Allowed

L. Ramesh v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

Andhra Pradesh HC4 Aug 2021WP/8883/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The State withdrew a government memo that had directed restoration of revenue entries, pattadar passbooks and permissions for land recorded as private patta but noted as submergible tank foreshore. The court held the withdrawal to be an impermissible review of a quasi-judicial order made without notice, and quashed it.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition allowed; Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 declared illegal and arbitrary and set aside; no costs.

L. Ramesh Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh — Property and Title | Andhra Pradesh HC (2021)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

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WRIT PETITION No.8883 of 2020

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ORDER :

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L.Ramesh and 15 others filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the action of respondent No.1 in issuing Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020, whereby the memo issued by the Government bearing No.26086A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 was withdrawn without giving any notice to the petitioners as illegal, arbitrary, against the principles of natural justice and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

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The case of the petitioners is that they are title holder/owners and possessors of land in different extents in different survey numbers situated at Erragunta and Karakambadi villages, Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District, which are as under.

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Sl. No.	Petitioner	Village	Survey No.	Extent Ac.Cts	1-B Doc.	Form/
1	L.Ramesh 1^stPetitioner	Erragunta Karakambadi	167, 168 and its sub-divisions 340,341,342 and its sub- divisions	4-06 5-46	1-B (ROR	Form )
2	L.Mahesh 2^ndpetitioner	Erragunta Karakambadi	168 and its sub- divisions, 341 and its sub-divisions	0-78 2-86	1-B (ROR	Form )
3	S.Babu 3^rdPetitioner	Karakambadi	340 and its sub-divisions	2-49	1-B (ROR	Form )
4	M.Damodar Reddy 4^thPetitioner	Erragunta	168 and its sub-divisions	0-41	Regd. Docu	ment
5	P.Vijayalakshmi 5^thPetitioner	Erragunta	168/9D	0-26	1-B (ROR	Form )
6	C.Satish 6^thPetitioner	Erragunta Karakambadi	168/9 340/2	0-04 0-30	Regd. Docu	ment
7	P.Yugandar 7^thPetitioner	Erragunta	168 and its sub-divisions	0-27	1-B (ROR	Form )
8	A.Narasimhulu Naidu 8^thPetitioner	Erragunta Karakambadi	167, 168 and its sub-divisions 341,342 and its sub- divisions	1-37 1-17	1-B (ROR	Form )

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9	A.Sujatha 9^thpetitioner	Erragunta	167 and its sub-divisions	0.06	Regd. Document
10	A.Varalakshmi	Erragunta Karakambadi	168 and its sub-divisions 341 and its sub-divisions	1-16 1-10	1-B Form (ROR)
11	K.Vijayalakshmi 11^thpetitioner	Erragunta	167 and its sub-divisions	0.21	1-B Form (ROR)
12	T.Jayaraman 12^thpetitioner	Erragunta	167 and its sub-divisions	0.33	1-B Form (ROR)
13	A.Krishna Murthy 13^thPetitioner	Erragunta Karakambadi	167 and its sub-divisions 342 and its sub-divisions	0-45 1-45	1-B Form (ROR)
14	Y.Kanakadurgamba 14^thpetitioner	Erragunta	167 and its sub-divisions	0.25	1-B Form (ROR)
15	T.Jhansi 15^thpetitioner	Erragunta	168 and its sub-divisions	0.49	Regd. Document
16	M.Saikrishna 16^thpetitioner	Erragunta	168 and its sub-divisions	0.79	Regd. Document

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The names of the petitioners have been mutated in the revenue

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records and 1-B Form (ROR).

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Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased an extent of Ac.25-05 cents of dry land situated in Sy.Nos.167, its sub-divisions, 168, its subdivisions of Erragunta Village and Sy. Nos.170, its sub-divisions, Sy.No.341, its sub-divisions and Sy.No.342, its sub-divisions of Karakambadi Village of Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District from the lawful title holders and possessors under various sale deeds during the years 2003 to 2005. Thereafter, pattadar passbooks and title deed were issued in their favour.

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Erragunta and Karakambadi villages of Renigunta Mandal were declared as Inam Estates under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908 and taken over by the Government under the provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1960 (for short “the Estates Abolition Act").

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The revenue authorities, in discharge of their statutory obligation under Section 3 (d) of the Estates Abolition Act not to dispossess any person from any land in the Estate in respect of which they consider that he prima facie entitled to Ryotwari patta. Equally, a statutory obligation is imposed on the Settlement Officer after determining the Inam Estate, issue pattas to the Ryots under Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act and as per the aforesaid statutory provision, every Ryot in the Estate shall with effect on and from the notified date be entitled to a Ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti lands. By virtue of this statutory obligation, the Settlement Officer conducted an enquiry and issued rough pattas for the land in Sy.Nos.167 and 168 of Erragunta village and Sy. Nos.170, 341 and 342 of Karakambadi village to the vendors‟ of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 herein in the year 1963. The vendors of the petitioners 1 to 3 were in possession and enjoyment of the said land till petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased the said land under various sale deeds from 2003 to 2005, obtained pattadar passbooks and got mutated their names in the revenue records.

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Having satisfied with the title and possession of the vendors, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased the property under various sale deeds in the year 2003, 2004 and 2005 and the names of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 were mutated in the revenue records and also issued pattadar passbooks. Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 applied for NOC to convert the land from agricultural to non-agriculture purpose. Accordingly, respondent No.6 issued NOC 05.10.2004 in their favour. Tirupathi Urban Development Authority (TUDA) granted layout permissions on 20.09.2005 based on the proceedings issued by respondent No.6.

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Basing on the news item in Eenadu, respondent No.3 issued an endorsement directing respondent No.6 to correct the village account duly making the entries in the prohibition order book and to take possession of the land and called upon to submit compliance report within a week. Aggrieved by the said endorsement, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 preferred W.P.No.11327 of 2010 and the said writ petition was allowed by orders dated 16.12.2010, whereunder this Court directed respondent No.3 to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. In pursuance of the direction, respondent No.3 passed order on 19.12.2011 declaring the land as communal (Government Land) and the petitioners cannot claim title over the land and consequently, cancelled the pattadar pass books and title deeds as well as NOC issued in favour of petitioner Nos.1 to 3. Thereupon, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 preferred an appeal against the order passed by respondent No.3 before the Commissioner of Appeals, Office of the CCLA, Hyderabad. The said appeal was dismissed by the aforesaid Authority, vide order dated 22.05.2013.

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Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner of Appeals, Office of the CCLA, Hyderabad, the petitioners filed Revision Petition bearing No.26086/EA and AR/A1/2013. The said revision was allowed by respondent No.1 by order dated 25.04.2016. The operative portion of the order dated 25.04.2016 is as follows:

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"8. I have carefully examined the points raised by the Counsel for the Petitioners and the grounds taken up the Joint Collector, I have also gone through the record. My findings are as follows:-

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(i) The Joint Collector has treated the lands as 'Tank bed land' whereas the lands are shown as "Karakambadi Neet imumpu' (Submergible in tank). There is a clear distinction between the lands

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which are part of the tank and the lands which may come under submergence on certain occasions. The lands which come under submergence cannot be treated as Tank bed land automatically. The Joint Collector has quoted the various orders of Hon'ble High Court out of context as these cases are applicable to tank bed lands only.

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ii) The validity of the rough patta which is a part of the procedure under the E.A. Act and Rules cannot be denied simply because the final enquiry was not done. It is very much the duty of the authorities to finalize the enquiry. Till that time the rough patta has to be treated as a valid document giving valuable rights. Further, the record does not show that there was any objection from any side.

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(iii) Since beginning the land has been treated as private land and there was no objection from any officer of the department till the adverse news item appeared in the local papers. The action of the authorities appears to be a panic reaction to the adverse report.

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9. Overall, I do not find any substance in the two main arguments of the Joint Collector i.e.,

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(i). To treat the land as part of tank bed though it was not true.

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ii) To deny the validity to the rough pattas given as per the procedure of the Act / Rules.

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10. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed and the orders of the Commissioner of Appeals Dt.22-05-2013 and orders of the Joint Collector, Chittoor District dt.19-12-2001 are set aside."

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The order passed by respondent No.1 became final, as the

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same was not challenged by any party. In spite of the orders passed by the respondent No.1, respondent Nos.2 to 6 failed to implement the said orders. Instead of implementing the said orders, respondent No.3 sent a letter to respondent No.1 to review the orders dated 25.4.2016. On that, respondent No.1 issued a Memo dated 08.06.2017 directing respondent No.3 to implement the order of the Government dated 26.4.2016 passed in Revision Petition No.26086/EA and AR/A1/2013.

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As respondent No.3 did not implement the order passed by respondent No.1 dated 25.4.2016 in the Revision Petition, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 sent a representation to the Government for implementing its orders. On that, respondent No.1 again issued a

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Memo dated 04.10.2017 under which the respondent No.1 directed respondent No.3 to implement the order dated 25.4.2016 and further requested to furnish the compliance report to the Government.

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Further, respondent No.3 sought some clarifications for implementing the Government orders dated 25.4.2016, on that respondent No.1 again issued a Memo dated 16.11.2017 whereunder suitable directions were given to respondent No.3 to restore the position prior to the date of orders of respondent No.4 dated 19.12.2011 in all aspects by quoting the orders of Government dated 25.04.2016. Respondent No.1 directed

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respondent No.3 as follows:

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"a. Restore the entries in revenue records.

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b. issue fresh Pass Books and Title Deeds to the petitioners and

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c. Restore all the permissions that were cancelled in pursuance to the orders of the Joint Collector issued in R.Dis. F116587/2005, dated 19.12.2011, with respect to the lands to an extent of Ac.25.05 in Sy.No.167P, 168P of Erragunta village and 170P, 340P, 341 P of Karakambadi village, Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District as the order of the Joint Collector, Chittoor District, dated 19.12.2011 have been set aside".

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Though the respondent No.1 passed an order and issued direction on 16.11.2017, respondent No.3 did not implement the order and due to the said reason, respondent No.1 again issued a Memo dated 04.06.2018 whereunder respondent No.1 passed the following order:

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"Therefore, the District Collector, Chittoor District is instructed to issue orders to the concerned for incorporation of the names of the petitioners i.e., Sri L. Ramesh and others in revenue records by putting them in online Adangal duly correcting entries in respect of the lands to an extent of Ac. 25-05 cents in Sy.No.167P, 168P of Yerragunta village and 170P, 340P, 341P, 342P of Karakambadi Village, Renigunta Mandal, Chittoor District and also for deletion from the list of prohibited properties notified under Section 22-A of Registration Act, 1908 to facilitate for issue

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of fresh Pattadar Pass Books & Title Deeds in favour of them for the subject lands within a week and send compliance report to Government immediately. "

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Finally, respondent No.3 issued proceedings dated 07.01.2018 directing respondent No.6 to implement the order of respondent No.1. In pursuance of the order issued by respondent No.3, respondent No.6 issued proceedings dated 19.02.2018 implementing the order passed by respondent No.1. Respondent No.3 also issued proceedings to the District Registrar, Tirupati dated 16.10.2018 whereunder the District Registrar was directed to delete the property from prohibition list, accordingly, the property was deleted from prohibited list of properties.

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It is further contended that Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department, Tirupati on the request of respondent No.5 inspected the subject land and submitted his report dated 29.04.2006 wherein he stated that Karakambadi Tank situated in Sy.No.339 and it is rain-fed III Class Minor Irrigation source with an Ayacut of Ac.347-11 Cents and further stated that petitioner Nos.1 to 3 raised the land level about one meter height by filling earth and constructed stone wall with cut stone masonry to a length of about 850 mtrs. with a height of 6 feet to divide the patta dry land from the Fore shore of the tank and he further stated that there is no encroachment of tank bed in Sy.No.339, there are three Irrigation wells in the subject land and the report further reveals that TUDA accorded permission to develop layout in the land in question subject to the condition of leaving buffer zone of 9 mtrs all along from the northern boundary of tank as per the Zonal development plan (Master plan) approved by the Government.

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Respondent No.5 issued proceedings converting part of the subject land i.e. Ac.0.33 cents belonging to petitioner No.12. The TUDA issued Master plan which was duly notified and approved by the Government. In the said master plan, the Sy.Nos.340, 341, 342,167,168 were shown in yellow colour which indicates that it is a Residential zone. Further, a Buffer zone was drawn alongside of the tank which was shown in green colour. The FLR pertaining to Karakambadi village demonstrates that the subject land is not part of tank and tank bund which is situated in Sy.No.339.

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The survey map which was published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated 27.10.1960 indicates that the subject land which was shown in Sy.Nos.340, 341, 342 of Karakambadi village is not part of Karakambadi tank and there is a gap between the tank bund and subject land. After implementing the orders of the respondent No.1 and after deleting the subject lands from prohibition list, petitioner Nos.1 to 3 alienated part of the subject land approximately an extent of Ac.12-00 cents to the petitioners 3 to 17 under various sale deeds in the year 2019. In pursuance of the alienations made by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3, the names of the petitioner Nos.4 to 17 have been mutated in the Revenue records and their names have been updated both in 1- B and Pahanies, despite clarity about land classification etc. the impugned memo was issued.

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The impugned Memo dated 16.3.2020 issued by respondent No.1 vide Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020, is unsustainable under the law and the same is liable to be set aside for the following reasons/grounds:-

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a) That the respondent No.1 being a statutory Authority

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having passed orders in Revision Petition dated 25.4.2016 cannot pass the impugned orders and respondent No.1 being a quasi-judicial authority has no such power of review its own orders passed in review petition unless the statute confers such power.

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b) That, the respondent No.1 having passed several orders cannot legally withdraw one of the orders by reexamining the issue which is beyond its powers.

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c) That, respondent No.1 by virtue of the impugned orders withdrawn the Memo No.26086-A /EA and AR/A1/2013, dated 16.11.2017 which is a consequential Memo only wherein and where under respondent No.1 directed the respondent No.3 to implement the order passed in Revision Petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013, dated 25.04.2016 and as such withdrawing the consequential orders dated 16.11.2017 in no way effects the rights of the petitioners secured by order in Revision dated 25.04.2016 and as such the impugned proceedings are non-est in law and as such liable to be set aside.

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d) That the impugned proceedings cannot be sustained as no notice was served upon the petitioners who are affected parties and as such the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

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e) That, the rough pattas were granted to the vendors of the petitioners 1 to 3 way back in the year 1963 on the premise that they are entitled for pattas under Section 11 of the Estate Abolition Act and thereafter the names were

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mutated in the Revenue records and pattadar pass books and title deeds were also were also issued in their favour and the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 purchased the subject land during the years 2003 to 2005 under various sale deeds having satisfied that their vendors have got alienable rights over the subject land and as such the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are bonafide purchasers for a valuable consideration.

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f) That the names of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 have been mutated in the revenue records after purchase of subject land and they were issued pattadar pass books and title deeds without there being any objections from the Revenue authorities.

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g) That it is a settled proposition of law that a rough patta, prima facie recognizes the rights of an individual to be granted Ryotwari patta and the rough patta cannot be ignored and in the instant case, respondent No.4 by virtue of proceedings dated 19.12.2001 only cancelled the NOC and Pattadar Pass books issued by respondent No.6, which was in turn set aside by the respondent No.1 in its Revisional jurisdiction.

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h) That, it is an admitted fact that rough pattas were granted to the vendors of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 way back in the year 1963 and moreover the respondent No.1 by virtue of Revisional orders dated 25.4.2016 accepted the entitlement of the petitioners 1 to 3 herein and it amounts to acceptance of the pattas granted under Section 11 of the Estate Abolition Act and such an

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Act cannot be unsettled 57 years thereafter by issuing the impugned proceedings.

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i) By virtue of Section 64 of the Estate Abolition Act, any lawful transferee of the right to the possession or occupation of such land, continue to have the same rights against its transferor as he had immediately before the notified date and further the lawful transferee of the title shall be entitled to all the rights of his transferor and in the light of aforesaid statutory provision, the rights of the petitioners herein are to be equated with that of the persons who were issued pattas and as such the petitioners are the lawful title holders and possessors of the subject land and their rights cannot be unsettled by issuing impugned proceedings. j) That, issuing patta is a statutory act under Section 11 of the Estate Abolition Act by the Settlement Officer and any person aggrieved by the said act of issuing patta has to prefer a statutory Appeal and in the instant case, no appeal was preferred against the said issuance of patta and as such it becomes final and such statutory right cannot be defeated by issuing impugned proceedings.

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k) That the secured rights of the petitioners cannot be unsettled after the gap of 57 years by issuing impugned proceedings. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held in a case reported in “ Koya Veeraju

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v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Gollaprolu, East Godavari

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District .¹ ” as follows:

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1 1998 (1) ALT 25

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"Rough patta granted by the revenue department cannot be reopened after lapse of long time except when there is a proof of fraud or misrepresentation while obtaining pattas, proceedings initiated out of pressure without application of mind - invalid. "

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l) That, the Constitutional Courts only passed orders to safeguard water tanks and tank bunds and the land which was referred as “Mumpu” (in vernacular) cannot be treated as part of tank and as such impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside.

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m) It is the well settled proposition of law that quasi judicial authority has no power of review its own orders unless the statute conferred such power (Vide: “ State

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Bank of India v. S.N.Goyal² ”)

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On the basis of the above grounds, the petitioners sought to declare the impugned memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 as illegal, arbitrary, consequently set aside the same.

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Respondent No.1 filed counter along with vacate stay petition denying material allegations inter alia contending that the Government of Andhra Prdesh has rightly withdrawn the Government Memo 26086/EA&AR/A1-2013, dated 16.11.2017 as the subject land is submergible land and highly objectionable land. The subject land is not private property, it is water spread area of Karakambadi Pedda Cheruvu. It is a water Body.

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The respondents admitted purchase of the land by the petitioners, passing of various orders, inspection of the land by Executive Engineer, issue of technical opinion by Executive Engineer. The respondents noticed that the petitioners have raised the land level about 1 Meter height by filling earth in the land in the

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2 AIR2008SC2594

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said Survey Nos. of Karakambadi village and constructed a wall with cut stone masonry to a length of about 850 Mts and with a height of 6 feet to divide the land said to have purchased. As such the land in Sy.Nos. 168, 170, 340, 341, 342 of Karakambadi village total extent of developed area comes to 26.265 acres. Out of the total area, the area fall in the foreshore of (FTL) Full Tank Level condition has been noted and accordingly the reduction in the capacity of the tank has been worked out, which comes to 1.60 Mcft, thus the ayacut affected land would be 12.84 acres say 13 acres. It is observed that about 20.00 acres in the ayacut land has been converted for nonagricultural purpose. The surplus arrangements proved for the tank are not disturbed. Hence, it is opined that the development made in the said Survey unlikely to pose any threat to the safety of the Tank/ Railway Track, unless or otherwise any natural disasters occurs, beyond the control the human thinking/power. Thus, the Chief Engineer clearly stated that there is a threat to the development activities whenever natural disaster happens. Thus layout proposals were approved in the water conservation Zone. The Joint Collector after inspection came to the same conclusion as expressed by the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Tirupati.

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It is further contended that a news item was published in "Eenadu Telugu Daily, Chittoor District Edition dated 17.07.2005 under the caption “Real Mosam”. Consequent to this news item, a report was called for from the Revenue Divisional Officer(RDO), Tirupati. The RDO, Tirupati has reported that the land in Sy.No.339 measuring an extent of 128.64 acres is classified as "Karakambadi Pedda Cheruvu" as per the village Accounts of Karakambadi village accounts and it is third class irrigation source with a registered

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ayacut of 346-96 acres. Further he has reported that an extent of Ac.26.09 cents of the land in Sy.No.340/2,3,4,5, 6,7, 341/1A,B,C,3,4, 5A,56,6,7,8,9, 10A,106,11,12A,126, 13, 14 of Karakambadi village and in Sy.No.167/9, 10, 156, 17B, 19B, 14, 15, 20, 168/1, 16, 1C, 168/3, 3131/6, 362, 364,168/5,6,7,9,169/2 of Yerramitta village, said to have purchased by Sri Babu, L. Ramesh are classified as patta Dry/Wet as per the Fair Adangal of Karakarnbadi village and in the remarks column of the Fair Adangal it was recorded as " Karakambadi Neeti -mumpu (Submergible due to water in tank)."

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Respondents admitted that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P.No11327 of 2010 dated 16.12.2010 has opined that the “impugned endorsement reflects the anxiety of respondent No.2 to protect the environment and the water bodies further directed him to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with the law, after informing the petitioners of the grounds and the relevant provisions of the Acts, under which, he is seeking to proceed against them, and after giving full opportunity of being heard to them."

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Accordingly, the then Joint Collector has issued notices to the petitioners, meanwhile, the petitioners have filed another W.P.No.10801 of 2011 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in the said writ petition, the Court directed the Joint collector " not to pass any orders", after that necessary parawise remarks were submitted by the District Collector and the writ petition was dismissed on 08.09.2011 as withdrawn. Again Notices were issued to hear the case and passed order vide F1/6587/2005, dated 19.12.2011 under section 9 and 12 of ROR Act 1971, duly observing that the petitioners cannot claim title over neeti -mumpu land.

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Appeal preferred against the order of the Joint Collector ended in favour of the State, but in revision, order was set aside. Thereafter, several directions were issued as narrated in the writ petition.

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The respondents contended that as per village Map of Karakambadi supplied by the M.R.O. the land purchased by the petitioners is submergible land. The railway line is separating the land on the western side of village, following water course poramboke

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are existing.

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Naidu Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.137

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Mangamma Kunta (Kunta) is in S.No. 151

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Erragunta (Kunta) is in S.No.157

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The karakambadi Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.339

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The Eguva Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.368

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The Diguva Cheruvu (Tank) is in S.No.384

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Gunta (Kunta) is in S.No.394

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Vagu (Stream) is in S.no. 391, 401, 402, 403, 406

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Cheruvu (Tank) in S.No. 409

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10.Kunta (Tank) in S.No.411

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Thus, the submergible land including the subject land is in Sy.No. 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 350, 354, 355, 356, 359, 141, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, adjacent to the Sy.No. 339 in an extent of Ac. 128.64 cents which is classified as Karakambadi Cheruvu, and the said adjacent Survey numbers are even though classified as Patta Dry/Wet, but noted as submergible land in Remarks column of Fair Adangal. The submergible land in the foreshore of any tank which is noted as submergible in water shall become part of the tank only, until the contrary is proved with specific evidence, which is lacking in this particular case as per BSO

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15 and 16. Therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief on this ground.

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Similarly, fair adangal supplied by the Mandal Revenue Officer disclosed that the Sy.No.167 is subdivided into 167/1 to 167/20 (Total extent 7.46 acres), Sy.No.168 is subdivided into 168/1 to 168/9 (Total extent 7.49 acres), Sy.No.169 - Total extent 0.99 acres is classified as Road, Sy.No.340 is subdivided into 340/1 to 340/8 (Total extent 5.45 acres), Sy.No.341 is Subdivided into 341/1 to 341/14 (Total extent 8.07 acres), Sy.No.342 is subdivided into 342/1 to 342/6 (Total extent 7.89 acres). In the remarks column of the above Survey numbers, it is clearly noted that Karakambadi Cheruvu Neeti Mumpu (in English submergible lands of karakambadi tank).

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It is contended that after verifying the records the lands are confirmed as submergible lands. The petitioner failed to produce the ryotwari pattas granted by the Settlement Authorities appointed under section 5(2) of E.A.Act. The Rough pattas filed by the petitioners are not final, Settlement authorities are not competent to issue ryotwari patta for the communal lands which attracts section 3(b) of E.A.Act. The G.O.MS.No.148, MA, Municipal Administration and Urban Development authority dated 21.03.2007 clearly mentioned that approval of master plan in Rural area shall be permitted within a radius of 500 Meters from the existing Settlements (except in Special development zone, conservation zone and industrial zone) for their natural expansion. The present lands are located in conservation zone i.e., water conservation namely “Karakambadi Cheruvu Neeti Mumpu.” Therefore the permission accorded by the TUDA in favour of the petitioners for laying layouts

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in the suit land is not in accordance with the condition laid down in para 3(1) of the G.O.Ms.No.148, MA, dated 21.03.2005.

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It is contended that according to BSO-16 (1) "no land belonging to Government shall be sold, under this standing order, to any person other than a citizen of India, except with the sanction of the Collector or the Board and with the previous permission of the Government. Every sale under this Standing Order shall be subject to the condition that, if the land is placed at the disposal of a company, association, society, institution or a local body or transferred to any person other than a citizen of India, without the sanction of the Government, the sale shall thereupon become null and void.

¶122

The land liable to submersion when a tank is full, should remain registered as "tank poramboke" as long as the tank is maintained. The actual extent of water spread of each tank at full tank level should be shown in color wash in the copies of village maps. Whether it is occupied or not, the entry "Water Speared of Tank" should be made in the Settlement Register and Adangal. Against every unoccupied field or Sub- division so registered, the further entry " Tank Poramboke" should be made if the field is not already shown as such; and in the case of occupied fields, the actual extent of the water spread of each tank at full tank should be separately sub divided and the entry " waterspread" should be made in the register against such sub-division in view to their being transferred to tank poramboke as soon as reverted to Government at a revenue sale or by relinquishment or otherwise. Whenever in consequence of improvements or repairs to a tank its waterspread area increases, the records mentioned above should be revised

¶123

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accordingly. It is the duty of the Revenue Officials to see that the maps and registers mentioned above are kept up- to- date and that no water spread land be transferred to "tank poramboke" and the same cannot be assigned.

¶126

It is also contended that when it is the duty of the State to protect water bodies, the earlier order issued by the State in favour of the petitioners cannot be sustained under law. The law is well settled in “ Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v. S.B.Kirloskar³ ”, “ Intellectuals forum, Tirupati v. State of Andhra Pradesh⁴ ” “ Hinchlal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi⁵ ”, and in “ Sarevapalli Ramaiah (Died) as per LRS v. The Collector, Chittoor District⁶ ” the Supreme Court candidly held that “water bodies cannot be assigned or converted into house sites and it is the duty of the Sate to protect the water bodies. In view of Article 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life and to have compassion for living creatures. As per Article 48-A of the Constitution of India, the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country and in case the earlier order passed by the State is not withdrawn, it amount to disowning directions issued by the Supreme Court. Finally, prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

¶127

Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of Sri Sudhakar Rao Ambati, learned counsel for the petitioners, mainly contended that the memo impugned in the writ petition is nothing

¶128

3 2018 (10) SCJ 609

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4 AIR 2006 SC 1350

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5 AIR 2001 SC 3215

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6 AIR 2019 SC 1706

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but reviewing the order passed by the State Government, which is impermissible under law, except when there is a specific ground that it was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, but no specific pleadings with details of fraud/misrepresentation are available in the impugned memo for withdrawing earlier memo issued by the Government. In the absence of any ground of fraud, misrepresentation with details, for withdrawing the orders passed by the State by issuing impugned memo, the memo impugned in the writ petition is unsustainable and placed reliance on the judgment of Privy Council in “ A.L.N.Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee

¶135

of the High Court, Rangoon⁷ ”.

¶136

Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel, further contended that unless power of revision is conferred on the authorities, the respondents cannot exercise such power of revision. The memo under challenge is only quasi judicial order, no power of review is conferred on the authorities specifically under any enactment, thereby exercise of power by the respondents – authorities is in excess of the power conferred on the authorities. In support of this view, he placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in “ Dasari Satyanarayana v. Dasari

¶137

Bapayya⁸ ” “ Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh⁹ ”, “ Koyya Veerraju v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Gollaprolu, East Godavari District¹⁰ ” and judgments of the Supreme Court “ Dr.Smt.Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (UP)¹¹ ” “ Patel Narshi Thakershi

¶138

7 AIR 1941 PC 93

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8 AIR 1963 AP 148

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9 Laws (APH) 1968 7 43

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10 1998 (6) ALD 594 (DB)

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11 AIR 1987 SC 2186

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v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji¹² ” “ State Bank of India v. S.N.Goyal¹³ ” and “ Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. State of

¶146

Tamilnadu¹⁴ ”

¶147

On the strength of the principles laid down in the above judgments, learned senior counsel contended that the respondents have no authority to review the order passed by the State as no such power is conferred on the respondents. On this ground, the impugned memo is liable to be set aside.

¶148

As regards the plea of the respondents that the subject land is “submergible land”, the learned senior counsel contended that in the revision order dated 25.04.2016, the Government categorically drawn distinction between “submergible land (Mumpu land)” and “tank-bed land”, held that the submergible land, which may get submerged on some occasions cannot be treated as “tank-bed land”. The said order of the Government has become final. Therefore, this aspect of the matter cannot be re-agitated or re-opened.

¶149

According to the respondents, rough patta does not fall under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948. However, it is admitted at the end of paragraph 8 of the Counter affidavit that rough pattas were issued to the petitioners and they were not cancelled. These pattas were issued in 1963. The revisional authority, the Government, held in its order dated 25.04.2016 that rough patta is a valid document and that it is the responsibility of the authorities to conduct final survey. Therefore, on this ground, the order passed by respondent No.1 cannot be reopened.

¶150

12 AIR 1970 SC 1273

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13 (2008) 8 SCC 92

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14 (2014) 5 SCC 75

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Learned senior counsel contended that the inspection of the land by executive engineer or the inspection report of the Joint Collector or any other document being relied on by the respondents have already been considered by the Government in its order dated 25.04.2016, on the basis of those order, the matter cannot be reopened by exercising power of review. Therefore, the impugned memo is illegal and unsustainable under law.

¶156

One of the contentions urged by the respondents is that the Government “cannot close its eyes to the fraudulent act” and if any order was issued basing on fraud or mis-representation by the beneficiary, the same can be reopened. Refuting the said contention, learned senior counsel would submit that till now in any of the proceedings or in any of the reports of the Revenue Officials or the Joint Collector or the Government, such plea of fraud or misrepresentation was neither pleaded nor raised. In fact, the impugned memo is not on the basis of any fraud or misrepresentation. Therefore, there is no basis for reopening the matter by issuing impugned memo. In addition to the above grounds, it is also contended that no notice was issued and no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners before withdrawing the earlier order by issuing impugned memo, as such it is violative of principles of natural justice, thereby the impugned memo is illegal and arbitrary.

¶157

On behalf of Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Additional Advocate General, Sri P.Yugandhar Reddy, learned Assistant Government Pleader attached to the office of learned Additional Advocate General, contended that when there is fraud in obtaining order, the State can reopen the order passed by respondent No.1 to exercise power of review, thereby the impugned

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memo is in accordance with law. Apart from that, the land is submergible as per the material available on record, though it is recorded as private patta/dry/wet in the revenue records. When it is submergible land due to water flow from Karakambadi tank, it is deemed to be communal land, as such pattas cannot be granted either under the Estates Abolition Act or under the provisions of any other enactment, as such patta granted in favour of the vendors of the petitioners is not sufficient to claim right by the petitioners. On the other hand, it is the duty of the respondents to protect water bodies in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgments (referred supra) and the impugned memo is an attempt made by the State to protect water bodies i.e. Karakambadi tank and other tanks. When the Government intended to protect water bodies and passed order, the Court cannot interfere with such order passed by the Government. Thereby, the Court cannot declare the impugned memo as illegal and arbitrary, requested to dismiss the writ petition and vacate the interim earlier passed by this Court.

¶161

Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points need to be answered by this Court are as follows:

¶162

(1) Whether the impugned memo No.26086/LandsVIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 issued by respondent No.1 withdrawing Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 based on any of the grounds mentioned in the impugned memo, without prior notice to the petitioners, is sustainable?

¶163

(2) Whether the State can exercise power of review in its quasi judicial orders in the absence of conferment of such power of review under the provisions of any law or enactment? If not, whether the memo impugned in

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the writ petition be declared as illegal and arbitrary; consequently liable to be set aside?

¶167

P O I N T No.1 :

¶168

As there is no dispute regarding various orders passed by the authorities, finally by the State vide memo No.26086-A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017. But the reason for withdrawal of the said memo by issuing impugned memo is specific that after dismissal of the appeal by the Commissioner, Appeals, the applicant therein approached the Government by filing revision petition requesting to set aside the orders of the Commissioner, Appeals. The Government vide Memo No.26086-A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 observed that the matter was not examined on merits, accordingly set aside the order passed by the Commissioner, Appeals dated 22.05.2013 and order passed by the Joint Collector on 19.12.2011, directed the District Collector to restore entries in revenue records and issue fresh pattadar passbooks.

¶169

The 2^nd ground raised in the impugned memo is that the Government did not decide the matter in proper perspective as to the issue of classification of the land as “Neeti Mumpu”, which is nothing but “Water Body”

¶170

The 3^rd ground raised in the impugned memo is that the Government has re-examined the whole issue and withdrawn the Government Memo No.26086-A/EA and AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017. Therefore, the respondents have to limit their counter to the grounds covered by the memo, but the respondents raised different contentions in the counter for the first time, which were not raised in the impugned memo.

¶171

Final order in revision was passed by respondent No.1 on

¶172

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25.04.2016 in revision petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013 dated 25.04.2016 and answered the contentions raised by the revenue authorities, finally in paragraph No.8 the Government i.e. Principal Secretary to Government concluded that the subject property cannot be treated as “Tank bed”, and validity of the rough patta cannot be questioned as they were issued as per the procedure prescribed under the Estates Abolition Act.

¶175

Aggrieved by the said order, the District Collector filed a review petition to review the order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the Principal Secretary to Government, but the same was dismissed by Memo No.26086/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 08.06.2017. Surprisingly, the impugned memo was issued withdrawing the order in review petition dated 16.11.2017 on various grounds, which I referred in earlier paragraphs. But the respondents, in the counter, made serious improvements in the plea raised before the Principal Secretary to the Government in the review petition, so also in the memo impugned in the writ petition. The contentions raised in the counter, which are beyond the contentions raised in the impugned memo, cannot be taken into consideration to adjudicate the real controversy between the parties since the parties cannot improve their pleas by filing counter affidavit.

¶176

It is a settled proposition of law that, by filing affidavit reasons cannot be supplemented to a ground in an administrative order and this view is fortified by the judgment of the Constitutional Bench in “ Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi¹⁵ ” , wherein it was held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its

15 (1978) 1 SCC 405

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validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned therein and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise; otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, gets validated by additional reasons/grounds later brought in. In the said judgment, the Constitution Bench referred to earlier judgment in “ Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji¹⁶ ” , wherein the Apex Court observed as follows:

¶181

“Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. As such orders are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed' they must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.”

¶182

By applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, respondents cannot improve the grounds by filing a counter affidavit, and this Court is not required to examine the contentions raised in the counter which are supplemented, as they were not raised in the impugned memo.

¶183

Applying the principle laid down by the Apex Court in “ Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi ” (referred supra), I would like to confine the decision on the basis of grounds raised in the impugned memo while ignoring the other contentions raised in the counter.

¶184

From the beginning and before this Court in the counter, it is stated that the land in dispute in different survey numbers (stated above) is private patta land and not vested on the Government consequent upon the abolition of estates under the Estates Abolition Act. Thus, rough patta was granted in favour of the original 16 AIR 1952 SC 16

¶185

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landholders i.e. vendors of the petitioners‟ predecessors, but the question of validity of rough patta cannot be decided in the present proceedings. Even in the fair adangal, the disputed land is shown as private patta land, but the contention of the respondents is that it is submergible land during rainy season.

¶188

The Principal Secretary to Government decided the issue on 25.04.2016 in Revision petition No.26086/EA&AR/A1/2013. Specific contentions urged by the petitioners were recorded in paragraph No.3 (ii) (iii) and paragraph No.6, recorded a specific finding in paragraph No.8 of the order dated 25.04.2016. In paragraph No.3 (i) of the said order, one of the contentions raised by the District Collector was that vendors of the petitioners were granted rough pattas under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act, necessary entries were made in the fair adangal in favour of the vendors of the petitioners. This fact is not in controversy since it was admitted before the authorities including the Principal Secretary to the Government and even before this Court also. Pattadar Passbooks and title deeds were also issued to the vendors of the petitioners. Therefore, the pattas granted in favour of the petitioners under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act cannot be examined in the present proceedings. However, the Government contended that such pattas will not create any title and they are only rough pattas. But in paragraph No.7 (iv) the revisional authority referred several judgments of the High Court and one such judgment is “ Bollineni Pedayogaiah v. Joint Collector/Settlement Officer¹⁷ ”, wherein the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held that once the pattas were granted long back, conducting of denovo enquiry after

17 2004 (5) ALT 806

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lapse of nearly 24 years on the alleged report of Tahsildar about the irregularities in granting pattas is not legal and further held that suo moto enquiry by the authorities should be conducted within the reasonable time.

¶193

In the instant case on hand, pattas were granted in 1963 under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, but the Joint Collector suo motu initiated proceedings prior to 2011 and passed an order on 19.12.2011 and the same was confirmed by the Commissioner of Appeals by order dated 22.05.2012 though pattas were granted long ago. In fact, initiation of suo motu enquiry into the irregularities in granting pattas under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act and recorded a finding is a serious illegality for the reason that against the order of Settlement Officer passed under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, an appeal lies to the competent authority under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. Therefore, the Joint Collector has no jurisdiction to record any finding. However, this Court in the present petition cannot examine the validity of the pattas issued under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act, in view of the limited question involved in the petition. In any view of the matter, the Principal Secretary to the Government being revisional authority based on the judgments (referred above) concluded that legality of rough patta granted in favour of the vendor of the petitioners cannot be examined at this stage, after long lapse of time.

¶194

In the present case, in the counter, respondents invented fraud, misrepresentation etc., for initiation of the proceedings, nowhere such ground was raised throughout the proceedings even before the revisional authority. However, fraud or misrepresentation

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must be pleaded with full details so as to enable the adversary/opposite party to meet such plea. Order 6 Rule IV of the Civil Procedure Code (for short “C.P.C.”) mandates that “in all cases in which the party pleading relief on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading." Though the rules under C.P.C. are not applicable to the writ petition, more details are required to decide the writ petition since the Courts are deciding those contentions based on the affidavit filed by the parties in the writ petitions, but not by conducting any process of trial or enquiry like suits. In the present facts, the respondents did not furnish any details of fraud or misrepresentation etc., but pleaded, for the first time, in the counter filed by them or even if, it is pleaded before the Joint Collector, appellate authority or in the revision, in the absence of details the Court cannot consider such plea of fraud or misrepresentation.

¶198

Learned senior counsel for the petitioners in support of his contentions, placed reliance on the judgment of Privy Council in

¶199

“ A.L.N.Narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignee of the High

¶200

Court, Rangoon ” (referred supra), wherein it is held that fraud of this nature, like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings, must be established beyond reasonable doubt.

¶201

Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, the plea of fraud or misrepresentation raised for the first time before this Court by the respondents in the counter cannot be entertained in the

¶202

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absence of sufficient details in the pleadings as mandated under law. On this ground, the plea or fraud or misrepresentation raised by the respondents is hereby rejected. Apart from that, such plea was not raised in the impugned memo.

¶205

The Principal Secretary to Government also referred to a judgment of Division Bench in “ the Mandal Revenue Officer v. Kanchubriki Parvathamma¹⁸ ”, wherein it is held that rough pattas are valid documents for seeking mutation of their names in the revenue records and the said pattas shall be proof of title as long as they are not set aside as per the procedure established by law.

¶206

In view of the principle laid down in the judgment (referred supra), rough patta granted in favour of the petitioners‟ vendors‟ predecessors is sufficient to mutate the name of the petitioners in the revenue records as patta was issued in their favour under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. At this stage, either this Court or the authorities or the Commissioner of Appeals or Revisional authority cannot examine validity of such pattas obtained under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act after long lapse of more than 50 years. Therefore, issue regarding validity of rough pattas cannot be decided at this stage, on this ground withdrawal of memo issued by the Government bearing No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 by impugned memo is a serious illegality.

¶207

The 2^nd ground urged by the respondents is that the subject land is a submergible land (Neeti Mumpu). At best, the land is subject to „inundation‟ during rainy season, but that cannot be said to be a „tank bed‟ or „tank poramboke‟. As admitted by the

¶208

18 2008 (6) ALD 788 (DB)

¶209

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respondents, it is only submergible land and it is a private zeroyati land as per fair adangal. Therefore, it is a private land. Though it is a submergible land, it cannot be treated as „government land‟ and it will not vest on the government consequent upon the abolition of estates more particularly, when patta was granted in favour of the original landholders. Even otherwise, the Principal Secretary to the Government discussed about this issue in the order dated 25.04.2016 in paragraph No.6 in detail and recorded that it was only submergible land. It is recorded as „private patta land‟ in the fair adangal, but in the remarks column, it is mentioned as „submergible land‟ and not part of karakambadi tank. The Principal Secretary to the Government dealt with the matter in detail and recorded a finding that the subject land is a patta land, but not a river poramboke or tank proamboke by placing reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad “ Pydah

¶212

Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh” (referred

¶213

above), wherein it is held that the payment of cist and acceptance thereof by the Government was a positive indication that the owner of the land was determined to retain his possession notwithstanding submersion of the land. In the same judgment, it was clarified that once right or title to the particular land is established, even in course of time by flow of water the land gets eroded, the title to the land does not pass from the private person to the Government and patta land does not become Government land or river proamboke.

¶214

In the facts of the case also, though it is recorded as private patta land in the fair adangal and in remarks column, it is mentioned as „submergible land‟. Hence, it is an undisputed fact that it is purely private patta land, though the land is subject to

¶215

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inundation during rainy season, the title will not divest from private parties, vest on the Government and the same cannot be treated as “river poramboke”. Therefore, on the ground that the land is submergible land, withdrawal of Memo No. 26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 by impugned memo is illegal.

¶218

The 3^rd ground urged by the respondents for withdrawing Memo No. 26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is that the land is „water body‟ and it is the duty of the State to protect water bodies in view of Article 48A and 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India and taking cue from the principle laid down in “ Hyderabad Urban Development Authority v. S.B.Kirloskar ”, “ Intellectuals forum, Tirupati v. State of Andhra Pradesh ” and “ Hinchlal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi ” (referred supra) the Memo No. 26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is recalled by impugned memo.

¶219

It is an undisputed fact that the subject land is not a part of tank bed or tank poramboke, it is only submergible land when watter filled in the tank in full. Merely because, it is a submergible land, it cannot be treated as a water body. The word „water bodies‟ are not defined anywhere.

¶220

Water body can be said to be a part of earth‟s surface covered with water, such as a river or lake or ocean.

¶221

Learned Assistant Government Pleader contended that when the land is a water body or tank poramboke, patta cannot be granted under the Estates Abolition Act or under Andhra Pradesh Revenue Board Standing Order 15.

¶222

Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners strongly refuting the contentions of the State, placed reliance on “ Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh ” (referred supra), where

¶223

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the Court held that merely because the lands are “mumpu lands (submergible lands), grant of patta cannot be denied.

¶226

In paragraph No.9 the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad placed reliance on “ Tarakdas Acharjee Choudhury v. Secretary of State¹⁹ ”, concluded that merely because the land is submergible, a patta under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act cannot be denied. In “ Tarakdas Acharjee Choudhury v. Secretary of State ” (referred supra), it was observed that if a person was owner of certain land before submersion, be would on reappearance of it be entitled to resume possession thereof, only that he has to prove his title in relation to that land on reformation. To put it differently, the right of the owner to the land by reason of its submersion would not be lost and he would be at liberty to enforce his right on proving that the land that has reappeared is the same it was in his ownership prior to submersion.

¶227

In “ Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh ” (referred supra), while dealing with the writ petition filed against the order passed by the Board of Revenue, the Court formulated a question whether a patta can be granted under Section 11 (b) of the Estates Abolition Act when the land is Mumpu land. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad observed as follows:

¶228

“It is a common ground that the name of the petitioner‟s predecessor-ininterest was found in 10 (1) account in relation to these lands and all that was required to be ascertained by them under Section 11 (d) was whether the petitioner satisfied the conditions laid in that provision. The continuous occupation from 01.07.1939 up to 07.09.1950 was the only matter about which the authorities had to be satisfied with. The Revenue Board, while

¶229

19 AIR 1935 P.C. 125

¶230

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admitting that in case of submerged lands such occupation could as well be proved by means of payment of cist had erred in holding that this payment should be proved only by producing cist receipts. In our opinion, nonproduction of cist receipts was not fatal if payment could be proved even otherwise. The Revenue Board could in this behalf take into consideration the other documents which were in their Department and on which the petitioner had relied, It would appear from the counter filed in this proceeding by the respondents, which curiously enough does not fully accord with the text of the order of the Revenue Board, that continuous payment of cist from 1939 up to 1956 is an admitted feet. Para 5(a) of the counter is specific that there was no balance of assessment due an these lands up to the end of fasli 1865. It is alto admitted in the counter that the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest was in possession of the land on the first day of July 1939. The counter indubitably is based on the documents available in the department. Section 11 (b), as already noticed, refers to the occupation between the first day of July, 1939, and the notified date only. This does not go beyond that, for conferring the right of patta on a ryot. It is common ground that proviso to section 11 (b) is not applicable to this case. The orders of the Revenue authorities also, in fact, proceeded on that basis. In these circumstances, it is clear that the Revenue Board had failed to take into consideration the facts admitted by the department in deciding the revision petition. Further, it was in error when it was inclined to think that the only way of proof of payment of cist was production of original receipts. Thus the decision of the Revenue Board is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. It is, therefore, liable to be quashed.”

¶233

In view of the law laid down in the above judgment, the contention urged by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of learned Additional Advocate General is unsustainable under law and the same is hereby rejected.

¶234

The Principal Secretary to the Government considered the issue in detail and recorded a finding merely because it is subject to inundation occasionally during rainy season, the same cannot be treated as „tank bed‟ or „tank poramboke‟ automatically and did not agree with the findings of the Joint Collector based on the law quoted by the Joint Collector since such principles are applicable only to tank beds, not to submergible lands. Even if, the contention of the respondents is accepted that the subject land is subject to

¶235

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inundation occasionally during rainy season, as the subject land is classified as „private land‟ in fair adangal of Karakambadi village, the same cannot be termed as „water body‟ for the purpose of deciding the present issue. Hence, on this ground also, the Memo No. 26086A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 cannot be recalled by issuing impugned memo.

¶238

The other ground raised by the respondents is that the Government has re-examined the whole issue. No doubt, the Government can re-examine the whole issue, but it must be within a reasonable time. The petitioners purchased the property from their vendors, who obtained ryotwari patta under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. The rights of the landholder or Ryots were crystallised on the day when the rough patta was granted, but at this stage i.e. after more than 50 years the whole issue cannot be reopened and re-examined. In addition to that, the subject land is not a tank bed or water body as admitted by the respondents. However, it is a submergible land, but in view of the endorsement in the „remarks column‟ of fair adanga that submergible land cannot be treated as „tank poromboke‟ or „water body‟. Even if, it is submergible land, water may struck for few days and water level in the tank is receded, it will reappear after some days. Therefore, the ground raised by the authorities that the State is under obligation to protect such submergible land treating it as „tank poramboke‟ or „water body‟ is a serious illegality.

¶239

In any view of the matter, the State is competent to settle the issue, but it must be within a reasonable time. When rough patta was granted to the landholders or Ryots, who sold the property to the vendors of the petitioners, thereafter to these petitioners, their title is

¶240

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crystallised and became owners of the property by purchase. In such case, the principle of proprietary estoppel can be invoked by the petitioners.

¶243

The Delhi High Court in “ Raj Kishan Dass v. Mrs. Kusum Singh²⁰ ” considered the Scope of Proprietary Estoppel, wherein it was observed that, Proprietary estoppel operates in a variety of cases to disparate that it has been described as "an amalgam of doubtful utility". The cases can be divided broadly into two categories. In the first, one person acts under a mistake as to the existence or as to the extent of his rights in or over another's land. Even though the mistake was in no way induced by the landowner, he might be prevented from taking advantage of it. Particularly if he "stood by" knowing of the mistake, or actively encouraged the mistaken party to act in reliance on his mistaken belief. These cases of so-called "acquiescence" do not raise any questions as to the enforceability of promises and therefore do not call for further discussion. In the Second situation, there is not merely "acquiescence" by the landowner, but "encouragement". The other party acts in reliance on the landowner's promise (or on conduct or a representation from which a promise can be inferred) that the promise has a legally recognized interest in the land or that one will be created in his favor. The question then arises, to what extent such a promise can be enforced, even though it may not be supported by consideration, or fail to satisfy the other requirements (such as certainty) of a binding contract.

20 93 (2000) DLT 359

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The present facts would attract the second situation as reliance was placed on patta granted under Section 11 (a) of the Estates Abolition Act. The property was sold by original landholder or Ryhot to several persons including the petitioners. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to insist the State to mutate their names in the revenue records and the State is under obligation to comply with such legitimate demand to mute the names of the petitioners. Therefore, to avoid uncertainty of the title to the property, principle of proprietary estoppel can be invoked.

¶248

As there is duty cast upon the Government to avoid litigation, the State shall not protract the litigation without any reasons. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the affairs of business. When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates. Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the consequences of this doctrinal confusion in the following terms:

¶249

“Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions like UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the capacity of public law to absorb the moral values underlying the notion of estoppels in the light of the

¶250

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evolution of doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and abuse of power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown its creativity in transforming the notion of promissory estoppel from the limitations of private law, then it does not stand to reason as to why it should also not articulate and evolve the doctrine of LE for judicial review of resilement of administrative authorities from policies and longstanding practices. If such a notion of LE is adopted, then not only would the Court be able to do away with the artificial hierarchy between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, but, it would also be able to hold the administrative authorities to account on the footing of public law outside the zone of promises on a stronger and principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a like doctrine to that of promissory estoppel outside the promissory zone, the administrative law adjudication of resilement of policies stands on a shaky public law foundation.”

¶253

The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme Court in Vitarelli v. Seton²¹ as follows:

¶254

“An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.”

¶255

In view of the said principle, when an order was passed by the

¶256

State exercising revisional power, the State cannot seek review of its order and again withdraw the order passed by the Government by issuing impugned memo as it creates confusion and uncertainty of title to the property of the petitioners. Therefore, by applying the principle of proprietary estoppel, the shortcut method adopted by the Government to recall the Memo No.26086-A/EA&AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is an illegality for the reason that the Principal Secretary to the Government passed order in revision in 2016, dealt with each and every issue raised by the Government. Review was also dismissed, but a different method was invented by the respondents

21 359 US 535 (1959)

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to recall its own order, which creates any amount of confusion and uncertainty as to the rights of the petitioners. Right of the party in immovable property cannot be undetermined for indefinite period by issuing different orders by the Government. Such conduct of the Government, respondents herein creates any amount of confusion and the Citizens of the State will lose trust on the Government.

¶261

One of the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners before this Court is that the impugned memo was issued withdrawing the order in review petition on various grounds. However, no notice was issued and prior opportunity was afforded to the petitioners before issuing impugned memo withdrawing the earlier order. The impugned memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 issued by respondent No.1 withdrawing the earlier order vide Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017, is a quasi judicial order though on administrative side. Such order cannot be passed without affording any prior opportunity to the petitioners since they are immediate affected parties to such proceedings. When an order is passed without issuing any prior notice and without affording any opportunity, it is in violation of principles of natural justice.

¶262

In “ Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India²² ” the Apex Court held that it is obvious that in passing the impugned order of cancellation, the respondents were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and also they were acting in exercise of their statutory powers. Indisputably, the third respondent while purporting to cancel the registration certificate was acting in exercise of his power

22 (2010) 13 SCC 427

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under Rule 43 of the MPEDA Rules. The show cause notice dated 23.01.2008 was issued by the third respondent in exercise of this power. Finally concluded that “a reasonable opportunity of making objection” or “a reasonable opportunity of defence” is to be afforded to the licensees and a similar question was considered by the Constitutional Bench in “ Khem Chand v. Union of India²³ ”, wherein Constitutional Bench unanimously expressed its opinion that concept of `reasonable opportunity' includes various safeguards and one of them, in the words of the learned Chief Justice, is:

¶267

“(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges leveled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based”

¶268

The Apex Court further held that it is no doubt true that at the stage of show cause, the person proceeded against must be told the charges against him so that he can take his defence and prove his innocence. However, show-cause notice cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read reasonably.

¶269

The entire exercise of the Apex Court in the said judgment is to the effect that a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded before passing any order.

¶270

In “ A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak²⁴ ” , Supreme Court held that violation of natural justice would render the order void. In “ Anisminic Limited v. Foreign Compensation Commission²⁵ ” the House of Lords held that breach of natural justice nullifies the order.

¶271

Thus, respondent No.1 violated principles of natural justice. In those circumstances, this Court while exercising power under

¶272

23 AIR 1958 SC 300

¶273

24 [1984] S.C.R. 495

¶274

25 [1969] 2 AC 147

¶275

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Article 226 of the Constitution of India can interfere with the quasi judicial order passed by respondent No.1 and set aside the same on this ground alone. Hence, the impugned memo is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.

¶278

P O I N T No.2 :

¶279

The main contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that when a revision petition is filed, no further revision is maintainable against such order. Here, the Joint Collector passed an order, and the Commissioner of Appeals confirmed the order of the Joint Collector, but in revision the Principal Secretary to the Government set aside the order of both the Joint Collector and Commissioner of Appeals and decided in favour of the petitioners. Thereafter, several directions were issued for implementation of the order dated 25.04.2016 passed by the Principal Secretary to the Government. For one reason or the other, the order was not implemented. Finally, the District Collector filed a petition for review of the order passed in Memo No.26086/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 25.04.2016 and the same was dismissed by Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017, while issuing directions for implementation of the said order dated 25.04.2016. However, the said Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is withdrawn by the Government by issuing impugned Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020

¶280

Learned Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of learned Additional Advocate General-I would contend that the Government can pass any number of orders and review its own orders, but this

¶281

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contention is fallacious and contrary to law. The law is well settled that against a review, no further review is maintainable and this view is fortified by the judgment of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in “ Dasari Satyanarayana v. Dasari Bapayya ” (referred supra), wherein the Court held that against a review, no further review is maintainable, and the Court specifically held as follows:

¶284

“The orders passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, and the Settlement Officer under Section 11 (a) are subject to revision by the Director of Settlements under Section 5 (2) of the Act The orders of the Director of Settlements including those made in revision under Section 5 (2) are subject to revision by the Board of Revenue under Section 7 (d). Under the Act, there is however no provision for any further revision to the Government, the Board of Revenue being the final revisional authority in matters arising under Section 11 (a) of the Act. In the absence of an express provision, there is no warrant for the assumption that by implication there is some residuary power in the Government to revise the orders of the Board of Revenue. In “Nagarathnammal v. Ibrahim Saheb (AIR 1955 Mad 305 (FB)” a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that under Section 10 (5) of the Madras Hereditary Village Officers Act, the Collector is the final authority, and neither the Board of Revenue nor the Government has any right to interfere. That decision is an authority for the proposition that where the statute does not expressly provide for a revisional jurisdiction, the Government cannot claim to exercise such a jurisdiction under an assumed residuary power. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., who spoke for the Full Bench. I hold, therefore, that in this case the Board of Revenue is the final revising authority against the orders of the Directors of Settlements, and no further revision to the Government lies. That being so, the proceedings now pending before the Government as a result of the revision petition filed by the 1st respondent are wholly lacking in jurisdiction.”

¶285

In the present case, the Government did not take this matter in further revision, but filed a review petition, which ended in dismissal. For one reason or the other, the order in review was withdrawn to unsettle the title of the petitioners by their acts at their whims and fancies of the authorities. The order passed in the review petition filed by the Collector cannot be withdrawn as it attained

¶286

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finality long back. Even as per the provisions of C.P.C., review against review is not maintainable. Therefore, when once review petition is filed, though not permissible under law, withdrawal of the order passed in review would amount to reviewing the order of review on the pretext to examine the issue in detail by the Government. No such power is conferred on the State authorities to keep the issue unsettled ad infinitum or indefinitely. If such power is conferred on the Government, whenever Government changes, by adopting different policies of their own may reopen the issue again to unsettle the title to the immovable property. Therefore, such bar is created only to put an end to the litigation attaching finality to such orders. Withdrawing order in review by issuing impugned memo is a serious illegality. Further, Order XLVII Rule 9 of C.P.C. says that no application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained. Though, the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable to the writ proceedings, the purport of the said provision can be applied to the present facts of the case to put an end to the litigation. Hence, the contention of the learned Assistant Government Pleader is rejected.

¶289

Yet, another contention urged before this Court by the learned Senior counsel is that a power of review cannot be exercised by the quasi judicial authorities except on conferment by Statute. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the Judgment of Apex Court in “ Dr.Smt.Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (UP)” (referred supra), wherein it is held as follows:

¶290

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“It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. "In the circumstances, it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity.

¶293

The next question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. It is true that there was an alternative remedy for challenging the impugned order by referring the question to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act. It is well established that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. When an authority has acted wholly without jurisdiction, the High Court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. In the instant case, the Vice-Chancellor had no power of review and the exercise of such a power by her was absolutely without jurisdiction. Indeed, the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor on review was a nullity; such an order could surely be challenged before the High Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and, in our opinion, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellant under Section 68 of the U.P. State Universities Act.”

¶294

In the present facts of the case, no review is provided by any statute either under the Estates Abolition Act or under the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 to review the orders passed by the authorities. But for one reason or the other, the District Collector after lapse of long period from the date of passing order by respondent No.1, filed petition for review of the order passed by the State Government, and the same was ended against the State, again the State issued impugned memo to withdraw the order to multiply the issue and unsettle the title of the

¶295

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petitioners indefinitely. Such course is not open to the Government. Moreover, very entertaining of review by the Principal Secretary to the Government is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in “ Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji” (referred supra). In the said judgment, the Apex Court held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.

¶298

Learned senior counsel for the petitioners further contended that suo motu power can be exercised only within a reasonable time to interfere with grant of pattas. But, in the present case, the issue was settled long back, but the State intended to interfere with such order and exercised inherent power with a view to review the issue again, which is already decided by the Principal Secretary to the Government, such course is not open to the Government in view of the law declared by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad

¶299

in “ Koya Veeraju v. Mandal Revenue Officer, Gollaprolu, East

¶300

Godavari District .” (referred supra), wherein it is held as follows:

¶301

“The above discussion including the legal position makes it clear that the powers which the authorities sought to exercise are neither just nor reasonable. By the present proceedings, they started to unsettle the things which were settled long ago. Keeping silent for several decades and then to come up with an explanation that lands in question (were) prohibited for alienation and the alienators (sic alienees) are not entitled for mutation is not tenable. The powers to revise are quasi-judicial in nature. The same shall be exercised within a reasonable period and while exercising shall give valid and acceptable reasons. The power exercised clearly establishes that the authorities acted under dictation influenced more by extraneous consideration; the proceedings are not only arbitrary and unreasonable, but they exercise powers with mala fide intention.

¶302

The submission of the Government Pleader is that the authorities to exercise suo motu powers as they came to know that alienations were made due to fraud and misrepresentation. But in none of the orders referred to

¶303

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earlier, mere was a finding as to fraud or misrepresentation. The facts narrated by the petitioners disclose that after purchase of the land they were put in possession of the land they improved it and they have been enjoying the same. If the authority felt that the land in question was required for some public purpose then they had to resort to invoke the provisions contained in some other law to take over the land and not by unsettling the things. In our view exercise of suo motu revisional powers is unwarranted, mala fide, unreasonable and illegal. When the Court comes to know that manifest illegality has been crept in or proceedings without jurisdiction, to render justice and avoid multiplicity of proceedings, this Court can exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India instead of driving the parties to exhaust alternative remedy. After all alternative remedy is not a rule of law, but it is a matter of convenience for Judges to dispose of the cases. The duty of the Court is to see justice is not only done but seemed to be done.”

¶306

One of the contentions raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader on behalf of learned Additional Advocate General is that the Joint Collector passed orders in R.Dis.F1/6587/2005 dated 19.12.2011 and Commissioner, Appeals passed orders No.P1/1012/2006 dated 22.05.2013, and based on the said orders, and memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017, it is contended that respondent Nos.2 and 3 recorded categorical findings regarding nature of the land in different paragraphs, but the same was not taken care of by the Principal Secretary to the Government. Therefore, the order of respondent No.1 is required to be reviewed again.

¶307

No doubt, if the revisional authority ignores certain aspects, the person aggrieved by the findings recorded by the revisional authority may prefer a review. Accordingly, respondent No.3 filed review petition for review of the order passed by the Principal Secretary to the Government, but the said review was dismissed again recording reasons having found no ground to review the order passed by respondent No.1. When once the review is dismissed no

¶308

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further review is permitted under law as discussed in the earlier paragraphs. Therefore, on this ground also, impugned memo proposing to review the entire proceedings is liable to the set aside as it is contrary to the law laid by the Apex Court and other Courts (referred supra). Hence, the documents produced along with the counter are of no assistance to the respondents.

¶311

In the present case, pattas were granted in favour of the petitioners‟ vendors‟ vendor or petitioners‟ vendor in 1963, later the Joint Collector passed order on 19.12.2011 and the same was confirmed by the Commissioner of Appeals on 22.05.2013, but both the orders were set aside by the Principal Secretary to the Government by order dated 25.04.2016. Thus, the order became final in the 2016 itself, but a review petition was filed, in the said review petition, an order dated 16.11.2017 was passed vide Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 directing to implement the order dated 25.04.2016. Late, the said Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 was withdrawn by issuing impugned Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020. As such, there is any amount of substantial delay and at such belated stage, the order cannot be reopened by issuing memo without notice to the petitioners. Therefore, on the ground of delay also, exercise of power by the Government to withdraw the order dated 16.11.2017 by issuing impugned memo is nothing but arbitrary and illegal exercise of power by the State and its authorities.

¶312

Sri S.S.Prasad, learned senior counsel would contend that when once final order is passed by the quasi judicial authorities, the quasi judicial authority will become functus officio only when its

¶313

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order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated to the party concerned and it cannot reopen the matter and take up proceedings further. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in “ State Bank of India v. S.N.Goyal ” (referred supra), wherein it is held that a quasi judicial authority will become functus officio only when its order is pronounced, or published/notified or communicated (put in the course of transmission) to the party concerned. Thus, once the order is published or notified or communicated by the authority, the quasi judicial authority has no power to reopen the issue once again as it becomes functus officio. Here, respondent No.2, 3 and 4 are quasi judicial authorities, who decided the rights of the parties in the land under different enactments i.e. the Estates Abolition Act and Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, where no such power to reopen is conferred on the State and the final orders passed in the revision by respondent No.1 attained finality in the year 2016 itself. Thereafter, several memos were issued for implementation of the order, but for one reason or the other, the authorities did not take steps, ultimately the Collector filed revision, obviously for the reasons best known, at belated stage, which ended in dismissal. However, not satisfied with the order of dismissal in review, the State invoked an indirect method of withdrawing the order, which is impermissible under law. Such withdrawal by quasi judicial authority after it becomes functus officio is a serious illegality and such exercise of power is arbitrary in nature.

¶316

Learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in “ Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamilnadu ”

¶317

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¶318

¶319

(referred supra), wherein the Apex Court held that when once a decision is taken on question of law, on which the judgment of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. In the present case, the State reopened the issue and reviewed the order by issuing impugned memo on three grounds, which I discussed in the earlier paragraphs. Change of law subsequent to the decision taken by the quasi judicial authority is not a ground to reopen the issue and review the order, which was already reviewed by the State in revision petition in 2017 itself.

¶320

In view of the law declared by the Courts in catena of perspective pronouncements (referred supra), exercise of power to review the order passed in review earlier, by issuing impugned memo and withdrawing the order in Memo No.26086-A/EA & AR/A1/2013 dated 16.11.2017 is without jurisdiction and not based on any irregularity in the order earlier passed by the State. Therefore, the impugned memo is illegal as the same was issued in arbitrary exercise of power.

¶321

Merely because, the State is the authority having control over all the departments in the State, it cannot exercise its power at its whims and fancies targeting few citizens in the State. Such exercise

¶322

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of power may lead to chaos by unsettling the settled rights of the parties in the immovable property. If exercise of such power is permitted, it will lead to multiplicity of litigation in the State and the never ending litigation seriously affects the economy of the State itself and such unsettling the title to the immovable property may mar the industrial growth having its serious consequences on the public life. Therefore, such exercise of power by the State by issuing impugned Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the issue is answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.

¶325

In the result, the writ petition is allowed declaring the Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is illegal, arbitrary and the said Memo No.26086/Lands-VIII/2020 dated 16.03.2020 is hereby set aside. No costs.

¶326

Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.

¶327

JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

¶328

04.08.2021 Ksp

L. Ramesh v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

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L. Ramesh v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

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