Allowed

Megh Raj Saini v. Wild Life Institute and Anr.

Uttarakhand HC12 Jul 2019WPMS/95/2010

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed two writ petitions challenging industrial awards that terminated the services of field assistants at the Wild Life Institute of India. Relying on a prior judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court held that the termination violated Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and ordered reinstatement, dismissing the lack of wage vouchers.

What did the court decide?

The impugned awards are quashed; petitioners are directed to be reinstated as Field Assistant forthwith and paid salary regularly thereafter.

Megh Raj Saini Vs Wild Life Institute… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Uttarakhand HC (2019)

¶1

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

¶2

Writ Petition No. 95 of 2010 (M/S)

¶3

Megh Raj Saini .…Petitioner.

¶4

Versus

¶5

Wild Life Institute of India and another .… Respondents.

¶6

With Writ Petition No. 96 of 2010 (M/S)

¶7

Noor Hasan .…Petitioner. Versus Wild Life Institute of India and another .… Respondents.

¶8

Present :

¶9

Mr. Aditya Kumar Arya, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, Advocate for the respondents.

¶10

Dated: 12th July, 2019

¶11

JUDGMENT

¶12

Hon’ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.

¶13

These are two Writ Petitions, being Writ Petition No. 95 of 2010, Megh Raj Saini Vs. Wild Life Institute of India and another and Writ Petition No. 96 of 2010, Noor Hasan Vs. Wild Life Institute of India and another.

¶14

In the Writ Petitions, in question, the petitioners have challenged the award dated 7^th October, 2009 and 6^th October, 2009 respectively, which have been rendered by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Lucknow in ID No. 14 of 2004, between Shri Megh Raj Saini Vs. the Director Wildlife Institute of India and ID No. 12 of 2004, Shri Noor Hasan Vs. the Director Wildlife Institute of India respectively.

¶15

¶16

In pursuance to the Reference, which was made by the Government of India, while exercising its powers under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-Section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a Reference was made of a dispute in relation to the petitioner to the effect that “whether the action of the Wild Life Institute Management in terminating the services of Shri Megh Raj Saini S/o Shri Desh Raj Saini, Field Assistant, w.e.f. 30.09.2000 instead of regularizing is legal and justified ? If not, to what relief he is entitled ?”

¶17

Identical reference has been made in Adjudication Case No. 11 of 2004, between Shri Ram Saran Singh Vs. the Director, Wild Life Institute of India, wherein, yet again, the reference was made by the Government of India on 14^th January, 2004, while exercising its posers under Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-Section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Here too, in this case, the question which was referred to be adjudicated was identical to the one as already mentioned above, as to whether the termination of services of the petitioner w.e.f. 30.09.2000 was just and valid and to what relief of he is entitled.

¶18

Being aggrieved against the award as rendered by the Industrial Tribunal on 30^th September, 2009, in Adjudication Case No. 11 of 2004, the petitioner of the said Writ Petition, preferred a Writ Petition No. 54 of 2010 (M/S), Ram Saran Singh Vs. Wild Life Institute of India and others, which was decided by the judgment of this Court as rendered on 13^th March, 2018. Consequent to the judgment, the Writ Petition was allowed and the impugned award under challenge in the said Writ Petition was set aside and the termination order of the petitioner was too set aside since having been issued not in compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, by the said judgment dated 13.08.2018, since apparently, the petitioner has not worked for the period after their termination of services and, thereafter, it was held out by this Court

¶19

¶20

that the petitioner would not be entitled for any backwages as there cannot be any salary for the period for which, the petitioner has not worked and rendered his services. Relevant part of the judgment Ram Saran Singh (Supra) is quoted hereunder :-

¶21

“On an overall scrutiny of the factual backdrop and the evidence, the controversy which is now required to be considered by this Court, boils down on two major issues :-

¶22

As to whether their existed relationship of employer and employee and,

¶23

Whether the petitioner has worked as a workman for a period of 240 days in the preceding 12 months which is the condition precedent under the law.

¶24

As to whether the act of the respondent of dismissing services of petitioner violated under Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act.

¶25

At least, at this stage two status which are very clear are one that the respondent is an industry and admittedly the petitioner is a workman. For the purposes to determine as to whether there existed a relationship of employer or employee, it has been a consistent stand taken by the Director, Wild Life Institute in the writ petition, as well as, before the Labour Court to the effect that the petitioner was engaged as a Casual Field Assistant in 1991 to assist research work, meaning thereby, at least, the induction of petitioner is said to have been made by the Director is an admitted fact. The purpose and the places where they have to discharge the work is an another aspect which too was regulated by respondent, it was not the choice of researchers and petitioner with whom he had to work as Field Assistant. In the absence of there being a contract to the contrary in

¶26

¶27

the appointment, there was no termination of services as a Daily Wager Field Assistant which could be said that it was co-terminus to the Project attached to the research workers. Thus, the Labour Court observed that the projects being carried out by the Wild Life Institute was the project which was under the control of the Institute, which was being effectively supervised by them reflect the control of respondent on functioning of Field Assistant and researchers.

¶28

The view taken by the Labour Court for not accepting the contention of the petitioner that he is a workman of the respondents, is merely on the premise that the petitioner had not filed any original documents to support his contention. Non filing of original documents will not create any impediment, more particularly, when the stand of the Director taken in the writ petition as well as in the affidavit filed it is admitted fact that the petitioner was engaged as a Daily Wager by the Wild Life Institute, though he worked with the researchers. This leads to an inference that there exists a relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the respondent. And also because of the fact that salary bills of petitioner was verified by the officers of the respondents.

¶29

The scrutiny of the statement made by the respondents’ witnesses, wherein, they have made an effort to deny that the petitioner is a workman in the Institute and alleging that he was a casual labour in the Institute and not a Daily Wager and was not paid wages by the Institute itself is contrary to the stand taken by the

¶30

¶31

Director in the writ petition before this Court when a plea of alternative remedy was raised for seeking an appropriate direction to the petitioner to approach the Industrial Tribunal. The Labour Court has mis-read the two letters which were admittedly written by Dr. S.P. Goel, the Scientist (F Category), i.e. the letter dated 15^th November, 1999 and 16^th November, 1999 addressed to the Director, National Parks, who was also a management witness who admits that the petitioner was working and was having an effective participation in the work of the Wild Life Institute.

¶32

In that view of the matter, the writ petition partly succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award dated 30^th September, 2009 is quashed. The termination order dated 30/09/2000, is set aside since having been issued in non compliance of Section 25–F of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal Act, 1967. However, since, apparently the petitioner has not worked from 1^st October, 2000, onwards till the date of passing of the present judgment, he would not be entitled for any backwages as there cannot be any salary for the period for which he has not worked and rendered his services.

¶33

Subject to the above observation, the writ petition partly stands allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into services forthwith as Field Assistant and pay his salary regularly thereafter.

¶34

Subject to above, writ petition succeeds partly.

¶35

No order as to costs.”

¶36

¶37

The said judgment dated 13^th March, 2018, which was rendered under identical circumstances, was challenged by the Wild Life Institute of India by preferring an SLP, being SLP No. 17 of 2019, which was decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 8^th February, 2019. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dismissing the SLP had made an observation that the impugned order will not be treated as a precedent. Relevant part of the Supreme Court judgment reads as under :-

¶38

“Delay condoned.

¶39

In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order (s) passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly dismissed.

¶40

However, the impugned order (s) shall not be treated as a

¶41

precedent.

¶42

Pending interlocutory application (s), if any, is / are disposed of.”

¶43

In the Writ Petitions, in question, almost an identical facts and situation has arisen, wherein, the entire proceedings of termination which has taken place by the order dated 30^th September, 2009, is common except for their respective date of indutcment into the services as Field Assistant. However, in this case, yet again, if the award is scrutinized in the light of the pleadings, there is non compliance of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, the learned counsel for the respondents has tried to draw a distinction in the present writ petition from view point that as far as the present Writ Petitions are concerned, it is different from the view point that in view of the observation, which was made in para 29 of the impugned award under challenge in the Writ Petition, their case was that the workman himself in his cross examination has admitted that he has not filed any proof of working continuously under the Institute w.e.f. the respective date of the appointment till the date of their original termination, i.e. 30^th September, 2000. He further wants to specify on

¶44

¶45

the observation which has been made in para 29 to the effect that there is no proof on record with regard to the working of the petitioners for the period more than 240 days in a calendar year nor the petitioners had proved by placing any vouchers by brining them on record in order to show that they were paid wages in lieu of the services rendered by them. Para 29 of the award 07.10.2009, passed in Writ I.D.No. 14 of 2004, reads as under :-

¶46

“In the present case, it is not the case of the workman that any appointment letter was ever issued to him. He himself has admitted during cross-examination that he has not filed any proof of working continuously under the Institute from July, 1987 till the date of his alleged termination i.e. 30.09.2000. He has categorically admitted that there is no proof on record as regard working for more than 240 days under the Institute. He has not produced any vouchers on record of getting wages by the Institute directly. He has also not produced original of the certificate said to be given by Director, Wild Life Instituted of India and Principal Investigator, Dr. A.J.T. John Singh. He has also not produced original Daily Working Diary said to be maintained by him. In absence of originals there is no evidentiary value of said documents, particularly, when the management has denied their genuineness.”

¶47

He further submits that in view of the findings, which has been recorded in the said paragraph, there is no proof which has been placed on record by the petitioners to show that the Director, Wild Life Institute of India had issued any original certificate giving them status of that being an employee of the Wild Life Institute.

¶48

He further made reference to the pleadings, which has been raised in the written statement, which he has preferred before the Labour Court and, in particularly, reference has been made to the pleading raised in para 1-C of the written statement to the effect that the researchers, who undertake the research projects, under the

¶49

¶50

various schemes floated by the Wild Life Institute for the Government of India, since the said scheme itself has come to an end on 30^th September, 2000, and the funds and financial aid, which was payable towards the project, against which the petitioners were appointed, since has ceased to continue, the petitioners too, who were appointed in the specified project, which was taken by the researchers, will loose their right of continuance because their nature of appointment was purely on a temporary basis and it was not a regular appointment and was co terminus with the project for which it was made and the nature of appointment was only for the purposes to assist the researchers in conducting their work.

¶51

But still, the fact remains that though the learned counsel for the respondents had tried to draw a distinction by making the reference to the pleading raised in para 1-C of the written statement to the effect that the appointment of the petitioners was co terminus to the period of the project, and also he has tried to draw a distinction to the effect that the appointment of the petitioners was not creating any lien for them to continue into the services because it was only an attachment which was made with the researchers, who were conducting the research work and as per his version, the financial liability could not be borne by the Wild Life Institute by permitting the petitioners to continue to serve because their payment was absolutely dependent upon the financial assistance, which was extended by the Government of India for the various projects which were required to be undertaken by the Wild Life Institute. Though this may be a fact, which is there on record sought to be pleaded but considering the period for which, the petitioners have been engaged by the respondents although not born out from the records and also considering the fact that under almost on an identical circumstances, the Writ Petition has already been allowed by this Court by the judgment dated 13^th March, 2018, and the said judgment has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, vide its judgment dated 8^th February, 2019, as rendered in SLP No. 17 of 2019, this Court is of

¶52

¶53

the view that since the factual backdrop and the circumstances prevailing in Writ Petition No. 54 of 2010 (M/S) as decided on 13^th March, 2018, since being exactly identical and based on same facts and circumstances to those of the present Writ Petitions, because they have been even adjudicated upon by the Central Industrial Tribunal by the award dated 6^th October, 2009, and 7^th October, 2009, the matter would stand covered by the aforesaid judgment.

¶54

Consequently, though the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the dismissal of the SLP will not create a precedence, but a very peculiar situation, which has arisen is owing to the fact that the circumstances and all the events which has followed in the two Writ Petitions being identical and the same circumstances prevailed in these two writ petitions also, hence the Court of law cannot take a different view in extension of the benefit which has been awarded to one of the workman, whose services were identically dispensed with under identical circumstances by the impugned order dated 30^th September, 2000, which is common to all the petitioners. This Court with all humility at command is of the opinion that the petitioners of this Writ Petitions cannot be given a different treatment as would vitiate the basic norms of dispensation of justice and equality before law and Courts.

¶55

Consequently, these Writ Petitions too would stand allowed in terms of the judgment dated 13^th March, 2018, as rendered in Writ Petition No. 54 of 2010 (M/S), Ram Saran Singh Vs. Wild Life Institute of India and others.

¶56

(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) 12.07.2019

¶57

Shiv

Megh Raj Saini v. Wild Life Institute and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Megh Raj Saini v. Wild Life Institute and Anr.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Vishal Mani Uniyal Vs Smt Kushla Devi

Afzal Alias Sonu Vs State of Uttarakhand

Saurabh Joshi Vs State of Uttarakhand

Parminder Vs State Of Uttarakhand and Another

Noor Hasan Vs Wild Life Institute and Anr.

Shankar Vs Mumtaz Hussain and Others