Dismissed

N.Dayakar Reddy v. P.Sreedhar Babu

Telangana HC1 Aug 2024CRLA/99/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Complainant appealed against acquittal of the accused in a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The High Court held no compelling reasons existed to disturb the acquittal and dismissed the appeal.

What did the court decide?

None granted; the appeal against acquittal was dismissed.

What the court decided

N.Dayakar Reddy Vs P.Sreedhar Babu — Cheque Dishonour | Telangana HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE^{OF TELANGANA} AT HYDERABAD

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THURSDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.^VENUGOPAL

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 99 OF 2018

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Appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C^{against the judgmentdated 14-06-} 2017 made in CC. No. 179 of 2015 on^{the file of the Court of the Vlll Special} lvlagistrate at L.B.Nagar, Hastinapur, Ranga^{Reddy District}

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Between:

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N. Dayakar Reddy S/o Late Venkata^{Narsimha Reddy, Aged-about 48years,} Occ: business, rio.^H. No.^{23-1 33, MathalakshmiNagar,Kothapet,Ranga} Reddy District, T.S.

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...APPELLANT(COMPLAINANT)

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AND

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P. Sreedhar Babu, S/o P.^{Venugopal,Aged about 42 years, Occ:Business,} r/o H.No. 6-4-7'1 , Maruthi Nagar,^{AnanthapurDistrict,A.P.}

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The State of Telangana, rep by^{Public Prosecutor, High Court,Hyderabad,} T.S.

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,..RESPONDENTS(ACCUSED/STATE)

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Counsel for the Appellant: Sri^{J. Rajeswar}

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Counsel for the Respondent no.^{1: Sri K. VenkatRao}

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Counsel for the Respondent^{No. 2: Smt. S. Madhavi,}

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Assistant Public Prosecutor

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The Court delivered the following^JUDGMENT:

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.,:.THE HONO SRI JUSTICE E. V. VENUGOPAL CRIMINAL APPEAL No.99 of 2OL8

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JUDGMENT:

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This appeal is preferred by the appellant against the Jrrdgment, dated i4.O6.2017 in C.C.No. lZ9 of 2015 on the file of the learned VIII Special Magistrate, at L.B.Nagar, Hastinapur, Ranga Reddy Distirct (for short, "the tria,l Court") wherein and whereunder the learned Magistrate acquitted respondent No.1 herein/accused ulrder Section 255 (1) of Cr.p.C for the offence ptrnishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, "the NI Act,,).

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Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Smt. S. Madhavi, learned Assistant public Pr,:secutor appearing on behalf of respondent No.2_State.

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The brief facts of the case are that the complainant and the accused are known to each other for the last se'zera-I years. On 01.03.2014, accused had approached the complainalt and requested to provide hand loan of

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Rs 8,00,000/- to meet his personal needs. At request of the accused, complainant gave Rs.8,O0,000 l- and having 1n received the amount, accused executed a pronote favour of the complainant and promised to repay the same within one year. After expiry of the period, on several demands by the complainant to repay the amount, accused issued a cheque bearing No. 06¹⁰⁷⁰ dated 18.07.20 15 for Rs.8,00,000/- drawn on Bank of India, Ananthapur branch. It is further contended that the compiainant deposited the salne on 18.07.20 15 in ING Vyshya bank, now Kotak Mahendra balk, Saroornagar branch, but it was dishonoured with^an endorsement "Funds Insufficient" on 14.O7 .2O 15.

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It is further contended that the complainalt demalded the accused to pay the cheque amount, but accused did not respond. The complainant^{got issued} lega-l notice to the accused on 10.08.2015 by^RPAD cal1ing upon the accused to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of^{legal notice.}

I he accused gave reply on 20.08.2015^{\Mith false} c:ontents. Thus the accused has committed^{an offence} punishable under Section 138 of Negotiatrle Instrument l\ct.

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:;. The trial Court took the cognizance against respondent No.1/accused for the offence under^Section ..38 of the NI Act and furnished the copies of the clocuments relied upon by the complainant to^the zrccused. The accused was examined under Section 251 of Cr.P.C. The accused denied the allegations,^pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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(). The trial Court vide impugned judgment found the accused not guilty for the offence punishable under Iiection 138 of the NI Act and acquitted him. Aggrieved by the same, the appeliant, who is the complainant herein filed the present appeal.

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'7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant coeteaded that the trial Court failed to

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appreciate the evidence available on record in proper perspective and passed the impugned judgment by acquitting the accused and seeks to set aside the impugned judgment.

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Learned Assistant Public prosecutor contended that the trial Court, upon carefi-rl scrutiny of the material avaiiable on record, rightly passed the impugned judgment and the interference of this Court is unwarranted. Therefore, she seeks to dismiss the Criminal Appeal.

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appellalt/complainant himself was examined as pw. 1 and a-lso examined the eye witness to the transaction as Pw.2 (since Pw.2 was not present for further cross examination, the counsel for the appellant/complainalt requested to close the evidence of Pw.2, as such the evidence of Pw.2 has been eschewed and got marked

Exs.P1 to P1 1.

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Upon careful scrutiny of the oral and documentar5r r:vidence, the trial Court observed that the accused did not deny the subject cheque and his signature on it. IJnless the accused does not deny the cheque and his srignature on it, burden heavily lies on him to prove that the cheque issued was not towards discharge of legally e,nforceable debt. Though the above said presumption is rnandatory, it sha-ll not be raised as against the accused iLr each and every case. Therefore, relying upon the clecision passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat os. Dattatrega G. Hegd.et, vrherein it is held that the prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond a,ll reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of an accused is preponderance of probabilities'. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also be reference to the circumstances upon which he r,:lies. Therefore, the trial Court observed that the

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prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him for the offence charged.

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1 1. It is well settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference has to be made with the order unless the approach made by the trial Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by it is such, which cr-ruld not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably ald judiciously and is therefore, to be characterized as perverse. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal 1S based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence

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e-dduced in the case, one pointing to the^guilt of^the e-ccused and the other to his innocence, the^{view which} i,s favourable to the accused shouid be adopted.

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In Mrinal Das Vs. State of Tripura2^{the Apex} Oourt held as under:

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"lt is clear that in an appeal against acquitta-l in^the absence of perversity in the^judgment and^order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court^{of fact,} is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider^and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal^{jurisprudence} every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the^part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found^and to^come lo its own

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conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the triai Court with respect to both facts and law. Whiie dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the^judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed."

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In Maloth Sornaraju Vs. Stote of Andhra

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Pradesh3 the Apex Court held that there carr be no two opinions that merely because the acquittal is found to be wrong and another view carl be taken, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has more arrd serious responsibility while dealing with the judgment of acquittal and unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or not at all supportable and where the

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€Lppellate Court comes to the conciusion^{that conviction} is a must, the^judgment of acquittal^{cannot be upset.} 'l'he appellate Court has to examine as to whether the trial Court, while upsetting the acquittal,^{has taken such} (:aIe.

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',-4. In view of the Judgments referred to above and for the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that^{there are no} rnerits in the appeal and the same is^{liable tobe} rlismissed.

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Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

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As a sequel thereto, Miscellaneous Petitions,^{if ary,}

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pending sha-1l stand closed.

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Sd/- M. RAMANA^KRISHNA DEPUTY^REGISTRAR

//TRUE COPY//

SECTION^OFFICER

To,

pur, Ranga Reddy^District 1 The Vlll Special^{tVlagistrate at L B Nagar' Hastina} 2 One CC td Sri J^{Raieswar, Advocate[OPU-ul} ^. 3 5;; CC io^{sri x. Venkat Rao' AdvocateIOPUC]} 4 Two CD CoPies (ro. Ha- sl.h +^{f'!ry*'r[o-ri} VIllglr cc$ +o ?.,bbe ?nac"Jrrr.^{rhlh cac!} 5. [c.ro

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HIGH COURT

DAll-ED: 0110812024

JUEIGMENT

CRI-A.No.99 of 2018