Vidadala Venugopinath @ Gopi Vs the State of Andhra Pradesh

1. Since these Criminal Petitions are filed, under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS'), seeking anticipatory bail by different accused i.e., Crl.P.No.3375 of 2025 (filed by A.1), Crl.P.No.3493 of 2025 (filed by A.3) and Crl.P.No.3455 of 2025 (filed by A.4) in same crime viz., Cr.No.01/RCO-CIU-ACB/2025 of Central Investigation Unit, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada, they are being taken up together for disposal by way of this Common Order.

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2. The above crime was registered against the petitioners and another for the offence punishable under sections 7, 7A of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (for short 'the PC Act') and sections 384, 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC'). During the investigation, the investigating officer subsequently altered the offence under Section 384 IPC to Section 386 IPC.

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3. The prosecution's case, in brief, is that the Vigilance & Enforcement (V&E) Department conducted an enquiry based on a representation from Sri Nallapaneni Chalapathi Rao, Managing Partner of Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers, Edlapadu, Palnadu District. The complaint alleged that Smt.

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Vidadala Rajani (A.1, former Minister and MLA), Sri P. Joshua, IPS (A.2, then RV&EO, Guntur), and others demanded and accepted bribes. The enquiry report, submitted vide Letter No.3999/V&E/NR/2024 dated 03.12.2024, recommended a comprehensive ACB investigation, disciplinary action against A.2, and legal proceedings against other involved parties. The Government forwarded the V&E report to the ACB through Memo No. 2645183/SC.D/A1/2024 dated 23.01.2025, requesting an investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Subsequently, the DG, ACB, A.P., Vijayawada sought sanction under Section 17A of the PC (Amendment) Act, 2018. The Government, vide Memo No.2645183/SC.D/A1/2024 dated 18.02.2025, granted permission for investigation against A.2 and A.4 (Sri Dodda Ramakrishna, PA to A.1). However, through Memo No. 2723576/A1/2025/Poll.B, dated 07.03.2025, it clarified that A.1, being an MLA, does not require sanction under Section 17A as the alleged act, extorting money from a businessman, was unrelated to her official duties. According to the complainant, A.1, her brother-in-law Sri Vidadala Gopi, i.e., A.3, A.4, and A.2 demanded and extorted ₹2 crores for A.1 and ₹10 lakhs each for A.2 and A.3. A.2 allegedly conducted an unauthorized inspection of the complainant's stone crusher unit on 10.09.2020, without a formal petition or orders, solely to intimidate and extort.

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4. I have heard both sides. Learned counsel on both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and the report.

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5. Sri S. Sriram, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy and Sri Saran Chodisetty, learned counsel for the petitioner/A.1 in Crl.P.No.3375 of 2025, contends that the petitioner, a former Minister, has been falsely implicated in the present case due to political vendetta by the newly formed Government; the prosecution was initiated without prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act, which is mandatory for public servants, including MLAs. Notably, such approval was obtained for A2, who

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stands on a similar footing; the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of four years, casting serious doubt on the credibility of the allegations; the delay appears to be motivated by malice and political considerations, as held in State of A.P. V. M. Madhusudhan Rao.¹ ; multiple false cases have been registered against the petitioner and her family post-regime change, clearly reflecting political bias; the statement of A2, allegedly implicating the petitioner, contains no direct accusation and lacks documentary support. Its unauthorized circulation by a ruling party MP reveals undue political influence over the investigation; as per Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia , anticipatory bail should not be denied on mere uncorroborated allegations; all relevant documents are already in police custody, negating any risk of evidence tampering; the petitioner, a resident of Chilakaluripeta and a prominent public leader poses no flight risk; despite the offence carrying a sentence below 7 years, there is misuse of power in making arrests, contrary to Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and another² ; the petitioner apprehends arrest driven by political motives; the petitioner is lawabiding, unconnected with the alleged offence, and undertakes to comply with any conditions imposed by this Hon'ble Court. The petitioner respectfully prays for a grant of anticipatory bail.

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6. Sri V. Maheswar Reddy, counsel for the petitioner/A.3 in Crl.P.No.3493 of 2025 , argues that the petitioner is not a public servant and the complaint filed by the Dy. Superintendent of Police, ACB, lacks factual basis. He contends that the complaint, allegedly politically motivated by Nallapaneni Chalapathi Rao, is without merit, factually incorrect, and malicious. The delay in filing the complaint and the invocation of Section 120B IPC suggest ulterior political motives. Documentary evidence is already with the investigating agency, minimizing the risk of tampering.

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1 (2008) 15 SCC 58

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2 (2014) 8 SCC 273

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7. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned senior counsel for the petitioner/A.4 in Crl.P.No.3455 of 2025 , contends that the allegations against the petitioner, related to a false political implication, are vague and unsupported by material evidence. The complainant's claim of the petitioner demanding five crores lacks specific details or a timeline, undermining its credibility. The petitioner asserts that the allegations against him are baseless, as there is no evidence of bribery demand or acceptance, essential elements under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Citing Sk. Hussain V. State of A.P.³ , the petitioner contends that mere demand is insufficient to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the act. Further, the petitioner is entitled for bail under Section 35(3) of BNSS, given the alleged offences carry less than 7 years of punishment. The petitioner, a permanent resident of Vijayawada and the sole caretaker of his family, and is willing to cooperate with the investigation and seeks bail.

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8. Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, Advocate General for the Respondent / State, opposes the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioners (A.1, A.3, and A.4), citing that the investigation is ongoing. He argues that granting anticipatory bail could lead to the petitioners tampering with evidence or interference with witnesses. He relied on the decision in Devinder Kumar Bansal V. State of Punjab⁴ , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

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21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely enroped in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the Petitioner accused for grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution.

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23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations that the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice.

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3 2020(1) ALD (Crl) 917 (TS)

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4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488

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26. If even a fraction of what was the vox pupuli about the magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far removed from the truth, that it is the rampant corruption indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to prosperity, undeniably it is corruption. If the society in a developing country faces a menace greater than even the one from the hired assassins to its law and Order, then that is from the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government and of the political parties.

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9. It is often quoted that public servants are like fish in the water; no one can say when and how a fish drank the water. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr Subrahmanian Swamy Vs. Director, C.B.I. and Another⁵ , taking very serious note of the level of corruption prevailing in the country and the objects of enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act, had observed as under:

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“74. Corruption corrodes the moral fabric of society, and corruption by public servants not only leads to the corrosion of the moral fabric of the society but is also harmful to the national economy and national interest, as the persons occupying high posts in the Government by misusing their power due to corruption can cause considerable damage to the national economy, national interest and image of the country.

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80. The two Judge Bench of this Court observed in Sanjiv Kumar[78] that the case before them had brought to the fore the rampant corruption in the corridors of politics and bureaucracy.

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In a comparatively recent decision of this Court in Subramanian Swamy, this Court was concerned with the question whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting the public servant for an offence under the P.C. Act, 1988 and whether the authority competent to sanction Prosecution of a public servant for offences under that Act is required to take appropriate decision within the time specified in Clause (I)(15) of the directions contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain and the guidelines issued by the Central Government, Department of Personnel and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission.

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In the supplementing judgment, A.K. Ganguly, J., while concurring with the main judgment delivered by G.S. Singhvi, J., observed:

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"Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, but it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the rule of law. The magnitude of

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5 (2014) 8 SCC 682

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corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins, all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, which are the core values in our Preambular vision.

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Therefore, the duty of the Court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption”.

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10. In Mahipal V. Rajesh⁶ , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is necessary for the court while considering a bail application, to assess whether, based on the evidentiary record, there existed a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed the crime. It is settled law that when granting bail, a detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the case's merits has not to be undertaken. That did not mean that whilst granting bail, some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated.

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11. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners contends that, under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, an MLA falls within the definition of a public servant, and prior approval from the competent authority is required before initiating proceedings. It is submitted that prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act was obtained for A.2, who stands on the same footing as the petitioner/A.1. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE)⁷ , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

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181. The Attorney General submitted that the scheme of the said act, as compared to the 1947 Act, had undergone an important change by reason of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 19. Sanction was no longer a condition precedent. A trial in the absence of sanction was not a trial without inherent jurisdiction or a nullity. A trial without sanction had to be upheld unless there had been a failure of justice. This feature had a material bearing on the present case. The trial court had taken cognizance of the charges against the accused, and the High Court had dismissed the revision petition to quash the charges. In light of Section

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6 (2020) 2 SCC 118

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7 (1998) 4 SCC 626

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19(3), this court should not interdict the charges, particularly since a complaint filed today would not require sanction against most of the accused. With regard to the effect of our findings upon the accused, it is not necessary to consider this submission.

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182. We have, as aforestated, reached the conclusion that Members of Parliament and the State Legislatures are public servants liable to be prosecuted for offences under the said act but that they cannot be prosecuted for offences under Sections 7, 10, 11 and 13 thereof because of want of an authority competent to grant sanction thereto. We entertain the hope that Parliament will address itself to the task of removing this lacuna with due expedition.

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12. The prosecution contends that the petitioner/A.1, although serving as an MLA at the time of the alleged offence, does not fall within the purview of a "public servant" for the purposes of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as the alleged act was not committed in the discharge of her official duties. Therefore, obtaining prior approval under Section 17A was not a pre-requisite for initiating the present criminal proceedings. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the quarry in question was inspected by A.2, thereby bringing the act within the scope of official duties performed by public servants.

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13. The record reveals that the Vigilance and Enforcement (V&E) Department conducted an enquiry based on a representation from Sri Nallapaneni Chalapathi Rao, Managing Partner of Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers, Edlapadu Mandal, alleging demand and acceptance of bribes by A.1, A.2, and others. According to A.2's version during V&E enquiry, during his tenure, A.1 (MLA) submitted a written petition alleging that a firm named Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers, located in her constituency, was engaged in indiscriminate mining activities in violation of rules and was evading government taxes. During the V&E enquiry, A.2 stated that A.1 had submitted the petition due to a political feud between the MLA and the quarry management. A.2 further mentioned that he had gone through the material collected at the office of the Regional Vigilance and Enforcement Officer

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(RV&EO), Guntur and Sri G. Prasad, Assistant Geologist, who was reportedly in possession of key documents related to the petition, unfortunately passed away on 04.06.2024. It later appeared that a vital document pertaining to A.1's petition was found missing. According to A.2's statement, the petition allegedly submitted by A.1 is not currently traceable in the office records. The V&E enquiry report was submitted to the Government vide Letter No. 3999/V&E/NR/2024, dated 03.12.2024, by the Director General (V&E) and ExOfficio Principal Secretary to Government, General Administration (V&E), Vijayawada. The report recommended a comprehensive investigation by the ACB and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against A.2. According to this, the Government forwarded the report to the Director General, ACB, A.P., Vijayawada, vide Memo No. 2645183/SC.D/A1/2024, dated 23.01.2025. Subsequently, the DG, ACB, vide C.No.1/PTN-CIU/2025, dated 10.02.2025, addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary, General Administration (SC.D) Department, requesting permission under Section 17A of the PC Act to conduct a detailed investigation into the allegations against A.1, A.2, and A.4. Accordingly, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, through Memo No. 2645183/SC.D/A1/2024, dated 18.02.2025, accorded permission under Section 17A of the PC Act for a detailed investigation against A.2 and A.4. Furthermore, the Government, vide Memo No. 2723576/A1/2025/Poll.B, dated 07.03.2025, clarified that A.1, during the commission of the alleged offence, was not acting in discharge of her official duties as an MLA. It cannot be reasonably construed that such duties involve extorting money from businessmen. Regl. Vigilance and Enforcement officer, Guntur, came to an opinion that A.2 inspected Balaji Stone Crusher in violation of G.O.Ms.No.504, with a malevolent invention and misuse of powers vested in him primarily to serve the interest of the then Ex-Minister, Smt. V. Rajani, A.1. Therefore, the alleged offence falls outside the purview of Section 17A.

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14. The prosecution did not obtain approval for any inquiry or investigation into alleged offences committed by A.1, as required under Section 17A of the

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Prevention of Corruption Act. Thus, the sum and substance of the Petitioner's (A.1) contention is that the provisions contained in Section 17A of the PC Act ought not to be rendered nugatory, and the investigation is not to be proceeded with. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner regarding the bar to investigate the issue in terms of Section 17A of the PC Act is concerned, the learned Advocate General has submitted that Section 17A of the PC Act mandates that said bar would be applicable only where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties.

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15. To appreciate the parties' contentions, it would be necessary to examine the provisions contained in Section 17A of the PC Act, which was introduced by Act No.16 of 2018 with effect from 26.07.2018.

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16. In the facts of the case, it has to be considered whether prior approval, as contemplated under section 17A introduced by the 2018 Amendment to the Prevention of Corruption Act, is required in respect of every act which forms the subject matter of prosecution. In this context, it is essential to refer to the exact words employed by the statute, which reads as follows:

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17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decisions taken by public servants in the discharge of official functions or duties.-

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No police officer shall conduct any Inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in the discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval-

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( a) in the case of a person who is or was employed at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed in connection with the affairs of the Union of that Government;

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( b) in the case of a person who is or was employed at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed in connection with the affairs of a State of that Government;

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( c) in the case of any other person of the authority competent to remove him from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed:

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Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving the arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person:

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Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month.

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17. The reasonable conclusion that can be arrived at regarding the scope of section 17A of the PC Act is that prior approval under section 17A for conducting any enquiry, Inquiry or investigation is required only when the offence alleged is relatable to a decision taken or recommendation made by the public authority and it involves a debatable or suspicious or doubtful recommendation made or decision taken by the authority. Acts which are exfacie criminal or constitute an offence do not require approval under section 17A of the PC Act. Therefore, the contention that Section 17A of the PC Act is applicable to the petitioner's (A.1) case is prima facie misplaced.

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18. Thus, it is evident that the Government has recorded specific reasons in its memo explaining why the alleged offence by A.1 does not fall within the scope of Section 17A of the PC Act. In view of these reasons, this court, at this stage, cannot say that the prosecution has not adequately justified the absence of prior approval under Section 17A in respect of A.1.

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19. In R.S. Nayak V. A.R. Antulay⁸ , the five Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:

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“Existence of a valid sanction is a pre-requisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking cognizance of offence by the court. Therefore, when the court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant …… It therefore appears well settled that the relevant date with reference to which a

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8 (1984) 2 SCC 183

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valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by Sec.6 is the date on which the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused."

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20. However, the relevant date concerning which the valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by Section 19 of the PC Act is the date on which the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused and not the date when the said offence was committed.

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21. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that no preliminary enquiry was conducted before the registration of the crime. It is evident that when registering the present case, all the offences were punishable by imprisonment of less than seven years. Sub-section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS mandates that a preliminary enquiry be conducted either by the police or the investigating agency upon receiving information about the commission of a cognizable offence. The learned counsel further contends that the investigation agency registered the crime and initiated criminal proceedings based on the complaint without conducting a preliminary enquiry, which is contrary to the procedure prescribed under Section 173(3) of the BNSS.

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22. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision in Imran Pratapgadhi V. State of Gujarat and Another⁹ , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

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20. The question is whether, in the facts of the case, it was obligatory under sub-Section (1) of Section 173 of the BNSS to register FIR. Section 173, which deals with information in cognizable cases, reads thus:

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“173. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given—

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(3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 175, on receipt of information relating to the commission of any cognizable offence, which is made punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,—

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(i) proceed to conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within fourteen days, or

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(ii) proceed with the investigation when there exists a prima facie case.

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23………… However, sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS makes a significant departure from Section 154 of the CrPC. It provides that when information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence which is made punishable for 3 years or more but less than 7 years is received by an officerin-charge of a police station, with the prior permission of a superior officer as mentioned therein, the police officer is empowered to conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter. ……… Sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS is an exception to Sub-Section (1) of Section 173. In the category of cases covered by subSection (3), a police officer is empowered to make a preliminary inquiry to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out for proceeding in the matter, even if the information received discloses the commission of any cognizable offence. That is very apparent as sub-Section (3) of Section 173 refers explicitly to receiving information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, in a case where sub-Section (3) of Section 173 is applicable, even if the information pertaining to the commission of any cognizable offence is received, an inquiry can be conducted to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists for proceeding in the matter. The intention appears to be to prevent the registration of FIRs in frivolous cases where punishment is up to 7 years, even if the information discloses the commission of the cognizable offence……….

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24. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS, after holding a preliminary inquiry, if the officer comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case exists to proceed, he should immediately register an FIR and proceed to investigate. But, if he is of the view that a prima facie case is not made out to proceed, he should immediately inform the first informant/complainant so that he can avail a remedy under sub-Section (4) of Section 173.

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25. Before we go into the applicability of sub-Section (3) of Section 173 of the BNSS to the facts of the case, we must deal with sub-Section (1) of Section 173…… Therefore, the allegations made in the information furnished to an officer-in-charge of a police station must be examined by the officer only with a view to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is made out. Taking the information as correct, the officer has to determine whether it makes out a case

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of the commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegation makes out a case of a cognizable offence, unless the offence falls in sub-Section (3) of Section 173, it is mandatory to register FIR.

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30. Even while dealing with the performance of an obligation under sub-Section (1) of Section 173, where the commission of the offence is based on spoken or written words, the police officer concerned will have to keep in mind the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) read with an exception carved out under clause (2) of Article 19. The reason is that he is under an obligation to abide by the Constitution and to respect the ideals under the Constitution. The Constitution is more than 75 years old. By this time, the police officers ought to have been sensitized about their duty of abiding by the Constitution and respecting the ideals of the Constitution. If the police officers are not aware of these obligations, the State must ensure that they are educated and sensitized by starting massive training programs.

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23. It is evident that the case against the petitioners was initiated based on an enquiry report furnished by the Vigilance and Enforcement Department. As per Section 173(3) of the BNSS, the investigating agency is well within its rights to proceed further when a prima facie case exists. In this context, the absence of a preliminary investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(3), does not, by any stretch, constitute a valid ground for seeking anticipatory bail.

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24. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the present case was registered after an unexplained and inordinate delay of four years from the date of the alleged offence. The learned senior counsel for petitioner/A.1 relies on the Order of this Court in Crl.P.No.8756 of 2023, dated 10.01.2024, wherein this court held that an unexplained delay of three-and-a-half years, as evident in the present case, can be a valid consideration for granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner, aligning with observations in the State of Punjab V. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar case.¹⁰ .

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25. The learned Advocate General submits that the observations made by this court cannot be made applicable to this case, as in the said case, the Petitioner was a former Chief Minister, and the case was instituted against him by the Government after a delay of three and half years. In contrast, in the

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present case, A.1 was serving as the MLA for the Chilakaluripet constituency, at the time of alleged offence and the complaint was filed only after the end of her tenure. The delay in lodging the complaint can be attributed to the hesitation of the de facto complainant to come forward while A.1 was in office, particularly in light of her position as both an MLA and a former Minister.

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26. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, following the change in Government, several cases have been filed against Petitioner/A.1 and her family members with an ulterior political motive and with the intent to wreak vengeance. In support of this contention, petitioner/A.1 relies on the statement of A.2 dated 21.10.2024, recorded by the Vigilance Department, which was subsequently circulated on social media by a Member of Parliament belonging to the ruling party through his official Twitter account. As seen from the record, the statement made by A.2 during the V&E enquiry is in the public domain. This court views that while the investigation agency claims to be investigating a case relating to a bribe amount said to be paid to the ExMinister (A.1), keeping the details about the investigation in the public domain raises serious concerns. It isn't easy to reconcile how such sensitive particulars of information could be made public at this initial stage of the investigation. This court views that the Investigating Officer, tasked with investigating sensitive matters, should ensure that investigation details are not disclosed unless necessary for the investigation or for the public interest at large or in society. Thus, it is argued that political interference in the initiation of prosecution is caused by investigating officers allegedly acting in alignment with the interests of those in power. However, according to petitioner/A.1, the statement of A.2 does not contain any allegations against her. In such circumstances, the fact that a Member of Parliament chose to circulate the statement on social media, despite there being no reference to A.1, does not establish that political mileage was intended or obtained by doing so. During the Vigilance enquiry, A.2, who served as the Regional Enforcement Officer in Guntur, stated that one of the partners of the firm, Sri Katta Srinivas, had

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proposed to erect a statue of the former Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, late Sri Kodela Siva Prasad, at a prominent location within the Chilakaluripet Assembly Constituency. This proposal was opposed and subsequently blocked by A.1 and her supporters, leading to a political altercation. Consequently, Sri Katta Srinivas installed the statue within his residential premises.

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27. As the investigation is pending, this court is not inclined to express any opinion on the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners that the case is foisted against them due to political vendetta. Even if it is assumed so, such a ground alone cannot warrant anticipatory bail.

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28. The core allegation against the petitioners is that they threatened one Sri N. Chalapathy Rao, Managing Partner of Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers, and demanded and collected ₹2 crores on behalf of A.1, along with ₹10 lakhs each for A.2 and A.3. The material collected indicates that Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers operates several quarries with varying lease periods, located in Sy.No.7 of Viswanadhuni Kandrika village. The investigation further reveals that on 10.09.2020, a team from the Vigilance and Enforcement Department, led by A.2 and comprising officers from the office of the RV & EO, Guntur, inspected the stone crushing unit. The purpose of the inspection was to verify allegations concerning the crushing and sale of metal in various sizes without valid waybills. Although a report was prepared at the RV & EO office in Guntur, it was never submitted to the Director General, Vigilance and Enforcement Department, Vijayawada, for further action.

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29. To properly consider the submissions made on behalf of the prosecution, it is relevant to refer to the findings of the Vigilance and Enforcement (V&E) enquiry. As per the Vigilance Manual, it is mandatory to notify the head office, specifically the Director General (V&E) and Ex-Officio Principal Secretary to Government, General Administration (V&E) Department, Vijayawada, of any such inspections. However, the office records indicate that

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A.2 failed to inform the head office about the inspection conducted on 10.09.2020. The officers who participated in the said inspection stated that they acted on the instructions of A.2, but they were unaware of any subsequent investigation or conclusion of the enquiry. Additionally, the records reveal that no assessment was made regarding mineral revenue loss for the varying quantities allegedly extracted. It is further observed that the inspection was conducted in the absence of any formal complaint, which supports the allegation that the inspection may have been used to threaten and unlawfully demand money from the complainant, allegedly by A.1 and A.2.

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30. The de facto complainant alleges that the inspection was conducted at the behest of A.1. The Vigilance and Enforcement enquiry further reveals that on 04.09.2020, A.4, the Personal Assistant to A.1, met with the owners of Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers and directed them to meet A.1. Acting on this, the de facto complainant, Sri N. Chalapathi Rao, along with his partner, Sri Namburi Srinivasa Rao, visited A.1 at her office in Chilakaluripeta. During the meeting, A.1 allegedly threatened them, demanding payment on the grounds that they were operating a stone-crushing business within her MLA constituency, and directed them to follow up with A.4. It is further alleged that approximately one month after the surprise inspection on 10.09.2020, A.2 called Sri N. Chalapathi Rao and threatened him, stating that unless the matter were settled with A.1, a penalty of ₹50 crores would be imposed.

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31. A perusal of the material placed on record by the prosecution prima facie indicates that A.1 to A.3 allegedly threatened the owners of the stone crusher unit and demanded payment, warning that failure to comply would result in cases being filed against their business.

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32. The learned senior counsel for petitioner/A.1 further submits that although the offences mentioned in the FIR are punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years, the police in the State have arrested several individuals under similar circumstances. As such, the petitioners apprehend a threat of

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arrest. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the investigation agency subsequently added an offence under Section 386 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) with a mala fide intent to circumvent the guidelines established in the decision of Arnesh Kumar (cited supra). All the offences initially charged carried a maximum punishment of up to seven years imprisonment and a fine. In contrast, Section 386 of the IPC prescribes a punishment of up to ten years of imprisonment. The petitioners filed these anticipatory applications on 25.03.2025, and the Section 386 IPC was added through a memo dated 04.04.2025. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for the offence of extortion under Section 386 of the IPC to be applicable, the essential ingredients require that the victim be subjected to a fear of death or grievous bodily harm.

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33. Section 386 of the IPC relates to extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Section 386 of the IPC runs as follows:

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“ Section 386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt . —Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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“Extortion” has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as follows:—

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“ Section 383. Extortion .—Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits ‘extortion.

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Illustrations

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(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

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(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.

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(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

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(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.”

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384. Punishment for extortion.—

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Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

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34. The learned senior counsel for petitioner/A.1 submits that the recitals in the report clearly show that certain words used by the accused, such as “Chitrahimsalu ku gurichestamu” and “ni anthu chustamu,” were part of the record when the offence was initially registered under Section 384 of the IPC. But the subsequent inclusion of offence was made with the ulterior motive of facilitating the arrest of the petitioners, bypassing the protections outlined in the Arnesh Kumar’s decision.

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35. At this stage, the learned Advocate General highlights that the same version of the threats is reflected even in the representation provided to the V&E authorities. However, no such version is found when going through the statements of the de facto complainant and other partners recorded by the V&E authorities.

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36. A close examination of the statements of defacto complainant and his partners made during the vigilance enquiry, dated 17.09.2024 and 28.09.2024 reveals that the petitioners allegedly threatened to shut down the business operations of the de facto complainant and his partners if the demanded amount was not paid. They further advised the complainants to reach a settlement with Accused No. 1 (A.1) by March 2021, failing which ₹50 crores would purportedly be imposed. Additionally, it was stated that the YSR Congress Party (YCP) government would remain in power for the next five years, and advised them to settle the matter with A.3, who is the brother-inlaw of A.1. During the vigilance enquiry, the complainants consistently claimed that they were subjected to threats of legal action and business closure should

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they fail to comply with the demands. However, these specific threats, constituting the alleged offence under Section 386 of the IPC, were notably absent from the statements made before the V&E officers, as highlighted in the representation.

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37. As reflected in the record, the present crime was registered on 22.03.2025, based on a complaint filed by the officer-in-charge, DSP, CIU (FAC), ACB, A.P., Vijayawada, which in turn was based on the report submitted by the Vigilance and Enforcement (V&E) Department, Andhra Pradesh. The allegations in the complaint filed by the ACB stemmed from the findings of the V&E Department. According to the V&E report, the inspection was conducted primarily to intimidate the owners of the crushing unit into paying money to A.1, as reflected in the statements recorded from the source applicants during the V&E enquiry. Upon going through the version provided by the source applicants, as noted in the V&E report, it is prima facie apparent that the essential ingredients of Section 386 of the IPC are not satisfied. The statements of the victims, which were reportedly recorded during the investigation by the ACB following the registration of the crime, may suggest a potential application of Section 384 IPC. The actual context of the words cited in the report was made crystal clear by the de facto complainant and the witnesses during the V&E inquiry. So the prosecuting agency, having already taken their statements, doesn’t get to twist the context now to suit its own narrative. However, had the de facto complainant and his partners genuinely been threatened with the fear of death or grievous harm, such version would have been reflected in the statements recorded during the V&E enquiry.

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38. The material placed by the prosecution clearly indicates that the words in question were used within the context of business interests pertaining to the mining lease. These statements were intended to address commercial operations and appear aimed at creating impediments to the smooth functioning of the business. There is no prima facie material to suggest that the language employed was intended to threaten or instill fear of death or

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grievous bodily harm in any individual. This Court finds merit in the petitioners' submission that the essential ingredients of Section 386 of the Indian Penal Code are not appeared to be attracted in the present case. Moreover, the applicability of Section 386 cannot be determined solely on the basis of an isolated sentence in the report. More particularly, when considered in conjunction with the representation made to the Vigilance and Enforcement Officer and the statements recorded during the ensuing inquiry, at best, the facts of the case may invoke the provisions of Section 384 IPC, as initially registered against the petitioners.

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39. The record indicates that political differences existed between Sri Lakshmi Balaji Stone Crushers and A.1. Notably, the de facto complainant lodged the report four years after the alleged incident, claiming that a bribe of ₹2 crores was paid to A.1, and also made certain allegations against A.2. However, the report fails to explain why the complainant did not report against A.2 to his superior authorities at the relevant time. The V&E report is silent on what compelled the complainant to pay such a substantial amount. It remains unclear whether he violated any rules while managing the mines that might have led to the alleged demand for the bribe.

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40. The Investigating Officer recorded statements from LWs.1 to 13. LW.1 claims to have arranged ₹2 crores, allegedly handed over to A.1, sourced through contributions from relatives and friends. Given the substantial sum, it was essential to verify whether the complainant could legally and credibly raise such an amount. The Investigating Officer neither recorded their statements nor examined the sources or legality of the funds.

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41. Thus, the verification of the source of funds during the investigation is crucial. There is no material of an examination of income tax returns, bank statements, or other financial records to trace the origin of the funds. The failure to inquire into the source of the funds, the political differences involved, and the inclusion of Section 386 of the IPC following the filing of the

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anticipatory bail application are key factors in evaluating the petitioners' request.

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42. The record reflects that the petitioners have a permanent residence, and given the nature of the dispute between the parties, there is no reasonable apprehension that they would influence or intimidate witnesses. Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that the petitioners would obstruct the investigation or interfere with the evidence. The first petitioner is a woman, an ex-MLA and former Minister, who has strong societal roots, making it highly unlikely that she would attempt to flee from justice. The fourth petitioner, a government employee, is in a position where it is difficult to believe he could pose a threat to businesspeople. Moreover, there is no allegation that any bribe has been paid to him. It appears that, as the personal assistant to the former Minister, A.4 may have merely conveyed his superior's message. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners have participated in the V&E enquiry and put forth their respective versions and thus, they have not evaded the enquiry. The offences under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, with which the petitioners are charged, are punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years. Furthermore, this Court finds reason to doubt the applicability of Section 386 of the Indian Penal Code, instead, Section 384 IPC, which was originally invoked and carries a lesser punishment of up to three years, may be more appropriately applicable.

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43. As a result, Criminal Petitions Nos.3375 and 3455 of 2025 are disposed of , directing the investigating officer to strictly follow the procedure laid down under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., / Section 35(3) of the BNSS, and also the guidelines set forth by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar and another . The petitioners / A.1 and A.4, shall cooperate with the investigation in compliance to the procedure contemplated under section 35(3) of the BNSS, by furnishing information and documents sought by them in completing the investigation. Additionally, the petitioners / A.1 and A.4 are required to adhere the following conditions:

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(a) The petitioners are obligated to furnish their address details to the investigating officer within a week. In case of any change in their residential address, they must promptly inform the investigating officer through an affidavit.

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(b) The petitioners should abstain from making any public comments related to this case.

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44. The Criminal Petition No.3493 of 2025 is dismissed as infructuous , in light of the learned public prosecutor’s submission that the petitioner (A.3) was arrested subsequent to the hearing of his anticipatory bail application, as reflected in the memo filed by the learned Public Prosecutor.

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45. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present petitions without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order.

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As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.

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JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

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Date: 25.04.2025 SAK

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

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