Disposed

Sampath Karthikeya Busa v. University Grants Commission

Telangana HC5 Jan 2023WP/42467/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Students challenged suspension by a private deemed university after an FIR was registered. The court held the writ was maintainable as the university performs a public duty, and the indefinite suspension without enquiry violated natural justice.

What did the court decide?

The court directed the university to constitute a Disciplinary Committee and conduct an enquiry by granting an opportunity of hearing within 15 days. In the connected petition where an enquiry and app

Sampath Karthikeya Busa Vs University Grants… — Education and Admissions | Telangana HC (2023)

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[³¹⁶⁸ ]

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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAO

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(Special Original Jurisdiction)

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THURSDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN

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WRIT PETlTlOItLNsstt246T, 42437 and 43304 of 2022

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WRIT PETITION NO: 42467 OF 2022

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Between:

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Sampath Karthikeya Busa, S/o. Shanmukha Kumar, Aged about^'19 years, Occ. Student, Enrollment No. 2'lFL|CHH010158, ICFAI Law School, Fl/o. 3154-25, Siddharatha Nagar, Vadlapudi, Visakhapatnam - 530046, Presently residing in Hostel Room No. F-121 , ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education (IFHE), Donthanapally, Shankarpalli Road, Hyderabad.

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Anurag Keshamouni, S/o. K Praveen Kumar Goud Aged about 19 years, Occ. Student, Enrollment No.2'1FLlCHH020047 , ICF Al Law School, Day Scholar, Fl/o. Flat No.122, Godavari Block, Gharondha Chamundeswari Apartments, vsr' RTC cross Roads' Hyderabad

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...pETrroNERS

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AND

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University Grants Commission, (UGC), Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi, 1 10002.

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The ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education, (IFHE), Hyderabad Donthanapally, Shankarpalli Road, Hyderabad - 50'1203, Telangana.

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The Registrar, The ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education (IFHE), Hyderabad Donthanapally, Shankarpalli Road, Hyderabad - 501203, Telangana.

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...RESPONDENTS

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Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction more-particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondent No.2 and 3 in issuing the Order of Suspension vide File No.lFHE/Admin 104122-23 against Petitioner No.1 and File No.lFHE/Admin-O5122- 23 against Petitioner No.2 both dated 18.11.2022 as illegal, arbitrary, u nconstitutiona I and violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of lndia and consequently set aside the Order of Suspension vide File No IFHE/Admin/04/2223 against Petitioner No.1 and File No.lFHE/Admin-05122- 23 against Petitioner No.2 both dated 18.1 1 .2022 issued by the Respondents.

lA NO: 3 OF 2022

Between:

lnstitute of Charter:d and^Financial Accounting of lndia Foundation for Higher Education,⁽ⁱⁿ short CFAI), Donthanapally, Shankarpally Road, Hyderabad college, Donthapally, HyJerabad 501203 represented by its Registrar.

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....ApplicanURespondent No.3

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AND1 Gaurav [)arya, Enrolment No.21FL|CHHOI01 48 S/o Brijgopal Daga. aged about 18 years Occ Student, ICFAI Shankarpally, Hyderabad R/S H.N0.1-624 Gulbarga, K:rnataka 5851 02.

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2 Mahesh t)al l, Enrollment: 21FL|CHH010111 S/o Jyothiram patil aged about 1B years Occ student, ICFAI Shankerpally, Hyderabad.Rl/o H.No.18-5-1^'l Ramagurdam. Telangana -505209.

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....Respondent Nos.1 & 2/Petitioners

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3 Governm:nt of lndia, Ministry of Education, Represented by its Under Secretary to the Government, Sastry Bhavan, New Delhi.

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4 The Telangana State Council of Higher Education, Govt. of Telangana, rep. by its Secreta y l\4ahavirmarg, Hyderabad 500 028.

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...Respondent Nos.3 & 4/Respondent Nos.1 & 2 Petition und,. Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed n support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to vacate the order ol this Hon'ble Courl d1.2411112022 in W.P.No.4243712022. Counsel for the Petitioner: SMT. M. SOWJANYA YADAV

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Counsel for the Rr-'spondent No.1: SRI GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, DEPUry SOLICITOR GENERAL OF INDIA

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Counsel for the Respondent No.2: SMT C. VANI REDDY SC FOR TSCHED

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Counsel for the Res pondent No.3: SRI KAILASH NATH P.S.S.

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VVRIT Pt:TlTlON NO:43364 OF 2022

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Between:

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Saif Ali khan, Sk,. t)' Sabir Ali Khan, Aged 17 years, Occ. Student, Rep. by his father natural guardian. S ri Dr.Sabir Ali Khan, Sio. Dr.Shahid Ali Khan, Aged 50 years, Occ. Doctor, Rlo. ti-2-6761118-3, Nemath Harmony Apartments, B Block, Sri Ram nagar Colony. Roarl ro.'12, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad.

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...PETITIONER

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AND

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1 The State of T.:langana, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Higher Education Departmerrt, Secrelariat, Hyderabad.

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2 The ICFAI Fc,rndatron for Higher Education, (Deemed to be Universitv). Ren by its Vice Ch:rncellor,65,3rd Floor, Nagarjuna Hills, punjagutta f-fvO'rjia Oi?

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)

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The ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education, (Deemed to be University), Rep. by its Registrar, IFHE- IBS Campus, Donthanapally, Shankarapally Road, Hyderabad

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The ICFAI Law College, IFHE^- IBS Campus, Donthanapally, Shankarapally Road, Hyderabad

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...RESPONDENTS

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Petition under Arlicle 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue any writ order or direction more in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the high handed action of the respondents no-2 and 3 is not allowing the petitioner to attend the online classes in l.CFAl Law college of the 2nd and 3rd respondents and not issuing hall ticket to the petitioner and further not allowing the petitioner to attend the First Semester 2022 - 23 examinations of BBA, LLB, I Year, scheduled from 2811112022 lo 0511212022 under the guise of false case against the petitioner vide FIR No.506 of 2022 is pending as illegal, arbrtrary, unconstitutional, violating the natural^justice and hits the personal liberty and rights without^jurisdiction guaranteed by the Constitution of lndia, and consequently direct the respondents no.2 and 3 to allow the petitioner to participate in the online classes, issue hall ticket and allow the petitioner to appear in First Semesler 2022 - 23 examinations of BBA, LLB, I Year scheduled from 2811112022 Io 0511212022 and further direct the respondents to allow the petitioner in academic semester exams up to final academic year without reference to the false case filed against the petitioner in FIR No.506 of 2022.

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lA NO: 1 OF 2022

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the respondents no. 2 and 3 herein to allow the^petitioner to attend his regular online classes in ICFAI Iaw college as usual while giving hall tickets and allow the petitioner to attend for the First Semester 2022 - 23 of BBA, LLB I year scheduled from 2811112022 to 0511212022, pending disposal of the above writ^petition. Counsel for the Petitioners: SRl. PRAMOD SINGH

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Counsel for the Respondent No.1: GP FOR HIGHER^EDUCATION

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Counsel for the Respondent No.2 to 4: SRI KAILASH^{NATH P.S.S.}

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The Court made the following: COMMON^ORDER

IIOvBLE SI].I .IUSTICE K. LAKSIINIAN

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WRIT IIETI'IION NOs.,12467 42437 AND {336.1 OF 2022

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CONlM()N OIIDER:

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Thc present writ petitions arise out ol thc same set ol lacts. 'I'herefore, the writ petitions are disposed of vidc the lollowing comnron orde^'

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Heard Sri A.Venkatesh, Sri Pranrod Singh and Srnt Sowjanya Yirclav. learned counsel for the petitioncrs erncl Srnt. lt4egha Rar-ri Agarwal. leamed standing counse'l appcaring Ibr [Jnivcrsity Grants Conrmission, leamed Governrrent Pleader lbr l ligher Education anc Sli P.S.S.Kailashnath, learncd coLrnsel appearing 1'or ICITAI Founrlation for fligher [ducationllCFAI t iniversity. Pelused the record.

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For the sake of convenience, the description of the parties in the present order is according to W.P. No. 42467 of 2022

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Facts nf the rase in W.P. No. 42467 and 42437 of 2022:-

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The c,ase involves suspension ol Petitioners hercin h'om Respondenr r.vo. 2 University (ICFAI [-lniversit),) on rhc allcged ground of ;nisconduct and indiscipline. An alleged ragging incident

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took place in Respondent No. 2's campus wherein a first-1,ear larv student was assaulted by a group of senior stucients lrom the business management college of Respondent No. 2.

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According to the Petitioners, they supported the student u,ho was subjected to ragging by reporting the said incident to the authorities. Later, the victirn ol ragging llled a cornplaint with Shankarpally Police Station and on 11.11.2022, a crirlc bearing I;lR No. 506 of 2022 was registered lor the offenccs under Sections 307, 323,450,342 and 506 read with 149 ollP(', and Sections 1(i) 4(ii) a(iii) of Telangana Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1997 against the people involved in the alleged ragging.

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Subsequently, the father ofone olthe accused in FIR No. 506 of 2022 lodged a complaint against the Petitioners herein and the said complaint was registered as FIR No.508 of 2022 dated 1 2. I 1.2022 for the offences under Sections 342,324 and 506 of IPC. In the said complaint, it is alleged that on 03.11.2022. the Petitioners herein physicalty assaulted and injured the complainant's son and his two fiiends

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Based on the registration ol FIR No.508 o1- 1022, Respondent No. 2 issued orders of suspension dated l8.l l.:012 under Rule 7 (iii)

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r/w Rule 9 of the IFFIE Students' Conduct and Discipline Rutes,2019 (hereinafler rt'[:red to as 'l{ule's'). Vide the said suspension orders, the Petitiorer; Irerein were irnmecliately suspended Iiom the class/ departmenttco Ii!'geihostel/ mr: ss/library/lab and from availing any other facili.y until furlher notice. Therefore, the Petitioners have challenged ;uspension orders dated 18.11.2022 and sought that the same be set rsid,-'

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Conttntk,ns ofthe Pctitioncrs: -

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l. Respondent No. I is a dcerned to be university under Section 3 of the Universiti,' Crants Commission Act, 1956 (hereinafter 'the Act. 1956'). It performs a public function of imparting e'ducation. Therelore. the present writ petitions are maintainable. Reliancc was placed on Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM tlniversityr.

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lt. The Petitioners could not have been suspended on the ground of rnere registration of F IIl. Reliance was placed on Ankita Kailash Khandelwat v. State of Maharashtra2.

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'(zors)^{ro scc,s:d} 12020)^{10 SCC670}

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iii. The FIR against the Petitioners \,zts registered asa counterblast to FIR registered against the accused of ragging in FIR No. 506 ol'2022.

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1V. Respondent No.2 unilateraily suspended the Petitioners herein without lollowir.rg the principles of natural justice. No disciplinary cornmittee under Part V of the Rules was constituted and no opportunity of hearing was granted. Reliance ri,as placcd on Board of Technical Education, U.P. v. Dhanu,antri Kumar't,Board of High School & Intermediatc Etlucation v. Ghanshyam Das Guptaa and Jiby P. Chacko v. Principal, Mediciti School of Nursing, Ghanpu r, Ranga Reddl Dislricls.

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Contentions of Respondent No. 2

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i. The present writ petitions are not maintainable as Respondent No. 2 is a private body and does not fall within the definition ol''Statc' under Articlc 12 of the Constitution of India.

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tntn t99t sc 271. 41952 Supp (3) scR 36. 52002 5cc onLine AP 126

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ll I unher, the writ petition is not maintainable as suspension of' the students was for individual actions and not in discharge of any public duty. No public function was being p:rlirrrned by Respondent No. 2 while passing the impugned srrspension orders. Reliance was placed on Ramakrishna lVlission v. Kago Kunya6 and St. Mary's Education Societv v. Rajendra Prasad BhargavaT.

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iii

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Tire orclers of'suspension were passed under Rule 7 (iii) r/w R rie 9 crl- the l{ules which permit suspension of students pe ndirrg enquiry or pending trial.

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i. No^,rpporlunity ol hearing is provided in the Rules fbr suspension under Rule 7 (iii) r/w Rule 9 of the Rules. Under Rtrlc l0 olthe Rules opportunity of hearing is only available in cases of penalties under clauses (vii), (viii), (ix), (x) and (xi) of Rule 7.

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Facts ol he c:rse and contentions of Petitioner in W.P. No. 433(r.1 of 2022 -

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I 0.^'l'lrc rl)or csaid Victim of ragging in FIR No. 506 of 2022 in his conrplair t t -, Ilcsponde nt No. 2 authorities named the Petitioner in

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ulzorsl re scc :o:. 72022 sCC OnLine SC l(,91

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W.P. No. 43364 ol 2022. Thereafter, a Disciplinary Committee was constituted on 05.1 1.2022 and the Disciplinary Committee subrnittcd its report and the Petitioner was expelled lrom the University r.r,ith irnrnediate elfect. Subsequently, the Petitioner preferred an appcal before the Vice-Chancellor against the order of expulsion passed by the Discipl inary Corrrnittee

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I l. The Petitioner has filed the present writ petition stating that hc has no lole to plav in the alleged incident of ragging. He contends that thc Disciplinan Comnrittce did not issue any notice and grant an opporlunity of hcarir-rg to the Petitioner. The Petitioner also conteucls that thc action o1'Respondent is iltegal, arbitrary and high-handed. l he Petitioner prays that he be allowed to attend online classes at the Respondent No.2/University and be permitted to write the semester exalns

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Contentions of the Respondent No. 2 in W.P. No. .13-16.1 of 2022

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'fhe *,rit pctition is not maintainable.

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ll. A Disciplinarl'Committee was constituted and the Petitioner' parlicipatcd by submitting a representation datcd 07 .l1.2022.^'I'he said committee conducted due enquiry and

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subinitted its report. Based on the said report, the Petitioner u'as r'xpelled. Further, the Petitioner has already prelerred an appe al befbre the Vice-Chancellor.

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ul Tre I'etitioner has not specificalty challenged the order of his suspension.

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Findines ol' the Court:-

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F-orn the facts and contentions of the parties, the fbllorving

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i-qsues l'all ft,r cc,nsideration belbre this Courl:-

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Whether rL writ petition under Article 226 ol'the Constitution o1' India is nraintainable against a private educational institution which is recognized as a deemed to be university by the tJniversitl Grants Commission?

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Whether Respondent No. 2 was justified in suspending the studenls rvithout following the principles of natural^justice?

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lssue No.l:-

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Beibre deciding the issue of maintainabitity, it is relevant to note that the scope of High Court's power under Article 226 is very rvide. Relief r-Lnder Article 226 is not restricted only to authorities that lbll u,ithin the de,f nition of 'State' under Article 12.

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The Supreme Court in Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanuals, held that Arlicle 226 confers wide powers on the lligh Court to issue a mandamus even to a private body perlorming a public duty. The relevant paragraph of the^judgment is extracted below:

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In our view the High Court was correct in holding that the rvrit petition filed under Arlicle 226 claiming against the company mandamus or an order in the nature of rnanclanrus rvas rnisconceived and not maintainable .^'l'he t rit obviouslr r.vas claimed against the company and not against thc conciliation officer in respect of any public or statutorJ' dul) imposcd on him by the Act as it rvas not bc, but the conlpan\ rvho sought to implenrent thc irnpugncd allrecnrent. No doubt, Article 226 provides that every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority orders and writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus etc. or any of them for the enforcement of anv of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. But it is well understood that a mandamus lies to secure the performance of a public or statutory duty in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest. 1'hus, an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be nraintainerl to secure performance of obligations orved bv a conrpan\ towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute.

*( l96e) r scc 585

t ; I i

It Ift I

t : i & I i

(See, S,rhan [.al v. Union ol India), |957 SCR 738] InRegrna v Industrial coun [(1965) I QB 377] rnandamus was rclused against the Industrial court though set up under the Indrrstrial courls Act. I9l9 on the ground that the refelencc lor arbitration made to it by a minister was not one undcr lhc Act but a privalc rcference.^"This Court has never exerciserl a gencral po\'er" said Bruce, J. in R. v. I awishamUnion l(1897) I Qts 498, 5011^"to enforce the perlurrnance ol their statutory duties by public bodies on the irpplication of anl,bodv s,ho cliooscs to apply lor a man<lanrus. [t has alrval,s required that the applicant lor a manclanrLLs should hare a lcgal and a specific right to enlorce the p,erlirnnance ol' thosc duties". l hcrelbrc. the condition precedent tbr the issue oi rrurdarnus is that there is in one claiming rt a Iegal right to the pcrlirmrancc of a legal duty by one againsl lvhorn it is souuhl. An order of nrandamus is, in form. a command directcd to a person, corporation or an inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do a particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their olfice and is in the nature of a public duty. It is, however, not necessary that lhe person or the authority on whom the statutory duty is inrposed need be a public official or an official bodl'. A mandamus can issue, for instance, to an official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms ol' the statute under or by vvhich the sociefy is constitulerl or governe<l and also to companies or corporations to carry oul dutics placed on them by the statutes authorising their undertakings, A mandamus would also lic against a c()tnl)an\i constitr.lted by a statute lor

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the purposes ol lullrlling public responsibil itics. [Cf.^{Halsbury's Laws ol England,(3rd ed.), Vol. II, p. 52 and} onwards].

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Further, in Andi NIukta Sadguru Shrec Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Snrarak Trust v. V.R. Rudanie, the Supreme Court held that the phrase'any person or authority' is wide enough to include norl-statutory bodies u,hich perform public duty. Further, the Court hcld that issuancc of writ of mandamus does not depend on the identity o1' the body against which mandamus is sought, but depends on the natrrre of dutl' such body performs. If such body performs a public dutv. thelr a rvrit is maintainable. The relevant paragraphs are extractecl belo$

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There, horn'evcr. the prerogative rvrit of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to cornpe I performance of public duty. The "public authority'' lor them means everybody which is creatod bl' statute - and whose powers and duties are defined by statutc. So govcmrnenl dcpartments, local authorities, police authorities. and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ''public authorities". But there is no such limitation for ou r High Cou rts to issue the writ "in the nature of nrandamus". Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue rvrits in thc nature of prerogatlve writs. This is a striking departure from the

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'1tese;^{z scco9t}

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English lau. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any^person or authority", It^can be^issued "for^the cnfolcenrcnt of an1 of the fundamental rights and for any other pru pose".

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**a

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The ternr "authority" used in Article 226, in the conlert, ruust receile a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article [ 2. Article I 2 is relevant only for the purpose of enforr:enrent of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 126 confers power on the High Courts to issue u rits lor r,nfcrrcenrent of the fundamental rights as well as non-frrntlrrnrcntal rights. The words "any person or autholitJ^" used in ,\rticle 226 are, therefore, not to be confinerl onl5' to statutory authorities and instrurnentalities of lhe State. They may cover any other pcrson ol botll Jrerfornring public duty. The form of the body ,:oncerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. Thc duty must be judgcd in the light of positive obligation owed by lht person or authority to the affected party. No matter b) rvh:rt nreans the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation erisls mandanrus cannot be denied.

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lJere arri]in \ e ural point out that mandamus cannot be tlcnied on llrc^.1rorrntl that the duty to be enforced is not intposed br ihe slarute.^{('orlnrenting} on the development ol this larv. I)"t,fcssor de Slnith states: "To be enforceable by rnandamrrs I public durl'docs not necessarily have to be one iurposcd bv stalutc. [t nrav be sufficient for the duty to have

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been imposed b1 charter, common larv, custom or even contract.'' [ .ludicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn.. p. 5401 Wc sharc this view.'fhe judicial control over the last cxpanding rnazc ol bodies aflccting the rights of the pcoplc should not bc put into watertight compartment. It should remain llexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstanccs. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available "to reach injustice wherever it is found". Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relicf under Article 226.We, therefore, reject the contcntion urgcd lbr the appellants on the maintainability U l' tlrc rrlitnctitirrn

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Sinrilar r,ic*s l ert crprcsscd by the Suprerne Couft in Ramakrishna Mission (supra) r,hcrein the Courl held that a writ petition undcr Article 226 is maintainable against a private body that performs a public lunction or dischargcs a public dutv. However, the Court held that not all actions of private bodies discharging public functions are amenable to u,rit^{jurisdiction.} As stated above, only actions that partake the character of a public function or a public duty ate amcnable to challenge under Article 226.

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ln a recent decision in St. Mary's Education Socieh (supra). thc Suprc-me Cour-t held that every dispute of a private body is not amenable to rvrit^{jurisdiction.} The Court held that an action

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rvhich has a prrblic law element is amenable to writ^{jurisdiction.} The

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relevant pa:agraphs are extracted below:

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It needs no elaboration to state that a school alfiliated to lhe CBSE which is unaided is not a State within Articlc 12 of thc Constir ution of India [See : Satimbla Sharma v . St. Pauls Senior Secona'ary School l(201I) l3 SCC 7601. Neverthcless the school discharges a public duty ol imparting education rvhich is a lundanrental right of the citizen [Sce^'. K. Krishn,zmacharyulu v. Sri Venkateshwaro Hindu College oJ' Ertgineering.(1997) 3 SCC 5711. The school affiliated to thr: CIISE is therefore an "authority" amenable to the .iurisdiction under Article 226 ol' the Constitution ol lndia lSc-e : Birn-r, Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 6571. Horverer. a .judiciai rcview of the action challenged by a party can be had by rcsofl to the wrii^{jr:risdiction} only if there is a public law elcmenl and not to enforce a contract of personal service. A contlact of personal service includes all matters relating to the service ol the employee - confirmation, suspension, transfer, termination, etc. [See:^{ApolloTyres Ltd. v. C.P.Sebastian,(2009) l4 SCC 360].}

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This Oourl in Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM Universily. reported in(2015) 1(, SCC 530: (2015) 13 Scale 622,held that when a private :od1 exercises its public functions even il'it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy, not onl), undcr the ordinarl, law, bu: also by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constituti(Jn. In the case of Binny Ltd. (slpra), this Court held that the Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in such a wav

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_J-

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that a writ of mandarnus could be issued even against a private authority. However, such private authority rnust bc discharging a public function and that the decision sought to be correctcd or enforced must be in the dischargc olpublic function.

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We may sum up our final conclusions as under:-

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(a) An application under Article 226 ol the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, thc body or the pcrson must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to thc public involving the public law element. Similarly, lor ascerlaining the discharge ol public function, it must bc establishcd that the bodl or the person was seeking to achieve the same fbr the collectir e benefit of the public or a section of it and the authoriti, to do so must be accepted by the public.

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(b) Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ^jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts rvithoul having any public element as its integral part cannot be rcctified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of^jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulatcd b1, the statutory provisions or the employer had the status o[^"Statc" within the expansive definition under Article l2 or it n,as lound that the action complained of has public law clcnrcnt.

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(c) It must be conseclucntly held that while a body may be discharging a public firnction or pcrforming a public duty and thus its actions bcooming amenable to .judicial review by a Constitutional Court. its cmployces rvould not have the right to invol..e the porvers ol the High Court conlerred by Article 226 in respect^(11'matter relaling to service whcre they are not govemed or c,rntrolled by thc statutory provisions. An educational institution may peri'ornr mvriad functions touching various facets of public lile and in the srrcietal sphere. While such ol those functions as would Iall \vithin Ihc domain ol a^''public function" or "public dutl,'' be undisputedly opcn to ohallenge and scrutiny under Artiole 226 ot'the Constitution. tlrc actions or decisions taken solr:l)' rvithin tlrc- conllncs ol- rn ordinary contract of service, having no statutorv lbrcc or backing. cannot be recognizc<l as being arlenablc to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In thc absence of thc service conditions being controlled or governed b) slatulory prorisions, the matter would remaitr in lhe realm of an ordinary' oontract ol sen'ice.

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(d) Eren if it be perccived that imparting education by private unaided the school is a publio duty within the expanded expression of the terrn. an employec ol a non-teaching staff engagcd trv the school lbr the purposc ol' its adrninistration or intemal nranagement is onl) an agcncl created by it. It is immatoriirl whether^''A" or "B'' is employed by school to dischalge that duty. In arry case. the terms of ernployment of contra( t l)et$'een a sehool ancl non-teaching staff cannot and should not b!' construcd t() be an inscparable part ol the obligation to irnpart etlucarion. lhis is particularly in respect to the disciplinarl' procecdings that ma)' be initiated against a

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1-6

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particular employce. It is only rvhcre the removal ol an employee of non-teaching stalf is regulated by sornc statutory provisions, its violation by the employcr in contravention ol law may be interlered by the court. But such interlerence will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the hasis ol interference in discharge of public duty.

¶142

(e) From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public larv is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challcnged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a privatc charactcr.

¶143

From the abovc decisions, it is clear that a writ petition against a private body perfomting a public lunction is maintainable, provided the action ofsuch private body has sorne public law element involved. In other words, only actions perlornred by private bodies in discharge of a function having a public law character is amenable to writ^{jurisdiction.} Therefore, a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable if the private body performs a public function and the impugned action shall fall within the ambit of public law.

¶144

This raises a question what constitutes a public function or public duty. The Supreme Court in Binny Ltd. r'. V. Sadasivan'o held that public functions are those which are sirnilar to the ones performed

¶145

'olzoos;^{6 scc sst}

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¶147

by the Strrte in its sovcreign capacity. Further, a public function is a lunction ne trnred lbr the collective benefit of the society. The

¶148

relevant p:rriigraphs are extracted below:

¶149

I l. Jt di,ri ri ro ieri, is designed to prevent the cases ol abuse of pou'e a:rtl ncqlect ol'dub hy public authoiities. However, under our C;;r;l tution. Article 226 is couched in such a way that a rvrit of mi ntlenrus coLrld bc issued even against a private authority. Ilor.r'cvcr . such prir rrte authority must be discharging a public luncti rr ir rti tire dcci:iou sought to be corrected or enforced must be in rli;r har.qu rrf ir public iunction. The role of the State cxpanded cnornrousll antl attempts have been made to create various :tqcncies to pcrform the governmental functions. Sever:rl^{(.rorl)()ralions} and companies have also been formed b) thc^(lorernnrenl to run industries and to carry on trading activities. Ihese have come to be known as public sector undcrtakings. Horvocr, in the interpretation given to Article 12 ot the^{('onstitution,} this Court took the view that many of these cornpanies and corporations could come within the sweep of ,\rticle l2 of the Constitution. At the same time, there an' private bodies also which may be discharging public funt'(ions. lt is rlifficult to draw a line between public functions anrl privrrle functions when they are being dischargetl by a prrrelv private authority. Abody is perforrnirrg a "public function" when it seeks to achieve some collectire bcnefit lbr the public or a section ofthe public and is accerrterl bl the yrublic or that section of the public as having authoritr to rlo so. Bodies therefore exercise public

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¶151

functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest. In a book on Judicial Review of Administratit,e Action^(5th Edn.) by de Smith, Wooll & Jowell in Chapter 3. para 0.24, it is stated thus:

¶152

"A body is perlorrning a 'public function' when it seeks to achievc some colleclive benefit lor the public or a section of the public and is acceptcd b1' the public or that section of the public as having authorit) to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions u'hcn thei' intcrvene or participate in social or economic allairs in the public interest. This may happen in a uide varicty of rravs. l'-or instance, a body is performing a public lunction rrtcn it providcs^'public goods' or other collective scrviccs. such as health carc, education and personal social servioes, lronr lunds raised by taxation. A body may perlorm public functions in the fonn of adjudicatory services (such as those ol the crirninal and civil courts and tribunal system). They also dri so il thcy rcgulate commercial and professional activities to ensure cornpliancc with proper standards. For all these purposes, a range ol legal and administrative techniques may be deploycd, including rule rnaking, adjudication (and other forms ol dispute resolution); inspcction; and licensing.

¶153

Public functions nced not be the exclusive domain of the Stato. Charities. self-regulatory organisations and other nominally privatc institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchangc. I lo-u-d's ol' I-ondon, churches) may in reality also pcrfbrnr sonlc typcs ol'public lunction. As Sir John Donaldson. M.R. urged. it is important lor the courts to 'recognise the rcalities of executir,e porvcr' and not allow 'their vision to be

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¶155

clou,lerl D), the subllety and sometimes complexitv ol thc u'af in rvhich it can be exerted'. Non-governmental bodies such as thesc are just as capable olabusing their powers as is Ciovemment."

¶156

No 'r' coming to the facts of the case, Respondent No. 2 is involved in in-rparting education. Education is a service having a public clrar,:,rter and right to education IS recognised as a constituticnal right. Imparting education, no doubt, is for the collective gorrd of the society. Therefore, Respondent No. 2 clischarges a pLrblic function by imparting education

¶157

{s stated above, mere discharge of public lunction by a prir rtc bocil i: not enough to maintain a writ petition Lrnder Articie 116. thc inrpugned action of the private body shalt involve a public law elemer t irnd must not be in the nature of private law involvir-rg individuals. irL the present case, t}re question would be whether tl're action of RcsFondent No. 2 in suspending the Petitioners herein has a public law elernent.

¶158

In l(.K. Saksena v. International^(lonrmission un Irrigation & Drainagelr, the Supreme Court held that private la'uv dcals rvith irdi''idual relationships like contracts or torts rvhich hare a

¶159

.,1201s) 4 sCC 67(l

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separate enforcement mechanism. The relcvant paragraphs itre ex lracted bclorv:

¶162

What follows from a minute and carelul reading ol thc aloresaid judgrnents of this Coufi is that if a person or authorit) is "State" within the meaning of Article l2 ol the Constitution. admittetill a writ petilion under Arliclc 226 rvould lic against such a person or body. However, we may add that cven in such cases writ rvould not lie to enforce private law rights. There are a catena ol'.iudgments on this aspect and it is not nccessarl,to ref'cr to those^judgments as that is the basic principlc of.judicial revics ol an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious. A private law is that part of a legal system rvhich is a pan of' colnmon lar.v that involves relationships betwcen individuals. such as law ol contract or torts. Therefore, even il'rlrit petition would be maintainable against an authority. which is^"State" under Article 12 of the Constitution, belore issuing arrr srit. particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisly that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.

¶163

Within a couple of years of the framing ol the Constitution, this Court remarked in Election Commission of lndia v. Soka Venkata Rao lElection Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao. AIR 1953 SC 2l0l that administrative law in India has beqn shaped in the English mould. Power to issue writ or any ordcr of direction for "any other purpose" has been held to be included in Article 226 of the Constitution with a vierv apparentll to placc all the I Iigh Courts in this country in somervhat the sanro posititrn irs

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the Court of the King's Bcnch in England. It is for this^reason ordinary "privatc law remedies" are not enlorceable through extraoldinary writ^{jurisdiction,} oven though brought against public arrthorities (see Administrative /cw. 8th lldn., H.W.R. Wade and C.F, Forsyth, p. 656). In a number of' decisions, this Court has held that oontractual and comurercial obligations are enforceable only by ordinary action and not by^judicial review.

¶166

./ts stated above, the public function/duty performed by Respondent No 2 is imparting education to students. Il any action of an educatiorlal institution elfects the right to education of a student, it partakes a public larv element as imparting education is a public law function. S,.ucents who arc suspendccl bv a pri ,ate educational institution fionr attending classcs and who challenge such suspension under Article 226 stand on a dif'ferent fboting than that of private individuals involved in private disputes like breaches of contract or commission o1' offences. Students and their right to education is central to any cducational institution. Any action eflbcting their right to education involves a public laq element. Such action should be the one which dir,:ctly effects thc stlldcnts and their education. The students can:hullenge sucir actiorr and its validity thereol. The courts can decide whether such action was valid,^jLrstified and reasonable in light of the fa:ts c,f the case and the applicable rules olthe university

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ln the present case. Respondent No. 2 performs a public function. It suspended the Petitioners hcrein indefinitely rvith immediate effect on the ground of registration of IrlR. The action of suspension ciirectly etTects the Pctitioners' education and such suspension involves a public law element. Thercfore, the present writ petition is maintainable.

¶169

Issu e No.2:-

¶170

As stated above, the Petitioners herein contend that they were suspended without any' opporlr:nitv o1' hearine ol show-cause notice which violates principles ol'natural .justicc. Respondent No. 2 contends that the Rules do not contempiate lollowing principles of natural justice. Therefore, it is apposite to extract the relevant Rules under which the Petitioners rvere suspended:

¶171

Acts of Indiscipline and Nlisconduct: An 1, act of misconduct committed by a student shall be an act of violation of discipline of the University. Without prejudice to thc gcncrality ol the foregoing provision, violations of the discipline shall include: (i) Disruption of teaching, student examination, researoh or administrative work, curricular or extra-curricular activity or residential lile of the rnernbers ol thc [Jniversit1,. including any attempt to prevent any member of the Universitl or its stafl from carrying on his or her u'ork: and any act rcasonably likely to cause such disruption.

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(ii) Use of unfair means or malpractices in exanrination. Any ol the lollowing events^(inclusive bul not crhaustive) shall constitute "unlair" practicc(s) during exarninations:

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a. P.rssessing unauthorized material like notes, small slips in pockets. on the body. or. in any other form, lil<c cell phones. vanitv bags and purses, whether used or nol.

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b. Copying lroni other students.

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c. A lkrr.r,ing/enabling other students to copy from one"s paper.

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d.^'taking or giring any' kind ol assistance to other StI^rd cnt .

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e. Conrnrunicating with the students in or outside the exirniination hall duringexamination time.

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i Relerring to any notes. slips or other sources in the lvasll roorll.

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g. Vis iting iurv f lacc trther than wash room during L'\a lr I illa t ion.

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h. lndrscipline and disruptive conduct.

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i. I(csorting to an) other unfair means to cause or obtain ad,.rr)tagc

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(iii) D;rrlrr:ing or dclrrcirrg [:niversity property or the property of rnembers o1'the Unive rsit<sup>()r any olher property inside or outside the [Jnivers ity carnpus.

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(iv) Errgaq,ng in. or:nv attcmpt, at, wrongful confinement of teachers. :,ilicq-s, cmpio)'ees and students of the University, or carnping rusidc and creating nuisance inside the boundaries of houses o1'rr'uchers. olllccrs irnd other members of the University.

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(v) Usc ,r1 abusive and derogatory slogans or intimidating language or inciternenr of hatrcd and violence or any other act calculat:d t(, lurther thc sanrc.

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(vi) Cornrrittrng anv act ol'cvbercrime like damage or cause to be clanrag'":tl anY cofrpr.rtcr. cornputer system or computer nr:[vork dara. con.rputcr data hasc or any other programmes residing it, suclt conrputcr. colnputer system or computer nclrvork: stt'al c-nrail ll)s and passwords of any person, inrpersorutiorr. serrdirtg tlcflntaton,. objectionable and obscene

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mcssagcs. rnails etc.. and any other act which is punishable under Inlonnation Technology Act. 2000 as amended from time to time and for the tirne bcing in lbrce.

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(vii) Ragging in any lorm.

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L,xplanation: Anyone indulging in ragging is liable to disciplinary action including expulsion fi'orn the University in accordance rvith UGC llegulations on Curbing the Menace of Ragging in IJigher Educational I nstitutions,2009 as amended from time to time and also liable lor prosecution under the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition of Ragging Act. 1997 (as applicable to the State of Tclangana ) anti untler othcr relevant laws. The relevant provisions of t-i(;C llegtrlations orr ragging are appended as Anncxure- I lo thcsc Itule s.

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(r,iii)Scxual Ilarassnrent: Scxual harassment in any form^,rvill be tiablc fbr action Lrnder University Grants Commission (Prevention and Rcdrcssal ol sexual harassment of women ernployees and studcnts in higher educational institutions) Rcgulations. 2015 and also liablc to criminal prosecution under the relevant lari s.^'l-hc rclevant provisions of UGC Regulations are appended as Annexurc-2 to these Rules.

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(ix)Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, gender ident it1/cxpression. religion, caste, age, color, creed. nationalit)'or cthnic origin. physical, mental or sensory disability and marital status is prohibited.

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(x) An assault upon. or intimidation of, or insulting behavior torvards a tcachcr.o fficer. cmployee or student or any other person.

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(xi) Causing or colluding in the unauthorized entry/trespass ol any person into the campus or in the unauthorizcd occupat ion/trespass ol an1' portion of University premises, including hostcls or rcsidcncc. by any person.

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(xii) tlc11i6e cnrolled in rnore than one coursc ol studl simultaneouslv in violation of the University rules. (xiii) t;6,11n.,111ing forgery, tampering with or nlisuse of the linivcrsit),^,Jocuments or records, identification cards ctc. (xir') [urrishing lalsc certificate or lalse infomration to an1' olfice undel the control and jurisdiction of the University. (xv) a. Procuremcnt, possession, distribution and / or consumption of tobacco. crgarettes and alcohc,l in any fornr in the Campus or entering the canrpus in an inebriat.'rl condition shall constitute a serious r.r.riscon cluct. b. Itrocurernent" possession, distribution or use of narcotic drugs riithin the^('ampus shall constitute a very serious rnisconduct. Actions to^l:,c taken under these Rules are without prc.iudice to crinrinal prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psvchotropic Substances .^ct, 1985. (xvi) [ndulgi;rg in acts of gambling or carrying of beveragcs other than in seal:tl condition into the University prcmises. (xvii) Posscssing or using any weapons of offenoe, such as knives, l,athis. iron chains, iron rods, sticks, explosives and fire arms in the University premises. (xviii) Arousing communal, caste or regional feelings or creating rlisharrnonl, arnong students. (xix) Not disolosing one"s identity when asked to do so by an ernpioyce or c,fficer of the University who is authorizcd to ask fbr identitl,. (rr) I'earing ()l'pages. defacing. burning or destrot,ing ol- books ol'anv librar.. ,rr serninar.

i I I

(xxi) Unauthorizcd occupation ol hostel, rooms or unauthorized acquisition or use of lJniversity furniture in one"s hostel room or clscn,here. Day scholars are prohibited entr), into hostel blocks/rooms. Day scholars shall leave the cautpus alicr academic hours, unless permitted by Faculty Coordinators for Student Club related activity/cvents in rvriting. under due intrrnation to Administration.

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(xxii) Accornmodating guests or other persons in hostels *,ithout pcrmission of the DirectorlDean/Addl. Registrar or Warden.

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(r-<iii)Any act ol moral turpitude.

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(.utit')Attt' offence under low.

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(xxr,) lmproper behaviour while on tour or cxcursion.

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(rxvi) Pasting of posters or distributing parnphlets, handbills etc. ol- an objectionable nature or writing on walls and disfiguring huildirrgs. and

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(xxvii) Violation of Research Integrity: Distorting researclr procedures by fabrication of data, generating and reporting fiaudulent data or distortion of the research process in any other \'avs.

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I'lagiarism and unauthorized Stealing ol Other"s Intcllectual Works: Plagiarism shows the stealing of another person"s intellectual property which includes ideas, inventions, original u,orks of authorship, rvords, slogans, designs, proprietarl inlbnnation. etc and misleading faculty members about thc condition under rvhich the work was prepared. Plagiarisrn in anr tbrrl will also be liable under relevant laws and UGC rc{ulations liorn timc to time.

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(sviii) Any other act which may be considcred by the Vicc Chancellor or any other officer delegated in this behall bv thc Llniversit),to be an act olviolation of discipline.

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Part lll: OlTlcers authorized to take disciplinary action

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Without rrreiudice to the Dorvers of the Vice-Chancellor^q9 specified u nder the University Itules. the llesistrar/ Director of all Facultics of the concerncd Facultv/Ad ministration^is authorizrd to tnke tlisciplin:rrv aclion in all acaricnric matters and Director Administration is authorized to take disciplinarl action in all non-academic matters bv rvav of imposing^penalties as specified in part IV of tbese Regulations. based upon {he findings of the Discirrlinan' Committce on the ac t of misconduct / intliscinlinc.

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Part IV Penaltie s

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Nature of Penalties:^'l'he lbliorr ing penalties nral'. Ibr act ol indiscipline or misconduct, be irnposod on a studertt. nantely:

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i) Written^rv rming and inlorrnltion to tltc^parent s 'guartlian

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ii) Fine of Rs.5,0001 u,hich mal cxtcnd rrp to Rs.25.0()0/-

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iii)Suspension from thc Class/l)e na rt nr cn t/Co llcqe/liostel/ Mess/Libr:rry/[,ab or from availins of anv other Iiacilitv.

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iv) Suspension or cancellation ol'scholarships. tello*'ship or any financial assistance lrom any sourcc or recommendation to that effect to the sanctioning agency.

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v) Recovery of pecuniary loss/damage/destruction caused to University I'roperty.

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vi) Disqualification lrom placenrent proccss, or lrorn holding any representative position in the ClassiCollegeil lostel/Mess/Sports/ Clubs and in similar other bodies.

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vii) Expulsion lrom the [)epartnrent,l f'acLrltl'/ [-[ostell Mess/ Library/ Club tbr a specilied period.

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viii) In case ol rnalpractice and use of un f air means in examination; Cancellation of Student Registration for the Course/Program or non-registration lor the subsequent semester along rvith any other punishrnent as rnay be decided.

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ix) Issue of'fransler Cerlificate.

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x) Permanent Expulsion from the Universitl, lor Very Serious Misconduct.

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xi) Disqualification lrom lurthcr studies. or prohibition of further admission or re-admission.

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{ny student agajnst n'honr a scrious chargc of nrisconduct has been made^qr141 be suspcnrlcd fronr thc lrostcl/rolls of thc University by the disciplinary authorit'r'nrcntioned at Para5, pending gnquiry or rrending tri:rl on a cognizablc offence by :r court of larv.

¶229

No enal rovidcd in^(-la u s cs vtI \ t t\ x and (xi) of Rule 7, shall be imnosed without due enquirv and without^giving the student a reasonable opDortunity of beinq heard. Penalties in certain cascs of serious misconducts are specified in Annexure- 3 to these Rules.

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Part V Constitution of Discirrlinarv Committee and Procedure for Disciplinarv Action

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A Disciplinary Committee shall be constituted by the Vice Chancellor for the purpose ol inquiring and invcstigating into complaints of misconduct-

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i) Three members nominated by the Vice Chanccllor hom a^panel of twelve members (3 each from the liaculty of Scicnce and l'echnology. Faculty of Management. Facultl of [-au'. and thc ,\dministrative wing)shall form quorum Ibr each Disciplinarl⁽ ornrr)ittce. out ol' whom one member shall be from thc Administralir e \'ins.

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ii) The Disciplinary Committee will inquirc/invcstigale into the complaint and submit a reporl not later than l5 rvolking da1's of^its constitution along with its findings. *,hether the concertrcd found

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itI

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guilty or not. t() the Registrar/Director/Dean of the Faculty/Adrninistration to which the student belongs.

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iii)'fhe sard Registrar'Director,'Dean of the Faculty/Administration based r.xr :hc report o{' thc Disciplinary Committee, may take appropriate decision on pcnaltr and communicate the same within a period ol st . en ',rorkinu dars ol the rcceipt of'the aforesaid repo(.

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iv) An appe,il slrall Iie r,garnst the orders of the authorities mentioned in these Ruics to the V ice -C hancellor. whose decision shalI be final. 'lhe Appeal shall be prc ierrcd/sLrbm itted within 10 days from the date of Order passed b1, thc c,rncerned authority.

¶239

Rulc I (xxir,) f ro\ ides that any offence under law will be

¶240

treated as indi:;,:iplinc anrl mi-sconduct. Fufther, Rule 7 provides for

¶241

penallie s ancl : lur.rsc (iii) o1 1l)r- said Ruleprovides the power of suspension. Rr 1,.' 9 states ihet a studL'nt charged with misconduct can be sr-rspendcci^p,'ncing cnqLrir'1 or' pcnding trial by the disciplinary authority. Ruie i() stirtcs that no pcnalty can be imposed under clauses (vii), (viii), (ix). rr) and (x: ) of ItLrie 7. unless an enquiry is conducted and a reasonable opporlunity ol hearing is granted.

¶242

Under Parl V and Rule 12, a detailed mechanism is prescribed lbr corrstitulion ,rf a I)isciplinary Committee and the mode and timeline rvithin rvhich irrr cst ip.ation/enq u iry should be completed.

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FLrrthc . Itulc 5 pror irlcs that Director Administration is authorized to taK,,'disciplin.rrl lction in all non-academic matters by

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imposing penalties under Part IV (Rule 7) based on the findings of the discipl inary committee.

¶246

In the present case, the Petitioners were charged under Rule 4 (xxiv) as an FIR was registered against them. They were suspended pending enquiry under Rule 7 (iii) read with Rule 9.

¶247

It is rclevant to note that Respondent No. 2 contends that it is not necessary to constitute a disciplinary committee and grant opportunity of hcaring as hearing under Rule l0 is only granted belore penalties undcr clauses (vii). (riii), (ix), (x) and (xi) of Rule 7 arc imposed. It contends that since the penalty was imposed under Rule 7 (iii), no opportunity olhearing is required.

¶248

3l. This Court carrrot accept the contention of Respondent No 2. It is relevant to note that in the matters of action pertaining to indiscipline by educational authorities, the principles of natural^justice do not apply strictly. 1'he application of principles of natural^justice depends on the facts of the case and the effect of the impugned action.

¶249

Dealing ivith a case where a student was dismissed from the rolls of a sclrool. a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in

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-i t I I

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Headmaster, I)oilkav High School, P.O. EdakkulamQuilandy v.

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Murali A.r2. held as follows:

¶254

Not\'itlr!{anding tho above, the leamed counsel lbr the first respondent reitcrated lhe argument that there is violation of the principles of'natural justice in that the deli.nquent pupil or his guardian dirl not get adequate opportunity to deny or defend the charges.^'[ht' submission, in substance, appears to be that mere issuing ol'slrou' cause notice and calling lor explanation would not sufficc In other words the delinquent pupil or his guardian should have lreen heard belore action was taken.^'l'his submission persuatlcs LLs to exarnine the width and amplitude o1'the enquirl undcr l{uic^(, ,hile disrnissing a delinquent pupil. fhc relevattt portion o1'C hirpter lX, I{ule 6 is extracted below: ''6. Suspens;on and dismissal:- (l) Any pupil who is deiiberatcl,r' rnsubordinate or mischievous or guilty of fraud or nralpracticc rn connection with examinations or who is found guilty ol an1, other oficnce under these rules or who by his proved conduct is in the opinion of the Headmaster likely to cause an un4rolesome influence on other pupils. may be, according to the degree of offence, censured, suspended or disrnisscd by the tleadmaster. (The Headmaster ol a Secondary School ma1 rlso lor adequate reasons impose f,rnes on pupils studying in Standards VIII to X). In case of dismissal, a report shall be scnt to thc Eduoational Officer. An appeal ltorn thc dismisscd pupil shall lie to the Educational Officer."

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19!r4 SCC OnLine Kei 73

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A Division Bcnch of this court had occasion to considcr this Rulc 6 inA. Raghavanv.D.E.O. Attingal, 1971 Ker LT 658 :(AtR 1972 Kerala 108), rvherein it is observed: "Rule 6 has a purposc. and that is to maintain discipline and order in a school: and fiorr the languagc ol the said rule, it does not appear that it is intcnded that. rvhen a Headmaster takes action under this rule, the rules of natural^justice should be followed strictly". The above rulc did not contemplate an enquiry known to disciplinary action against a civil seri,ant. It did not provide lor the application of'principlcs o1'natural .justice either directly or impliedly. There is no cxpress provision much less any indication in the Rule ro hear the dr:linqucnt student or his guardian before passing the ordcr ol' disnrissal. Ordinarily the Headrnaster need not corrduct arr enquirl rvhich is not prescribed under the Rules. Ii nray hc bccause ol his 'pivotal position' in maintaining discipline in thc sclxrol. The duty of the Headmaster and Teacher in maintaining internal discipline is paramount. When they see any slightest threat to discipline, preventive measures are enforced eo-instanti. That necessarily obliterates the extravagence of a full-fledged enquiry. When the courts have recognized the power of the school master to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on erring pupil, the holding of a full enquiry for indiscipline appears to be out of place. The I')nglish larv, no doubt, has recognized the above poncr of' thc school master lor purpose of correction and cnlbrcing discipline. in Reginav. Hopley, (1860) 2 F & F 202). uherr' Cockburn, C.J. observed: "By the law ol England, a parcnt or a school rnaster (who for this purpose represents the parent ancl ltas tlrc. parental authority delegated to him), may lor the purpose of

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correcting what is cvil in the child inflict rnoderate and reasonable colporal punishment, always, however. with this condition, that it is moderate and reasonable." This principle has been follorved by the Indian courts.^(See: Ganesh Chandra Saha v. Jitt' Roj Sontani, AIR 1965 Cal 32, Sankunni v. Venkataramani, AIR 1922 Madras 200, and G.B. Ghatev. Emperor, AIR 1949 Bombay 226. Without juxtaposing this trait in the teacher-student affinity, it rnay not bc possible lor this court to delineate amplitude o{'the procccding in a dismissal ofa student under Rule 6 and the applicabilitl'ol-right ol'hearing in such proceeding.

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The Supreme Courl in A.K. Kraipak t. Llrtiotr of lndia. AIR 1970 SC i50, held that thc rules o1' nrtural .iusticc airns at securing^justice or to prevcnt injustioc. [-hcr operatc only in the areas not covered by any law validll urade. [n Union of Indiav. J.N. Sinha, AIR 1971 SC 40. it u'as laid down that principles of natural justice do not supplant law but supplement it. If a stalutory provision either specilically or b1 necessary implication excludes the application ot' anl rulcs ol' natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate olthe legislature or the statutory authority and read into thc concemed provision of the principles of natural .justice. In this vieri. the Suprenre Court held in that case, the principles ol natural justice cannot be read into Fundamental Rules and no opporlunity can be given belbre compulsorill, retiring an employee as that irnplication does not arise by reason of the exprcss statutorv languagc. Applf ing this ratio the Supreme Courl in Union o.l'lndiu t. L-x^(.-onstuhle Amrik Slzg, AIR l99l SC 564" hcld that in cases ol'spccial enacrrnents like Army Act all the principlcs ol'natural justice canrrot be

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imported. It furthcr held that thc sarnc ratio *'ill appl1, lo a petition under S. 117(2) oi the Border Securiq, Irorcc Act. 1968. It is also pointed out that Chapter XIll consisting ol Rulcs 167 tcr 169 olthe B.S.F. Rules deals rvith pctitions Illccl Lrndcr S. i l7 oi the Act and "even in thcm there is nothing to indicate that a hearing has to be given befbre disposal ol a petition."

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I l. We do not find any reason to detract in extcuding latio in Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, AIR l97l SC^,10 (supra). and Union of India v. Ex Constable Antrik Szrg/r, AIR l99l SC 564 (supra), to academic bodics like schools and colleges, where the prevalence of discipline is asseverated. It cannot therefore be said, opportunity of hcnring to thc dclinquent student or his guardian is ahvays an invariable attrihutc in a proceeding under. Rulc 6. We are fulll conscious of thc position that "principles of natural justicc arc fundanrcntal in he constitutional set up of this country" (CharanlalSahu v. Union of Indiu, (1990) I SCC 613 : (AIR 1990 SC 1480). However, the limitations and reslrictions imposed by the Supreme Court in this regard on different occasions are reverberative. Once it said "the extcnt and application of the doctrine of natural^justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight^jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon thc nature and jurisdiction conferred on thc administrative authority, upon the character of the rights affected, the scheme arrtl policv of the statute and other relevant circurnstances tlisclosetl in the particular case" (Uniott of India v. P.K, Rol', AIR 1968 SC 850). In Maharashtra State Board of Secondurl, attd Higher

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Seconda,\ Educatiot,t,. K.S Gantlhi. (1991) 2 SCC 716 :⁽¹⁹⁹¹ AIR SCW ti79) (srrpra). the Supreme Court remarked "the applicabiJrty of the principles ol'natural^justice is not a rule of thumb or straight^jacket tirrrnula as an abstract proposition ol law. It dcpen<ts on the lilcts of the casc, naturc of the inquiry and the cff'ect ol thc ordcr/<lecision on the rights ol the person and attendanl circumstances." ln a rccent decision, Rattan Lal Sharma t l4anaging Comntittee. (1993) 4 SCC 10 :^(AIR 1993 SC 2155 ) the Supr crre^('oLr( has approved the lollowing observatiL)n ol"ftrcker L..1. rn Russell v. puke ofNorfolk, (1949) I All EI{ l()9 (C.A.).^u hich is lbund to bc very relevant on the point undcl discussior :

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In cases rvhere acadenric discipline is involved rule of hearing has ahvays bcen construed strictly. It is not the indispensa[rle facet of principles of natural^justice. Such rule can be rvaived in situation rvhere Headmaster or Principal is satisfied tlrat thc 'fairness' has been shown to delinquent student or his guarrlian before ac(ion is taken against him. Such satisfaction can lre arrived at by the Headmaster or by the Principal depending on the facts of each case and attendanl circumstances. Issue of a pre-decisional or show cause notice to the dclinquent student or his guardian to cxplain the allegations rvould no doubt constitute 'fairness'. When such fairness is slrown it is for the Headmaster or the Principal to decide anv furthcr opportunity is necessary in the facts of thc case. But rrc can certainly visualise that even fairness to a delinqucnt *oukl. in certain cases, cause more injusticc thun.justice. Recentll' thc Constitution Bench of the

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Supreme Court made a very significant remark about the extension of the rule of natural justice while dealing with the question of furnishing cnquiry report to a delinquent employee. It is contained in hlanaging Director, ECIL v. B. Korunckar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : (AIR 1994 SC 1074). There it is obscrved: "Where. therefore. cven alier the furnishing of the report, no difi'crent consequencc rvould have lollowed, it would be a perversion oi.justicc to pennit the employee to resume duty and to get all thc consequcntial bcnefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishoncst and tl.:e guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justicc to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural cxparrsion of natural .justice."^'fhc Supreme Coun in Karnotaka Public .Service^{('ontrrtis.sion} t. B.M. Vijayashanker. AIR 1992 SC 9-52. rernarkcd:^"L'.ven though the procedure ol allording hcaring is as inrporlant as decision on merits yet urgency of thc nrattcr. or public interesl at times require flexibility in applic.ation ol thc rule as the circumstanccs of the case and the nature of the matter required to be dealt may serve interesl ofjusticc better by denying opportunity of hearing. .....". Irr that case the Kamataka Public Service Commission did not aflord any opportunitl to thc candidates who appeared in competitive exarninations to explain their bona fides and innocence in disobef ing the instructions. But the Kamataka Administrative l rihurral issued directions to get the answer books ol' the candidates craluated.^'l hese dircctions were challenged belbre thc Suprernc C ourt b1 the Puhlic Ser':ice Commission and State ol Kanrataka.^.['he orders of the Administrative Tribunal wcre sct asiclc bl the^SLrpretne Court on the ground that facts ol

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the case Jusrif]. the exclusion of the natural justice before taking any action ;n the mafter. -1^, In ,lib-v p. Chacko (supra), this Court held that not all disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial ln nature and where students act erlantr-v and action is taken against them, the same wiil termed as an adnrinistrative action requiring no compliance of natural justice. Ho*,er,.er, expulsion and rustication entail serious consecluences, thcre{bre, in such cases, principles of natural justice have 1o bc ftrllo\l.e(i. J.he relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

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lt is n,ell seltled tl a student of a college or a school cannot be rusticated '"nout following the principles of narurar jusricc and , t ! i g h .t c. h o o t, u,,,, n, i))) nu,t;,'J';:;'-, :, I ffi l" ::r::"i Iloard cance,lletl erami trebarred rhenr r .m "rJ::, ;ill""lI::;'IiT:.,.*, 'l'hc charge aqairrst them was that they used unfair means in the examinations. l.he action was impugned as violating principles of natural iusticc riticrr wa uon"'o by the High court ln appeal belore the Suprenre "orrt a constitution Bench of the supreme c'ourr considere,r rvheths ot not the college rules provide for -outli ,lrerom pat t?tn *nt a student's examination is cancelled as the authorit) \ ould ben principres or ,,ar urai i,sr ice srr. r d rre .: :,:::',:;::,;:':H . .. . Ihotrgh llrcr.,l,rre thc ts nothing express one wa'v or the other in the Act ( )r the Regulations casting a duty on thc

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Committcc to act judicially, the manner of the disposal. based as it must be on materials placed before it, and the serious el'fccts of thc decisions ol the Conunittee on the examinee conccmed, must Iead to the conclusion that a duty is cast or, the Committce to act judicially in this matter particularly as it has to decide objectively ccrtain f'acts which may seriously affect the rights and careers of' examinecs. before it can take any action in the exercise ol its porver under Rule I ( I ). We are theref,ore of opinion that thc Comrnittec ',vhen it exercises its powers under Rule I ( I ) is acting quasi-.iud icially and the principles ol natural justice rvhich rcquirc that thc otlier party, (namely, the examinee in this case) must bc heard. u.ill apply to the proceedings before the Ccmmittec.

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-ll.^{In nratters of studentdisciline all actions of educational} institutions cannot be termed as^{quasi-iutlicial.} The matters of domcstic discipline ryhere for non-com pliance rvith curricular instructions or deviant student behaviour resulting in inconvenience to other students e/c., the educational institution rvould onlv be actin^g ad ministratively. Horve ver. in the nratter oI erlrlusion oLru5tication, the same is not thc case.^-l'his r'vas explained in Glynn v. Keele University, ( 197 I ) 2 All. IrR 89. The Vice-Chancellor of Keele University took disciplinary action against a number of students who are found standing or sitting naked in the University Campus by fining tcn pounds and cxpelling them from the hostel. The action sas qucstioned b1' one student. The Court noticed the distinction - the naturc ol adrninistrative powers and quasi-judicial powcrs of'arr educational society in the following manner:

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-l'he context ofeducation societies involves a speciai lactor which is not prescnt in olher contexts, namely, the relation ol tutor and pupil 1.e., the society is charged with the suporvision and upbringing of the pupil under tuition, be the socicty a university or college or a school. Where this relationship exists it is^quite plain that on the one hand in certain circumstances the body or individual acting on behalf of the society must be regarded as acting in a quasi-judicial capacity - expulsion lrorn the sociely is the obvious example. On the other hand. there exists a wide range of circumstances in *'hich thc bodi or individual is concerned to impose penalties by way ol dornestic discipline . In these circumstances it seems to me that the body or individual is not acting in a qrnsi-judicial capacity at all but in a magisterial capacity, ie . in the perlbrmance of the rights ancl tluties vcstcd in the society as to the upbringing and supcrviston of' the members ol the society.

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ln the llresent case, the Petitioners herein u'cre suspended indefinitely as an FIR was registered against thern. l'he suspension in the present case entails serious consequences whereby the Petitioners cannot attend classes at Respondent No. 2's campus. An action where there is an indefrnite suspension is penal in nature and must be lbllowed with an enquiry in light ol principles of natural^justice. ln other rvords, the suspension cannot be indefinitc rvithout conduct olan

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cnq ulry

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Even othenvise, Rule 5 provides that an order irnposing any penalty under Part IV should be based on the findings of the Disciplinary Con.rmittee constituted undel Rule 12. Therclorc, Ruic I0 camot be relied upon by Respondent No. 2 to contend that principlcs of natural^justice are not applicable fbr suspension pending enquiry and trial.

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In light of the aforesaid discussion, the present rvlit pctitions are disposed off with the lollowing directions:

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a) In W.P. No. 42467 of 2022 and 42431 ol 1021. Rcspondent No.2 shall constitute a Disciplinary Comnrittee and conduct enquiry by granting an opportunity' ol hearing to thc l)c-titiorrers under Rule 12 of the Rules rvithin 15 days 1l'orr thc date o1: receipt of a copy of this order. The Petitioners helcin arc at liberty to take all the grounds before such Disciplinary Committee.

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b) In W.P. No. 43364 of 2022 is concemed, a Disciplinary Committee was already constituted and a report u,as subrnitted after due enquiry. An appeal befure the V ice-Cl'rancellor was also preferred and the sarle is pending. As such, the Petitioner in the said writ petition is granted liberty to pursuc the said

)

appeal and Respondenr No.2 is directed to decide the appeal

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within I5 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

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Conseqr.rently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall

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also stand c losc,l

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SD/.T.SRINIVAS DEPUD(REGISTRAR ,TRUE COPY// (={J SECTION OFFICER

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One fair copy to THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN (For His Lordship's Kind Perusal)

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To,

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I The Universitl,ilrants Conrnrission, (UGC), Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi, 1 10002

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2 The ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education, (IFHE), Hyderabad Donthanapall,r,. Shankarpalli Road, Hyderabad - 501203, Telangana.

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2 The Registrar^-the ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education (IFHE), Hyderabad Donthanapally. Shankarpalli Road, Hyderabad - 501203, Telangana.

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4 The Under Sec'etary to thr: Government, Government of lndia Ministry of Education, Saslry Bhavan New Delhi. The Secretary, Telangana State Council of Higher Education, Govt. of Telangana Mahavirmarg, Hyderabad 500 028.

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6 The Vice Chanr:ellor, ICFAI Foundation for Higher Education, (Deemed to be University), 65. 3rd Floor, Nagarjuna Hills, Pun.jagutta, Hyderabad.

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7 The ICFAI Law College, IFHE - IBS Campus, Donthanapally, Shankarapally Road, Hyderabad.

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6 11 L.R. Copies o The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi.

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10 The Secretary, Telangana Advocates Association Library, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad.

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11 One CC to Srr A. Venkatesh, Advocate [OPUC] 12 One CC to Snrt Megha Rani Agarwa, SC for University Grants Commission loPUCl

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IJ One CC to Sr Kailash Nath P.S.S., Advocate [OPUC]

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14 One CC to Snrt M. Sowjanya Yadav, Advocate [OPUC] '15 One CC to Sr Gadi Praveen Kumar, Deputy Solicitor General of lndia [OPUC] 16 One CC to Snrt C. Vani Reddy, SC FOR TSCHED [OPUC] 17 One CC to Sri Pramod Singh, Advocate [OPUC] 18 Two CCs to GP for Higher Education, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OUT]

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