Smt. Kalpana @ Pinki and 3 Others v. State of U.P. and Another

Allahabad HC18 Dec 2019CRLR/4465/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This criminal revision was filed by Smt. Kalpana against the rejection of her discharge application in a 306 IPC case alleging abetment to suicide. The court held that the lower court did not err in refusing discharge as a prima facie case was made out against the accused and no abuse of process was evident.

What did the court decide?

The prayer for quashing or setting aside the order rejecting the discharge application is refused. The present revision is rejected.

Smt. Kalpana @ Pinki and 3 Others Vs State of… — Succession and Inheritance | Allahabad HC (2019)

A.F.R.

Court No. - 76

Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 4465 of 2019

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Revisionist :- Smt. Kalpana @ Pinki And 3 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Revisionist :- Radhey Shyam Yadav Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Pankaj Satsangior

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Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.

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Mr. Sikandar B. Kochar, learned counsel filed his vakalatnama on behalf of the opposite party no.2 today in the Court, is taken on record.

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Heard Mr. Rajiv Lochan Shukla, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Radhey Shyam Yadav, learned counsel for the revisionists, Mr. Sikandar B. Kochar and Mr. Pankaj Satsangi, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned A.G.A. for the State.

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This criminal revision under section 397/401 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the revisionists against the impugned order dated 01.10.2019 passed by Sessions Judge, court No. 9, Budaun in Sessions Trial No.148 of 2019 (State vs. Smt. Kalpana alias Rinki and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 95 of 2013, under Section 306 IPC, Police Station- Kotwali, District- Badaun, whereby the discharge application of the revisionists for discharging from above charge section, has been rejected.

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The facts in brief which are essential to be stated for adjudication of this revision are that the present first information report has been lodged by the opposite party no.2 Manoj Kumar against the revisionists on 27.02.2013 through an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. with regard to the alleged incident dated 28.01.2013, which was registered as Case Crime No. 95 of 2013, under Section

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306 IPC, Police Station-Kotwali, District-Badaun. As per the allegations made in the first information report, the first informant Manoj Kumar (opposite party no.2) along with his younger brother, namely, Praveen Kumar (now deceased) stays together at their ancestral home at Mohalla Jagipura, Budaun and both of them looked after the agricultural work as well as brick kiln. The first informant's younger brother, namely, Praveen Kumar got married on 30.04.2012 with the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki and after marriage, the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki along with her father, namely, Narendra Singh Rathore, her uncle, namely, Umesh Rathore, her mother, namely, Smt. Jaiwanti had started building pressure upon Praveen Kumar (now deceased) to live separately from his family members, on account of which, relations between Praveen Kumar (husband) and the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki (wife) became strained and led to frequent fight between the two. The first informant Manoj Kumar along with his wife, namely, Anita tried to mediate between them. On repeated pressure of family members of the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki, Praveen Kumar (now deceased) did not agree to live separately or have partition of his house, a fight took place between the two on 27.01.2013 and then the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki called her parents. Thereafter, her father, namely, Narendra Singh Rathore, her mother, namely, Smt. Jaiwanti, her uncle, namely, Umesh Rathore came and threatened Praveen Kumar (now deceased) and the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki declined to stay at her matrimonial house and left the place by threatening Praveen Kumar (now deceased) to institute a false first information report with regard to dowry. At the relevant point of time, maternal brother of the opposite party no.2, namely, Sanjeev and brother-in-law of the opposite party no.2, namely, Santosh also arrived and tried to persuade the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki and her family members but the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki, without paying

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attention to the request made by Sanjeev and Santosh, left the matrimonial house with her bag and baggage, jewellery and other articles to stay with her parents. Subsequently, on 28.01.2013, the opposite party no.2 Manoj Kumar (first informant) received an information that the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki has instituted a false case of demand of dowry against her husband Praveen Kumar (now deceased) and his family members. On hearing the same, Praveen Kumar (now deceased) went into depression and was worried about his family members who would go to jail and was also worried about reputation of his family in the society, in this adverse circumstance, he was not in a position to survive, although all the family members consoled him but he went to his room. On the next morning, when Praveen Kumar (now deceased) did not wake up, the family members went up stairs and found that Praveen Kumar (now deceased) had committed suicide by hanging himself from the fan. Thereafter, information about the said incident was given to the concerned police station immediately, and then, last rites were performed on 29.01.2013. Thereafter, on 30.01.2013, without delay, the opposite party no.2 went to the concerned police station for lodging the first informant report but no attention was given. Subsequently, the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. moved by the opposite party no.2 against the revisionists before the concerned court below. Thereafter, the present first information report was lodged on 27.02.2013.

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It has been contended by the learned counsel for the revisionists that Praveen Kumar (now deceased) was married on 30.04.2012 with the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki after giving a sufficient dowry as per the status, however, elder brother-in-law, namely, Manoj Kumar (first informant), his wife, namely, Anita and mother-in-law were not satisfied with dowry received in the marriage. On various occasions, the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki was assaulted by her husband

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(Praveen Kumar) due to which, she suffered serious injuries. However, she did not lodge any complain or F.I.R. to save the reputation of the family. After some time, on 27.01.2013 at about 8 O'clock, in the evening, she was again badly beaten by her husband (Praveen Kumar) and his family members as a result of which she suffered various injuries and was also forced to leave the house. Being thrown out of the house, she called her father, mother and uncle, who reached her matrimonial house and she went along with them to her parents' place. In such compelling circumstances, there was no option to the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki to leave her matrimonial house and stay at her parents' place. For the aforesaid incident, when she was beaten on 27.01.2013, the revisionist no.1 instituted a first information report bearing Case Crime No. 32 of 2013, under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and ¾ D.P. Act against Praveen Kumar (husband now deceased), Manoj Kumar (borther-in-law), Anita (Jeth) and Resha Devi (mother-in-law).

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It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the revisionists that after lodging of the aforesaid first information report, the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki was sent to District Hospital, Budaun for examination on 28.01.2013 at about 01:00 p.m. A copy of injury report dated 28.01.2013 has been appended as Annexure no.4 to this application. Perusal of which goes to show that she has suffered a number of injuries on account of assault made by the family members of her husband.

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It has further been contended by learned counsel for the revisionists that after lodging of the present first information report by the opposite party no.2, the investigation has been made by the Investigation Officer. During investigation, the statement of Manoj Kumar, Anita, Ashok Kumar, Arvind Lal, Sanjeev Kumar and Santosh were recorded and the charge-sheet was submitted against the revisionists. However, the Investigating Officer has not considered the

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first information report instituted by the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki on 28.01.2013 and the injuries suffered by the revisionist no.1, which goes to show that she was victim of the illegality as committed by Praveen Kumar (now deceased) and his family members. Aggrieved by the charge sheet, the revisionists approached before this Court by means of Cri. Misc. Application No. 35330 of 2013 for quashing the entire proceedings initiated on the basis of F.I.R. dated 27.02.2013 bearing Case Crime No. 95 of 2013 under Section 306 IPC wherein vide order dated 14.12.2018, the Court was pleased to disposed of the aforesaid application with the direction that the revisionists may appear and surrender before the court below within 30 days from that day and apply for bail. Thereafter, the revisionists were granted bail by the court below. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the revisionists that the copy of post mortem report of the deceased Praveen Kumar also shows that there were no injuries on the body of Praveen Kumar (deceased). It was also testified that he had suffered no injury prior to his death.

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It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the revisionists that the real facts is that since father of Manoj Kumar (first informant) and Praveen Kumar (deceased) had expired. Manoj Kumar (first informant) and his wife Anita wanted to grab the property of Praveen Kumar, therefore, Manoj Kumar (first informant) along with his wife Anita exerted tremendous pressure upon Praveen Kumar (deceased) and tried to create differences between the revisionist no.1 Kalpana @ Rinki and her husband Praveen Kumar (deceased) for the last few days, due to which Praveen Kumar committed suicide.

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It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the revisionists that the discharge application moved by the revisionists before the concerned court below on 25.05.2019, which has been rejected by order dated 01.10.2019 in an unjustified, illegal and

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arbitrary. While deciding the discharge application, the court concerned has not appreciated the points raised by the revisionists in the discharge application and failed to consider the documents available in the case dairy.

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It has further been contended by learned counsel for the revisionists that there is absolutely no evidence on record about any instigation/ abetment on the part of the revisionists to instigate the commission of suicide by the deceased Praveen Kumar (husband of the revisionist no.1). Hence, the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the revisionists has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar & Others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor reported in 2013 (3) SCC 330 wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that only the material placed on record by the prosecution, could be gone into at the time of framing charges. And if, on the basis of the said material, the commission of the alleged offence was prima facie made out, the charge was to be framed. At the stage of framing of charges, it was submitted, that the requirement was not to determine the sufficiency (or otherwise) of evidence to record a conviction. The High Court can exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or suo motu to prevent abuse of process of law and can rely on material produced by the accused if suspicion is shown as the allegations in complaint and the accused may not be discharged. Paragraph no. 17 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar (Supra) read as follows:-

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“17. A perusal of the order of the High Court would reveal that the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, had primarily relied on certain observations made in the judgment rendered by this Court in Satish Mehra Vs. Delhi Administration, (1996) 9 SCC 766 :-

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“15. But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the

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case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work-load.

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If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself” Madan Lal Kapoor (the respondent-complainant), before the High Court, had relied upon the judgment in State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 , to contend that the judgment relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, having been overruled, had resulted in an erroneous conclusion. For the same proposition, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Suresh Kumar Tekriwal Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 12 SCC 278 . On behalf of the complainant, reliance was also placed on the decision in State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 , to contend, that only the material placed on record by the prosecution, could be gone into at the time of framing charges. And if, on the basis of the said material, the commission of the alleged offence was prima facie made out, the charge(s) was/were to be framed. At the stage of framing of charges, it was submitted, that the requirement was not to determine the sufficiency (or otherwise) of evidence to record a conviction. For this, reliance was placed on State of M.P. Vs. Mohanlal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 , wherein this Court had concluded, that the requirement was a satisfaction, that a prima facie case was made out. On behalf of Madan Lal Kapoor, reliance was also placed on State of A.P. Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522 , to contend that at this stage, meticulous examination of the evidence was not called for.”

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It has further been contended by learned counsel for the revisionists that in the present case, the evidence produced by the revisionists has not been contested or refuted by the opposite party no.2 and also there is nothing on record to show that the commission of suicide was a result of part of revisionists. Therefore, the charge framed under Section 306 IPC against the revisionists is prima facie made out.

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Learned counsel for the revisionists has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Harshendra Kumar D vs. Rebatilata Koley Etc reported in 2011 AIR (SC) 1090 . The paragraph nos. 21 and 22 of the aforesaid judgment read as follows:-

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“21. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at

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the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents - which are beyond suspicion or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the matter at prima facie stage.

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22. Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a person. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than dragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave error in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to appellant's resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these documents been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that the appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company............”

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It has further been contended by learned counsel for the revisionists that in view of the settled law as laid down in the aforesaid judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned order dated 01.10.2019 passed by the court below is not sustainable in the eye of law and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.

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Mr. Sikandar B. Kochar, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 as well as Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned A.G.A. for the State, per contra, have vehementally opposed the submissions as urged by the learned counsel for the revisionists by submitting that no case for discharge is made out as the discharge application has been rightly rejected by the court below. While passing the impugned order dated 01.10.2019, the court below concerned has considered all the points raised by the revisionists as well as documents available on record. It has further been submitted that at the initial stage, it is the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted

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therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf and on the basis of which, the court is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. To bolster the contention, the learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Tamil Nadu vs. J. Doraiswamy and Others reported in (2019) 4 SCC 149 wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that while considering petition for discharge, courts cannot act as appellate court and start appreciating evidence by finding out inconsistencies in statements of witness and also consideration of record for discharge purpose is different from consideration of record while deciding the appeal. The paragraph no. 15 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case read as follows:-

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“15. While considering the case of discharge sought immdeiately after the charge-sheet is filed, the court cannot become an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistency in the statements of witnesses as was done by the High Court in the impugned order running in 19 pages. It is not legally permissible.”

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Mr. Sikandar B. Kochar, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 as well as Mr. Amit Singh Chauhan, learned A.G.A. for the State, therefore, submits that in view of the settled law as laid down in the aforesaid judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned order passed by the court below dated 01.10.2019 cannot be interfered with by this Court and the present revision is liable to be rejected, as the court below has rightly rejected the discharge application filed by the revisionists.

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I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the revisionists, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State as well as have gone through the records of the present application along with the impugned order.

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It shall be advantageous to refer to the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh 1977 (4) SCC 39 which are as follows :-

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"4. Under S. 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and State by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at the initial stage, the duty of the Court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227 or u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing ", so enjoined by s. 227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which …................................... (b) in exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused," as provided in S. 228.

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Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at this stage of deciding the matter under s. 227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order

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under S. 227 or S. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under S. 228 and not under S. 227.

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Aforesaid case was again referred to in another judgemnt of the Hon'ble Apex Court's in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil Kumar Bhunja reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 52 and the Hon'ble Apex Court proceeded to observe as follows:

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" 18. It may be remembered that the case was at the stage of framing charges; the prosecution evidence had not yet commenced. The Magistrate had, therefore, to consider the above question on a general consideration of the materials placed before him by the investigating police officer. At this stage, as was pointed out by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”

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In yet another case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh reported in AIR 2009 SC 887 the Hon'ble Apex Court had the occasion to reflect upon the scope of adjudication and its ambit at the time of framing of the charge and also about the scope to consider the material produced by the accused at that stage. Following extract may be profitably quoted to clarify the situation : -

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" 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can be framed also on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in state of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as under :

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" 23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case holding that the trial Court has powers to consider even materials which the accused

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may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided."

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The following observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Choudhary reported in AIR 2009 SC 9 also reiterated the same position of law :-

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" 10. After analyzing the terminology used in the three pairs of sections it was held that despite the differences there is no scope for doubt that at the stage at which the Court is required to consider the question of framing of charge, the test of a prima facie case to be applied.

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11. The present case is not one where the High Court ought to have interfered with the order of framing the charge. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, even if there is a strong suspicion about the commission of offence and the involvement of the accused, it is sufficient for the Court to frame a charge. At that stage, there is no necessity of formulating the opinion about the prospect of conviction. That being so, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside. The appeal is allowed.”

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In fact while exercising the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or while wielding the powers under Section 226 of the Constitution of India the quashing of the complaint can be done only if it does not disclose any offence or if there is any legal bar which prohibits the proceedings on its basis. The Apex Court decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC(Cr.) 426 make the position of law in this regard clear recognizing certain categories by way of illustration which may justify the quashing of a complaint or charge sheet.

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In the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, referred to above, it is explicitly clear that the discharge application to discharge the revisionists from the charge framed under section 306 IPC is cryptic and does not stand the test laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court.

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The submissions made by the learned counsel for the revisionists call for adjudication on pure questions of fact which may be adequately adjudicated only upon by the trial court and while doing so

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even the submissions made on points of law can also be more appropriately gone into by the trial court in this case. This Court does not deem it proper, and therefore, cannot be persuaded to have a pretrial before the actual trial begins. A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial. But it shall suffice to observe that the perusal of the complaint, the summoning order and also all other the material available on record makes out a prima facie case against the accused at this stage and this Court does not find any justifiable ground to set aside the impugned order refusing the discharge of the accused. This court has not been able to persuade itself to hold that no case against the accused has been made out or to hold that the charge is groundless.

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The prayer for quashing or setting aside the impugned order is refused as I do not see any illegality, impropriety and incorrectness in the impugned order or the proceedings under challenge. There is absolutely no abuse of court's process perceptible in the same. The present matter also does not fall in any of the categories recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court which might justify interference by this Court in order to upset or quash them.

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The present revision lacks merit and is, accordingly, rejected .

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(Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)

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Order Date :- 18.12.2019 JK Yadav

Smt. Kalpana @ Pinki and 3 Others v. State of U.P. and Another

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Smt. Kalpana @ Pinki and 3 Others v. State of U.P. and Another

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