Dismissed¶77

Uday Bhan Singh v. Ram Raj Singh and 2 Others

Limitation – Condonation of delay – Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Allahabad HC26 Feb 2026SAPLD/22/2026

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Case brief

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What is this about?

condonation of delay; Section 5 Limitation Act; sufficient cause; 384 days delay; second appeal defective; procrastination by earlier counsel; explanation versus excuse; negligence and inaction; delay and laches; interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench; Prashant Kumar, J.; Uday Bhan Singh v. Ram Raj Singh; Civil Appeal No.44 of 2023 Raebareli.

What did the court decide?

The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant seeking condonation of delay, who must show that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence; courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference. ¶25

Uday Bhan Singh vs Ram Raj Singh and 2 Others — Allahabad HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the delay of 384 days in filing the second appeal against the judgment and order dated 19.09.2024 should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the sufficient cause shown by the appellant.

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Court's answer

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Ratio / Principle

On the touchstone of the Supreme Court dicta surveyed, the discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously based on the facts and circumstances of each case, and 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.

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Key takeaways

The reason shown by the appellant in the delay condonation affidavit is nothing but an eye wash, as no case is made out as to what prevented him from contesting the proceeding.ratio¶20
The delay of 384 days in filing the appeal is miserably barred by limitation: neither sufficient cause is shown in the application nor is the Court satisfied, so the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied and the belated delay cannot be condoned.ratio¶21
The affidavit does not show sufficient cause; accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is rejected.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Limitation — Condonation of delay — Section 5 of the Limitation Act — Second appeal filed against judgment and order dated 19.09.2024 of the Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Raebareli in Civil Appeal No.44 of 2023 with a delay of 384 days; the only explanation offered was procrastination by the earlier engaged counsel. After surveying Section 5 and Supreme Court authority (Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.; Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh; Maniben Devraj Shah; Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd; Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu; State of M.P. v. Perfect Sales; Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India; Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy; Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA)), the Court held that the burden of proving sufficient cause lies on the applicant, that the reasons must be real, bonafide and free of negligence, that courts must distinguish an 'explanation' from an 'excuse', and that gross negligence, deliberate inaction or casual indifference ought not to be condoned. Finding the affidavit explanation to be an eye wash with no case made out as to what prevented the appellant from contesting the proceeding, the Court held the delay miserably barred by limitation: the delay condonation application was rejected and the second appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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SECOND APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 22 of 2026

Uday Bhan Singh

.....Appellant(s)

Versus

Ram Raj Singh And 2 Others

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.....Respondent(s)

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Counsel for Appellant(s)	: Atul Kumar,	Pushpendra Chauhan
Counsel for Respondent(s)	:

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Court No. - 20

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HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

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C.M. Delay Condonation Application No.IA/1/2026

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The instant second appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 19.09.2024 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Raebareli in Civil Appeal No.44 of 2023.

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The office has reported a delay of 384 in filing the instant appeal.

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The reasons given for the delay in filing the application for condonation of delay are as follows :

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"1. That the undersigned could not file this Second appeal within period again order dated 19-09-2024 due to procrastination of earlier engaged counsel of appellant.

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2.That the Second Appeal being filed herewith after engaging new counsel."

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Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that there is a delay of 384 days in filing the instant appeal and the reason for delay has been well explained in the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay and the delay caused is not deliberate. Hence, the delay so occasioned may be condoned.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

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Before proceeding further, this Court would like to delve into various observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and also deems it appropriate to look into the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act , which is reproduced herein-under:-

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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" 5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—

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Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

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Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."

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A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly shows that an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such time. The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the appellant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real, bonafide and free of negligence. No doubt this expression has been constituted with justiceoriented approach so as to not punish an innocent litigant for circumstances beyond the control. However, the Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.

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According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28. Page 266 :-

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'605 Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.'…

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It has been emphasised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as far back in 1962 in the matter of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 , that even after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with the court. The court, despite establishment of a "sufficient cause" for various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon the bona fides of the party. The relevant extract is as follow :-

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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" 7. In construing Section 5(of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice.

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***

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12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone."

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(emphasis added)

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 705, has observed that the object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.

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The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. To assail the remedy, the person has to be vigilant and has to approach court within the prescribed limitations.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:—

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" 24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

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(emphasis added)

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 : AIR 2012 SC 1506 has held that unless reasonable and acceptable explanation of delay and sufficient cause is shown, the application need not be accepted.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant, a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of State of M.P. v. Perfect Sales, Gwalior, reported in AIR 2015 MP 161 , has categorically held that the appellant slept over the matter for 296 days and did nothing to assail the judgment of the subordinate court. It shows careless attitude on the part of the appellant and there being no sufficient cause shown, the delay can not be condoned.

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This Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:-

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"31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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"explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

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32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

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(emphasis added)

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :-

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"27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants."

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(emphasis added)

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On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of law the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), reported in (2024) 12 SCC 336 , has held as follow :-

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" 28. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

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(emphasis added)

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On the touchstone of the dictum noted above, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. The burden to prove 'sufficient cause' lies on the applicant, who is seeking condonation of delay and he has to prove sufficient cause that the reasons for not approaching the court are real and bonafide and free of negligence.

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On bare perusal of affidavit filed in support of the application for the condonation of delay shows that the reason shown by the appellant in the delay condonation application is nothing but an eye wash as no case is made out by the appellant as to what prevented him from contesting proceeding.

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Thus, the delay of 384 days caused in filing the instant appeal by the appellant is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to be the satisfaction of this Court. Therefore, the valid test for condonation of delay is not satisfied, thus the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

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Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court finds that a bleak effort has been done to justify the delay. The delay as stated in the

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SAPLD No. 22 of 2026

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affidavit does not show sufficient cause and accordingly, the instant application for condonation of delay is rejected .

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