Dismissed

Chetna Chandrakant Todankar v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

Bombay HC7 Mar 2005WP/2427/2004

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this petition challenging an order of detention under the MPDA Act, the Court held that the order was not bad-in-law. Although one ground was vague, it was severable from other valid grounds. The Court found that conditional bail did not vitiate the detention order and that the accumulated activities justified preventive detention.

What did the court decide?

Petition dismissed; detention order upheld; rule discharged with no order as to costs.

Chetna Chandrakant Todankar Vs A.N. Roy and… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Bombay HC (2005)

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2427 OF 2004

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 Mrs.Chetna Chandrakant Todankar, )
 Age 34 years, R/o.Room No.245, )
 Janata Colony, Worli-Koliwada, )
 Mumbai - 400 030. )..Petitioner

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Vs.

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 1. Shri A.N.Roy, )
 Commissioner of Police, )
 Bombay. )
 2. The State of Maharashtra, )
 3. The Superintendent, )
 Nasik Road Central Prison, )
 Nasik. )..Respondents

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--

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 Shri U.N.Tripathi for the petitioner.

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 Shri D.S.Mhaispurkar for the respondents.

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--

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 CORAM : R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR &
 P.V.KAKADE, JJ.

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 DATED : 7th March, 2005.

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ORAL JUDGMENT : ( Per R.M.S.Khandeparkar, J )

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 1. Heard. Perused the records. The petitioner
 challenges the order of detention passed under the
 Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of

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 Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous
 Persons Act, 1981, hereinafter referred to as "MPDA
 Act", dated 19th August, 2004 against the husband of
 the petitioner, viz. Chandrakant Prabhakar Todankar,
 on four grounds.

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 2. The materials on record disclose that the
 C.R.No.136 of 2004 came to be registered against the
 detenu at Dadar Police Station on 22nd June, 2004
 under Sections 387, 323, 506(ii) read with 34 of
 Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 3 and 25 of Arms
 Act, pursuant to the complaint lodged by one Shri
 Ramkrishna Genu More. The detenu applied for
 anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court on 9th
 July, 2004 which came to be rejected on 12th July,
 2004. The detenu was arrested on 13th July, 2004. He
 was remanded to the custody from time to time till
 23rd July, 2004. He was released on bail on 23rd
 July, 2004, pursuant to the order passed by the
 learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th
 Court, Dadar, on execution of the bond in the sum of
 Rs.7,000/- with one solvent surety in the like amount
 and on the condition that he should report at Dadar
 Police Station daily between 7.00 p.m. to 9.00 p.m.
 until further order. The bail facility was availed by
 the detenu from 26th July, 2004. Meanwhile, in-camera

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 statement of the Witness "A" came to be recorded on
 25th June, 2004, and another in-camera statement of
 the Witness "B" came to be recorded on 28th June,
 2004. The sponsoring authority proposed detention
 under the provisions of MPDA Act against the detenu on
 23rd July, 2004, and ultimately the order of detention
 came to be passed on 19th August, 2004. The same was
 served upon the detenu on 20th August, 2004.

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 3. The first ground of challenge to the impugned
 order of detention is that the subjective satisfaction
 of the detaining authority for the purpose of issuance
 of order of detention against the detenu is being
 vitiated since the detaining authority failed to take
 into consideration the fact that the detenu though was
 released on bail, the same was subject to his daily
 attendants at Dadar Police Station between 7.00 p.m.
 to 9.00 p.m., and there was no complaint of any
 violation of the terms of the bail order nor the
 records disclose any attempt on the part of the
 investigating agency to seek cancellation of the bail,
 and that therefore, there was no case for clamping
 detention order against the detenu and in that regard,
 the detaining authority even failed to take note of
 the settled law that the detention is not substitute
 for punishment. Reliance is placed in the decision of

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 the Apex Court in the matter of Ramesh Yadav v.
District Magistrate, Etah & Ors., reported in AIR 1986
 SC 315. The contention of the petitioner in that
 regard is sought to be countered on behalf of the
 respondents while drawing attention to the
 affidavit-in-reply by the detaining authority wherein
 it has been stated that imposing condition of daily
 reporting at the police station did not sufficiently
 prevent the detenu from acting in any manner
 prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order,
 and taking into consideration the overall materials
 placed before the detaining authority including the
 order regarding grant of conditional bail and
 in-camera statements of the witnesses, the detaining
 authority was subjectively satisfied that the order of
 detention was the only remedy to curb prejudicial
 activities of the detenu.

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 4. The Apex Court in Ramesh Yadav’s case (supra),

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 and particularly in the paragraph 6 thereof to which
 the attention was drawn had observed that the order of
 detention was passed as the detaining authority was
 apprehensive that in case the detenu was to be
 released on bail, he would have again carried out his
 criminal activities in the area. Considering the
 same, the Apex Court had held that "if the

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 apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the
 bail application had to be opposed and in case bail
 was granted, challenge against that order in the
 higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground
 that an accused in detention as an undertrial prisoner
 was likely to get bail, an order of detention under
 the National Security Act should not ordinarily be
 passed." That was a case wherein the detenu was
 already in the jail as an undertrial prisoner in
 connection with certain pending criminal cases.
 Besides, Allahabad High Court had already quashed the
 earlier order of detention dated 7th December, 1981 by
 its order dated 27th May, 1982 in Writ Petition
 No.2649 of 1982. The order challenged before the Apex
 Court was dated 16th September, 1984. It is to be
 noted that the ruling of the Apex Court was in the
 peculiar facts of that case wherein the grounds of
 detention mentioned that "At this time you were
 detained in the District Jail, Mainpuri and you have
 filed an application for bail in the Court of law
 which is fixed for hearing on September 17, 1984, and
 there is positive apprehension that after having bail
 you will come out of the jail and I am convinced that
 after being released on bail you will indulge in
 activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public
 order." Obviously, the order of detention was passed

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 one day prior to the hearing of the detenu’s
 application for bail which was fixed on 17th
 September, 1984. In the background of those facts,
 the observations regarding need for opposing bail
 application were made in the said decision. Those
 observations having been made in the peculiar set of
 facts, the same cannot be applied to the case in hand
 where the facts are totally different in nature. It
 is well settled law, as laid down by the Apex Court in

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Union of India & Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi & Ors.,
 reported in (1996)6 SCC 44, as also in Smt.Kesar Devi
v, Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 2003 SC 4195

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 that the ratio of a judgment is to be understood by
 considering the fact of the case, points raised and
 adjudicated therein and the ruling delivered on such
 points. In fact, in Kesar Devi’s case (supra), the

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 Apex Court had clearly ruled that - "the judgment of a
 Court has not to be interpreted like a Statute where
 every word, as far as possible, has to be given a
 literal meaning and no word is to be ignored. The
 observations made have to be understood in the context
 of the facts and contentions raised." It is also well
 settled that every decision is an authority for what
 it actually decides and not what follows from it.

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 Being so, the decision in Ramesh Yadav’s case (supra)
 is of no help to the petitioner either in relation to

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 the first ground of challenge or for that matter even
 in relation to other grounds of challenge.

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 5. As regards the contention that on account of
 conditional bail being granted, there was no occasion
 for the detenu to indulge in the activities
 prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and
 that there was failure on the part of the detaining
 authority to consider the same, it is to be noted that
 apart from the grounds of detention, the
 affidavit-in-reply clearly discloses that the

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 detaining authority did take into consideration the
 fact that the detenu was released on conditional bail,
 as well as the fact that the same was not sufficient
 to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial
 to the maintenance of public order and clamping of
 detention order was the only remedy. Undoubtedly, the
 law of detention is to prevent future activities on
 the part of a person to be detained and it is not to
 be used as punitive action. Merely because the
 authorities did not move for cancellation of the bail,
 that will not amount to vitiate the subjective
 satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority
 against the detenu in each and every case. It is also
 to be borne in mind that the order relating to the
 bail is in relation to the offence to which

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 investigation is carried out and charge-sheet is
 filed, whereas the order of detention in question does
 not relate to only one instance which is referred to
 in the charge-sheet. Undoubtedly, the order of
 detention has been issued after taking into

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 consideration the various activities of the detenu
 disclosed from the investigation as well as the
 in-camera statements of the witnesses. That apart,
 the conditional bail merely required the attendance of
 the detenu at the police station for a period of two
 hours every day. That apart, criteria for grant of
 bail and the criteria to be followed to ascertain the
 need for detention of a person in custody, though in
 some aspects may be overlapping, are not essentially
 the same. The preventive detention is necessarily to

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 prevent a person from indulging in an illegal
 activities in future. Being so, taking into
 consideration the grounds in support of detention
 order and the explanation furnished by the detaining
 authority in the affidavit-in-reply, the first ground
 of challenge is to be held as being without any
 substance.

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 6. The second ground of challenge to the impugned
 order of detention is that the first ground in support
 of the detention order as far as it relates to the

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 statement of the complainant Ramkrishna Genu More is
 concerned, is totally vague and does not disclose
 details of the allegations made against the detenu
 thereby resulting in great prejudice to the detenu as
 it adversely affects his right to make effective
 representation available and assured to him under
 Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, and
 therefore, the order of detention is bad-in-law.
 Referring to the paragraph 5(a)(i) of the grounds of
 detention, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has
 submitted that the ground therein reads that "Shri
 Ramkrishna Genu More is aware that several criminal
 cases are registered against you and your associate
 Pramod @ Popatya Adsul and you were arrested in those
 cases. You and your associates had extorted money
 from Shri Ramkrishna Genu More on many occasions." The
 learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that
 neither the grounds in support of detention order
 disclose which were those several criminal cases
 registered against the detenu nor the same disclose on
 what occasion the detenu had extorted the money from
 the said Ramkrishna Genu More, nor any materials
 regarding the said criminal cases were disclosed, and
 yet the detaining authority has arrived at the
 subjective satisfaction regarding the need for
 issuance of detention order against the detenu based

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 on such vague ground.

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 7. According to the learned Advocate for the
 petitioner, since it is not permissible for the
 detaining authority to arrive at the subjective
 satisfaction based on such vague ground and excluding
 the C.R.No.136 of 2004, there are only two in-camera
 statements and they being merely corroborative pieces
 of materials in support of the said C.R., the same

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 cannot be read independently, and in that regard, no
 assistance can be derived from Section 5A of MPDA Act,
 and in such cases, no ground can be severable from
 other grounds. Reliance is placed in the decision in

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 the matter of Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of
U.P. & Anr., reported in (1990) 2 SCC 629 as well as

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 of Division Bench of this Court in Mrs.Jainab Sale

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Mohammed v. M.N.Singh, Commissioner of Police & Ors.,

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 reported in 2002 ALL MR (Cri) 2305. The said
 challenge is sought to be countered on behalf of the
 respondents by contending that the statement in
 paragraph 5(a)(i) in the grounds in support of the
 detention order is merely a passing reference to the
 facts stated therein in order to complete the
 narration of events in the complaint lodged by the
 complainant and the detaining authority has not relied
 upon the said narration for the purpose of arriving at

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 the subjective satisfaction regarding need for
 issuance of the detention order against the detenu.
 Without prejudice, it is sought to be contended that,
 assuming that the detaining authority is not able to
 establish one of the grounds comprised under the
 grounds in support of the detention order, the order
 of detention can be justified on remaining grounds by
 resorting to the provisions of Section 5A of the MPDA
 Act, and in that regard, reliance is sought to be

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 placed in the decisions in the matter of Prabhakar
Menka Shetty v. S.Ramamurthy, Commissioner of Police
for Greater Bombay & Ors., reported in 1993 Cri.L.J.
 1981, of the Apex Court in Attorney General for India
etc.etc. v. Amratlal Prajivandas & Ors. etc.etc.,
 reported in 1995 Cri.L.J. 426, of Kamarunnissa v.

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Union of India & Anr., reported in 1991 Cri.L.J.
 2058, and of Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v. The Police
Commissioner & Anr., reported in AIR 1989 SC 1282.

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 8. Plain reading of the grounds of detention
 discloses that the detaining authority, after taking
 into consideration all the facts recorded in paragraph
 5 of the grounds in support of the detention order,
 has arrived at the subjective satisfaction about the
 detenu being a dangerous person within the meaning of
 the said expression under MPDA Act and the need for

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 issuance of detention order against him.
 Undisputedly, the fact relating to the statement by
 Ramkrishna Genu More alleging the involvement of the
 detenu in criminal cases as well as extortion of money
 from the said Ramkrishna More by the detenu have been
 narrated in the said paragraph 5 of the grounds in
 support of the detention order. In the circumstances,
 the contention which is now sought to be raised in the
 affidavit-in-reply that it is merely a passing
 reference to complete the narration of events is to be
 rejected as being totally devoid of substance.
 Reading of the grounds of detention apparently
 discloses that the detaining authority has taken into
 consideration even the allegations made by Shri
 Ramkrishna More regarding the criminal cases having
 been registered against the detenu and the allegation
 regarding extortion of money from the said Shri
 Ramkrishna More by the detenu on many occasions.
 Undoubtedly, there is no reference to the particulars
 regarding the alleged criminal cases or the alleged
 extortion of money. The learned Advocate for the
 petitioner is justified in contending that the detenu
 is entitled to make effective representation against
 the order of detention, and therefore the grounds in
 support of the detention order should be clear and
 should not be vague. As the said ground does not

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 disclose details regarding the alleged criminal cases
 stated to have been registered against the detenu and
 the alleged extortion of money from Shri Ramkrishna
 Genu More, certainly the detenu was prejudiced in that
 regard in making effective representation, and the
 said order of detention based on the said ground
 cannot be sustained on that count. However, as
 submitted by the learned APP that the order of
 detention is not based solely on the said ground, but
 there are two more grounds, and undisputedly, the said
 grounds disclose the activities of the nature of
 extortion of money, and therefore, there was
 sufficient cause for the detaining authority to arrive
 at the subjective satisfaction for the purpose of
 issuance of detention order against the detenu. The
 contention that the said two grounds in support of the
 detention order are subsidiary to the main ground
 revealed from the said C.R.No.136 of 2004, and
 therefore, cannot be read independently, is a
 far-fetched argument, as those grounds clearly
 disclose that the activities of the detenu on
 different occasions were sufficient to arrive at the
 subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for
 issuance of detention order. The Apex Court in
Amratlal Prajivandas’s case (supra) had clearly held
 that where an order of detention is made on more than

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 one ground, it must be deemed that there are as many
 orders of detention as there are grounds, which means
 that each of such orders is an independent order, and
 therefore, when an order is supported by more than one
 ground, and one or more grounds are found to be vague
 or irrelevant, nevertheless the order can be justified
 on the remaining valid ground or grounds. Considering
 the same, while holding the first ground to be
 invalid, it cannot be said that the impugned order of
 detention is totally bad-in-law.

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 9. The decision in Kamarunnissa’s case (supra) is
 of no relevancy to the matter in hand. In the said
 case, it was held that, if an incidental reference is
 made to some part of the investigation concerning a
 co-accused in the grounds of detention which is not
 relevant as far as the case set up against the detenu
 is concerned, the detenu cannot contend that he was
 denied the right to make an effective representation,
 on account of non-supply of copies of the documents in
 relation to the incidents so referred. That is not
 the case in hand. The averment in paragraph 5(a)(i)
 of the grounds in support of the detention order
 specifically refers to the allegation against the
 detenu by the complainant without giving any details
 regarding the allegation, and the said allegation was

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 certainly taken into consideration by the detaining
 authority while arriving at the subjective
 satisfaction regarding need for issuance of detention
 order against the detenu.

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 10. The Division Bench of this Court in Prabhakar

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Menka Shetty’s case (supra), after taking into
 consideration the various earlier decisions, had held
 that "even if one or more of the grounds fail on the
 ground of non-supply of the documents thereby
 infringing Article 22(5), the said infringement will
 not invalidate the order if it can be sustained on the
 basis of the remaining grounds wherein the
 constitutional requirements of Article 22(5) are
 complied with."

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 11. The decision in Vashisht Narain Karwaria’s

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case (supra) is of no help to the petitioner as that
 was the case wherein the detention order was based on
 single ground and once it was found that the same was
 based on some extraneous materials, there was no
 question of applicability of the provisions of Section
 5A of MPDA Act. That is not the case in the matter in
 hand.

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 12. The decision of Division Bench in Mrs.Jainab

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Sale Mohammed’s case (supra) is absolutely of no
 relevance as that was the decision delivered in the
 peculiar facts of that case which were not similar to
 those in the case in hand.

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 13. In Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal’s case (supra),

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 the detaining authority had taken into account a
 non-existing fact for arriving at the subjective
 satisfaction for issuance of detention order. In that
 case, when the order of detention was passed, a vital
 fact, viz. acquittal of detenu in two of the cases
 relied upon in the grounds of detention, was not
 brought to the notice of the detaining authority, and
 on the other hand, the said information was withheld
 and the detaining authority was given to understand
 that the trial of those cases were pending, and
 therefore, non placement of the material fact, viz.
 the acquittal of detenu in two of the cases, was held
 to have resulted in non-application of mind by the
 detaining authority rendering the impugned detention
 order invalid. Referring to the said judgment, it was
 sought to be contended that there were five cases
 which were referred to for arriving at the subjective
 satisfaction of the detaining authority for need of
 issuance of detention order. However, because there
 was suppression of relevant materials by the

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 sponsoring authority, the order of detention was held
 to be bad-in-law, even after referring to Section 6 of
 Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act,
 1985, which is in pari materia with Section 5A of MPDA
 Act. There is no dispute that Section 6 of Gujarat
 Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 is in
 pari materia with Section 5A of MPDA Act. However, it
 is pertinent to note that the Apex Court has nowhere
 considered the applicability of the said section 6 to
 the detention order which was under consideration in
 the said case. Being so, the same cannot be held to
 be laying down the law on the point regarding
 applicability of the provisions of Section 5A of MPDA
 Act and for that matter, Section 6 of Gujarat
 Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, and

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 therefore, the decision Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal’s

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case (supra) is of no help to the petitioner in the
 case in hand. In any case, the said decision is of
 the Bench of two Judges whereas the decision in
Amratlal Prajivandas’s case (supra) is of the Bench of
 nine Judges. Besides, the decision in Dharamdas

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Shamlal Agarwal’s case (supra) was delivered on 16th

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 March, 1989 whereas the decision in Amratlal

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Prajivandas’s case (supra) was delivered on 12th May,
 1994. So, on all counts, we are bound by the decision
 of Amratlal Prajivandas’s case, besides the same being

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 directly on the point in issue.

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 14. For the reasons stated above, therefore, even
 though the order of detention cannot be sustained
 under the first ground in support of detention, the
 same cannot be held to be bad-in-law, as it finds
 support from other two grounds based on in-camera
 statements of the said witnesses.

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 15. The third ground of challenge to the order of
 detention is that the materials referred to in the
 grounds in support of the detention order, at the most
 disclose the law and order problems and not the
 activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public
 order as such. It is the contention of the learned
 Advocate for the petitioner that every disorder cannot
 be equated to public disorder and considering the
 facts and the alleged threats and attempt for
 extortion of money having been stated to have made
 either in the house or in the lane and not in the
 public view as such, there was no case for arriving at
 the subjective satisfaction regarding the involvement
 of the detenu in criminal activities leading to the
 disturbance of public order. In that regard,
 attention was drawn to the decision of the Apex Court
 in State of U.P. & Anr. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta

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alias Pappu & Ors., reported in 2004 AIR SCW 5314.
 The decision sought to be relied upon, rather than
 assisting the petitioner lends support to the order of
 detention in question. The Apex Court therein, after
 taking note of various earlier decisions on the point
 in issue, has held that "Does it lead to disturbance
 of the current life of the community so as to amount
 to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect
 merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the
 society undisturbed ?" It is further ruled that "the
 true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the
 act in question. One act may affect only individuals
 while the other, though of a similar kind, may have
 such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of
 the life of the community. This does not mean that
 there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act
 cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An
 act, for instance, affecting public order may have an
 impact that it would affect both public order and the
 security of the State." The in-camera statement of
 Witness "A" clearly discloses that it was widely
 discussed in the business circles that the detenu and
 his associates were the members of one Arun Gawali
 gang and were engaged in extortion spree and that the
 detenu and his associates were involved in the
 assaulting, threatening and destroying of the

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 belongings of people who refused to accede to their
 demand. Considering the statement of the said
 witness, it was observed by the detaining authority in
 the grounds in support of the detention order that the
 detenu and his associates are the members of
 underworld kingpin Arun Gawali and the victims are
 mortally scared and are reluctant to come forward with
 their complaints. The activities of the detenu also
 disclosed from his statement that he was engaged in
 extortion of money and for that purpose, did not
 hesitate to threaten the members of the public with
 the help of revolver. Similar is the statement of the

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 Witness "B" which discloses that the detenu and his
 associates had created a reign of terror in the
 localities of Worli Koliwada, Janata Colony, Rumade
 Chowk, Mahakali Nagar Zopadpatti and the adjoining
 areas, and had engaged in extortion of money from the
 people at the point of revolver, threatening and
 assaulting those who refused to give the money
 demanded by him and also used to destroy the articles
 and belongings of his victims, however, those victims
 were not ready to complain against him due to the fear
 of reprisal at his hands. These narrations by the
 witness clearly disclose the involvement of the detenu
 in those activities which are sufficient to affect the
 even tempo of life of the society which can result in

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¶91

 disturbance of the public order. Hence, the challenge
 on this ground is also without substance.

¶92

 16. The last ground of challenge to the impugned
 detention order is that while the grounds in support
 of the detention order do not disclose that the detenu
 belongs to ill famed Arun Gawali gang and yet the
 detaining authority was very much impressed by such
 allegation revealed from a copy of the documents in
 the form of remand application placed before the
 detaining authority. It is the contention of the
 learned Advocate for the petitioner that the
 extraneous materials having been collected and
 referred to in the grounds in support of the detention
 order, the same vitiates the validity of the order of
 detention. Undisputedly, the sponsoring authority had
 placed before the detaining authority a copy of the
 remand application which disclosed the allegation
 regarding involvement of the detenu in Arun Gawali
 gang. However, the said fact has also been considered
 by the detaining authority as it was revealed to the
 detaining authority from the statement of the witness
 "A" and the same has been clearly referred to that
 effect in the grounds in support of the detention
 order. Once it is revealed from the grounds in
 support of the detention order that the detaining

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¶94

 authority was appraised of the fact regarding the
 involvement of the detenu in Arun Gawali gang from the
 statement of the witness "A", merely because there was
 additional material placed by the sponsoring authority
 as regards such allegation in the form of copy of the
 remand application that would not mean that the
 detaining authority was influenced by any of the
 extraneous materials as such. Once the relevant
 information was revealed to the detaining authority
 from the statement of the witness, it cannot be said
 that merely because the said fact is also revealed
 from another document which was placed before the
 detaining authority and to which there was no
 reference in the grounds of detention order that there
 was a consideration of any extraneous materials for
 the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction
 by the detaining authority. The fact regarding
 involvement of the detenu in Arun Gawali gang was not
 extraneous as such. The detaining authority was
 appraised of the said fact through the materials on
 record. Being so, the challenge on the last ground
 also fails.

¶95

 17. For the reasons stated above, there is no case
 made out for interference in the impugned order of
 detention of the detenu Shri Chandrakant Prabhakar

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 Todankar, and therefore, the petition fails and is
 hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as

¶98

 to costs.

¶99

 ( R.M.S.Khandeparkar, J )

¶100

 ( P.V.Kakade, J )

Chetna Chandrakant Todankar v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

Case brief

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Chetna Chandrakant Todankar v. A.N. Roy and Ors.

Case brief

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