expressed any opinion on this aspect and all contentions
 in that behalf are kept open. Similarly, no opinion is

¶115

 expressed on the merits of the matter.

¶116

 ( S.C. DHARMADHIKARI,J.)

Raju Ranjan Singh @ Guddusingh Thakkur v. the State of Maharashtra

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Raju Ranjan Singh @ Guddusingh Thakkur v. the State of Maharashtra

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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