Allowed

Deshapogu Ramudu v. the State of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh HC13 Mar 2024CRLP/704/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court quashed criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for offences under Sections 376-C and 506 IPC. Although rape is a heinous crime, the Court exercised its inherent powers to quash proceedings due to a full settlement between parties, the victim's reluctance to support the prosecution, and the early stage of the trial where charges were unframed, ensuring the victim was not subj

What did the court decide?

The criminal proceedings in PRC.No.68 of 2022 registered against the petitioner for offences under Sections 376-C(c) and 506 IPC were quashed.

Deshapogu Ramudu Vs the State of Andhra Pradesh — Quashing and FIR | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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THURSDAY ,THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY

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I.A.Nos.l & 2 of 2024 In/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 704 OF 2023

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Between:

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Deshapogu Ramudu, S/o. D. Lakshmana, Aged 38 Yrs, Occ. Commission Agent of Star Power Digital Technology (Consultancy), R/o. H.No,11/214, Ganesh Nagar, Kurnool Town, Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh

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...Petitioner/Accused

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AND

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The State Of Andhra Pradesh, Represented by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh At Amaraati, Through SHO, Kurnool III Town Police Station, Kurnool District

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Uppari Ramya Krishna @ Ramya Laksmi, W/o. Uppari Nagaraju, Aged about 26 Yrs, R/o. 76-97-280-3, Weaker Section Colony, Kurnool Town, Kurnool District, Andhra Pradesh

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...Respondent/De-facto Complainant

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Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition

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the High Court pleased to quash all the further proceedings in .p‘RC.No.68/2022, for the offence U/SS 376-C (c), 506 of IPC, which is '’V pending on the file of Hon'ble Judicial First-Class Magistrate (Proh. and Excise), Kurnool, against the Petitioner/Accused, and pass l-A. NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 320(2) of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to permit the respondent No.2 to compromise the case with the petitioner/accused and the proceedings against the petitioner/accused may be quashed in PRC.No.68/2022,^forthe offence U/SS 376-C (c), 506 of I PC, which is pending^{onthefileofHon'ble} Judicial First-Class Magistrate (Proh. & Excise), Kurnool.

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I.A. NO: 2 OF 2024

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Petition under Section 320(6) of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to permit the petitioner/Complaina^ntherein to compromise the matter with the Respondent No.l/Petitioner/acc^used in PRC.No.68/2022, for the offence U/S S 376-C (c), 506 of IPC, which is pending on the file of Hon'ble Judicial First-Class Magistrate (Proh. & Excise), Kurnool.

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I.A. NO: 1 OF 2023

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Petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C praying that in the circumstances stated in the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant stay of all further proceedings including appearance of the Petitioner/Accused in PRC.No.68/2022 , for the offence U/SS 376-C (c), 506 of IPC, which is pending^{onthefileofHon'ble} Judicial First-Class Magistrate (Proh. and Excise),^Kurnool.

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This Petition coming on for hearing, upon perusing the Memorandum of Grounds of Criminal Petition and upon hearing the arguments of Sri Y Balaji .Advocate for the Petitioner and the Public Prosecutor (AP) on behalf of the Respondent No.1 and of Sri M.Rajeev Kumar, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2

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The Court made the following Order :

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

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(Special Original Jurisdiction)

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THURSDAY ,THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY

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I.A.Nos.l & 2 of 2024 in/and

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CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 704/2023

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Between:

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Deshapogu Ramudu

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...PETITIONER/ACCUSED

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AND

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The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others

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...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S)

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Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:

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1.YBALAJI

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Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):

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1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

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The Court made the following:

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I.A.Nos.l & 2 of 2024 in/and CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 704/2023

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COMMON ORDER

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This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,^{hasbeenfiledonbehalfof} the petitioner/accused, seeking to quash the proceedings^{inPRC.No.68of2022on} the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Proh. 8i Excise), Kurnool, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376-C-(c) and 506 IPC.

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It is represented that both the parties have settled the dispute amicably out of the Court at the intervention of their elders and well wishers. In view of the settlement arrived between both the parties, they filed I.A. Nos. 1 & 2 of 2024 seeking to permit them to compound the offence and record the compromise. 3. Today, when the matter is taken up, petitioner herein/accused and 2""^ respondent/ofe facto complainant are present before this Court. They produced their respective aadhar cards in proof of their identity. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for 2"'^ respondent have identified the parties in the open Court. This Court has questioned the de facto complainant with regard to compromise and she has categorically stated to that extent that she has voluntarily entered into compromise with the petitioner herein/ accused. This Court is satisfied with the identification of the parties and voluntariness in arriving at the compromise. As the parties have entered into a compromise and compounded the offences, the chance of conviction is bleak and remote.

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In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & another/ the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: (para 57)

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the nnwe^nf h r discussion can be summarised thus: f ^ quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences Under Section 320 ^^h^c tn h^' plenitude with no statutory limitation^but I in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; 0) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or . i/ay be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category^can exercise of such power, the High Court^must offeLpf and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot

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2012(9) Scale 257

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be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise^{betweenthevictimand} offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases. High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether^{tosecuretheends} of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High^{Courtshallbewellwithinits} jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

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In a decision in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi & another^

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wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:

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"12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position^{thatinheinous} and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph^{29.5to29.7ofthe} judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh v. State of Punjab^, which read thus: "29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is^toexamineas to whether the possibility of conviction is remote^andbleakand continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would^becaused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

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29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against^{theindividual} alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the^FIRorthe

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^(2022) 8 Supreme 341

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charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of^Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,^whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding^factor.Onthe basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence^based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

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29.7 While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet^has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge^isframed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or^afterthe conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on^meritsandto come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept^the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict^found guilty of such a crime."

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It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may improve their mutual relationship.

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The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application^ismadeat an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power.

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The facts and circumstances as stated hereinabove are peculiar in the present case. Respondent No. 2 is a young lady of 23 years. She feels that going through trial in one case, where she is a complainant and in the other case, wherein she is the accused would rob the prime of her youth. She feels that if she is made to face the trial rather than getting any relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing the trial. 16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No. 2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case,^even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only request adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts.

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In that view of the matter, we find that though^inaheinousor serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally^exercisethe powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar^factsand circumstances of the present case and in order to give^succourto Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings."

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6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Mandar Deepak Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra & another^, wherein it was held thus:

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'The appellant and respondent No.2 were undisputedly in a consensual relationship from 2009 to 2011 (or 2013 as stated by the respondent No.2). It is the say of the respondent No.2 that the consensual physical relationship was on an assurance of marriage by the appellant. The complaint has been filed only in 2016 after three years, pursuant whereto FIR dated 16.12.2016 was registered under Section 376 and 420, IPC. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we find ex facie the registration of FIR in the present case is abuse of the criminal process. The parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time. For some reason, the parties fell apart. It can happen both before or after marriage. Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR. The facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid by us that we have no hesitation in quashing the FIR dated^{16.12.2016and} bringing the proceedings to a close. Permitting further proceedings under the FIR would amount to harassment to the appellant through the criminal process itself. We are fortified to adopt this course of action by the judicial view in (2019) 9 SCC 608 titled Pramod Suryabhan Pawar^Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. wherein the factual scenario where complainant was aware that there existed obstacles in marrying the accused and still continued to engage in sexual relations, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR. A distinction was made between a false promise to marriage which is given on understanding by the maker that it will be broken and a breach of promise which is made in good faith but subsequently^{notfulfilled.This} was in the context of Section 375 Explanation 2 and Section 90 of the IPC, 1860. The Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and the proceedings in pursuance to FIR dated 16.12.2016 stand quashed, leaving parties to bear their own costs."

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In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Apex^Courtand as the parties have entered into a compromise and compounded the offences, this Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings in P.R.C.No.68 of 2022 before the trial Court, against the petitioner herein is hereby quashed..

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