Allowed

Kingshuk Nag v. Income Tax Officer

Telangana HC7 Aug 2025WP/23348/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court quashed a notice under Section 148A and 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as violating Section 151A and the faceless assessment scheme. The Bench allowed the writ petition on jurisdictional grounds but reserved the right on the procedural flaw, subjecting the disposal to the outcome of pending SLPs before the Supreme Court.

What did the court decide?

The impugned notices under Sections 148-A and 148 are set aside; consequential orders are quashed; writ allowed subject to Supreme Court decision on pending SLPs.

Kingshuk Nag Vs Income Tax Officer — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | Telangana HC (2025)

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[^348e ]

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction)

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THURSDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO

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WRIT PETITION NO: 23348 OF 2025

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Between:

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Kingshuk Nag, S/o Late Dr. S. K. Nag, Aged About 66 years, Occ;Journalist, R/o.C903, Lansum Etania Apartments, On Way To Financial District Hyderabad.

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.....PETITIONER

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AND

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lncome Tax Officer, Ward 6 (1), Hyderabad, Telangana.

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Assessment Unit, National Faceless Assessment Centre, lncome Tax Department, I,4inistry of Finance, Room No.401, 2nd Floor, E-Ramp, Jawaharlal Nehru Staoium, Deihi, 1 10 003.

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....,RESPONDENTS

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Petitron Under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or directron more particularly one in the nature of WRIT OF MANDATVUS holding that the notice issued (JAO) by Respondent No.1 under Section 148 Dated. 28.03.2025 with DIN and Notice No. lTBAiASTiSi14812024-2511075205231(1) for the Assessment Year 2023-24 as arbitrary, iliegal, bad in law. void ab initio, violation of principles of natural^justice apart from violation of Articles 14, 19 (1Xg) and 265 of constitution of lndra apart from being violative of provisions of Section 148A and contrary to the circular issued by CBDT and provisions of Section^'151A of the Act, and consequently set aside the order passed by under Section 148 Dated. 28.03.2025 with DIN and

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Notice No. ITBA/AST/S/'14812024-2511075205231(1) for the Assessment Year 2023-24 and all consequential proceedings pursuant there to.

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l.A.NO:1 OF 2025

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Petition Under Section 15'1 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Cour, may be pleased to suspend the operation of the notice issued by the Respondent No.1 u/s 148 of the Act, dt. 28.03.2025 for the assessment year 2023-24 with DIN and Notice No. ITBA/AST/S/'14812024-251107 5205231(1 ) and all conseq,-rential proceedings thereto.

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Counsel for the Petitioner : Ms. NALAGAMA SUCHETHA SREE

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Counsel forthe Respondents : Ms. BOKARO SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC rNcoME TAX)

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The Court made the following ORDER

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THE HONOURABLE SRT JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND T}IE HO}JOUP.ABLE SIiI JUSTiCE SUDDALA CHALAPATHI RAO

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wRIT PETITION No.23318 OF- 2025

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ORDER,^(pcr llon'blc Sri .Justicc ,suddala Chulupurhi Rutl

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Heard Ms. Nalagama Suchctha Srcc. lcarned counsel lbr thc petitioner, Ms. B-Sapna Reddy, learr.red Senior Standing Counsel for the lncome Tax Department for the respondents. Perused the record.

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This is a writ petition where the proceedings are either chalienged to the notices which were issued under Section 148,{ and 148 olthe lncome Tax Act. 1961^(lor short^'the Act')or the assessment orders those have been passed under Section 147 of the Act which have been assailed.

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This writ petition is being taken up today only on one of the grounds, that the notices issued under Section l48A of the Act and the subsequent initiation of proceedings under Section 148 of the Act by the^{jurisdictional} Assessing Officer, whereas in terms of the amendment that was brought to the Income Tax Act by way of Finance Act, 2O2l w.e.f., 01.04.2021 onwards,^proceedings

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under Section l48A of the Act as also under Section 148 of the Act nrrolrt to have also heen issrred rnd l"'--"''nrnceetlo,rⁱⁿ ll ft1r!.,.q lllanner.

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The contention of the petitioner ts that the issue ol proceedings being in violation of the Finance Act. 2021 i.e.. the impugned notices under Section 148,{ and Section 148 of the Act not being issued in a faceless manner, have already been dealt with and decided by this Court in the case of KANKANALA RAVINDRA REDDY vs. INCOME-TAX OFFICERT dccided on 14.09.2023 whereby a batch of writ petitions were allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 148A as als<l under Section 148 otthe Act were held to be bad with consequential reiiefs on the ground of it being in violation of the provisions of Section l5lA of the Act read with Notification 1812022 dated 29.03.1022.^'fhe said judgment passed by this Court has also been subsequcntly tbllowed in a large number of writ petitions which were allor.r'ed on similar tc rnts

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' l(2023)^{I 56} taxrnann.com 178 (Telangana)l

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Down the line, we find that the same issue lras also been Cecicled against the^R.r'/enue hv various I Iieh Coufts i.e., by the Bombay High C-'ourt in the case ol HIIXAWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD., vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX & OTHERS2, Gauhati High Courl in the case of RAM NARAYAN SAH vs. UNION OF INDIAT, Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case oIJATINDER SINCH BANGU vs. UNION OF INDlAl, and'I'elangana High Court in the case ol SRI VENKATARAMANA REDDY PATLOOLA vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX5 rvhere the issue r.r,as in respect of intemational taxation, Bombay High Court in the case of ABHIN ANILKUMAR SHAH vs. INCON'IE TAX OFFICER,

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INTERNATIONAL TAXATION('which is again on international taxation and central circle, Lligh Court ol- I{irnachal Pradesh in the case of GOVIND SINGH vs. INCOME TAX OFFICERT, Gujarat High Courl in the case of MANSUKHBHAI

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'lzoz+1464^{rrR 430 (uonr)}

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'[(2024)^{156 taxmann.corn 478(Gauhati)l}

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^ [(2024)^{165 taxmann.coruI I 5 (Pun jab} &^I laryana)l

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'12024) 167 taxmann.com^:l I I^(Tclangana)l "12024)¹⁶⁶ taxmann.com 679^(Bombay)l

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'12024)^{165 taxmann.com} l l3^(Hinrachal l'radesh) |

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DAHY.{BHAI RADADIYA vs. INCOME TAx OFFICER,

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WARI, -3(J)(5r^, .,. -^I ihalkanci High Coult in rire ea.c oi SHYAlli SUNDAR SAW vs. UNION OF INDIAe, Rajasthan High Court in the casr' ot'SHARDA DEVI CHHAJER vs. IIJCOME TAX OFFICER & ANOTHER and batch of writ petitionsr0 which stood decidcd on 19.03.2024. Sirnilar views have also bcen taken by the Dir ision Llench of Calcutta Fligh Court in the case of GIRDHAR GOPAL DALMIA vs. tiNION OF I\DIA & ORS (M.A.T 1690 of 2023), decided on25.09.2024.

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Even though the same issue having been decided by a large number of Iligh Courts, we are still conlronted rvith [arge filing of identical matters on daily basis ranging betwcen 5 to 10 u,rit petitions. 1'hat upon the instructions being sougl'rt tionr tlre Department. they have been taking a solitary ground that the decision of the Bornbay High Court in the case of He-rawore Technologit,s Lld., (2 supra) as also the one which has been decided by this Court in the case of Ktnakalo Ruvindro Redd.y

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t2024 SCC] (,)nl-inc Guj 4012 '2025 SCC OnLinc Jhar 287 'opzo23,^{R.r-.il ):4984-DBl}

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(l supra) has been subjected to challenge in a Special Leave Petition i.c., SLP No.3574 of l0l4 L.'el'ore the Ilon'ble S'.rpr':mc Court and the Hon'ble Supremc Courl is seized of the matter. In addition, there are about 1200 SLPs also liled arising out of the same issue being decided by various High Courts.

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7 . To a query being put to the learned counsel fbr the Rcvenue, they have categorically accepted the t-act that there is ntr interirn ordcr granted by the l{on'ble Suprenre Court in any of these rnatters pending before it. Meanrvhile, lresh writ petitions of' identical nature are being piled up befbrc this Bench on daily basis and the pendency is getting increased on rnatter which otherwise has already been dealt and decided by this very High Court itself.

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On the one hand, even though the order of this Courl that was passed as early as on 14.09.2023 and more 16 months have lapsed, till date, we do not find any rer.nedial steps having becn taken by the Income^'l ax Departrnent to take appropliate stcps to eitl-rer hold back issuance of notice under Scction l48A and under Section 148 of the Act by the .iurisdictional Asscssing Officer, rather the authorities concemed in the teeth of series of decisions

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by all the major High Courts in India are conllnuously still r:.-... .-.-.1^- C^^i:^l4O ^C +1,^ 4^r :lnd flSC lllltl.l(lllE, PlLrLiiLlillg5 LiiiUUi JULLiUii l-iO/i⁽⁾ⁱ ii;U initiating proceedings under Section 148 of the Act in corrtlavention to the amendments brought into the Income^'lax Act pursuant to the L-inance Act, 2020 as also the Finance {.ct 2021.

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Upon a query being put as to why can't this ulit petition be disposed ol-in tlre teeth of the decision rendered bl this Court in the case of Konaknlt Rovindru Reddy (l supra), Iearned Standing Counsel lor the Income Tax Department contends that those rvould unnecessarilv burden the Income Tax Department where they would be required to file equal number of SLPs betbre thc l lon'ble Supreme Court and it would be fulther burdcuing the exchequer of the lJnion of tndia. It was also the contention of the Icamed Standing Counsel that no prejudice would be caused to tl.rc interest olthe petitioners in case if this writ petition is kept pending till the tlnalization of the SLPs pending before the Hon'ble Suprerne Court and the fact that the petitioner is already enjoying thc benellt o I interin-r protection. Nonetheless, on the earlier qucry ol- this Court as to why the Income Tax Depadrnent have not come out w'ith a mechanism to issue appropriate instructions or to take

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appropriate steps in ensuring that proceedings under Section l48A of the Act as also the assessnrelrt orders Lrnder Section 148 ollhe Act are kept in a hold in the light of the decisions dedcided by the various High Courts, it was subrnitted by the learned Standing Counsel that the said steps can only be takcn at the level of CBDT as any such steps would have to be taken Parr India and cannot be lirnited to any of these^{jurisdictional} High Courts.

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As a result of which, what we a|c facir-rg is stccp increase o1' litigation day in and day out even though various orders have been passed by this High Court allowing writ petitions on the very sarne issue. The Income Tax authorities concerned are stil[ even now in 2025 also initiating proceedings in contlalention to thc provisions of Section l5lA of the Act and as a result by now, more than 600 to 700 petitions have been already got piled up befbre this lJigh Coufi on an issue which otherwise stands squarely covered by thc jr-rdgnrer.rt of this Court in the case of Kanokalu Rat,indro Redd!, (I supra). What is also surprising is the t-act that though while allowing tlre writ petitior-rs in the case ol- Kunakala Ravindru Reddy (l supra), the Division Bench while reserving the right ol the Revenue, has also E9-te_cted the interest of the petitioners

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insofar as the I iberly which was grarrted to the Revenue for' provisions ol'the Act, as amended by the Finance z\ct, 2020 and the Financc Act. 2021 .^'l-he petitioner assessee would be entitled to challcngc ol raise the other legal objections if the Revenuc initiates frcsh procccdines. The Deparlment has made no endeavour in availing the said liberty that was reserved for the Ilevenue. On the c()ntrary. they have been still sticking on to the stand, which this High Courr as rvcll as many other High Courts alreudy held to bc bad.

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I l. It appears that because of the afbresaid libertl that this High ('ourt [rirci ltlantcci permitting the Revenue lor inrtiating lieslr proceedings as a one-time measure in a faceless manner, the Income^')'ax [)epartment wants to take advantage ol the same by protracting thcse proceedings which would enable thern to meet the limitation that u'ould otherwise come in the way. Likewise, if the writ pctition is kept pending lor a considerable long pcriod ol'tinre and tinally at a later stage if the Hon'ble Supreme Court contlrms the dccision take'n by this High Court as also by tht other l'Iigh Courls in rvhich the SLPs are still pending,, the Income Tax

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Deparlment would get the advantage of the liberty that is otherwise protected in favour of the Revenue for initiation of fresh proceedings from the disposal ofthese rnatlers at a rnuch later stage which would be advantageous and benellcial to thc ltcvenue and would be equally disadvantageous and detrimental so f-ar as interest of the assesses are concemed. As a consequence, the lncome^'fax Department gets an extended period of time fbr initiation ol tiesh proceedings.

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12.^-lhe alarrning trend of docket explosion in this Court, despite the cleal precedent set in Kanakalo Ravindra Reld_v (l supra), is a matter of grave concem. The Income Tax Departrnent's persistent initiation of fresh proceedings, disregarding the establishcd^judiciai pronouncements, has led to an unprecedented surge in litigation with over 600-700 petitions piling up on the same issue. This deliberate approach not only undermines the principle ol-^judicial precedent but also strains the^judicial resources unneccssarily. 1'[re Department's strategy of awaiting the Supreme Court's decision on pending SLPs while continuing to initiate frcsh proceedings appears 1o be a calcuiated move to buy tirne and circumvent limitation periods, rather than adhering to the established legal

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position. Such conduct raises serious questions about the ilullllllt5ll.lLr!r r.--:.-:....^.. !lrlLle lrL) .r1:.;^-^.. .lllu ^...t rL^ lrlr, lusP(-L( l\rl r^.. Jlrur!1..1:,,,1:^:^l pronoun ceurcnts, particularly when this Court has al|eady provided a balanced approach by preserving both the Revenue's rights and assesses intclests

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Another aspect which needs to be considered is that in fact it should havc been realized by the Incorne I'ax Deparlnrent itself and should havt: fbund out via media in ensuring that proceedirrgs under Sections 148-A and 148 should not have been issued in a faceless rnanner, at least till the Hon'ble Supreme Cor-rrt decide the trvelve hundred⁽ 1200) odd SLPs which it is already seized ofor. at least the Incorne lax Department should have tbund out some remedial steps to ensure that wherever the authorities intend to initiate procccdings under Sections 148-A and [4t], other than in a faceless manner, the proceedings should have been deferred witl-rout precipitating the rnatter further intimating the assessee that they shall initiate appropriate proceedings only after the SLP's are decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Couft on the vera same issue. This again, the Income Tax Department, has not been able to give a convincing reply, except for the fact that such a decision if at all

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has to be taken. has to be taken lbr the whole of India, and which olhr'rrr iso hrs tn hn hl rvrv ol'r nnlic. rlanicinn ^h.l rh.r - J "t,J^{r^^ .t rh,'} level of Central Board of Direct^{'faxes.-though} the learned Stancling Counsel fbr the lncome Tax Department contended that the Dclhi l{igh Court dismissed a writ petition of similar naturc, on the one hand when the High Courl is struggling to reduce its pendency, such notices which are under challenge in this writ petition are fbrcing the assessee to knock the doors of this tligh Cor-rrt rcsulting in fiting of hundreds of new writ petitions which in the long run not only atfects the disposal of the writ petitions but also consumes substantial tirne of the Bench in hearing these nlattcrs again and again on daily basis. Admittedly, in spite ol'the rlattcl belore the Hon'ble Supreme Court having been taken on many occasions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court which is seized ol the matter has been reluctant in granting any interim protection to the Inconrc Tax Deparlment. Yet, the authorities concerned at the Statc level are not ready to accept the verdict passed by a majority of Iligli Courts ol difGrent States on the same issue; and to nrake things lurther \ryorse, the Income Tax Department IS showing audacity by issuing notices continuously under Sections 148-A and

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148 through the .jurisdictional Assessing Officer whereas it ought

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In thc casc o1' BANK OF INDIA vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, INCOME TAXrr. on an issue r.vhether it was -justifiabte^{on the part of the Income Tax Department in not} fbllorvirrg an order passed by thc adjudicating authority only on the ground that the appeals are pending, the Division Bench of the Iligh Oourt ol'Bornbay held a1 paragraph No.25 as under, viz., :

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"25 ltilr Paridwalla has rightly drawn out attention to the decision of this Court in Commissioner of lncome Tax vs. Smt. Godavaridevi Sarafl2 as also the recent decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in Samp Furniture (P) Ltd. v. lTO13 of which one of us (Justice G.S. Kulkarni) was a member, wherein the Court categorically observed that the Revenue having not "accepted" the judgment of the High Court would not mean that till the same is set aside in a manner known to law, it would loose its binding force Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of lndia vs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd.14, the Court observed that the approach of the officials of Revenue of treating decisions being^"not acceptable" was criticized by the Supreme Court. ln such decision, following are the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court.

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" l(ZOZS)^{I 7() raxmann.corn 422(Bornbay)]} 12 1toz81 I l3 t fR 589 (Bombay) " 11.02+1^{165 taxmann.corn5ll l/300 'faxnran 452 (Bombav)} I4 1t9e21 taxnrann.com l6155 Iil-T431 (SC)

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"6. Sri Reddy is perhaps right in saying that the officers were not actuated by any mala fides in passing tire irrpLrgnci oideis. ihey perhaps genuinely felt that the claim of the assessee was not tenable and that. if it was accepted, the Revenue would suffer. But what Sri Reddy overlooks is that we are not concerned here with the correctftess or otherwise of their conclusion or of any factual malafides but with the fact that the officers, in reaching in their conclusion, by-passed two appellate orders in regard to the same issue which were placed before them, one of the Collector (Appeals) and the other of the Tribunal. The High Courl has, in our view, rightly criticized thrs conduct of the Assistant Collectors and the harassment to the assessee caused by the failure of these officers to give effect to lhe orders of authorities higher to them in the appellate hierarchy. lt cannot be too vehemently emphasized that it is of utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasi.,udicial issues before them, revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities. The order of the Appellte Collector is binding on the Assistant Collectors working within his jurisdiction and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors who function under the^jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not^"acceptable" to the department - in itself an objectionable^phrase - and is the subject matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it unless ils operation has been suspencied by a competent court. lf this healthy

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rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assesses and chaos in administration of tax laws.

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We have dealt with this aspect at some length, because it has been suggested by the learned Additional Solicitor General that lhe observations made by the High Court, have been harsh on the officers. lt is clear that the observations of the High Court, seemingly vehement, and apparently unpalatable to the Revenue, are only intended to curb a tendency in revenue matters which, if allowed to become widespread, could result in considerable harassment to the assesses-pubtic without any benefit to the Revenue. We would like to say that the department should take these observations in the proper spirit. The observations of the High Court should be kept in mind in future and the utmost regard should be^paid by the adjudicating authorities and the appellate authorities to the requirements of^judicial discipline and the need for giving effect to the orders of the higher appellate authorities which are binding on then1."

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I5. What is worrying this Bench rnore is thc fact that an endeavollr i:; being made whole heartcdly to ensurc not to generate firrther litigation on issues which have bcen laid to rest by a large number of LIigh Courts all of, rvhom have taken a cor]sistent stand that the acti('n ol'the Income'fax Departrnent bcing violative of the

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Finance Act,2020 and Finance Act, 202.l . Now, in order to protect tlra intnrnet ^f rho 12o.'^-',.'." rl.^ rh.r ^lr[.^ ir .',^',1.1 k^ tlite at this j uncture, if we dispose ol the writ petition with an obsen,ation/direction that thc disposal of the instant writ petition in tenns ol the judgrnent rendcred by this lJigh Court in the case of Kankunala Ravindra Redd.y (l supra) shall however be subject to the oulcome of thc SLPs which were filed by the lncorne Tax Depaftment and which is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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In the given lacts and circumstances, this Bench is ol the considered opinion that unlcss and until we do not timely dispose oimatters which ale squarely covered by the decision of this Court and which stands fbrtifled by the decisions of the various other High Couts on the very sar.ne issue, the pendency of this High Coult would lurther be br-rrdened whicl-r otherwise can be decided and disposed ofas a covered matter.

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17 . So fhr as the inte'rest of the Revenlre is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the interest of the Revenue has already been considered arrd protectcd, as has been observed in paragraphs

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-t6

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36, 37 and 38 of the order which, for rcady referencc, is reproduced

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36 For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned notices issued and the proceedings drawn by the respondentDepartment is neither tenable, nor sustainable. The notices so issued and the^procedure adopted being per se illegal, deserves to be and are accordrngly set aside/quashed. As a consequence, all the impugned orders getting quashed, the consequential orders^passed by the respondent-Department pursuant to the notices issued under Section 147 and 148 would also get quashed and it is ordered accordingly. The reason we are^quashing the consequential order is on the^prrnciples that when the initiation of the proceedings ilself was procedurally wrong, the subsequent orders also gets nullified automatically.

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37 The preliminary objection raised by the petrtroner is sustained and all these writ petitions stands allowed on thrs very^{jurisdictional} issue. Since the impugned notices and orders are gefting quashed on the point of jurisdiction, we are not inclined to proceed further and decide the other issues raised by the petitioner which stands reserved to be raised and contended in an appropriate proceedings.

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Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had, in the case of Ashish Agarwal, supra, as a one-time n'reasure exercising the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of lndia, permitted the Revenue to proceed under the substituted provisions, and this Court allowing the petitions only on the procedural flaw, the right

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conferred on the Revenue would remain reserved to proceed further if they so want from the stage of the oroer of the Suprenre Coul i iit the case of Ashish Agarwal, supra.

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We would only lurthcr likc to rnake observations that since we are inclined to dispose of the instant writ petition, conscious of the fact that the earlier order o1' this lJigh Court in the case of Ktnakala Ravindru Reddy (1 supra) is subjected to challenge befbre the Hon'ble Supreme Courl in SLP No.3574 of 2024, pref'erred by thc Income^-fax Departrncnt, we make it clear that allowing of the instant rvrit petition is subject to outcome ol the aforesaid SI-P prefer:red by the Reverrue against the decision of this High Court in tlte case of Kunakalu Ravindra Redd.y (l supra) This, in other words, would nrean tltat cither o1'the parties, il they so want, may move an appropriate petition seeking revival of this writ petition in the light o1' the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the pending SLP on tl-re very same issue.

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Accordingly, the instar.rt writ petition stands allowed in favour of the assessee so fbr as the issue of^jurisdiction 1S concemed. As a consequence, the impugned notice under challenge under Sections 148-A and 148 stands set aside/quashed.

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The corrsequcntia[ orders, if any, also stand set aside/quashed in

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Ktnkanulu Rulitrtlru Reddl' (l supra). There shall oe no ordcl as

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to costs

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ConseqLrcntlv. miscellaneo,,rs petitions pendinq. if anr,. shall

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stand c Lrsed.

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SD/-N. SRIHARI DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// 6 SECTION OFFICER

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The lncome: Tax Officer, Ward 6 (1), Hyderabad, Telangana.

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The Assessment Unit, National Faceless Assessment Centre, lncome^Tax Department, Ministry of Finance, Room No.401, 2nd^Floor, E-Ramp, Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Delhi, 110 003.

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One CC to lvls. NALAGAMA SUCHETHA SREE, Advocate [OPUCI 4 One CC to Ms. BOKARO SAPNA REDDY (SENIOR SC INCOME TAX) Advocate IOPUC] 5. Two CD Copies rg,

HIGH COURT

DATED:071r)U2025

ORDER

WP.No.23348 of 2025

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ALLOWI}"IG THE W.P