Addanki Sateesh Kumar Vs Icici Bank Limited

ADDANKI SATEESH KUMAR, S/O. A. PRABHAKARA RAO, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O. H.NO. 10-38-23-21, FLAT NO. 202, SUN MOON APARTMENTS, RAM NAGAR,VISAKHAPATNAM DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH530001.

¶10

...PETITIONER

¶11

AND

¶12

ICICI BANK LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER, ICICI BANK TOWER, NEAR CHAKLI CIRCLE, OLD PADRA ROAD, VADODARA - 390007,GUJARAT.

¶13

ICICI BANK LIMITED, REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER, HAVING BRANCH OFFICE AT 2ND FLOOR VIJAY LAKSHMI NILAYAM, RAM NAGAR ,VISAKHAPATNAM - 530002.

¶14

...RESPONDENT(S):

¶15

Counsel for the Petitioner:

¶16

1.NALLAGONDA MANIKANTA MAHENDRA

¶17

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

¶18

The Court made the following:

¶19

2

¶20

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

¶21

WRIT PETITION NO: 32818/2025

¶22

ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)

¶23

This matter has been listed before this Bench under the orders of the Hon’ble The Chief Justice.

¶24

Previously, on 25.11.2025, the following order was passed by a Coordinate Bench.

¶25

“When the matter is taken up for hearing for admission, Sri Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela one of the members of the Bench intends to recuse from hearing the matter, as the petitioner through someone else, tried to influence the Judge, seeking a favourable order over a phone. We seriously deprecate the said attempt made by the petitioner. In fact, it amounts to contempt of the Court.

¶26

Therefore, list the matter before another Bench, to which one of us Sri Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela is not a member of the Bench. Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble The Chief Justice and seek appropriate direction to list the matter before another Bench.”

¶27

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

¶28

The petitioner, being aggrieved from the order dated 11.11.2025

¶29

passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Visakhapatnam under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial

¶30

3

¶31

Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

¶32

In para-10 of the writ petition, the petitioner has clearly stated that the petitioner has remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

¶33

In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon¹ , the Hon’ble

¶34

Apex Court held as under in para No.42:

¶35

“42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the Sarfaesi Act are both expeditious and effective.”

¶36

The same principle has been reiterated in Phoenix Arc Private

¶37

Limited v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir² .

¶38

In Boddu Prasad Rao Vs Punjab National Bank³ , a

¶39

Coordinate Bench of this Court held that in the presence of the statutory alternative remedy, generally, the High Court would not

¶40

1 (2010) 8 SCC 110

¶41

2 (2022) 5 SCC 345

¶42

3 2024 SCC OnLine AP 5742

¶43

4

¶44

entertain the petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. The Coordinate Bench referred the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank⁴ , in which the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that in such matters the High Court should not entertain the writ petition, when there is statutory alternative remedy. Para No.13 reads as under:

¶45

“13. Recently, in PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank, the Hon'ble Apex Court reiterated that in such matters the High Court should not entertain the petitions when there is statutory alternative remedy. Paragraph Nos. 28, 29 & 41 of PHR Invent Educational Society (supra) deserves reproduction as under:

¶46

“28. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters.

¶47

29. Recently, in Celir LLP ((2024) 2 SCC 1), after surveying various judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus:

¶48

“101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon ((2010) 8 SCC 110), it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.”

¶49

41. While dismissing the writ petition, we will have to remind the High Courts of the following words of this Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra) since we have come across various matters wherein the High Courts have been entertaining petitions arising out of the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act in spite of availability of an effective alternative remedy:

¶50

“55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction

¶51

4 2024(6) SCC 579

¶52

5

¶53

under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection””.

¶54