Dismissed

Union of India Thru. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi v. Smt. Seema Sharma

Allahabad HC27 Feb 2026FAFOD/177/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Condonation of delay refused; 1937 days delay; Section 5 Limitation Act; Section 23 Railway Claims Tribunal Act 1987; State/instrumentality at par with private litigant; explanation vs excuse; bureaucratic inefficiency no ground; RCT Lucknow award 26.05.2017 in OA. 0300140; review Rev/A/18/19 dismissed 13.05.2024; FAFO dismissed on delay and laches; Postmaster General v. Living Media India; Borse

What the court decided

AI extract

Union of India Thru. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi vs Smt. Seema Sharma — Allahabad HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 177 of 2024

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Union Of India Thru. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi

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.....Appellant(s)

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Versus

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Smt. Seema Sharma .....Respondent(s) Counsel for Appellant(s) : Mahendra Kumar Misra Counsel for Respondent(s) : Pradeep Kumar Singh, Amit Kumar, Amrita Singh

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Court No. - 20

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HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

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C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.IA/1/2024

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This is an application for condonation of delay in filing the instant first appeal from order.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

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The instant belated appeal has been preferred under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 against the impugned judgment and order dated 13.05.2024 passed in Rev/A/18/19 (Union of India v. Smt. Seema Sharma) and the impugned Judgement and Award dated 26.05.2017 passed in Case No. OA. 0300140 (Smt. Seema Sharma v. Union of India) passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Lucknow.

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The office has reported a delay of 1937 days in filing the instant appeal.

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The reasons given in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application for delay are as follows :-

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"3. That appellant filed Review Petition No. Rev/A/18/19 which was dismissed by the Circuit Bench (Single Member) vide impugned order dated 13.05.2024.

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4. That the Railway Advocate sent the certified copy of the order dated 13.05.2024 & 26.05.2017 along with his opinion letter dated 17.09.2024 with the opinion to challenge the order before this Hon'ble High Court.

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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5. That the CLA/RCT/LKO after examining the entire facts and going through the judgments and orders submitted his report dated 14.10.2024.

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6. That the CLA1/C/NR submitted his report dated 21.10.2024 for approaching CCO/NR for approval for filing appeal/FAFO and the deponent submitted his report dated 21.10.2024 and Dy.CCM/CLM2/HQ submitted reports dated 29.10.2024.

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7. That subsequently the CCO/HQ/NR granted approval for filing appeal on 29.10.2024.

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8. That the DSGI, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow allotted the file to Shri Mahendra Kumar Mishra Advocate on 20.11.2024, for filing the FAFO and thereafter the FAFO was drafted and sent for vetting and subsequently after completing necessary formalities, the FAFO is being filed without any further delay.

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9. That thereafter the FAFO was drafted and sent for vetting and subsequently after completing necessary formalities, the FAFO is being filed without any further delay."

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The additional reasons given in the supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant on 17.02.2025 are as follows :-

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"4. That the Certified Copy of the impugned judgment and award dated 26.05.2017 was made available to the appellant then came out that the Compensation awarded vide impugned judgment and award dated 26.05.2017 is not in accordance with law and such on communications made in department the department had decided to get the order challenged in the review petition by the their counsel.

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5. That the applicant being the government functionaries and due to involvement of various agencies of the Government and perhaps lack of time management the delay has occurred.

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6. That the further delay has been caused due to quashing the penal of Railway Advocates by the Hon'ble High Court Lucknow in the year 2017. Thereafter the paper book has been given to the counsel who prepared the Review Petition.

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7. That some delay occurred in the process of for the providing official instructions. communications, appropriate official orders and preparation of the Review Petition on behalf of respondent / here Appellant. In the mean time the matter remain transit and thereafter some time consumed in preparation of the Review Petition on behalf of respondent / here Appellant. Delay in filing the Review Petition on behalf of respondent/ here Appellant is procedural in nature. But the Learned Court below had heard the aforesaid Review Petition filed respondent / here Appellant on merit and decided on 13-05-2024.

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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8. That either vicariously or non- vicariously on being approved or on consulted as well the review petition No. Rev/A/18/19 was filed by the appellant. But it remained pending for long span of time and every possible effort to get the review petition decided had went in vain. Hence some delay has stood occurred. therefore instant application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is being filed.

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9. That on being come for hearing on board on 13.05.2024 the aforesaid review petition was heard and finally decided vide judgment and order dated 13.05.2024, the learned tribunal had proceeded to again disbelieved the contention of the appellant and dismissed the aforesaid review petition by the Circuit Bench (Single Member) preferred by the appellant vide judgment and order dated 13.05.2024.

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10. That the Railway Advocate sent the certified copy of the order dated 13.05.2024 & 26.05.2017 along with his opinion letter dated 17.09.2024 with the opinion to challenge the order before this Hon'ble High Court.

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11. That the CLA/RCT/LKO after examining the entire facts and going through the judgments and orders submitted his report dated 14.10.2024.

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12. That the CLA1/C/NR submitted his report dated 21.10.2024 for approaching CCO/NR for approval for filing appeal/FAFO and the deponent submitted his report dated 21.10.2024 and Dy.CCM/CLM2/HQ submitted reports dated 29.10.2024.

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13. That subsequently the CCO/HQ/NR granted approval for filing appeal on 29.10.2024.

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14. That the DSGI, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow allotted the file to Shri Mahendra Kumar Mishra Advocate on 20.11.2024, for filing the FAFO and thereafter the FAFO was drafted and sent for vetting and subsequently after completing necessary formalities, the FAFO is being filed without any further delay.

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15. That thereafter the FAFO was drafted and sent for vetting and subsequently after completing necessary formalities, the FAFO is being filed without any further delay.

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16. That the delay in filing the FAFO against the impugned judgment and order is neither deliberate nor intentional but bona fide due to pendency of the Review Application."

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Learned counsel for the appellants submits that there is a delay of 1937 days in filing the instant appeal and the reasons for delay have been well explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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condonation of delay as well as in the supplementary affidavit. He further submits that the delay caused is not deliberate, but because of the bureaucratic set up at the end of the appellants. Hence, the delay so occasioned may be condoned.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent vociferously opposes the application for condonation of delay and submits that the instant belated appeal has been preferred after a delay of 1937 days, however, no sufficient cause has been given for such long delay neither any day to day explanation has been made in the appeal. The entire efforts shown in the affidavit is nothing but an eyewash and has been engineered to explain the delay in which they have clearly failed to do so. It was further submitted that the delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity at this belated stage.

¶45

Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record.

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A bare perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay in filing appeal as well as supplementary affidavit shows that an effort has been made by the appellants to justify the delay, however, rather than furnishing a satisfactory explanation, it merely shows an excuse.

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Before proceeding further, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is being reproduced herein-under :-

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" 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases .— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

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Explanation. —The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."

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A plain reading of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such prescribed time. The burden to prove sufficient cause lies on the appellant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Lanka Venkateswariu v State of A.P. reported in MANU/SC/0153/2011 deprecated the High Court in condoning the delay in filing of the appeal therein, that was occasioned not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer Inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders concerned, merely because the party seeking condonation happened to be the State.

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Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 has held that the State cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation and in the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned in the mechanical manner just because the Government or its instrumentality is a party before the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further went to hold that the department cannot take advantage of earlier decisions and claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology or making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the Modern Technologies being available. The law of limitation bounds everybody equally including the government.

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A similar view was iterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court placing reliance on Postmaster General (supra) held that a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down merely because the Government is involved. The relevant observations read as under: -

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“ 59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.”

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(Emphasis added)

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Odisha and ors. vs. Sunanda Mahakuda reported in (2021) 11 SCC 560 has held that the

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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leeway which was earlier enjoyed by the State and its instrumentalities on account of bureaucratic inefficiencies in matters of condonation of delay is no longer available in view of the technological advancement and the shift in jurisprudence as elucidated in Postmaster General (supra).

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Similarly, in State of U.P. v. Sabha Narain, reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court once again deprecated the tendency of State and its Instrumentalities to proceed on the assumption that they may approach the courts at their own convenience and sweet will, disregarding the period of limitation prescribed by statute, as though the Limitation statute does not apply to them. It held that the leeway which was at one point extended to the Government/public authorities on account of innate functional inefficiencies is no more the norm, particularly in the wake of the decision of Postmaster General (supra).

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This Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531 . The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:-

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"31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

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32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

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(emphasis added)

¶71

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. versus Karnataka Housing Board and others, 2025 SCC Online SC 1969 has held as follows:-

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"210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.

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* * *

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230. To permit condonation of delay to become a matter of course for the Government would have the deleterious effect of institutionalising inefficiency. It would, in substance, incentivise indolence and foster a culture where accountability for delay is eroded. If the State is assured that its lapses will invariably be excused under the rubric of "public interest," there would remain little incentive for its officers to act with vigilance or for its instrumentalities to streamline procedures for timely action. The consequence would not be the advancement of public interest but rather its betrayal.

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232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people's interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order.

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249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.

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* * *

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261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

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262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law."

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(emphasis added)

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In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the catena of judgments, it is clear that the State or its instrumentalities has to be treated at par with any individual, the law of limitation cannot be said to be different for them. While dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the vital test is whether “sufficient cause” has been made out. However, in cases involving bureaucratic inefficiency, the

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FAFOD No. 177 of 2024

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Court must examine whether there is a valid explanation for the delay or merely an excuse has been set up. Though the two concepts may sometimes overlap, there is a fine distinction between a genuine explanation and a mere excuse, which the appellant is required to establish satisfactorily.

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It is evident that the department was well aware of the impugned order dated 26.05.2017. No sufficient reasons for the delay has been explained for the entire delay period. The appellants have tried to justify the delay but the reasons given in the affidavit seems more like an excuse then a sufficient cause which hold them back from filing the present appeal within prescribed time of limitation law. The claim was filed on 05.06.2003 and the impugned judgement was passed on 26.05.2017 and thereafter a review was filed in the year 2019 and the same was dismissed on 13.05.2024. Thereafter the present belated First Appeal From Order was filed on 06.12.2024 and if the benefit of review period is given to the appellant, then also there is a delay in filing the present appeal without any sufficient explanation. Thus, the delay of 1937 days as pointed out by the Registry caused in filing the instant appeal by the appellants is barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to the satisfaction of this Court. Therefore, the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied, thus the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

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Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds that a bleak effort has been done to justify the delay, the delay as stated in the affidavit does not show sufficient cause and accordingly, the instant application for condonation of delay is rejected.

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Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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(Prashant Kumar,J.)

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April 27, 2026

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Arjun/-

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Digitally signed by :- ARJUN PRASAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Union of India Thru. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi v. Smt. Seema Sharma

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Union of India Thru. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi v. Smt. Seema Sharma

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