Dismissed

Jagadeesh Vasamji Tank, Rajahmundry, E.G.Dist and 4 Others v. Smt.Divya Jitendra Chauhan @ Chavan, M.P. State and 3 Others

Andhra Pradesh HC11 Dec 2024AS/241/2009

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court heard joint appeals challenging decrees in three original suits regarding partition and inheritance. The court upheld the challengeable decrees, validating a Will and affirming the genuineness of a gift deed despite claims of subsequent revocation and misrepresentation.

What did the court decide?

Costs of Rs. 1,60,960 to Respondent No.3; Rs. 20,266 to Respondent No.1; and Rs. 36,845 to Respondent No.1 were awarded to the respective parties.

Jagadeesh Vasamji Tank, Rajahmundry… — Succession and Inheritance | Andhra Pradesh HC (2024)

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

¶2

THURSDAY ,THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER

¶3

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

¶4

PRESENT

¶5

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

¶6

.4®
'A
>1
V,*

¶7

APPEAL SUIT NO: 241 OF 2nnq

¶8

Between:

¶9

Jagadeesh Vasamji Tank, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank, Hindu Business R/o. H.No. 29-7-1, Opp; Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta,

¶10

Balakishan Vasamji Tank (Died) per LR A-5

¶11

Chandrakanth Vasamji Tank @ Chandu, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank, Hindu, Business, R/o. H.No. 29-7-1 Opp:Ghowhami Library

¶12

Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District

¶13

Dismissing the appeal as withdrawn in so far as the 3rd appellant is concerned as per Court Order dt.15.9.2011 made In AS No. 241/2009

¶14

Sharad Vasamji Tank, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank, Hindu, Employee Sarala Manohar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Flat No.63, 6th floor, sector 17, Plot No. 19, Vashi, Newdelhi-400703.

¶15

Dismissed the appeal as withdrawn insofar as it relates to appellant no.4 vide as per the C.O. dt.29.4.2013 in ASMP-1220/2013

¶16

Sameet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years. Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry,^E.G.Dist.

¶17

¶18

Appellant No.5 is brought on record as LR of deceased A-2 as per the Hon'ble C.O. dt.6/2/2013 in ASMP-223/2013

¶19

...Appellants/Defendants

¶20

AND

¶21

Smt.Divya Jitendra Chauhan @ Chavan, Hindu, 43 years, Inamdarini 4 & 5 Sector, 4 Sainik Society, Jabbalpore, Madhya Pradesh State.

¶22

... Respondent/Plaintiff

¶23

Smt. D. Lalitha Ram Murthy,

¶24

Smt. D. Prathima

¶25

Rajeev Nandlal Tank

¶26

(Respondent 2 to 4 are not necessary, hence given up)

¶27

...Respondents

¶28

Appeal Suit under Section 96 of C.P.C, aggrieved by the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 11 of 2001, dated 12-3-2009 on the file of 1 Additional District Judge, E.G.Dist, at Rajahmundry.

¶29

This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and material papers in the Suit and upon hearing arguments of M/s Bharadwaj Associates, Advocate for the Appellant Nos. 1 & 5 and of Sri V V Satish Advocate for Respondent No.3

¶30

This Court doth Order and decree as follows:

¶31

That the appeal be and hereby is dismissed;

¶32

That the Decree and Judgment dated 12.03.2009 passed by the I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry in O.S No.11 of 2001 be and hereby is confirmed and

¶33

¶34

That the appellants do pay costs of Rs. 1,60,960/- to the Respondent

¶35

No.3 towards costs.

¶36

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

¶37

(Respondent No.3 Costs) A.S No. 241 of 2009

¶38

Rs. Ps.
Stamps for Vakalatnama 5 00
Value of Copy Stamp paper used for
enclosures

¶39

(■

¶40

Senior Advocate’s fee on Rupees (Certified) 1,20,716
(as per Advocate Fees Act)
Junior Advocate fee on Rupees (Certified) 40,238
(as per Advocate Fees Act)
Batta and Postage Nil
Translation and Printing charge Nil
Total Rs. 1,60,960/-

¶41

(The appellants herein do pay a sum of Rs.1,60,960 /- to the Respondent No.3 herein towards costs )

¶42

//TRUE COPY//

¶43

Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR SCSECTION OFFICER

¶44

To, 1. The 1 St Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari^District (with records if any)

¶45

Three CD Copies

Stu sree

HIGH COURT

DATED: 12/12/2024

DECREE

AS.Nos.241 of 2009

DISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT WITH COSTS

¶53

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

¶54

THURSDAY ,THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER

¶55

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

¶56

PRESENT

¶57

V ^

¶58

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

¶59

APPEAL SUIT NO: 252 OF 2009

¶60

Between:

¶61

Velubhai Vasamji, W/o. Late Vasamjr Taunk, Hindu, 78 years, Business D.No. 29-7-1/1, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.Dist. (Died)

¶62

Jagadeesh Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk,i Hindu Business D.No. 29-7-1/4, Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District.

¶63

Balakishan Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji^Taunk-Died per LR, Appellant No.5

¶64

Chandrakanth Vasamji Taunk @ Chandu, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business D.No. 29-7-1/2, Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District.

¶65

The appeal Is dismissed as withdrawn in so far as the Appellant No.4 Is concerned as per Court Order dt.14.9.2011.

¶66

Sameet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry,^E.G.Dist.

¶67

Appellant No.5 is brought on record as LR of deceased Appellant No.3 as per the Hon'ble C.O. dt.08/09/2017 in ASMP No.84/2017

¶68

...Appeliants/Defendants

¶69

AND

¶70

Devlupalalli Prathima, W/o. Venkata Subba Rao, Hindu, 44 years Inamdarini Plot No.11, Ratna Apartments, Thota Ramulu Nagar, A.V.Apparao Raod, Rajahmundry.

¶71

...Respondent/Plaintiff

¶72

Divya Jitendra Chauhan, W/o. Jitendra Chauhan, Hindu Housewife Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh.

¶73

Dantu Lalita Ram, W/o. Ramamurthy, Hindu Housewife M.V.P. Colony, Visakhapatnam.

¶74

(The respondents 2 & 3 are not necessary. Hence given up)

¶75

...Respondents/ Respondents

¶76

Appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C, aggrieved by the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 62 of 2003, dated 12-3-2009 on the file of the 1 St Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry.

¶77

This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and material papers in the Suit and upon hearing arguments of M/s Bharadwaj Associates, Advocate for the Appellant Nos. 2 & 5 and of Sri V V Satish, Advocate for Respondent No.1.

¶78

This Court doth Order and decree as follows:

¶79

That the appeal be and hereby is dismissed;

¶80

That the Decree and Judgment dated 12.03.2009 passed by the I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry in O.S No.62 of 2003 be and hereby is confirmed and

¶81

¶82

That the appellants do pay costs of Rs.20,266/- to the Respondent No.1 herein towards costs.

¶83

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS

¶84

(Respondent No.l Costs) A.S No. 252 of 2009

¶85

Rs. Ps.
Stamps for Vakalatnama
5 00
Value of Copy Stamp paper used for
enclosures
Senior Advocate’s fee on Rupees (Certified) 15,196 00
(as per Advocate Fees Act)
Junior Advocate fee on Rupees (Certified) 5,065 00
(as per Advocate Fees Act)
Batta and Postage Nil
Translation and Printing charge Nil
Total Rs. 20,266/-

¶86

(The appellants herein do pay a sum of Rs. 20,266 /- to the Respondent No.1 herein towards costs )

¶87

Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR

¶88

//TRUE COPY//

¶89

SECTION OFFICER

¶90

To,
1. The 1 St Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District
(with records if any)

¶91

Three CD Copies

Stu sree

HIGH COURT

DATED: 12/12/2024

V' *"4

¶96

DECREE

¶97

AS.Nos.252 of 2009

¶98

2 8 I AM 20?5 \ *2:^ , Current aecwon ^

¶99

DISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT WITH COSTS

¶100

¶101

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

¶102

THURSDAY ,THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

¶103

PRESENT

¶104

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

¶105

APPEAL SUIT NO: 366 OF 2009

¶106

Between:

¶107

Jagadeesh Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business, R/o. H.No. 29-7-1/4 Opp; Ghowhami Library Lakshmivarapupeta,

¶108

Balakishan Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji^Taunk-Died per LR- Appellant No.4

¶109

Chandrakanth Vasamji Taunk @ Chandu, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business R/o. H.No. 29-7-1/2, Opp: Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta

¶110

The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn in so far as the Appellant No.3 is concerned as per Court Order dt.14.9.2011.

¶111

Sameet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry,^E.G.Dist.

¶112

Appellant No.4 is brought on record as LR of deceased Appellant No.2 as per the Hon'ble C.O. dt.03/11/2017 in ASMP No.125/2013

¶113

...Appeliants/Plaintiffs 2-4

¶114

AND

¶115

Devulapalli Prathima, W/o. Venkata Subba Rao, Hindu, 43 years, Inamdarini Plot No. 11, Ratna Apartments, A.V. Apparao, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District.

¶116

Devulapalli Venkata Subba Rao, S/o. not known, Hindu, 49 years. Plot No. 11, Ratna Apartments, A.V. Apparao, Rajahmundry,^EastGodavari District.

¶117

Velubhai Vasanji (died)

¶118

...Respondents/Defendant 1& 2/Plaintiff No.1

¶119

Appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C, aggrieved by the decree and judgment ini . O.S.No. 83/2003 dated 12-03-2009 on the file of 1st Additional District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry.

¶120

This appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the grounds of appeal, the judgment and Decree of the Lower Court and material papers in the Suit and upon hearing arguments of M/s Bharadwaj Associates, Advocate for the Appellant Nos. 1 & 4 and of Sri V V Satish, Advocate for Respondent No.1.

¶121

This Court doth Order and decree as follows:

¶122

That the appeal be and hereby is dismissed;

¶123

That the Decree and Judgment dated 12.03.2009 passed by the I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry in O.S No.83 of 2003 be and hereby is confirmed and

¶124

¶125

That the appellants do pay costs of Rs.36,845/- to the Respondent No.1 herein towards costs.

¶126

M-EMORANnuM qf mQTo

¶127

No. 366 of 2nnQ (Respondent No.l Costs)

¶128

Stamps for Vakalatnama Rs. Ps.
5 00
Value of Copy Stamp paper used for
enclosures
27630 00
9210 00
ss'SSLtssr"""'
Batta and Postage
Nil
Translation and Printing charge
Nil
Total
Rs. 36,845/-

¶129

(The appellants herein do No.1 herein towards pay a sum of Rs.36,845/- to the Respondent costs)

¶130

Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// FT To. SECTION OFFICER 1. The Additional District (with records if any) Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District

¶131

Three CD Copies

¶132

Stu sree

¶133

HIGH COURT DATED: 12/12/2024

¶134

DECREE

¶135

AS.Nos.366 of 2009

¶136

o
2 8 JAN 2025
o ^
^ . Current Section

¶137

DISMISSING THE APPEAL SUIT WITH COSTS

¶138

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

¶139

THURSDAY ,THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

¶140

PRESENT

¶141

¶142

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

¶143

APPEAL SUIT NOS. 241 OF 2009. 252 OF 2009 AND 366 OF 2009

¶144

APPEAL SUIT NO: 241 OF 2009

¶145

Appeal Suit under Section 96 of C.P.C, aggrieved by^thedecreeand judgment in O.S.No. 11 of 2001, dated 12-3-2009 on the file of 1st Additional District Judge, E.G.Dist, at Rajahmundry.

¶146

Between:

¶147

Jagadeesh Vasamji Tank, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank,^{HinduBusiness} R/o. H.No. 29-7-1, Opp: Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta,

¶148

Balakishan Vasamji Tank (Died) per LR A-5

¶149

Chandrakanth Vasamji Tank @ Chandu, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank, Hindu, Business, R/o. H.No. 29-7-1, Opp:Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District

¶150

Dismissing the appeal as withdrawn in so far as the 3rd appellant

¶151

is concerned as per Court Order dt.15.9.2011 made in AS No. 241/2009

¶152

Sharad Vasamji Tank, S/o. Vasamji Madhavji Tank, Hindu, Employee Sarala Manohar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Flat No.63, 6th floor, sector 17, Plot No. 19, Vashi, Newdelhi-400703.

¶153

¶154

Dismissed the appeal as withdrawn insofar as it relates to appellant no.4 vide as per the C.O. dt.29.4.2013 in ASMP-1220/2013

¶155

^meet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years 4 '*■ Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry,^E.G.Dist.

¶156

Appellant No.5 is brought on record as LR of deceased A-2 as per the Hon'ble C.O. dt.6/2/2013 in ASMP-223/2013

¶157

...Appellants/Defendants

¶158

AND

¶159

Smt.Divya Jitendra Chauhan @ Chavan, Hindu, 43 years,^Inamdarini4 & 5 Sector, 4 Sainik Society, Jabbalpore, Madhya Pradesh^State.

¶160

...Respondent/Plaintiff

¶161

Smt. D. Lalitha Ram Murthy,

¶162

Smt. D. Prathima

¶163

Rajeev Nandlal Tank

¶164

(Respondent 2 to 4 are not necessary, hence given up)

¶165

...Respondents

¶166

I.A. NO: 1 OF 2009rASMP. NO: 772 OF 2009)

¶167

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the^{circumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased grant stay of all further proceedings in O.S.No.11 of 2001 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry pursuant to the decree and Judgment in O.S.No.11 of 2001 dated 12.03.2009

¶168

¶169

¶170

Counsel for the Appellant Nos. 1 & 5 : M/s Bharadwaj^Associates

¶171

Counsel for the Respondent No.3 ; Sri V V Satish

¶172

APPEAL SUIT NO: 252 OF ?nnQ

¶173

Appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C aggrieved by the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 62 of 2003, dated 12-3-2009 on the file of the 1st Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry.

¶174

Between:

¶175

Velubhai Vasamji, W/o, Late Vasamji Taunk, Hindu 78 years. Business D.No. 29-7-1/1, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.Dist. (Died)

¶176

Jagadeesh Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business D.No. 29-7-1/4, Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District.

¶177

Balakishan Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji^Taunk- Died per LR, Appellant No.5

¶178

Chandrakanth Vasamji Taunk @ Chandu, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business D.No. 29-7-1/2, Ghowhami Library Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry, E.G.District.

¶179

The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn in so far as the Appellant No.4 Is concerned as per Court Order dt.14.9.2011.

¶180

Sameet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry E.G.Dist.

¶181

Appellant No.5 is brought on record as LR of deceased Appellant No.3 as per the Hon'ble C.O. dt.08/09/2017 in ASMP No.84/2017

¶182

...Appellants/Defendants

AND

Devlupalalli Prathima, W/o. Venkata Subba Rao, Hindu, 44 years Inamdarini Plot No.11, Ratna Apartments, Thota Ramulu Nagar

¶188

A.V.Apparao Raod, Rajahmundry.

¶189

...Respondent/Plaintiff

¶190

Divya Jitendra Chauhan, W/o. Jitendra Chauhan, Hindu Housewife Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh.

¶191

Dantu Lalita Ram, W/o. Ramamurthy, Hindu Housewife M.V.P. Colony,

¶192

Visakhapatnam.

¶193

(The respondents 2 & 3 are not necessary. Hence given up)

¶194

...Respondents/ Respondents

¶195

Counsel for the Appellant Nos.2 & 5: M/S Bharadwaj^Associates

¶196

Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : Sri VV Satlsh

¶197

APPEAL SUIT NO: 366 OF 2009

¶198

Appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C, aggrieved by the decree and judgment in O.S.No. 83/2003 dated 12-03-2009 on the file of 1st Additional District Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmundry.

¶199

Between;

¶200

Jagadeesh Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business R/o. H.No. 29-7-1/4, Opp: Ghowhami Library,

¶201

Lakshmivarapupeta,

¶202

Balakishan Vasamji Taunk, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk- (Died) per LR- Appellant No.4

¶203

¶204

¶205

Chandrakanth Vasamji Taunk @ Chandu, S/o. Late Vasamji Madhavji Taunk, Hindu Business R/o. H.No. 29-7-1/2, Opp; Ghowhami Library, Lakshmivarapupeta

¶206

The appeal Is dismissed as withdrawn in so far as the Appellant No.3 Is concerned as per Court Order dt.14.9.2011.

¶207

Sameet Taunk, S/o. Late Balakishan Taunk, Hindu, age 36 years. Business, D.No.29-7-1/3, Laxmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry,^E.G.Dist.

¶208

Appellant No.4 is brought on record as LR of deceased Appellant No.2 as per the Hon’ble C.O. dt.03/11/2017 in ASMP No.125/2013

¶209

...Appellants/Plaintiffs 2-4

¶210

AND

¶211

Devulapalli Prathima, W/o. Venkata Subba Rao, Hindu, 43 years, Inamdarini Plot No. 11, Ratna Apartments, A.V. Apparao, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District.

¶212

Devulapalli Venkata Subba Rao, S/o. not known Hindu, 49 years. Plot No. 11, Ratna Apartments, A.V. Apparao, Rajahmundry,^EastGodavari District.

¶213

Velubhai Vasanji (died)

¶214

...Respondents/Defendant 1& 2/Plaintiff No.1

¶215

Counsel for the Appellant Nos. 1 & 4 : Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, Senior Counsel for M/s Bharadwaj Associates

¶216

Counsel for the Respondent No.1 : Sri V V Satish

¶217

Counsel for the Respondents: Sri O. Manohar Reddy, Senior Counsel for

¶218

Sri V.V. Satish

¶219

The Court made the following

¶220

¶221

APHC010037732009

¶222

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

¶223

[3369]

¶224

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

¶225

THURSDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF DECEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FOUR

¶226

PRESENT

¶227

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

¶228

APPEAL SUIT NOs: 241/2009. 252/2009 AND 366/2009

¶229

A.S.No.241 of 2009

¶230

Between:

¶231

Jagadeesh Vasamji Tank, Rajahmundry, E.g.dist And 4 Others and Others

¶232

...APPELLANT{S)

¶233

AND

¶234

Smt Divya Jitendra Chauhan Chavan M P State And 3 Others and Others

...RESPONDENT(S)

A.S.No.252 of 2009

Between:

V.vasamji, Rajahmundry, E.g.dist (died) And 3 Others^and Others

¶239

...APPELLANT(S)

¶240

AND

¶241

D Prathima Rajahmundry And 2 Others and Others

...RESPONDENT(S)

A.S.No.366 of 2009

Between:

Jagadeesh Vasamji Taunk, Rajahmundry, E.g.dist & 2^{Others...APPELLANT(S)} and Others

AND

Devulapalli Prathima Rajahmundry E G Dist And 2 Others Counsel for the Appellant(S):

¶250

...RESPONDENT(S)

¶251

M/S BHARADWAJ ASSOCIATES

¶252

2.P MEHAR SRINIVASA RAO

¶253

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1..

2.S PRANATHI

3.VVSATISH

The Court made the following COMMON JUDGMENT:

¶258

These three Appeals arise from the common judgment and decrees dated 12.03.2009, in O.S.No.11 of 2001, O.S.No.62 of 2003, and O.S.No.83' of 2003, passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court'). Accordingly, they are disposed of by the following common judgment.

¶259

A.S.No.241 of 2009 has been filed by the Appellants/Defendant s, challenging the decree and judgment dated 12.03.2009, in O.S.No.11 of 2001; A.S.No.252 of 2009 has been filed by the Appellants/Defendants, challenging the decree and judgment dated 12.03.2009, in O.S.No.62 of 2003. A.S.No.366 of 2009 has been filed by the Appellants/Plaintiffs, challenging the decree and judgment dated 12.03.2009, in O.S.No.83 of 2003, on the file of the I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry.

¶260

Referring to the parties as arrayed in the suits is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The suit in O.S.No.11 of 2001 was filed by the Plaintiff seeking vacant possession of the properties shown in the plaint 'A' schedule by evicting the Defendants, as well as a partition of the properties in the plaint 'B' schedule into

¶261

¶262

eight equal shares, with one such share to be allotted for the exclusive possession of the Plaintiff. 5. The Plaintiffs in O.S.No.11 of 2001 and O.S.No.62 of 2003 are sisters, they are daughters of Plaintiff in O.S.No.83 of 2003, who is figured as 1 St Defendant in O.S.No.62 of 2003. The Defendants 2 to 4 in O.S.No.62 of 2003 are none other than the brothers of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.62 of 2003 and the Plaintiff in O.S.No.11 of 2001 i.e., sons of Plaintiff in O.S.No.83,of 2003. These brothers are referred to as Defendants 1 to 3 in O.S.No.11 of 2001. The Plaintiff in O.S.No.62 of 2003 is figured as 6*^ Defendant in^{O.S.No.11of2001.Theother} Defendants in O.S.No.11 of 2001 are their other family^members.

¶263

Brief averments of the plaint, in O.S.No.11 of 2001.^arethat:

¶264

(a) The Plaintiff and Defendants 1 to 6, along with Nandalal V. Tank, are children of S. Vasamji Madhavaji Tank (hereinafter referred to as ‘Madhavaji’) and Smt. Velubhai Vasamji (hereinafter referred to as ‘Velubhai’) inherited and acquired valuable properties for the family, which was part of a Hindu undivided joint family. In 1980, the joint family assets were divided among Vasamji and his sons (Defendants 1 to 4). Before this, Nandalal, the eldest son, separated from the family after receiving his share of the assets, particularly fixed assets. Thus, the 1980 partition was between Vasamji and Defendants^1to4.

¶265

(b) In 1980, Madhavaji and his sons (Defendants 1 to 4) partitioned their joint immovable properties, including the house site buildings (D.No.29-7-1 and 29-7-1/1) at Lakshmivarapupeta. A plan was drawn to^{allocateshares,withitem} 'B' given to Madhavaji and item 'C to 4‘^ Defendant. Subsequently, Madhavaji purchased item No. 2 of the plaint 'A' schedule from 4*^ Defendant (Sale Deed dated 30.5.1985) and item No.3 (Ac. 1-35 cents) under^a Sale Deed dated 29.5.1983. On 23.07.1986, Madhavaji executed a Will in a sound and disposing state of mind, stating that his wife, Smt. Velubhai would enjoy the plaint 'A'

¶266

¶267

schedule properties during her lifetime, and the Plaintiff would take possession thereafter. Upon his death on 24.03.1994, however. Defendants 1 to 3, particularly 2"'' Defendant, unlawfully took possession of the properties, ill-treated Smt. Velubhai, and misappropriated her assets. Smt. Velubhai passed away intestate on 07.04.2001, leaving behind her heirs, including the Plaintiff and Defendants. The Plaintiff is entitled to an undivided 1/8''' share in the plaint properties. Defendants 1 to 3 had acknowledged Smt. Velubhai's exclusive ownership of the plaint 'B' schedule house property, as per the partition deed dated 19.10.1985. The Plaintiff is entitled to exclusive possession of the plaint 'A' schedule properties and seeks partition of the plaint 'B' schedule house property into eight equal shares. Despite her demand for possession arid partition (through a registered notice dated 14.05.2001), the Defendants failed to respond. Plaintiff, now in constructive possession of the plaint 'B' schedule house property, is entitled to both possession of the plaint 'A' schedule land properties and partition of the plaint 'B' schedule house property. 7. The 2 nd Defendant filed a written statement, adopted by Defendants 1, 3 and 4, denying the plaint’s allegations. They claimed that Madhavaji executed a valid Will on 15.03.1994, revoking all prior Wills. According to this Will, items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property were bequeathed to Smt. Velubhai Tank for her life, with the remainder to be equally shared among Defendants 1 to 3. (a) According to the Will of Madhavaji, Item No. 3 of the plaint 'B' schedule property was bequeathed to Defendants 1 to 4, and all his cash was bequeathed to his wife, Smt. Velubhai. The Plaintiff, aware of this Will, took the savings certificates kept in her name by her father. She has stolen silver articles from Velubhai. Regarding the plaint 'B' schedule property, Smt. Velubhai and Defendants 1 to 3 formed a partnership, and Smt. Velubhai invested in this property as her capital share. By her death, Smt. Velubhai no longer owned it.

¶268

¶269

Displeased with the Plaintiff and 6“^ Defendant, Smt.^{VelubhaiexecutedaWillon} 02.12.2000, bequeathing all her properties to Defendants 1 to 3, leaving the Plaintiff with no claim to the property.

¶270

During the pendency of the suit, the 5'*^ Defendant filed a memo reporting no objection to decreeing the suit, and the 6^^ Defendant^{alsofiledamemo} submitting that she has no objection to decreeing the suit as prayed for by the Plaintiff.

¶271

Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.11 of 2001,^{thetrialCourtframed} the following issues:

¶272

1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of plaint ‘A’ schedule land property?

¶273

1. Whether the Will dated 23.07.1986 is true, valid and binding on the Plaintiff?

¶274

1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to partition of the plaint ‘B’ schedule house property and is entitled to 1/8^^ share in the^same?

¶275

1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to future profits?

¶276

1. Whether Vellubhai Vasanji Taunk is having plaint^{‘B’schedulehouse} property by the time she died?

¶277

1. To what relief?

¶278

Brief averments of the plaint, in O.S.No.62 of 2003.^arethat:

¶279

Brief averments of the plaint, in O.S.No.62 of 2003.^arethat: th (a) The suit in O.S.No.62 of 2003 was filed by the^{Plaintiff,whoisthe6} Defendant in O.S.No.11 of 2001, against the 4**^ Defendant (the Plaintiffs mother and brothers). Following the demise of the mother (1®* Defendant), Defendants 5 and 6 were brought on record. The suit seeks a declaration^{oftitletotheplaint} schedule property, along with a consequential permanent injunction,

¶280

(b) The Plaintiff is the youngest daughter of the 1®'^{Defendantandherlate} husband, Vasanji M. Tank. On 31.12.1996, the Plaintiff was not given valuable assets at her marriage, unlike other family members. However, the 1st

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Defendant, out of love and affection, gifted the schedule property to the Plaintiff through a registered Gift Deed, executed on the same date. This gift was made voluntarily, with full consent from the 1 Defendant and in the presence of attestors. Defendants 2 to 4 also consented, acknowledging their responsibility to provide for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has since taken possession of the property and enjoys it with full rights and title. (c) Defendants 2 to 4, after gaining control over the fixed deposits, filed a suit (O.S.No.83 of 2003) in the name of the 1®' Defendant against the Plaintiff and her husband, challenging the validity of the Gift Deed dated 31.12.1996 executed in favour of the Plaintiff by the 1®‘ Defendant. Plaintiff alleged the malicious intentions of her brothers (Defendants 2 to 4), who sought to harass, threaten, and coerce their mother (1®* Defendant),

¶283

(d) The Plaintiff is the sole and exclusive owner of the schedule property, which she possesses and enjoys without interference. The Defendants have no right, interest, or possession in the property and cannot disturb the Plaintiff’s ownership or possession. Defendants 2 to 4, being able-bodied, have the capacity to use physical force to disrupt the Plaintiff’s peaceful enjoyment of the property. 11. The 1®^ Defendant, during her lifetime, filed a written statement denying the allegations in the plaint. She claimed that as of 31.12.1996, she held no right, title, or interest in the 'A' schedule land properties and that Defendants 2 to 4 had been in possession of these properties since 16.07.1991, to the Plaintiffs knowledge. The 1®* Defendant alleged that the settlement deed was fraudulent, made under misrepresentation and coercion, and could not convey any rights to the Plaintiff. She further stated that she did not knowingly or willingly execute the deed and that it was filed as a counterclaimto the Plaintiffs suit. Additionally, she asserted that she had no rights to the property even before 31.12.1996.

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(a) The 1®* Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff is not in possession of the plaint schedule properties and that the Defendants 2 to 4 remain in possession. Upon discovering the alleged fraud, the 1®* Defendant revoked the Gift Deed vide a registered revocation deed dated 28.05.1999 and notified the Plaintiff through a registered letter. She also revoked the power of attorney granted to the Plaintiffs husband. The 1®* Defendant claims the plaint schedule property was not joint family property and that Defendants 2 to 4 had partitioned their properties, with her signing the partition document, which did not mention her possession of the plaint schedule property. She asserts that the Gift Deed of 31.12.1996 was invalid due to fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, was not acted upon, and that possession was never transferred to the Plaintiff. Consequently, Defendants 2 to 4 are the rightful owners and continue to possess the property.

¶286

Defendants 2 to 4 filed a written statement asserting^{that1®*Defendantlost} all rights, title, or interest in the plaint schedule property as of 16.07.1991. They claimed to have been in possession and enjoyment of the property in their own right, with the Plaintiff and others being aware of this. Additionally, they contended that the alleged Gift Deed was the result of fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion.

¶287

3'^'' Defendant filed an additional written statement asserting that Defendants 5 and 6 are not the legal heirs of the 1®‘ Defendant. In the light of the Will dated 02.12.2000, executed by the late Velubhai Vasanji Tank, 3'”'^ Defendant contended that Defendants 2 and 4 are the rightful heirs and entitled to the plaint schedule property. Therefore, Defendants 5 and 6 have no claim to the property. 14. The Plaintiff filed a rejoinder asserting that the total 3800 sq. yards of land, part of the plaint schedule property, was jointly purchased by Defendants 1 to 4 under a Sale Deed dated 09.08.1968. They later divided the property among themselves, as shown in the partition list dated 19.10.1985,^and have since

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enjoyed their respective portions exclusively. The Plaintiff also contended that the Will dated 02.12.2000, claimed by Defendants 2 to 4, is forged and fabricated, pointing to the execution of the Will by the 1®' Defendant in favour of the 2""' Defendant as evidence of its falsity. Furthermore, Plaintiff noted that the 1®‘ Defendant never took action against 5*^ Defendant regarding any jewellery or gold and acknowledged receipt of Rs. 13,500/- as interest on her fixed deposit at Vijaya Bank, per the receipt dated 08.12.1999.

¶291

Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.62 of 2003, the trial Court framed the following issues:

¶292

/1) Whether the Plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property?

¶293

(2) Whether the f Defendant has any title and interest in the plaint schedule property? If so, whether the Gift Deed dated 31.12.1992 in favour of the Plaintiff is true, valid and binding?

¶294

(3) Whether the f' Defendant is entitled to revoke the Registered Gift Deed? If so, whether the Registered Revocation deed dated 28.05.1999 is true, valid and binding on the Plaintiff?

¶295

(4) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to seek consequential relief of permanent injunction?

¶296

(5) To what relief?

¶297

Additional Issue:

¶298

Whether the Defendants 2 to 4 alone are entitled to schedule property by virtue of the Will executed dated 02.12.2000 by late Velubhai Vasanji Taunk and that Defendants 5 and 6 have no right in the schedule property?

¶299

¶300

Brief averments of the plaint, in O.S.No.83 of 2003. are^that:

¶301

(a)The suit in O.S.No.83 of 2003 was filed by the Plaintiff,^who is the mother and appears as the 1®* Defendant in O.S.No.62 of 2003. The suit seeks a declaration that the Gift Deed dated 31.12.1996, purportedly executed by Plaintiff in favour of the 1®* Defendant, is void, invalid, and unenforceable and that it was never acted upon. The Plaintiff also seeks an order to send a copy of the decree

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to the office of the Sub-Registrar to update their records’ regarding the cancellation of the said Gift Deed.

¶304

(b) The plaint schedule property was not the absolute property of the deceased sole Plaintiff. It was contributed as her capital investment in the partnership firm "Marthandachal Graphite and Crucibles, Rajahmundry." Upon the settlement of accounts, the property was retained by her sons (the other partners), while the Plaintiff received cash in place of her share. As a result, the Plaintiff no longer had any rights to the plaint schedule property. The Defendants allegedly induced the Plaintiff to execute a registered document on 31.12.1996, which the Plaintiff later discovered was a Gift Deed for the plaint schedule property. The Defendants misled the Plaintiff into signing the document by making her believe it was a power of attorney when it was, in fact, a Gift Deed. Despite the execution of the Gift Deed, Defendants 1 and 2 were never in possession or enjoyment of the property.

¶305

The 1 Defendant, adopted by the 2 Defendant, filed^{awrittenstatement} asserting that the plaint schedule property was the absolute and exclusive property of the Plaintiff, who gifted it through the Registered Gift Deed dated 31.12.1996, which was accepted by the 1®* Defendant with the Plaintiffs knowledge. Since then, the 1®* Defendant has owned and possessed the property as its absolute owner. The 1®* Plaintiff obtained the property through a partition with her sons, as shown by the partition deed dated^19.12.1985. If the Plaintiff had ceased to be the owner by the time of the alleged^{GiftDeedin1996,there} would have been no need for her to file the suit, as the true owners (her sons) would have taken action. Furthermore, the plaint does^{notmentionthePlaintiffs} claim of executing a deed to cancel the Gift Deed.

¶306

Based on the above pleadings in O.S.No.83 of 2003,^{thetrialCourtframed} the following issues;

{1) Whether the plaint ‘A ’ schedule land property was not owned by the Plaintiff as on 31.12.1996 and if Gift deed dated 31.12.1996 is void for want of title?

¶311

(2) Whether the Gift deed dated 31.12.1996 ivas obtained by misrepresentation and fraud and if the said deed is not enforceable?

¶312

(3) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration as prayed for?

¶313

(4) To what relief?

¶314

All three suits are clubbed, and the evidence is recorded in O.S.No.62 of 2003. During the trial, P.Ws.1 to 6 are examined, and Exs.AI to A40 are marked. On behalf of the Defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 are examined, and Exs.BI to B24 are marked. One witness is examined as Court Witness No.1 (C.W.1).

¶315

After the trial concluded and both sides presented their arguments, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in O.S.No.11 of 2001 by holding that the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession of plaint 'A' schedule properties and she is entitled to partition of plaint 'B' schedule properties; the^trial Court also decreed the suit in O.S.No.62 of 2003 by declaring that the^{Plaintiffistheownerofthe} plaint schedule property and also granting of consequential permanent injunction in favour of the Plaintiff and the trial Court dismissed the suit in O.S.No.83 of 2003 vide common judgment dated 12.03.2009.

¶316

Aggrieved by the said common judgment and decrees as stated supra, the aggrieved parties preferred the present appeals.

¶317

During the pendency of the Appeal in A.S.No.241 of 2009, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn concerning the Appellant by an order dated 15.09.2011. Similarly, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn concerning the 4th Appellant by an order dated 29.04.2013. Furthermore, by the order dated 06.02.2013 in A.S.M.P.No.223 of 2013, the 5*^ Appellant was brought on record as the legal representative of the 2"'' Appellant.

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rd the 3 23. During the pendency of the Appeal in A.S.No.252 of^2009, Appellant died, and the 5*^ Appellant was brought on record as the legal representative of the 2 nd Appellant by an order dated 08.09.2017 in A.S.M.P.No.84 of 2017. Additionally, an order dated^{14.09.2011dismissedthe} appeal as withdrawn concerning the 4*^ Appellant. the 2 nd 24. During the pendency of the Appeal in A.S.No.366 of^2009, Appellant died, and the 4 th Appellant was brought on record as the legal representative of the 2 nd Appellant by an order dated 03.11.2017 in A.S.M.P.No.125 of 2013. Additionally, an order dated^{14.09.2011dismissedthe} appeal as withdrawn concerning the 3’''* Appellant. 25. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel^representing Sri M. Balangu Srinivas, learned counsel for the Appellants^{andSriO.Manohar} Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri V.V.^{Satish,learnedcounselfor} the respondents. 26. Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel for^{theAppellants,} asserts that the trial Court should have seen the Will dated 15.03.1994^asthe last testament of the deceased, as it was proven with^{cogentandunimpeachable} evidence by the Appellants. He contends that the respondents failed to establish of the Will dated 23.07.1986, which they rely on for^theplaint the genuineness schedule properties. The trial Court should have considered^{thelaterWilldated} 15.03.1994, which the Appellants assert to be the true and final^{testamentofthe} the learned Senior Counsel deceased, proven beyond doubt. Further emphasizes that Will dated 15.03.1994 (Ex.B4) clearly^{statesthatallpriorWills} Will dated 23.07.1986, relied upon by the are cancelled. Therefore, the of Ex.B4 is respondents, cannot be considered once the genuineness established by the Appellants.

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(i) Learned Senior Counsel further asserts that the trial Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against the Appellants^{duetotheabsenceofa} recital in the Sale Deeds (Exs.A.36 to A.38), stating that they inherited the property through the Will. He contended that the lack of such a recital should not have led to an adverse inference. The trial Court's finding that had the Will (Ex.B4) existed at the time of the three Sale Deeds, there should have been a reference to it, was erroneous. Learned Senior Counsel explained that the documents were typically drafted by a document writer, and more importantly, the Appellants, being North Indians, were not fluent in Telugu. Additionally, the learned Senior Counsel asserts that the trial Court failed to recognize that the testimony of P.W.5 should not have been treated differently in proving the two Wills, both of which were attested by the father of P.W.5, whose signatures were identified. He al.so emphasized that the trial Court should have taken into account EX.B11, a Will dated 02.12.2000, executed by the father of both the Appellants and the respondent. This Will bequeathed the respondent's rights over the property to the Appellants, as her limited estate granted under Ex.B4 by her husband was enlarged under Section 14(1) of the Hindu^{SuccessionAct.}

¶323

(ii) Learned Senior Counsel further asserts that the trial Court should have acknowledged that the Will under Ex.BII was properly proved by examining the attestors of the Will, whose evidence remained unchallenged during crossexamination. He asserts that the trial Court should have placed trust in Ex.B16, a document in which the Appellants' mother, a partner in the firm under Ex.B15 (the partnership deed dated 09.08.1968) relinquished her rights in the firm and received cash in lieu of her share. Learned Senior Counsel contended that this document further supported the Appellants' claims and should have been given due weight by the trial Court,

¶324

(iii) Learned Senior Counsel further asserts that the trial Court should have seen that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property in O.S.No.11/2001 was given by the

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Appellants' mother as her share in the partnership. This property was later relinquished under the relinquishment deed (Ex.B16),^{andshereceivedcash} in lieu of it. As a result, the respondent has no claim over the plaint 'B' schedule property. The trial Court should also have acknowledged that the alleged Gift Deed (Ex.A17), under which the respondent is claiming her rights, is not genuine. The Gift Deed was revoked under Ex.B14 and it was not voluntarily executed by the Appellants' mother. Therefore, the trial Court^{shouldnothaveconsideredthe} Gift Deed (Ex.A17) in light of the revocation deed (Ex. B14). The respondents failed to prove the genuineness of Ex.A17, the Gift Deed dated 31.12.1996, in favour of G. Prathima.

¶327

Per contra, Sri O. Manohar Reddy learned Senior Counsel representing the Respondents, contends that the trial Court appreciated^{thecasefactsand} reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference.

¶328

Concerning the pleadings in the suits, the findings recorded by^thetrial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions^{madeoneitherside} before this Court, the following points would arise^{fordetermination:}

¶329

Whether the trial Court justified in holding that^the Will, dated 23.07.1986 is true, valid and binding and that the Plaintiff in O.S.No.11 of 2001 is entitled to have vacant possession of plaint ‘A’ schedule property?

¶330

Whether the trial Court Justified in holding that^the Plaintiff in O.S.No.11 of 2001 is entitled to 1/8*'' share of partition of plaint ‘B’ schedule house property?

¶331

Whether the trial Court Justified in holding that^{theGiftdeed,dated} 31.12.1992 in favour of the Plaintiff in O.S.No.62 of 2003 is true, valid and binding?

¶332

Whether the f®' Defendant in O.S.No.62 of 2003 is entitled^to revoke the plaint schedule property, and if so, whether the Plaintiff in O.S.No.83 of 2003 is entitled to a declaration that the gift deed is not valid and is obtained by misrepresentation?

¶333

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¶335

Whether the trial Court justified in holding that^{PlaintiffinO.S.No.11} of 2001 is entitled to future profits?

¶336

To what relief?

¶337

The schedule property involved in O.S.No.62 of 2003 and O.S.No.83 of 2003 is the same, a site measuring 921 sq. yards. The^{PlaintiffinO.S.No.62of} 2003 filed for a declaration of title and a permanent injunction regarding this property, claiming that her mother executed a gift deed. In contrast, the mother filed O.S.No.83 of 2003 to cancel that same gift deed.^{ThePlaintiff'ssisteralso} initiated O.S.No.11 of 2001 against their mother and siblings, demanding vacant possession of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property and a partition of the plaint ‘B’ schedule house property. It is crucial to note that the property in O.S.No.11 of 2001 is entirely distinct from the properties in the^{othertwosuits.}

¶338

As per the record, all three suits were consolidated, and the common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.62 of 2003. The Appellants'^{counselasserted} that the trial Court should not have consolidated the suits and that common evidence should not have been recorded. However, this Court holds that, having actively participated in the trial proceedings, the Appellants cannot now challenge the decision to club the suits and record common evidence. Furthermore, the Appellants failed to show any actual prejudice arising^{fromtheconsolidationof} the suits. While the trial Court highlighted certain procedural lapses in other cases, the Appellants may have been under the mistaken impression that the trial judge should have influenced these procedural issues. Nevertheless, during the appeal, the Appellants raised objections to the^{consolidation} of the suits without proving how it adversely impacted their case.

¶339

POINT N0.1:

¶340

The relationship between the parties in the suit O.S.No.11 of 2002 is undisputed. The Plaintiff, Defendants 1 to 6, and one Nandalal V. Tank (the

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father of the Defendant) are all children of Madhavaji^{andSmt.Velubhai.} In O.S.No.11 of 2001, the Plaintiff filed the suit demanding the vacant possession of the properties shown in Schedule A, seeking their eviction from the Defendants, along with a request for the partition of the B Schedule properties into eight equal shares.

¶343

Plaint A's Schedule consists of three distinct items: Item No.1 - House property located at D.Nos.29-7-1 & 29-7-1/1, along with its gppurtenant site situated at Lakshmivarapupeta in Rajahmundry town; Item No. 2 - House property at D.Nos.29-7-1 and 29-7-1/1, also located in Lakshmivarapupeta, Rajahmundry town; Item No.3 - Dr>'land measuring approximately^Ac.1.35cents on the western side of R.S.No.774/2, out of a total of Ac.2.70 cents, situated in Kolamuru village, Rajahmundry rural.

¶344

Plarrt B's Schedule consists of 788 square yards of land located in R.S.Nos.233 and 234, within the former Gandhi Prakashnagar Panchayat area, now part of the Rajahmundry Municipal Corporation. 34. Plaintiff asserts that following the partition, Sri Madhavaji purchased Item No. 2 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property from his son, the 4'^ Defendant, under a registered sale deed dated 30.05.1985, and subsequently took possession of the property, enjoying its rights. Additionally, Madhavaji purchased Ac.1.35 cents of land described in Item No.3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule^{underasaledeeddated} 29.05.1983. It is also undisputed that, before filing the suit. Plaintiff issued a registered notice on 14.05.2001, vide Ex.A9, demanding possession of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties. The Defendants acknowledged receipt of this notice, vide Exs.A.10 and A.11, but failed to respond. There is no serious dispute regarding the Plaintiffs sending of notice. Plaintiff contends that they have not specifically claimed for the plaint ‘B’ schedule property in the notice, with the

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expectation that Defendants 1 to 3 would facilitate the partition of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property. 35. The Plaintiffs specific case in O.S.No.11 of 2001,^{whotestifiedasPW.2} that her father, .Madhavaji, executed a Will on 23.07.1986 (Ex.A. 10) in a sound and disposing state of mind, which was duly registered. According to the Will, Madhavaji granted his wife a life interest in the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties, and upon her demise, the Plaintiff was to take possession of these properties. In contrast, the Defendants assert that their father, Madhavaji, executed a subsequent Will (Ex.B.4) on 15.03.1994, which purportedly cancelled all prior deeds, including the Will of 23.07.1986. 36. Even though the trial Court did not frame issues regarding^{thesecondWill} purportedly executed by Madhavaji on 15.03.1994, or^{theWillofSmt.Velubhai,} dated 02.12.2000, nevertheless considered the pleadings and made explicit findings on the authenticity and genuineness of both^Wills.

¶347

In Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs Sampati Subba Rao MANU/SC/0319/1962, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

¶348

No doubt, no issue was framed, and the one which was^{framedcouldhave} been more elaborate. Still, since the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support^{oftheircontentionsbut} in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot^{besaidthattheabsenceof} an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that^{mistrialwhichvitiates} proceedings. 38. Both parties have not raised any objections to considering^thoseissues based on the available pleadings. Given the established legal principles, the trial Court was right to address those contentions, even without framing specific issues. 39. In support of their respective positions, both parties relied on their respective Wills, and the trial Court thoroughly considered^{thecontentionsraised}

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by each side. The Plaintiff in O.S.No.11 of 2001 was examined as PW.2. During her testimony, she stated that one of the attestors, Dr Chainulu, the family doctor, is no longer alive, and the other attestor, Thakur Das, along with D. Saraswathi, both friends of their father, left India approximately fifteen years ago, and their current whereabouts are unknown. The Defendants did not dispute this assertion. Therefore, the Plaintiff has explained the non-examination of the attestors. Her testimony also reveals that she does not have a close acquaintance with them.

¶351

Evidently, Ex.A.8', the typographed Will, was registered^{on05.01.1987.As} per the Will, immovable properties were given to his wife for a^life interest, while the vested remainder was left to the Plaintiff. All the movable properties were bequeathed to his wife. It is undisputed that Madhavaji^was involved in the graphite and real estate businesses and owned an industrial^business. 41. The Plaintiff examined one Akella Sankara Narayana, a typist, as PW.3, who typed Ex.A.8, the Will in question. His testimony^{revealedthatheworkedas} a typist at the office of Sri P.S.R. Bhaskar Murthy, Senior Advocate, Rajahmundry. According to his evidence, he typed the Will on 23.07.1986, following a draft Will written by Madhavaji, which was given to him. After completing the typing, he delivered the document to Madhavaji's office. PW.3 testified that, at that time, both attestors were present, and Madhavaji read through the contents of the Will. Madhavaji made corrections by deleting paragraph No.2 and renumbering the remaining paragraphs. After these changes, Madhavaji signed each paragraph of the Will.^{PW.3alsoconfirmedthe} attestation of the Will by the attestors and stated that he signed the document as the typist. He further testified that Madhavaji was of sound and disposing mind when the Will was executed. Upon reviewing Ex.A.8,^{thetrialCourtobservedthat} the evidence provided by PW.3 regarding the corrections^{anddeletionsmadein} the Will was consistent with the document itself. The evidence provided by PW.3,

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along with Ex.A.8, clearly indicates that although he typed the Will, he also subscribed his signature and provided his address. In light of this, the trial Court correctly concluded that the intention was to treat PW.3 as an attestor. Had this not been the case, he would not have needed to include his address or sign the document, especially since the Will had already been typed.

¶355

PW.5, S. Sreenivasa Murthy, son of Dr. Chainulu, testified that he was familiar with his father’s signature and that his family was well-acquainted with Madhavaji's family. He identified his father's signature as the first attestor on Ex.A.8. His evidence establishes that Ex.A.8 bears the signature of Dr.Chainulu. On the other hand, the trial Court considered the recitals of Ex.B.4 (the Will executed later). It affirmed Madhavaji's sound and disposing state of mind at the time of executing Ex.A.8. The trial Court correctly pointed out that neither PW.2 nor PW.3 were cross-examined or suggested that Ex.A.8 was forged or fabricated. The Defendants did not raise such a defence in their written statement. The trial Court further observed that DW.1', the 2"'' Defendant in O.S.No.11 of 2001, did not dispute the authenticity of Ex.A.8 in his testimony. In the aforementioned circumstances, the trial Court arrived at a definite finding that the statutory requirements to prove the Will had been complied with. Normally, appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court is only interfered with by the Appellate Court if such appreciation of evidence appears to be absurd or there has been a serious challenge to such exercise. This proposition of law has been so firmly settled that it does not require any reiteration by citing any authority.

¶356

Based on this evidence, the trial Court concluded that Plaintiff had successfully proven the authenticity of Ex.A.8, the Will executed by Madhavaji on 23.07.1986, which was registered on 05.01.1987. Therefore, I do not find any lacunae in the evidence of the witnesses mentioned above regarding the execution of the Will by Madhavaji; they have also spoken about the effect that the document was presented for registration. Their evidence has not been

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shattered in the cross-examination. Nothing was elicited^{toshowthatthetestator} was not in a sound and disposing state of mind during execution or registration. In the circumstances stated above, I could find that Will was executed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind, and the testator gave free and genuine consent for the execution of the said Will.

¶359

The defence asserts that Ex.A.8 Will is superseded by Ex.B.4 Will. Through PW.5, the signature of Dr. Chainulu was marked as Ex.B.3, but the burden was still on the Defendants to prove the execution of Ex.B.4 by Madhavaji. The 2"^^ Defendant in O.S.No.11 of 2001, testifying as DW.1, claimed that his father executed Ex.B.4 Will while in a sound and disposing state of mind, expressly revoking all prior Wills. According to Ex.B.4, item No.3 of the plaint schedule property was allocated to Defendants 1 to 4, while items No.1 and 2 were given to Smt. Velubhai for her lifetime, with the remainder passing equally to her sons. Furthermore, all cash was bequeathed to^{Smt.Velubhai.BothWill} align in granting Smt. Velubhai has a life interestⁱⁿ items No.1 and^2. However, the disposition of the remaining items diverges.

¶360

DW.2, the 2"*^ Defendant in O.S.No.11 of 2001, stated in crossexamination that, during their father's lifetime, he^{andhisbrothersdividedtheir} joint family properties and executed an unregistered partition deed. In further cross-examination, DW.2 conceded that item No.3 is dry land, which is the selfacquired property of their father. 46. DW.2 admitted in cross-examination that he, along with^Defendants 1 and 3 in O.S.No.11 of 2001, sold item No.3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule property through registered sale deeds, Exs.A.36 to A.38. One of the purchasers was Akula Surya Prakash Rao, while Ex.A.36 stands in the name of Akula Kasi Annapurna. DW.1, however, claimed ignorance about whether the sale deeds mention that Defendants 1 to 3 inherited the property through the Will executed by their father.

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¶362

¶363

According to DW.1, he only learned about the execution^{ofEx.B.4Willafterhis} father's death. He testified that the sale deeds for item No.3 were drafted only after proceeding through the Ex.B.4 Will. As the trial Court pointed out, the signatures of DW.2 and his brothers, Defendants 1 and 3, are marked on Ex.A.36 (A to E), with additional signatures on sale^deeds in favour of Karri Udaya Satyanarayana Reddy and Kandukuri Veera Venkata Lakshmana Chowdary, marked as Ex.A.37 (A to E) and Ex.A.38 (A to D). The trial Court emphasized that these documents make no reference to Ex.B.4 Will but clearly state that the property passed to them after their^{father'sdeath.DW.1admitted} that the sale deeds do not specify that their father passed away testate. This Court concurs with the trial Court's conclusion that had Ex.B.4 Will existed at the time the sale deeds were executed, it would have been^{mentionedasthesource} of the title for Defendants 1 to 3 rather than merely stating that they acquired the property by succession from their father.

¶364

The trial Court further noted that, according to Ex.B.4 Will, item No.3 of the schedule property was bequeathed to all four sons.^{However,thesale} deeds show that only Defendants 1 to 3 executed them. The trial Court rightly pointed out that if the Will were genuine, the fourth brother,^{Sarath,shouldhavealso} been part of executing the sale deed. Regarding this discrepancy, no plausible explanation or substantial reason has been provided. Additionally, the trial Court observed that if Ex.B.4 Will were authentic, there^{shouldhavebeenareference} to the earlier registered Will, Ex.A.8, and a clear explanation for its revocation. DW.1 testified that his father left around Rs.25,00,000/- in fixed deposits and Vikas Patras. However, DW.Ts evidence fails to show that Ex.B.4 was produced to the banks for withdrawing the amounts. He also admitted there is no proof that the legatees under Ex.B.4 had received their respective shares as per the Will. Furthermore, DW.1 acknowledged that after their mother’s death, no action was

¶365

¶366

taken against their sisters for recovering gold, cash, and silver allegedly belonging to the mother. 48. The other Ex.B.4 attestor, K. Babu Reddy (CW.1), was^{examinedasthe} Court witness. Although he admitted his signature as^{thefirstattestorofEx.B.4,} he testified that he did not know Madhavaji personally or whether he was involved in the timber business. He also stated that he did not know Dr. Chainulu, though he had heard the name. Therefore, the only available^{attestorforEx.B.4} did not support the Defendants' case regarding the execution of Ex.B.4 by Madhavaji in a sound and disposing state of mind. The trial Court noted that neither CW.1 nor PW.3 were confronted with the suggestion^{thatEx.B.4was} in Madhavaji's handwriting. While PW.3 testified that he was familiar with Madhavaji's handwriting, the Defendants did not confront PW.3 with the handwriting of Ex.B.4. As a result, the trial Court^{observedthattherewasno} evidence to suggest that Ex.B.4 was in Madhavaji’s^{handwriting.Ex.B.1,} a book relied upon by the Defendants, was compared by the trial Court with both Madhavaji's handwriting and the handwriting on Ex.B.4.^{ThetrialCourtconcluded} that it could not be determined that the handwriting^on Ex.B.4 was that of Madhavaji. Aside from identifying the signatures of^{theattestors,theDefendants} failed to establish the authenticity of the contents^ofEx.B.4 as^required under Sections 68 and 69 of the Indian Evidence Act.

¶367

After a detailed analysis of the evidence on record,^{thetrialCourtrightly} concluded that the Defendants failed to prove the execution^{ofEx.B.4Willby} Madhavaji. The circumstances highlighted by the trial^{Courtraisedsignificant} doubts about the genuineness of Ex.B.4. The trial Court^correctly observed^that the Defendants introduced Ex.B.4 under questionable^{conditionsandultimately} concluded that it could not be accepted as valid or binding on the Plaintiff. Therefore, the trial Court’s conclusion that Ex.B.4 was not a legitimate Will and cannot affect the Plaintiffs rights is well-foundedand justified.

¶368

¶369

¶370

Ex.A.8 Will mentions the fixed deposits held in the names of both Madhavaji and his wife, as well as the amounts lent to Marthandachal Graphite, Crucibles (owned by his son), and the starch industry (also owned by his son). The Defendants have not provided any evidence to suggest^{thatthePlaintiffs} mother, during her lifetime, took any action against^the Plaintiff or her sister regarding the encashment of these fixed deposits. In this context, the trial Court made a significant observation: Since the Plaintiff’s mother did not raise any objections during her lifetime, her sons, after her demise, cannot now question the encashment of these fixed deposits.

¶371

During the cross-examination of PW.1, the handwriting in the notebooks, marked as Ex.B.1, was confronted. Ex.B.1 was relied upon by the Defendants to suggest that Plaintiff had encashed the Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) in her father's name. However, the trial Court observed that even if it were assumed that PW.2 (the Plaintiff) and her sister, Prathima (Plaintiff in O.S.No.62 of 2003), had taken the FDRs, it would not affect their case. The trial Court also noted that the Defendants had not taken any action to recover the cash encashed by the Plaintiff or the value of those FDRs. It indicated that they had not pursued any legal remedy for the alleged encashment, making their^{claimslesscredible.}

¶372

At this Point, it's crucial to highlight that Smt.^Velubhai filed the suit in O.S.No.83 of 2003 (formerly O.S.No.234 of 1999). However, in that suit, she did not claim a refund for the amount or the value of the gold and silver items allegedly taken by her daughters. Similarly, in the suit O.S.No.11 of 2001, the 1st Defendant made no counterclaim regarding these assets. The trial Court referenced these facts to emphasize that DW.Ts assertion that his sisters, PWs.1 and 6, took the FDRs and gold of their mother was entirely false. As outlined in Ex.A.8 Will, Madhavaji granted a life interest to his wife, with the vested remainder going to PW.2.

¶373

¶374

The Defendants contended that Smt. Velubhai's life interest, granted by her husband, was converted into a vested remainder through Ex.B.11 Will dated 02.12.2000. However, the trial Court correctly noted^{thatSmt.Velubhai} never claimed her life interest was enlarged, and no such plea was made in O.S.Nos.11 of 2001 or 62 of 2003. Ex.B.11 did not mention the enlargement of her life interest. The trial Court discarded the Defendants' assertion, as there was no supporting pleading or evidence, nor was Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act applicable. Thus, the trial Court correctly disregarded the Defendants' argument, as it lacked both factual and legal basis.

¶375

It’s clear that Smt. Velubhai passed away in 2001. In the suit she filed, her children, Plaintiffs 2 to 4, only came on record after^shedied in O.S.No.83 of 2003 as legal representatives of the deceased. Not once did they mention that their mother had executed Ex.B.11, Will. They came on record solely as her legal heirs, not as beneficiaries of the Will. The trial Court noted that if Ex.B.11 had existed at the time the plaint in O.S.No.83 of 2003 was amended, it would have been included in the amendment. They would have stated explicitly that their mother executed the Will dated 02.12.2000 and that they came on record by it. Even when they were added to the case, they didn't^{informtheCourtaboutthe} execution of Ex.B.11 by their mother, and the amended plaint didn't make any reference to it. After reviewing Ex.B. 11, the trial Court pointed out that the paper's adjustment suggested it was a fabricated document. Though PW.2 admitted to signing Ex.B.11 and the signature of Smt. Velubhai was marked as Ex.B.2, the trial Court rightly observed that this admission of signature does not prove the legitimacy of the Will.

¶376

The trial Court considered the testimonies of PW.2, PW.6, and DW.1 and noted that Smt. Velubhai was always under the control^{ofhersons.Theevidence} shows that the Defendants and their mother lived in Rajahmundry, while PW.2 and her sister, PW.6, lived far away with their families.^{ThetrialCourtobserved}

¶377

¶378

that by this time, Smt. Velubhai was very old and under the influence of her sons, making it easy for them to get her signature on blank papers. The trial Court also noted that the sons of Smt. Velubhai filed the suit by her as an informa pauperis to pose that their mother herself came to the Court and presented the plaint, but later, the Court fee was paid. 56. A propounder of the Will indeed has to remove all suspicious circumstances. In PPK Gopalan Nambiar V. PPK Balakrishnan Nambiar & ors.\ the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the propounder of the Will to remove all the suspected features, but there must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not the fantasy of the doubting mind.

¶379

In Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan^Deb& Anr}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

¶380

"Even if the onus of proving the Will was on the propounder^andinthe absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the^Will proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Will could be accepted as genuine "

¶381

Even where there were no such pleas, but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience^oftheCourt."

¶382

In Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti & Ors.,^ the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 20, has summarised what the Court should do in the manner as follows:

¶383

"The executant of the Will cannot be called to deny^{theexecutionorto} explain the circumstances in which it was executed. It Is, therefore, essential that trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence should be produced before the Court to establish genuineness and authenticity of the Will. It must be stated

¶384

'AIR 1995 SC 1852 ^ MANU/SC/0020/1961 ^MANU/SC/0258/1989

¶385

¶386

that the factum of execution and validity of the Will^{cannotbedetermined} merely by considering the evidence produced by the^{propounder.Inorderto} judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the^{truthfromfalsehoodthe} Court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would be open to the Court to consider circumstances brought out^{intheevidenceor} which appear from the nature and contents of the documents^itself It would be also open to the Court to look Into surrounding^{circumstancesaswellas} Inherent Improbabilities of the case to reach a proper^conclusionon the nature of the evidence adduced by the party."

¶387

It is also the law that when suspicious circumstances^arealleged, it is no longer a lis between propounder and caveator, it is^{aquestionofsatisfactionof} the conscience of the Court.

¶388

surrounding 60. The trial Court pointed out the suspicious circumstances Ex.B.11 Will, where no properties were left to any^{ofherdaughters.Therewas} also no explanation as to why her other son, Sarath,^{wasexcluded,orwhythe} properties were only bequeathed to her other sons. 61. The Defendants examined DW.2, K. Sai, and DW.3 (P. Radha Krishna), of Ex.B.11 Will, and DW.4, M.G.M. Narasannas, wife^ofthe the alleged attestors cook for Smt. Velubhai was illiterate and could scribe. DW.2 admitted he was a not understand Gujarati, the language in which the^{Willwaswritten.Hewasfrom} and did not know the language or any familiarity with the Andhra region Smt.Velubhai's personal affairs. The trial Court noted^{that,givenSmt.Velubhai} was a Gujarati woman, she would have likely sought^{femaleassistanceforfood} connection to her.DW.2 also preparation and security, not a male cook with no testified that Smt. Velubhai had a cordial relationship^{withherdaughters,who} used to visit her; however, in the suit filed by Smt.^{Velubhaiclearlystatedthat} she had no such relationship with her daughters, and^{theynevervisitedher.The} trial Court pointed out that DW.2 was a planted witness^{andthathistestimony} was unreliable. He couldn't confirm whether the Will^{wasexecutedperSmt.}

]

Velubhai's instructions, nor could he provide a date, month, or year for when the Will was signed. He also couldn't say if Ex.B.11 was the actual document executed in Smt. Velubhai’s presence. The trial Court^{furtherobservedthatDW.2} couldn’t even specify how much time had passed between Ex.B.4 and Smt. Velubhai’s death. The trial Court also noted that DW.2 wasn’t a relative, elder, or close associate of Smt. Velubhai’s family, making his role as an attestor highly suspicious. If Smt. Velubhai had truly wanted to execute a^will, and .she would . have taken steps to ensure it was correctly done using stamp paper or good quality paper. She would likely have involved someone closer to her family, not a cook who didn’t understand Gujarati. After thoroughly examining the facts, the trial Court rightly discarded DW.2’s testimony.

¶393

The testimony of DW.3 indicates that he was in the lorry transport business and had no connection with Smt. Velubhai. He didn’t live near her or even in the same area and had no acquaintance with her family.^{Hecouldn'tevennamethe} street or locality where she lived. DW.3 admitted he didn’t understand Gujarati, the language in which the Will was supposedly discussed and prepared. According to his statement, Smt. Velubhai and Mahendra^{discussedtheWill} in Gujarati, but he had no idea what was said or what Smt. Velubhai expressed that DW.3 also claimed that Smt. Velubhai called him to her house when he visited Mr. Chandu, her youngest son. Based on these facts, the trial Court rightly found his role as an attestor highly questionable.

¶394

DW.4 identified her husband, P. Narsanna’s handwriting and signature on Ex.B.11. However, her testimony revealed that she expressed ignorance about even preparing her chief affidavit. She admitted that^{thiswasthefirsttimeshe} had seen Ex.B.11, and she acknowledged that her husband^was neither a document writer nor experienced in dealing with legal^{documents.ThetrialCourt} observed that if Smt. Velubhai intended to bequeath significant property, she

¶395

¶396

would have engaged someone with experience in document preparation, not a person like DW.4’s husband, who lacked such expertise. 64. The trial Court further noted that after their mother's death. Plaintiffs 2 to 4 failed to present Ex.BJI Will to any public office for mutating the records, particularly regarding items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties. The trial Court also observed that Plaintiffs 2 to 4 had sold off dry land covered by Ex.B.11 long before the Will existed, as shown by Ex.A.36 to A.38. The trial Court pointed out that they sold the property in 1999 with incorrect descriptions, as shown in these documents, and later had to execute two rectification deeds (Ex.A.39 and A.40) in 2007. The trial Court highlighted that these rectification deeds came long after the litigation began. It concluded that only the purchasers could claim rights to the property from the dates of Exs.A.39 and A.40. The trial Court rightly observed that, since these deeds were executed after the litigation had started, they were affected by lis pendens, meaning they couldn't alter the Plaintiffs rights to the property. The trial Court also noted that the^{Defendants,whoexecuted} Exs.A.39 and A.40, had no rightful claim to the property^{and,therefore,} the purchasers had no legitimate claim either. The trial^Courtmade it clear that the Defendants' actions were calculated—an attempt to grab the property and mislead the purchasers, pulling them into litigation. It noted how the Plaintiffs brothers were trying to manipulate the situation to strip the rights of their sisters, who had inherited the property under the Will. Based^{ontherecord,the} trial Court concluded that the purchasers knowingly bought into the litigation, as they obtained the rectification deeds in 2007, by which time all the suits were already pending. After carefully evaluating the testimony of DWs.^{2to4,thetrialCourt} correctly concluded that their evidence was not credible.^{Allthesemattersremain} unexplained, and no attempt has been made to remove the suspicion. The Will is surrounded by suspicion as enumerated above, and cannot be accepted as a last Will and testament of Smt. Velubhai.

¶397

¶398

The trial Court specifically pointed out that DW.I’s^{testimonyregarding} these documents was evasive and clearly showed his attempts to feign ignorance on critical matters. He failed to provide^{anyreasonableexplanationfor} why he executed the rectification deeds in 2007. After^{reviewingthePlaintiffs'} evidence and considering all the material on record, the trial Court rightly concluded that Ex.B.11 Will is neither true, valid,^{norbindingontheDefendants.} On the other hand, Ex.A.8 Will, dated 23.07.1986, is^{determinedtobetrue,valid,} and binding on the Defendants. Accordingly, the Point^isanswered.

¶399

POINT NOs.2 & 5:

¶400

It is admitted that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property^{wasallocatedtoSmt.} Velubhai in the partition between her and her sons,^{asevidencedbyEx.A.35,the} partition list dated 19.10.1985. The Defendants assert^{thatSmt.Velubhai,asa} partner in ‘Marthandachal Graphite and Crucibles,'^{contributedthe} plaint ‘B’ schedule property as capital to the firm and later^{receivedcashwhensheretired} from the partnership, thus making the property part^{ofthefirm.Giventhisclaim,} the Defendants must prove it. The Defendants relied^{onEx.B.15,apartnership} deed dated 09.08.1968. However, as the trial Court^{correctlynoted,Ex.B.15} does not indicate that Smt. Velubhai used the Plaint^{‘B’schedulepropertyasher} capital contribution. According to PW.Ts testimony, the partnership was dissolved on 16.07.1991, as per Ex.B.16. This dissolution^{documentdoesnot} mention that Smt. Velubhai received cash for her share,^{ortheplaint‘B’schedule} property was given to the firm. The trial Court also^{observedthatthedissolution} was not communicated to the relevant authorities.Ex.B.^13, a receipt dated 06.08.1991, signed by Smt. Velubhai (Ex.B.10) shows that she received Rs.85,554.58 ps, from her three sons as a settlement^forhershare in the partnership.

¶401

¶402

However, the trial Court pointed out that neither Ex.B.16 nor Ex.B.13 mentions that Smt. Velubhai gave up her claim to the plaint ‘B’ schedule property in exchange for this cash settlement. It can be seen that the Defendants failed to produce any partnership account books, income tax receipts,^{orbalancesheets} to substantiate their claim that Smt. Velubhai had contributed the plaint ‘B’ schedule property to the firm, as rightly observed by the trial Court. DW.1 claimed that they had notified the Rajahmundry Municipality in 2001 about the dissolution to transfer Smt. Velubhai’s share in the Plaint ‘B’ schedule property. However, DW.1 admitted that the Municipality did not transfer the property, and no action was taken to rectify the situation. The Defendants also issued Ex.B.21, a legal notice to the Municipal Corporation, relying on the receipt of postal acknowledgement (Ex.B.22), as well as Exs.B.23 and B.24, letters to the A.C.T.O, Rajahmundry. DW.1 admitted that by the time of sending Ex.B.21, the plaint ‘B’ schedule property and other immovable properties had already been assessed separately in the names of the three sons^{andtheirmother,showing} no explicit transfer of the property as claimed.

¶403

Based on the evidence presented, the trial Court concluded^that by 2001, the plaint ‘B’ schedule property was still registered^{inthenameofSmt.Velubhai.} The trial Court pointed out that if Smt. Velubhai had indeed relinquished her claim to the property, as the Defendants claimed, the property would not have been assessed in her name even after she retired from the firm in 1999. The Defendants did not dispute her ownership of the plaint^{‘B’scheduleproperty,} which remained in her name until 2001. The trial Court^observed that those documents might have been accepted if the Defendants^{hadpromptlysubmitted} Exs.B.13 and B.16 to the relevant authorities in 1991. However, since the Defendants failed to produce income tax returns or^{thefirm’sassessmentbooks,} this Court is not inclined to accept these receipts. These registers didn’t reflect the transactions referenced in Exs.B.13 and B.16, suggesting^{theDefendants}

¶404

¶405

might not have relied on them. The trial Court also highlighted a crucial point during cross-examination. Ex.B.16 refers to a schedule containing divided shares, but the sheet referenced in the document was missing. DW.1 admitted that the sheet was in his possession. He also conceded that no records show he and his brothers paid property tax on the plaint ‘B’ schedule property after the firm's dissolution. Additionally, DW.1 admitted that the dissolution of 'Marthandachal Graphite and Crucibles' was never reported to the Registrar of Firms, nor did they inform the sales tax or commercial tax authorities. He also claimed ignorance of the contents of Exs.B.21 and B.23, letters supposedly sent to the A.C.T.O. If the firm had been dissolved and the plaint ‘B’ schedule property had been transferred to it, the Defendants would have notified the relevant authorities and taken steps for the property’s mutation.

¶406

After a thorough analysis of the evidence, the trial^{Courtconcludedthat} DW.I's claim about the existence of a partnership deed^and Smt. Velubhai's retirement from the partnership was nothing more than a fabrication; it w.as created solely for litigation. Although the Defendants presented ledger books from the firm 'Marthandachal Graphite and Crucibles,’^{thesebooksfailedtoshow} the dissolution of the partnership. They lacked the necessary stamps and seals from auditors. Upon considering all the evidence, the trial Court rightly determined that the plaint ‘B’ schedule property^ remained the property of Smt. Velubhai. She did not relinquish it, and the Defendants failed to prove that she gave up her rights to the property by receiving the^{amountsoutlined} in Ex.B.13 receipt. After appreciation of the evidence on record, this Court concurs with the trial Court’s finding that the Will, dated 02.12.2000, which purportedly bequeathed Smt. Velubhai’s properties to the Defendants have been proven false. The plaint ‘B’ schedule property remained with^{Smt.Velubhaiatthetimeof} her death. She died intestate, leaving behind her daughters and sons, in total

¶407

¶408

eight shares, and the Plaintiff is entitled to 1/8**^ share, along with her brothers and sisters, each of whom is entitled to an equal share.

¶409

After carefully considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the^trial Court rightly concluded that the Plaintiff is entitled to future profits from the date of the suit. This entitlement extends until the property is divided into eight equal shares and the Plaintiff is granted possession of her 1/8th share of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property. Additionally, Plaintiff is entitled to future profits up to the period until she is provided with vacant possession of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties by Defendants 1 to 4. Accordingly, the Points^areanswered.

¶410

POINTS N0.3 AND 4:

¶411

In the case at hand, the Plaintiff in O.S.No.62 of 2003 (formerly O.S.No.13 of 2000) claims that her mother, Smt. Velubhai gifted the property described in the plaint by executing a registered gift deed dated^31.12.1992 in her favour, however, Smt. Velubhai has contested the validity of the gift deed, filing a suit in O.S.No.83 of 2003, asserting that the gift deed was obtained through misrepresentation and fraud, thus rendering it unenforceable. Consequently, the subject matter in both suits is identical, revolving around^the same^property and legal claims. 72. In O.S.No.63 of 2003, the Plaintiff was examined as PW.6, where she testified that the property covered under the gift^{deedfelltohermother’sshare} according to Ex.A.35, a partition list and that her mother executed^thegift deed^of her own free Will. It is undisputed that Ex.A.35 was executed as part of a partition and that the property belonged to Smt. Velubhai following^{thatpartition.}

¶412

The Plaintiff, PW.6, further testified that her mother^{executedtheEx.A.17} gift deed voluntarily, without any coercion. On the^{otherhand,Smt.Velubhai} claims that PW.6 and her husband used a power of attorney to manipulate her

into executing the gift deed. Notably, Ex.A.17 was drafted in Rajahmundry, and the necessary stamps were purchased there, with the document being executed at the Rajahmundry Sub-Registrar’s office. This location is significant as it is the residence of the Plaintiff’s brothers, while the Plaintiff herself resides far away from Rajahmundry.

¶417

The trial' Court took into account the circumstances mentioned in the written statement, noting that Smt. Velubhai’s sons never left her unattended for long periods. Based on this and the overall evidence presented, the trial Court concluded that it was highly improbable that PW.6 and her husband had successfully obtained the gift deed under the pretext of holding a power of attorney, given that Smt. Velubhai was under constant vigilance and supervision by her sons. Thus, the version put forth by Smt. Velubhai raised reasonable doubts regarding her version.

¶418

To establish the execution of the gift deed, the Plaintiff (PW.6) examined one of the attesting witnesses, Ramakrishna Rao, as PW.4, who corroborated the Plaintiffs version of events by testifying that^{Smt.VelubhaiexecutedEx.A.17} gift deed while in a sound and disposing state of mind, according to PW.4, Smt. Velubhai was fully aware of the document's contents and nature before she executed it. Further, PW.4 testified that Smt. Velubhai instructed the scribe to prepare the document, and she read it herself. After reading it, she accepted the contents as correct, affixed her signature, and participated in the registration process of the deed. This testimony from PW.4, coupled^{withtheexecutionof} Ex.A.17, demonstrates that he acted as an identifying witness during the registration of the gift deed, further supporting the claim that she properly executed the deed. Velubhai. Thus, PW.4's evidence strengthens the Plaintiffs case by confirming that the gift deed was executed voluntarily and with full awareness by Smt. Velubhai, and that the document was registered following legal procedures.

¶419

¶420

¶421

After a thorough examination of PW.4’s testimony, this Court agrees with the findings of the trial Court. The evidence provided by PW.4, along with the execution of Ex.A.17 gift deed, clearly establishes^{thatSmt.Velubhaiexecuted} the gift deed voluntarily, with full knowledge and understanding of the nature and contents of the document. PW.4 also explained his relationship^withPW.6and her husband, providing context to his involvement in^{thematter.WhilePW.4was} subjected to cross-examination, no evidence was brought forth during the questioning that could substantiate the claim that the gift deed (Ex.A.17) was executed under fraudulent circumstances or through misrepresentation. In light of these factors, the evidence supports the conclusion that the execution of the gift deed was legitimate and done without any undue influence^{ordeceit.Therefore,} this Court upholds the trial Court's findings, reinforcing the authenticity of the gift deed.

¶422

To further support the Plaintiffs case, PW.6 examined PW.1, P. Suryanarayana Murthy, a Senior Advocate from the Rajahmundry^bar,toprove that he issued a notice on the instructions of Smt. Velubhai to DW.1 on 05.05.1997. A copy of the notice was also sent to the Manager of Aryapuram Cooperative Bank and the Manager of Bank of Baroda, Rajahmundry. Exs.A.2 and A.3, which are postal acknowledgements, were marked through PW.1. In his testimony, PW.1 confirmed that in response to Ex.A.1 notice, a reply notice (Ex.A.4) was issued. The exchange of notices between the^{partiesindicatesthat} Smt. Velubhai was capable of instructing an advocate^{toissuethenotice.This} demonstrates that, at the time of issuing the notice,^{shewasnotincardinalterms} with DW.1 and the others, contrary to later claims.

¶423

The trial Court placed significant weight on the fact^{thatinthesuitfiledby} Smt. Velubhai, no reference was made to a revocation deed she supposedly executed. It is also undisputed that Smt. Velubhai never issued any notice to the Plaintiff regarding the revocation of the gift deed.^{Thisabsenceofarevocation}

notice further weakens the claim that the gift deed was invalidated and supports the argument that Smt. Velubhai did not intend to revoke the gift deed after the exchange of notices. The trial Court observed that it appears Smt. Velubhai may have been influenced by her sons after the exchange of notices, ultimately filing the suit under their influence. The lack of mention of a revocation deed or notice of revocation suggests that Smt. Velubhai did not take formal steps to undo the gift deed, which aligns with the Plaintiff’s case: the gift deed remained valid.

¶428

In N. Thajudeen vs Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board*, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that;

¶429

Once it is heid that the gift deed was vaiidly executed, resuiting in the absoiute transfer of titie in favour of the Piaintiff-Respondent, the same is not iiabie to be revoked. As such, the revocation deed is meaningless, especiaiiy for the purposes of calculating the period of limitation for instituting the suit. 80. As the trial Court rightly observed, Smt. Velubhai did not claim that the gift deed had not been acted upon. The trial Court noted that it appeared Smt. Velubhai had been manipulated by her sons, leading^{hertofilethesuitinforma} pauperis (without paying Court fees initially). The^trail Court further observed that Smt. Velubhai came to the Court to present the plaint,^{andtheCourtfeewas} later paid. This suggests that the action taken was influenced by external factors, likely her sons, rather than stemming from any true grievance or intention to revoke the gift deed. The evidence on record also establishes that Smt. Velubhai had no apparent animosity with her daughters. It was noted that Smt. Velubhai maintained a good relationship with her daughters, who had a cordial relationship with their father, Madhavaji. As previously mentioned, Madhavaji had given property to PW.2, and it seems that he had not bequeathed any property to PW.6, which might explain why Smt. Velubhai decided to gift her property to PW.6 instead. The trial Court considered these circumstances as natural.

¶430

''mANU/SC/1 153/2024

¶431

¶432

acknowledging that if Smt. Velubhai had any resentment towards her daughters, PWs.2 and 6, and she would have taken action against them for allegedly taking her FDRs, cash, gold jewellery, etc. However, there is no evidence to suggest that she took such steps during her lifetime, nor did she issue any notices to them. Additionally, the evidence from DW.2, K. Sai,^{confirmedthatDW.6had} delivered all of Smt. Velubhai's FDRs in the presence of an auditor, V.S. Prakash Rao, as per Ex.A.25 receipt. This further supports^{theconclusionthattherewas} no ill will or misconduct between Smt. Velubhai and her daughters, and that the gift deed was executed in a context of genuine intent. The^{trialCourt,therefore,} considered these factors when reaching its conclusion.

¶433

As rightly observed by the trial Court, the actions^{ofPW.6demonstrateher} bona fide intent. The trail Court pointed out that if PW.6 were truly greedy for the property, she would not have returned the FDRs. After carefully reviewing the evidence, this Court concurs with the trial Court’s conclusion that no suspicious circumstances were raised from PWs.2 and 6 testimonies and that Ex.A.17 gift deed was not procured through fraud or misrepresentation. Further, DW.1 testified that Smt. Velubhai had executed a revocation deed (Ex.B.14) on 28.05.1999. However, the trial Court specifically noted^{thatSmt.Velubhaifiled} the plaint in O.S.No.83 of 2003 on 08.12.1999, while^{therevocationdeedwas} supposedly executed on 25.05.1999. Despite this, the^plaint in O.S.No.83 of 2003 made no mention of the revocation deed. Moreover, the Plaintiffs in O.S.No.83 of 2003 failed to provide evidence that Ex.B.14^was executed voluntarily, willfully, and with full knowledge of^{itscontents. ThetrialCourt rightly} pointed out that Ex.B.14 was not legally proven in^{Court.HadSmt.Velubhai} indeed executed a valid revocation deed, she would have certainly referenced it in her suit (O.S.No.83 of 2003). Based on this, the^{trialCourtconcludedthatSmt.} Velubhai was likely unaware of Ex.B.14 and that the^{executionoftherevocation} deed was not proven in a legally acceptable manner.^{Therefore,thetrialCourtis}

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justified in rejecting the validity of the revocation deed and affirming the legitimacy of the original gift deed.

¶436

In its careful analysis, the trial Court considered Ex.A.18, a letter written by Smt. Velubhai in Gujarathi, which further supports the conclusion that she executed Ex.A.17 gift deed voluntarily and willfully. The contents of Ex.A.18, addressed to her daughters, reveal how Smt. Her sons allegedly coerced Velubhai. This letter provides context for the trial Court's determination that the gift deed was executed under her own free Will, despite^{theinfluenceofher} sons. The trial Court also noted that Smt. Velubhai’s sons appeared to be deeply interested in the property, which is why they initiated the litigation. The trial Court reasoned that without such a vested interest, there would have been no compelling reason for them to create such legal disputes. This observation strongly suggests that the sons had ulterior motives for challenging the validity of the gift deed. Furthermore, the evidence supports the trial Court's finding that the revocation deed (Ex.B.14) lacked legal validity. There was insufficient proof that Smt. Velubhai executed the revocation deed voluntarily and with full knowledge of its contents. The failure to substantiate the revocation deed legally, combined with the compelling evidence in favour of the original gift deed, reinforced the trial Court's conclusion that the revocation deed should not be upheld. Thus, this Court is of the view that the trial Court's conclusions, both regarding the execution of Ex.A.17 and the invalidity of the revocation deed, are firmly supported by the evidence on record.

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After careful consideration, the trial Court correctly appreciated the evidence. There is no reason for this Court to arrive at a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court. The findings arrived at by the trial Court are correct, and the Appellants/Plaintiffs have shown no justifiable reasons for arriving at different conclusions. I agree with the conclusion reached by the trial Court.

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In light of the preceding discussion, there is no basis for intervening from the perspective adopted by the trial Court, and thus, these Appeals are unsuccessful and hereby dismissed. The Decree and Judgment challenged in these Appeals, passed by the trial Court, are affirmed. Consequently, the points raised in the Appeals are addressed accordingly.

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POINT N0.6:

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Consequently, the Appeals are dismissed with costs, confirming the Decrees and Judgments dated 12.03.2009, passed by I Additional District Judge, East Godavari District at Rajahmundry, in O.S.No.11 of 2001, O.S.No.62 of 2003, and O.S.No.83 of 2003.

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Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand^closed.

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Sd/- K TATA RAO DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// 'iC-

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' SECTION OFFICER

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