Dismissed

Chandra Prakash and 4 Others v. Ranveer Singh

Allahabad HC14 Feb 2020SAPL/81/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In two second appeals challenging a decree for specific performance of sale agreements, the court upheld the lower courts' decisions. Rejecting claims of misrepresentation and lack of funds, the main judge found the appellants failed to prove unconscionable circumstances under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act or intent under Section 16 of the Registration Act.

What did the court decide?

Both appeals were dismissed and the prior decrees for specific performance were confirmed.

Chandra Prakash and 4 Others Vs Ranveer Singh — Specific Performance | Allahabad HC (2020)

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Court No. - 53

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Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 81 of 2018 Appellant :- Chandra Prakash And 4 Others Respondent :- Ranveer Singh Counsel for Appellant :- Vinod Kumar Upadhyay, ,Santosh Kumar Upadhyay Counsel for Respondent :- Pankaj Kumar Tyagi, ,P.K.Singh,R.P.Singh,Sanjay Kumar Pundir

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with

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Case :- SECOND APPEAL No. - 82 of 2018 Appellant :- Premwati And 3 Others Respondent :- Ranveer Singh Counsel for Appellant :- Vinod Kumar Upadhyay,Santosh Kumar Upadhyay Counsel for Respondent :- Pankaj Kumar Tyagi,Sanjay Kumar Pundir

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Hon'ble Vivek Agarwal,J.

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Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Upadhyay, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Sanjay Kumar Pundir, learned counsel for the respondent.

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These two appeals have been filed by the defendants before the trial court. It is an admitted fact that these appeals have been filed by the husband and wife respectively who had entered into an agreement to sale on 10.01.2005. It is also an admitted fact that plaintiff first filed a suit for permanent injunction bearing suit no.98 of 2006 and subsequently that suit was withdrawn and suit for specific performance was filed which has been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs.

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Learned counsel for the appellants submits that these second appeals have been admitted on the following substantial questions of law namely;

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“(i) Whether the learned trial court is justified in decreeing the suit ignoring the provisions of Section 20(2)(a)(b) of the Specific Relief Act ?

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(ii) Whether the impugned judgment dated 25.09.2017 passed by the appellate court and dated 23.05.2016 passed by the

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trial court is based on proper appreciation of facts, evidence on record and consideration of relevant provisions of law?

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(iii) Whether the agreement to sale dated 10.01.2005 was duly and validly executed and registered by the defendant Chandra Prakas / Premvati afterreceiving consideration/earnest money of Rs.2 lakhs and 3 lakhs respectively from the plaintiff?”

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Learned counsel for the appellants submits that both the courts below have erred in allowing the suits for specific performance overlooking certain basic facts namely; plaintiffs and defendants are known to each other and there was a relationship of trust between them. It is submitted that in the name of taking consent as a guarantor for a loan, plaintiffs were taken to the Office of SubRegistrar but through mis-representation, agreement to sale dated 10.01.2005 was got executed. It is further submitted that there is no finding of payment of earnest money by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It is submitted that there is no material on record to show that plaintiff could arrange a huge sum of Rs.5 lakhs involved in the two cases to be paid to the appellants and besides this, the trial court has erred in not appreciating the factum of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. It is also submitted that it will be evident from the Khasra Entry available on record as Annexure-1 for the ‘Fasli’ year 1396 that i.e. the only source of livelihood of the plaintiff-Chandra Prakash and, therefore, both husband and wife could not have decided to alienate their sole source of livelihood on the same day rendering them helpless.

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It is submitted that there was no reason for them to enter into an agreement as neither there was any need for money nor there was any such occasion like marriage of their child etc. necessitating the appellants to enter into an agreement to sale. It is further submitted that all the witnesses as have been produced by the plaintiff before the trial court are related to each other. It is further submitted that there is no evidence on issue no.3 adduced and appreciated by the

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trial court and since an alternative relief especially looking to the fact that appellants would not have deprived themselves of their bread and butter, by alienating the complete parcel of land recorded in their names, court should have been slow in exercising the grant of discretionary relief as provided under Section 20 of Specific Relief Act.

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Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the judgment of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in case of Ram Singh and others Vs. Sughar Singh as reported in 2011 (112) RD 164 wherein, drawing attention of this Court to para nos.44, 47 and 48, it is submitted that Apex Court has clearly observed that the relief for specific performance is discretionary in nature and is not given merely because it is legal to do so. It further lays down that in a suit for specific performance, the evidence and proof of the agreement must be absolutely clear and certain. It is submitted that in short, the grant of decree of specific performance is not automatic even if the agreement is found to be duly executed and the plaintiff ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement but such grant of decree is depending upon principles of justice, equity and good conscious.

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Further placing reliance on the judgment of supreme court in case of Azhar Sultana Vs. Ramamani and others as reported in 2009 (2) ARC 370 , It has been observed that grant of decree of specific performance of contract is discretionary and the conduct of the parties assumes great significance and, therefore, interest of justice would be subserved if the court directs for refund of the sale consideration. Further referring to para-48 wherein, Supreme Court has referred two judgments in case of M.K. Rangnathan Vs. Government of Madras as reported in AIR 1961 SC 104 has been held that "it is trite to note that the applicability or compliance of Section 20 of the Act is a pure legal question and as such can be permitted to be raised even in second appeal for the first time. Similarly, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Nanjappan Vs. Ramasamy and another as reported in 2015 (128) RD 627 .

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Placing reliance on para-12 of the judgment, it is submitted that Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 deals with grant of specific performance of contract which is a discretionary relief and Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. While doing so, the court should be guided by judicial principles of law.

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Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Veluyudhan Sathyadas Vs. Govindan Dakshyani as reported in 2002 (4) AWC 2767 (SC) wherein, placing reliance on para-8 of the judgment, it is submitted that mere establishment of the facts that the agreement for sale had been entered into is not sufficient to grant a decree for specific performance, and if the circumstances as indicated in Section 20 of the Act exists, in a particular suit, the court ought to certainly exercise its discretion in favour of the defendant and give lesser or limited relief to the plaintiff as indicated in Section 21 of the Act.

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In the light of the aforesaid judgments and the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is submitted that this second appeal deserves to be decreed and the impugned judgment and decree passed by the courts below be set aside.

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Sri Sanjay Kumar Pundir, counsel for the respondent in his turn submits that it is neither the pleading of the appellants nor any evidence has been led in this regard that the only source of livelihood of the appellants is agriculture. It is submitted and substantiated by reading over the portion of order passed by the learned appellate court that Chandra Prakash was essentially a contractor and was doing the work of contractorship. Taking this Court through document produced by the appellants namely Annexure-1, it is submitted that land in question is only 720 square mts. 720 sq. mts. of land is not sufficient to sustain the livelihood of a person through the mechanism of indulging in agricultural activities and, therefore, the plea of the appellants that they are agriculturists and their source of livelihood is

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being taken away without there being any reason is not made out. It is further submitted that there is a mention of Fasli 1396 on the document Annexure-1, when this translated to ‘Gregorian Calendar’, then it will come out to 1986. Thus, it is submitted that land in question is not only meagre i.e. 720 sq. mts. but it was recently acquired in the year 1986 and, therefore, it cannot be said that for times immemorial that has been the source of livelihood as has been made out by the learned counsel for the appellants.

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In view of such submissions, he has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Mst. Sugani Vs. Rameshwar Das and another as reported in 2006 (11) SCC 587 . It is submitted that in paragraph 24 and 25, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that when there are concurrent findings of fact, then it is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings are arrived at by last court of fact. It is true that lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject the witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but, even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so.

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In the aforesaid backdrop, three substantial questions of law framed by my predecessor on 24.01.2018 needs to be answered on the basis of the material available on record and the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents.

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Provisions contained in Section 20(2)(a)(b) are to be understood before arriving at a conclusion as to whether the courts were just and correct in exercising their discretion as to the decreeing of the suit of specific performance.

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Sub-section 1 of section 20 provides that the jurisdiction to decree, specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so as has been held by Supreme Court in case of Veluyudhan Sathyadas (supra).

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However, it also provides that the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Sub-section 2 deals with the contingencies under which a court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. These circumstances are namely; (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into or such that the contract though not voidable gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardships to the defendants whereas, its non-performance would involve no such hardships to the plaintiffs.

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When the material on record is tested on the touchstone of the provisions contained in Sub-section 2, Clause-a and clause-b of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, then it is apparent that defendant appellant has failed to make out a case so to render the agreement dated 10.01.2005 to be voidable or to show that it gives any unfair advantage to the plaintiffs over the defendant. In fact, appellant all through argued that relationship of trust has been misused. It is further submitted that there is no alternate source of livelihood and, therefore, why would a family of husband and wife would like to alienate their whole holding of land on the same date.

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However, it is evident and as has been pointed out by Sri Sanjay Pundir, counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that the land in question as contained in Annexure-1 as far as Chandra Prakash is concerned, is only 720 sq. mts. roughly translating to 7500 sq. fit.

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Similarly, there is evidence on record that Chandra Prakash was working as a contractor and, therefore, the plea of only source of livelihood has not been proved. It is for the defendant who had raised this plea to have proved it beyond reasonable doubt.

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However, it has come on record that plaintiff chose only to examine one witness namely Premwati. No other independant witness

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has been examined to prove this submission of the counsel for the appellant that there is no other source of livelihood.

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Similarly, Premwati in her cross examination has admitted as has been appreciated by the learned trial court that she and her husband were in the office of the Sub-registrar for a duration of 1-1/2 hours when these agreements were executed and these agreements too contain their photographs. It has also come on record that Chandra Prakash though initially canvassed himself to be an illiterate person is neither an illiterate person nor a person of limited mental profess but after having spent several years in the profession of contractorship was a man of reasonable wisdom to understand the difference between the document of guarantee for a bank loan and a document consisting of an agreement to sale.

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On the basis of such specific findings, which could not be rebutted by the appellant, it is apparent that first substantial question of law is to be decided against the appellants as appellants could not put forth any of the circumstances which would have persuaded the courts below to not to exercise the discretion to decree specific performance.

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Intermingled with this first substantial question of law is the second and third questions of law, as to whether, the courts below passed the judgment and decree based on proper appreciation of facts, evidence on record and whether the agreement was duly executed and registered by the defendant after receiving their consideration.

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As far as these two substantial questions of law are concerned, learned trial court as well as the first appellate court has referred to provisions contained in Section 16 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 giving rise to a bona fide appreciation of fact that if a document is registered, it has been duly executed, then its genuineness will not be put to doubt, unless proved otherwise by the party challenging the execution of such document.

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As has been discussed above, defendants-appellants have miserably failed to put their defence.

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It is though true that even in a second appeal, the substantial questions of law can be raised but the fact is that it cannot be in isolation and in utter disregard to the pleadings and evidence on record.

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When learned counsel for the appellant has failed to demonstrate any such facts from the pleadings or from the evidence on record that the agreement to sale was executed without accepting any consideration then for the failure of the defendant-appellant to discharge such burden, no premium can be attached in favour of the defendant appellant. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, these second and third questions also need to be answered in the following terms that the courts below did not commit any irregularity or illegality in appreciation of the facts, evidence on record and the relevant provisions of law so also in construing the agreement to sale to be an agreement executed bona fidely.

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Before parting with the judgment, it will be appropriate to answer one argument of the counsel for the appellants namely; there was no reason for them to have entered into such agreement to sale. Though, this submission has not been put forth by learned counsel for the plaintiff but it is borne out from the record that the defendant appellant was under debt and there was loan from the bank which was to be paid and that appears to be the reason for entering into an agreement to sale.

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In view of such submissions, both the appeals are dismissed.

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Parties to bear their own costs.

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Order Date :- 14.2.2020 Ashutosh

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Chandra Prakash and 4 Others v. Ranveer Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

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Chandra Prakash and 4 Others v. Ranveer Singh

Case brief

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