Partly allowed¶64

Ramavath Raju , Hajurya v. State of Telangana

Telangana HC11 Mar 2025CRLA/857/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

dowry death; Section 304-B IPC; sentence reduction from life imprisonment to seven years rigorous imprisonment; suicide by self-immolation/setting herself ablaze; dying declaration Ex.P6; additional dowry demand Rs.50,000/-; harassment in proximity to death; benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C.; Hem Chand v. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727; G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka Crl.A.No.160 of 2006; Telangana High Court CRLA.No.857 of 2018; SC No.185 of 2016 Nizamabad Family Court-cum-Additional Sessions Judge; appeal partly allowed.

What did the court decide?

Sentence reduced from rigorous imprisonment for life to rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Section 304-B IPC; conviction and other findings of the trial Court upheld; appellant entitled to benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C. ¶64

Ramavath Raju , Hajurya Vs State of Telangana — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Telangana HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the appellant's conviction under Section 304-B IPC was sustainable, given the dying declaration (Ex.P6) and the testimony of PWs.1 to 4 regarding harassment for additional dowry preceding the deceased's suicide by self-immolation. +1 more

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Court's answer

Though the witnesses did not narrate any specific incident or specify the quantum of dowry demanded, the allegation of harassment for additional dowry levelled by PWs.1 to 4 was in proximity to the death, sustaining the dowry-death case against the appellant.

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Ratio / Principle

The sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life is severe; following the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana and G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant is reduced to seven years.

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Key takeaways

The appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 428 of Cr.P.C.ratio¶62
The criminal appeal is partly allowed: the period of imprisonment is reduced from rigorous imprisonment for life to rigorous imprisonment for seven years, and except this modification the findings of the trial Court hold good in all other aspects.ratio¶64

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Telangana High Court (Criminal Appeal No. 857 of 2018, decided 11.03.2025, per K. Surender, J.) partly allowed an appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 30.12.2017 in SC No. 185 of 2016 (Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, Nizamabad), whereby the appellant-husband was convicted under Section 304-B IPC for the dowry death of his wife Lalitha @ Tulasibai, who committed suicide by self-immolation on 14.03.2016, about nine months after marriage, amid an alleged demand of additional dowry of Rs. 50,000/-. Upholding the conviction (harassment for additional dowry spoken to by PWs.1 to 4 was held to be in proximity to the death, read with the dying declaration Ex.P6), the Court held the life sentence severe and, following the Supreme Court's observations in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 727 and G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (extreme punishment of life imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC to be awarded only in rare cases), reduced it to seven years' rigorous imprisonment; the appellant was extended the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C.; the trial Court's findings otherwise hold good.

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[³⁴⁵³¹

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NOTE:- The Accused was directed to be released on bail by the^{order of the High} Court dated 10.08.2022 in l.A. No. 1 of 2019 in Crl.A. No. 857 of 20'lB.

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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TUESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF MARCH iWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER AND

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V. VENUGOPAL

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO:857 OF 20'18

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Appeal filed under Section 37 4(2) of Cr.P.C against the^judgment dated 30-12-2017 in SC.No.^'185 of 2016 on the file of the court of the Judge, Family Co u rt-cu m-Add itional Sessions Judge, Nizamabad.

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Between:

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Ramavath Raju @ Hajurya S/o Laxman, Aged 26 years, Occ. Labour, ST Lambada, R/o.Gaddagundu Thanda of Pitlam Mandal, Nizamabad District.

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AND

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The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court at Hyderabad for the staie of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh.

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...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT

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Counsel for the Appellant: Sri Srinivasa Srikanth, Legal Aid

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Counsel for the Respondent: Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, Additional Public Prosecutor

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The Court delivered the following JUDGMENT:

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER

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AND

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTTCE E.V.VENUGOPAL

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CRIMI}IAL APPEAL N0.857 0F 2018

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JUDGMENTi (pt:r Hon'ble Si Justice K.Surender)

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The present criminal appea_l is hled by the appellant/accused under Section 374(21 of Cr.p.C., aggrieved by the judgment dated 30. l2.20l7 in SC No. 185 of 2016 on the file of the learned Judge, Family Court-cum-Additional Sessions Judge, Nizamabad.

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Heard Sri Srinivasa Srikanth, learned legal aid counsel for the appellant and Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, learned Assistalt Public Prosecutor for the respondent/ State.

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The appellant was convicted under Section 235(21 of Cr.P.C., for the offence punishable under Section 304_8 of IPC and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.

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The case of the prosecution, as per the charge_sheet iaid by PW12/R.Venkateshwarlu, Sub-Divisional police

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Officer, Bodhan, is that the marriage of the deceased u,oman, Lalitha (al Tulasibai, was performed with one Ramavath Raju (accused), 9 months prior to the alleged incident. In the marriage, her parents gave net cash of Rs.5O,00O/- and 2 tulas of gold as dowry to the accused. She led a happy marital life for only one month. Later, the accused, addicted to bad vices, started harassing her both mentally and physically for ar additional dowry of Rs.50,0OO/-. When the parents of the deceased expressed their inability to meet the illegal demand ol the accused, he used to beat the deceased it mercilessly and drove her out of his house. Though panchayat u,as he1d, and the accused was convinced not to harass her and sent her back to her in-laws' house, he did not mend his ways and repeated his acts. Unable to tolerate his actions ard disgusted with her life, the deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze on 14.03.2016 at about 1 1.30 AM. On i4.03.2016 at OB.OO PM, PW1 Vadithya Laxmal, the paterna-l uncle of the deceased, lodged Ex.Plcomplaint with the police of Pitlam Police Station regarding the dowry death. The police investigated the matter, arrested the accused, and filed a charge-sheet.

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^^_:*

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The learned Sessions Judge examined pWs. I to 12, and markecl Exs.Pl to P13 as well as MOs.l to 3 for the prosecution. During the cross-examination of pWs.3 and 4, Exs.Dl and D2 were marked..espectiveiy, by the accused.

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The learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty, holding that the dying declaration coupled with the evidence of PWs. I to 4, established the harassment meted out by the accused against the deceased. Due to the said harassment, the deceased resorted to the extreme act of self-immolation.

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7 . The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is threefold: (l) In the dying declaration recorded by pW6, the deceased did not mention anything about the alleged dowry harassment; (2) None of the witnesses spoke about any alleged demald or harassment just before the death of the deceased to infer a dowry death; and (3) Alternatively, the quantum of punishment inflicted is severe, and the minimum punishment may be imposed.

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PWI is the paternal uncle of the deceased, pW2 is the lather of the deceased, pW3 is the brother of pWl, and pW4 is an independent witness. They all stated that at the time

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Pase 4

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of marriage, dowry was given, and after the marriage, there was a demand for additional dowry. The appeilant used to harass the deceased to bring additional dowry.

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Though the witnesses speak about the harassment of the deceased, however, no specific incident or event was narrated by them. Additionally, the witnesses did not specify the amount demanded as additional dowry. Though the quartum of dowry is not specified, however, the allegation levelled by the witnesses regarding the harassment for additional dowry is in proximity u.ith death.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryanar, held in paragraph No.7 as under :

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"7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-8 I.P.C. lavs dou,n that :

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"Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term u,hich shall not be less thari seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.^"

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The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case, A reading of Section 304-8 I.P.C, would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman that

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I ( I994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 727

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l)age 5

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all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassntent for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can thercfore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directlv responsible for the death of the dicease(l or not bv virttre of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassnrent and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewisr: there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person u,ho has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before hcr death shall presume to have caused the dowry death if it is shorvn that before her death, such woman hacl been subjectcd, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection u'ith any demand for dowry. Practically this is thc presumption that has becn incorporated in Section 3O4-B I.P.C. also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection With the death or not, he shall be presumr:d to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satislied. In the instant case no doubt thc prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no clirect evidence connecting thc accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 I.P.C. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the ltle in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani, P.W. 6 zrnd Dr. Indu Latit, P.W. 7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury rvas found on the dead body zrnd that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr. Dalbir Singh, P.W. 13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved thal it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-8 I.P.C. would be attracted. Br-rt this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in

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balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelt5z has been estabiished and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 3O4-B and 201 l.P.C. have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was lully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a- dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therelore an offence under Section 3O4-B I.P.C. was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above Section 304-8 I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for iife shouid be in rare cases and not in every case."

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in G.V.Siddaramesh Vs.

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State of Karnataka [Crl.A.No.160 of 2OO6], at paragraph

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Nos. 16 alld 17, held as under :

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"16) On the point of sentence, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that the appellant is in jail for more than six years. The appellant was young at the time of incident ald therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court may be modified. In so far as scntencing under the section is concerned, a three Judge Bench of this court in the case of Hemchand v. State of Haryana, has observed that "Section 304-8 merely raises a presumption of dowry death and lays down that the minimum sentence should be 7 years, but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be used in rare cases and not in every case." Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, this court reduced the

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I I

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sentence from life imprisonment awarded by the High Court to 10 vears R.I on the above principle.

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In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly convictcd under Section 304-8 IPC. Howevr:r, his sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts belorv appcars to us to be excessive. The appellant is a young man and has already undergone 6 lears ol imprisonment after being convicted by the Additional Sessions .Judge and the High Court. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a sentence ol 10 years rigorous imprisonment nould meet the ends ol'^justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-8 Irc, reduce the sentence of imprisonment ior life to i O years rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are confirmed. L-r the resrrlt, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modificrLtion of sentence."

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Accorclir-rg to PWs. 1 to 4, there was ha-rassment prior to the deceased committing suicide. However, in the dying declaration,/ Ex.P6, the deceased stated that since she refused to go to the forest to cut the u.ood/timber, the appellant abused her, and thereafter, she committed suicide.

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i3. in the said circumstances, we find that the sentence of rigorous inrprisonment for life is severe. Accordingly, following the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions cited supra, the sentence of imprisonment imposed again st the appellant is reduced to seven years

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I']ase 8

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The appellant is entitled for the^{benefitunder Section 428 of} Cr.P.C.

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In the result, this criminal appeal is^{partlyallowed,} reducing the period of imprisonment imposed against^the appellant from rigorous imprisonment^{for iife to rigorous} imprisonment for seven years. Except the^above modihcation, with regard to the^period of imprisonment,^the findings ofthe trial Court in all other aspects^{hold good.}

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//TRUE COPY'

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SD/-K.SRINIVASA^RAO JOINT REGISTRAR \ SECTION OFFICER

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To,

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