Dismissed

K.S.K.v.Prasada Rao v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh HC14 Nov 2024WA/902/2015

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This writ appeal challenging the dismissal of a writ petition against a registered sale deed was dismissed. The court held that since the appellant sought a declaration that the deed was null and void and asserted superior title, these petitions must be tried in civil court under the Specific Relief Act. A writ under Article 226 lies only for procedural failures of the registering authority, not f

What did the court decide?

This writ appeal was dismissed as there is no writ remedy for the substantive questions of title and validity raised by the appellant. Parties referred to the appropriate civil court.

K.S.K.v.Prasada Rao Vs The Government of Andhra… — Land Acquisition | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVAT^

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FRIDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER

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TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RA

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AND

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THE HONOURABLE SRUUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

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WRIT APPEAL NO: 902 OF 2015

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Writ Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Orders dated 08-4-2015 in WP.No. 11889 of 2014 on the file of the High Court. ^- Between:

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K.S.K.V.Prasada Rao, S/o late Venkateswara Rao, aged 60 years, 5-178, Porank Village, Penamalur Mandal, Krishna District.

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...APPELLANT/PETITIONER

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AND

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The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Revenue (Registration & Stamps) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad.

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The Inspector General of Registration, State of A.P. Mehdipatnam, Hyderabad.

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The Sub-Registrar, Movva, Movva Mandal, Krishna District.

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The Sub-Registrar, Kankipadu, Kankipadu Mandal, Krishna District.

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The Tahsildar, Penamaluru Mandal, Krishna District.

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Sri Velega Krishna Rao, S/o Seetha Ramayya, age 70 years, Poranaki Village, Penamaluru Mandal, Krishna District.

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Sri Ganne Venkata Narayana Prasad, S/o Rama Lingeswara Rao, D.No.32-27-9, Maruti Nagar, Vijayawada, Krishna District.

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(Cause title of RR1 & 2 amended as per court order dated 21/09/2015 in W.A.M.P.No.1700 of 2015)

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...RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS

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I.A. NO: 2 OF 2015fWAMP. NQ: 2417^QF 2015t

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Petition under Section ^\f CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the operation of the judgment dated 8/4/2015 in WP No. 11889/2014 and set aside the document vide Sale Deed No. 386/2014 dated 25/3/2014 in so far as it relates to RS No. 90/1C an extent of Acs. 1.58 cents of Poranki village, Penamaluru Mandal Krishna District.

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Counsel for the Appellants: SRI K.V.BHANU PRASAD SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. A. VARALAKSHMI ' Counsel for the Respondent Nos.1 to 5: GP FOR REVENUE Counsel for the Respondent Nos.6 & 7: SRI SRINIVASA RAO VELIVELA The Court made the following: JUDGMENT

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RRR,J & MRK,J W.A.No.902/2015

APHC010142182015

1%.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3508] (Special Original Jurisdiction)

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FRIDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

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WRIT APPEAL NO: 902/2015

Between:

K.S.K.V.prasada Rao

...APPELLANT

AND

...RESPONDENT(S) The Government Of Andhra Pradesh and Others

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Counsel for the Appellant:

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1.DVN ACHARYA

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2.AVARALAKSHMI

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Counsel for the Respondent(S):

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1,GP FOR REVENUE (AP)

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2.SREENIVASA RAO VELIVELA

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The Court made the following Judgment:

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Heard Sri K.V. Bhanu Prasad, learned Senior Counsel^representing ^ Smt. A. Varalakshmi, learned counsel appearing for^{theappellantand} Sri Srinivasa Rao Velivela, learned counsel appearing for^{respondents6and7.}

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The appellant herein claims ownership over Ac.3.16 cents of agricultural land in RS.No.90/1C of Poranki Village, Penamaluru Mandal Krishna District. An extent of Ac. 1.58 cents of this land was sold by the 6 th respondent, under a deed of sale, which was registered by the 3"'^ respondent as Document No.386 dated 25.02.2014.

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Aggrieved by the said registration, the appellant had approached this Court, by way of W.P.No.11889 of 2014, seeking^{adeclarationthatthe} said deed of sale registered as Document No.386 is invalid and without jurisdiction and registered by way of misrepresentation by the 7'^ respondent.

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The appellant sought the above relief on the following grounds: a) The land in question originally belonged to his father and upon his demise it had devolved on the appellant. However, the respondent claimed to have inherited the property on the basis of a Will, dated 25.10.2004, executed by the father of the appellant and such a Will is a fabricated and illegal Will. Apart from this, the father of the appellant could^{nothaveexecutedsuchaWill} as the property in question is joint family property.

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b) The property, which is the subject matter of the deed^ofsale, was also the subject matter of O.S.No.159 of 2006, which was a suit for partition. filed in the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Krishna District at Vijayawada. There was an injunction granted against^{thealienationofthis}

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r V

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property. Despite such an injunction, the 3'^'^ respondent had accepted the docunnent and registered the same.

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c) The property in question fell within the jurisdiction of the SubRegistrar, Kankipadu. However, the 6*^ respondent being^{awareofthefact} that any registration with the Sub-Registrar, Kankipadu^wouldcome to the attention of the appellant, had got the document registered with the SubRegistrar, Movva. For the purpose of creating jurisdiction to the 3 rd respondent-Sub-Registrar Movva, the 6**^ respondent^{hadincludedabout100} Sq. yards of house site plot in Nidamanuru Gram Panchayat,^{whichfallswithin} the jurisdiction of the 3'"'^ respondent-Sub-Registrar,^{Movva.Theconductof} the 6*'^ respondent in registering the document with^{the3'^'^respondentinstead} of the proper Sub-Registrar, demonstrates that the respondent was seeking to commit an illegal act.

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d) The 3'^^ respondent-Sub-Registrar, Movva, had initially^placedthe document under the pending registration category and^{soughtinformation} from the Sub-Registrar Kankipadu. Though the Sub-Registrar,^Kankipaduhad informed the 3'"^ respondent-Sub-Registrar, Vijayawada^{aboutthependencyof} O.S.No.159 of 2006 in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Krishna District, at Vijayawada, as well as the interim injunction^{grantedbytheCourt,} the 3'’'^ respondent-Sub-Registrar ignored the same^{andregisteredthedeedof} sale. The same is highly irregular and opposed to the^{circularissuedbythe} Registrar General of Registration prohibiting registration^{ofanydocuments}

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relating to a property on which a Court of competent^jurisdiction had^issued an injunction.

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e) The appellant also contended that he was the owner^oftheland and sought a declaration from this Court that he was^{theabsoluteowner,} possessor and enjoyer of the entire extent of Ac.3.16^cents.

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th 5. The 7^^ respondent, who is the purchaser of the land^fromthe6 respondent, has filed a counter affidavit. In this counter affidavit, the 7 th respondent contended that the respondent was the owner^{ofAc.1.58cents} on account of the registered Will deed, dated 20.10.2004, executed by the father of the appellant. He would further submit that^O.S.No.159 of 2006 which was being relied upon by the appellant, was actually a suit filed by the third parties against the father of the appellant and the appellant, for partition of the property. The interim injunction granted in that suit was against the father of the appellant and the appellant herein. The 6'^ respondent was not a party to this suit and as such the injunction would not bind the 6'^ respondent. The 7‘^ respondent also refers to O.S.No.14 of 2012 filed by the 6 th respondent in the Court of XXll Fast Track Court, Vijayawada, for partition of the property and that the filing of such a suit and the contentions raised by the appellant, in his written statement in that suit, would not make any difference for the registration of the deed of sale.

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A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the 3’’'^ respondent. In this counter affidavit, it was stated that Section 28 of the Act permits any sub-

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registrar within whose jurisdiction a part of the property^mentioned in the document is situated. As 100 sq. yards of house site mentionedⁱⁿ the deed of sale, fell in the jurisdiction of the 3'"' respondent, there was no irregularity or illegality in the 3"'^ respondent registering such a document. The 3 rd respondent further contended that the Standing Order No.219, which prohibits a registering officer from entertaining documents of registration when there is an injunction order, is not applicable unless the injunction is granted against the registering officer also. Further, the injunction granted in O.S.No.159 of 2006 dated 31.01.2012 would operate only against the parties to the suit and not against any other party. As the 6^^ respondent was not a party to the suit, the action of the 3^^ respondent in registering the^{documentcannotbefaulted.}

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The learned Single Judge, after considering all these issues, had held that the proper remedy for the appellant would be to move the appropriate Court under Section 31 as well as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, rather than approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, without expressing any view on the allegation of misrepresentation etc., pleaded by the appellant, had dismissed the writ petition leaving it open to the appellant to initiate appropriate action against the deed of sale before a competent Court.

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Aggrieved by this order of dismissal of the learned Single Judge, dated 08.04.2015, the appellant has approached this^Court.

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Sri K.V. Bhanu Prasad, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt. A. Varalakshmi, learned counsel for the appellant,^{wouldcontendthat} the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the appellant should approach the competent Civil Court and that the remedy sought by the appellant would not be granted by this Court. The learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon the proceedings dated 19.12.2015 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Vijayawada, wherein the 3'"' respondentSub-Registrar was punished with stoppage of increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect for having registered the said deed of sale. This punishment is said to have been awarded on the ground^{thatinstructionsof} the Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, vide Circular Memo No.G1/9732/2013, dated 17.07.2013 had been violated. This Circular required the registering authority to verify the Web Adangal Pahani and ROR-1B records to see whether the details set out therein tallied with the details set out in the document which is sought to be registered. The finding of the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Stamps^{wasthattherecords} contain the name of the father of the appellant, whereas the document was executed by the 6*^ respondent and the same is not in accordance with the circular. The Deputy Inspector General also took the view that Standing Order 219 B requires every registering authority to stall registration of properties which are covered by a Court Order.

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•' /

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The learned Senior Counsej would contend that the view of the learned Single Judge that such cases could be moved only before a Civil Court and not before the High Court under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has now been reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Asset Reconstruction Company (India)^Limited vs. S.P. Velayutham and Ors.,V Learned Senior Counsel relying upon this judgment would contend that the registration of a document can be set aside, by approaching the constitutional courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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Sri Srinivasa Rao Velivela, learned counsel appearing for respondents 6 and 7 would contend that the said judgment^{oftheHon’ble} Supreme Court does not set out a strait jacket formula that the High Court can be approached in all cases of challenge to the registration^ofadocument. Learned counsel would submit that registration of documents can be challenged only on the narrow ground of irregularity in registration and that such a challenge would not be maintainable before the High Court if any other issue is raised. On the question of whether Standing^Order219and the Circular had been violated, the learned counsel would submit that a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, in Sangaraju Laxminarayana Raju vs. Principal Secretary Revenue (Registration)

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^ (2022) 8 see 210

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Department, Guntur District and Ors.,^ had held that the registration authority cannot refuse to register a document, merely^{onthegroundthatan} injunction had been issued against alienation of such^{property,unlessthe} person presenting the document is also a party to the^{suit.Learnedcounsel} would submit that since the 6‘^ respondent was not a party to O.S.No.159 of 2006, the respondent could not have refused registration.

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Consideration of the Court:

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The primary issue before this Court is whether the^{observationof} the learned Single Judge that such cases should go before the competent Court of civil jurisdiction, requires to be overruled^{onaccountofthejudgment} of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited vs. S.P. Velayutham and Ors.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Limited vs. S.P. Velayutham and Ors., while considering the question of whether registration of a document can be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, had held^asfollows:

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Actually, the registration of a document comprises^ofthree essential steps among others. They are:

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(/) execution of the document, by the executant signing^or affixing his left hand thumb impression;

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(/■/) presenting the document for registration and admitting to the registering authority the execution of such document;^and

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^ 2018 (6) ALD 413

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(/■/■/) the act of registration of the document.

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In cases where a suit for title is filed, with^{orwithoutthereliefof} declaration that the registered document is null and^{void,whatgets} challenged, is a combination of all the aforesaid three^stepsinthe process of execution and registration. The first of^{theaforesaidthree} steps may be challenged in a suit for declaration that^{theregistered} document is null and void, either on the ground that^theexecutant did not have a valid title to pass on or on the ground^thatwhatwas found in the document was not the signature of the^{executantoron} the ground that the signature of the executant was^obtainedby fraud, coercion, etc. The second step of presentation of the document and admitting the execution of the same, may^alsobe challenged on the very same grounds hereinabove stated. Such objections to the first and second of the aforesaid^{threestepsare} substantial and they strike at the very root of creation of the document. A challenge to the very execution of a document, is a challenge to its very DMA and any defect or illegality on the execution, is congenital in nature. Therefore, such^{achallenge,by} its very nature, has to be made only before the civil court and certainly not before the writ court.

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Thus, the first two steps in the process of registration are substantial in nature, with the parties to the document^playingthe role of the lead actors and the registering authority^{playingaguest} role in the second step. The third step is procedural^{innaturewhere} the registering authority is the lead actor. 57. In suits for declaration of title and/or suits^{fordeclarationthata} registered document is null and void, all the aforesaid^threesteps which comprise the entire process of execution and registration come under challenge. If a party questions the very^executionofa document or the right and title of a person to execute^adocument and present it for registration, his remedy will only^betogotothe civil court. But where a party questions only the failure of the registering authority to perform his statutory duties^{inthecourseof} the third step, it cannot be said that the jurisdiction^{oftheHighCourt}

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under Article 226 stands completely ousted. This is^forthereason that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is to ensure that statutory authorities perform their duties within the bounds^oflaw.

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It must be noted that when a High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 finds that there was^{utterfailureonthe} part of the registering authority to stick to the mandate of law, the Court merely cancels the act of registration, but does^{notdeclarethe} very execution of the document to be null and void.^Adeclaration that a document is null and void, is exclusively within^thedomainof the civil court, but it does not mean that the High^Courtcannot examine the question whether or not the registering authority performed his statutory duties in the manner prescribed by law. 59. It is well settled that if something is required by law to be done in a particular manner, it shall be done only in that^mannerand not otherwise. Examining whether the registering authority did something in the manner required by law or otherwise, is certainly within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. However, it is needless to say that the High Courts may refuse^toexercise jurisdiction in cases where the violations of procedure on the part of the registering authority are not gross or the violations^donotshock the conscience of the Court. Lack of jurisdiction is completely different from a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 60. In the case on hand, the appellant has not sought a declaration from the High Court that the execution of the document in question was null and void or that there^wasno title for the executant to transfer the property. The appellant assailed before the High Court, only the act of omission^onthe part of the registering authority to check up whether the person who claimed to be the power agent, had the power of conveyance and the power of presenting the document for registration, especially in the light of the statutory rules. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly applied^thelawand ' allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant,^{buttheDivision}

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Bench got carried away by the sound and fury created by the contesting respondents on the basis of:

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(/) pendency of the civil suits;

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(/■/) findings recorded by the Special Court for CBI cases; and

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(/■//) the order passed by this Court in the SLP arising^outof proceedings under Section 145CrPC.

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It would now have to be seen whether the registration of the document was challenged only on the ground of irregular presentation of documents and on the ground of irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows:

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“ calling for records relating to Registered Sale deed bearing No.386, dated 25.02.2014 in office of the Sub-Registrar, Movva and declare the same so far as it relates to R.S.No.90/1C an extent of Ac.01.58 cents of Poranki Village, Penamaluru^Mandalas invalid without jurisdiction, and got registered by misrepresentation as owner of R.S,No.90/1C an extent of Ac. 1.58 cents of land, whereas the petitioner is absolute owner, possessor and enjoyer^oftheentire extent of Ac.3,16 cents in Rs.No.90/1C of Poranki Village^and it is also covered under Civil Court’s Order in O.S,No.59/2006, dated 31.01.2012 restraining alienation of the above land.”

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This prayer calls upon this Court to declare -

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The deed of sale registered as document No.386 dated^25.02.2014 is invalid, without jurisdiction and was registered by misrepresentation:

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The petitioner is the absolute owner, possessor and enjoyer of the entire extent of Ac.3.16 cents, and out of which Ac. 1.58 cents was sought to be sold under the impugned deed of sale.

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The contention raised by the appellant, in the writ petition, was that the claim of the 6'^ respondent over the property, by virtue of the Will said to have been executed by the father of the appellant, is invalid in as much as such a Will could not have been executed by his father. Further, the property could not have been sold as it is the subject matter^{ofO.S.No.14of2012filed} by the respondent against the appellant and others for partition of the property and no sale could have been done without division of the property by metes and bounds. The appellant also contended that the 6^*" respondent had made a false statement and had played fraud on the Sub-Registrar for obtaining the registration of deed of sale and as such the deed of sale would have to be set aside.

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The prayer mentioned above and the pleadings of the appellant, in the writ petition, make it clear that the appellant was challenging the registration of the deed of sale not only on the ground of irregular presentation but also on the merits of the title of the respondent.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the passages extracted above, had held that a writ petition would be maintainable only where there is failure on the part of the registering authority to stick to the mandate of law and mere

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cancellation of registration of the document is sought.^{Furtheradeclaration} that the document is null and void is exclusively within^{thedomainofthecivil} Court. Though the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed^{thatthiswouldnot} restrict the High Court from examining the question^{ofwhethertheregistering} authority had performed his duties, it was also held^that it would be open to the High Court to refuse to exercise jurisdiction in^{suchcases.TheHon’ble} Supreme Court, after specifically observing that the^{appellantinthatcasehad} not sought a declaration that the document is null^{andvoid,hadheldthatsuch} a challenge is maintainable. In the present case, the^{appellanthadsoughta} declaration that the deed of sale is null and void. The appellant also sought recognition that he was the absolute owner and possessor^oftheland.

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In such circumstances, the observations of the learned^Single Judge cannot be faulted and the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on the peculiar facts of this case,^{wouldnotaidtheappellant.} 20. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, had vehemently contended that once an injunction order^has been issued in relation to a property, there can be no registration^{ofanydeedofalienation} relating to that property. He contends that the registering^{authoritywouldhave} to only verify whether the property in question is^{coveredbytheinjunction} order or not. This Court is unable to accept this contention.^As rightly observed by the learned Single Judge in Sangaraju Laxminarayana^Rajuvs. Principal Secretary Revenue (Registration) Department,^{GunturDistrict}

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and Ors., the registering authority cannot refuse registration, merely on account of an injunction order being passed in relation to the subject land, unless the parties to the document are also parties^{tothesuitwheresuchan} interim injunction had been granted.

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In the circumstances, nothing further survives in this writ appeal. Accordingly, this writ appeal is dismissed. It is clarified that this Court is not pronouncing on merits of the case and it would be open to the parties to agitate their respective contentions before the appropriate^{Court.Thereshall} be no order as to costs.

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As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand

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closed.

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Sd/- Wi-RAWIESH BABU deputy registrar

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//TRUE COPY//

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SECTION OFFICER

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To,