Dismissed

Shri. Gopal Agarwal v. The Special Director

Telangana HC10 Apr 2023WP/4176/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Writ petition challenged an ED order under Section 16 FEMA after Section 6(3)(b) was omitted. The court held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act saves pending proceedings even after omission of the provision; dismissed the writ due to alternate remedy under Section 19 FEMA.

What the court decided

AI extract

Shri. Gopal Agarwal Vs The Special Director — Writ and Judicial Review | Telangana HC (2023)

¶1

[³¹⁶⁸ ]

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HIGH COURT^{FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANAAT HYDERABAD} (SPecial Original Jurisdiction)

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IVIONDAY,^{THE TENTHDAY OF APRIL} TWO THOUSAND^{AND TWENTYTHREE}

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE^{SRI JUSTICE K.LAKSHMAN}

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WRIT PETITI^{ON NO: 4176oF 2023}

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Between:

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Shri. Gopal^{Agarwal s/o late NathmalAgarwalAoed about65 years'Ex'} I\rlanaoino Director, M/;: B;;;l^{sieetsano"Power Pvi Ltd ' Plot No 22'Road} ii;ls, "il;ffi JrI'-uirr.^{er.i M'iredpallv'Secunderabad-500026'}

¶9

2 Shri Piyush^{Agarwal !i;G;;;i[ga'n1iiAgeo.'uout 40 vears' Ex Direclor'} Itr/s Basai steels^{and E,i;J#"t iio iroil'rt zz Road Nir's Mahendra Hills} Eist tvtarreOpatly tvtarreOpatly^{Secunderabad-500026'}

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Eist tvtarreOpatly tvtarreOpatly^{Secunderabad-500026'}

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3 Smt Pushpa^{ngr*;""il;L-"b;p;i7s1al,.Aoed about 60 vears' Ex} Director, Mls -i,ri.^{aasar 3ie"rt-'nO-Fo"t-PvtLtdIPlot No 22' RoadNo 5} ilr"n!"0i, East Mirredpally,^{Secunderabad-500026'}

¶12

1. Smt Sweta^{Agarwal W;;"Pi"iti AgiiiAged-about 40 vears' Ex Director'} M/s Basai Steets^{and'poiv.ie'i' LiolitJt Nt 22 RoadN6 5' Mahendra Hills} iiit tr,tarreapauy,^{Secunderabad-500026}

¶13

iiit tr,tarreapauy,^{Secunderabad-500026}

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1. Shri Mavur^{Asarwai"siJsn''i"c@-Agarwal'Aged about al yqa19'^f^lot} " il.i )2,'iilio r.itss r,rr;h!.iiij'nirii-E st r'rijir"dpallv" Secunderabad-500026 6 smr^{Nisha Agarwal'Wil'"siii 'r'i'v';} 49a*?i^{Aoed about 40 vearsdPlot} No.22, Road^{No S rvlhenir""'iiili.Eastrrrriiredpallvl Secunderabad-500026}

¶15

7 Shri Mridul^{ngr*rr.-'s"lottt C;P;i Ag;*aini:eoabout37 vears'Plot} No.22, Road^{r.ro s. n/larieioir'HiirJEj.ttriarredpalli,secunderabad-soo.o2ji}

¶16

1. smt. saniana^{ngr*Ii'-wTostrii.-rrrriiour AgarvrialAoed about 37 years,Plot} No 22 Road ruo s,^{rv;ienair-riiir.E jii vtriredpaily, -secunderabad-500026}

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...PETITIONERS

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AND

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l.TheSoecialDirector'DirectorateofEnforcement'southernRegionalOffice' iHi["B-#;;; llr'Fi;;. ili Bioir' e wins, 26' Haddows Road'^chennai- 600006.

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Z itr6 Oeputv^{Director, Office of the Additional Director'Enforcement} " Di;;"6lri; Hvderaoad 2onal office' 3rd Floor' Shakar Bhavan' Bisheerbagh,'Hyderabad^-500004' -

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Bisheerbagh,'Hyderabad^-500004' -

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1. Uniorr^{of lndia, ,"p oillt-s""igiary'Depa{pent of Revenue'Ministryof} " F ;.;, r'rottn elb"kl C"nirat Secietariit' New Delhi-1¹⁰⁰⁰¹ '

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...RESPONOENTS

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Fetition uncJer^{Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia prayingthat in the} circumstances^{stated in the affidavitfiled therewith' the High Court may be} pleased to lssue a^{writ,order or directionmore particularly one in the natureof} Writ of Mandamus:-

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(a) declaring tlre rmpugned Order No SDE/SRO/tl^{/i:'.O10112023 dated} 04.01 .2023^passed,y the¹ st^{Respondent ln terms of Sectrc tr 1 6 of the Foreign} Exchange l,/anagem :r't ltct 1999^{(here n referred to a: FI tt/ 119 ]9) wilhregard} to alleged violation:^llection 6(3)(b) of^{FEIVA. 199s} )^{w tir regard to alleged} vrolations Sectron 6 3t(br of FEMA. '1 999 r/w the Regulatrrlrr-' 5( l)(i) of Foreign Exchange Managen errt^(Transfer or^{lssue of Securltybv .:Perrson Resident} Outside lndia) RegLr ations, 2000^{r/w. Paragraphs8 anl 9 of !iche'dule-1thereof,} r/w Sectron 42(1) o F Et/lA, 1999 and also Sections^{:i(b), 4 irnd 3(d) of iEMA,} '1999 as rllegal. arbr rary, and passed without lurisdictton and cluas,h the same as void ab in itto,

¶26

(b) ancl cor serquently stay the operation of tn,: impugned^Order No SDE/SRO/I |YZO'Oll2O23 daled 04 01 2023^{passed by :lte 1't Respondent'} including all thr: conr erluential^proceedtngs.

¶27

lA NO: 1 OF 2023

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Petition unde Section 151 CPC^praying that in tne ciftrurnstances^{stated in} the affidavit fik>d in^,uopcrt of the^petrtion. the High^{Court na)' be pleased to stay} all further proceedir g:; lvith regard to Order No.SDE/SRO/ll'ZOl0112023^daied O4lO1l2O23 passed^)y the'1'r Respondent along^{with consequ:t,tial proceedin!|.} Counsel for the Pel ti()ners: Dr. C.P. RAMASWAMI

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Counsel for the Rer pr:ndent Nos.1 & 2: SRI V. RAMAKRISHNA^REDDY SC FOR DIRECTORATE OI: ENFORCEMENT

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Counsel for the Rer^pondent No.3: SRI GADI PRAVEEN^Kulll/\R, DEPUTY SOLICITOR GENERAL^(:)F INDIA

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The Court made thr following: ORDER

¶32

)

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HON'I]LE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN

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WRIT PETITION No.4l76 ot2023

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ORDER

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'fhe present writ petition is filed challenging the order in SDE/SRO/HYZO|I||2023 dated 04.01.2023 passed by Respondent No. I herein under Section l6 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinalter relerrcd to as 'the Act, 1999').

¶37

Heard Dr. C.P. Ramaswami learned counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. V. I{ama Krishna Reddy lcamed standing counsel for the Directorate of Enfo|cement appearing for the Respondent Nos. I and 2 and Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy Solicitor Gener4l of India, appearing fbr rcspondent No.3. Perused the record

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Facts of the case:-

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Alleging violations under Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 read with Regulation 5( 1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of security by a person resident outside India) Regulations, 2000^{(hereinafterre} lerred to as 'Regulations') and violations under Sections 3(b) & 4 of the Act, 1999, a complaint bearing No. T-3l27lI1ZOl20l I dated^{12.07 .201 7 was} filed before the

¶40

I)irect()ratc o1 l:nforccnrent (hcrcinalier re l'errctl to rr; 'l:l)') urrtjer Scction l6(3) r I .hc Act. 1999.

¶41

J. I)r:r'sr lrt ,o the said contltlaint. l shori L.aru i' 11(,tice d:ttcd 14.01 .)0 7 uu.t issued to ihc Petilioners lrc.rein \ Il(r ir turrl subnrittcd replies to the : aid sho* cause notice on 21.08.101 I r rrl l.i.0g.l0l I An oral hearir g was conducted by Respondent No. I in rr hich the Petitioncr:; pa 1i:ipated and subrnitted their ,r'ritt.'.r sLrlrrrissio,s Thereaftcr. the irnpugne<l order datcd 04.01.2011 was f z :.se(

¶42

I'he I etitioners challenge the impugnec ordc-. rnlr,r. alia. <.tn thc grourd tha rhey WCI'E charged under Secti()u 6(.1 (l',) ol the Act, 1999 rvhich v a: subsequently omitted liorn tlre .,\ct. 1999. rv.e.f r5.10.20t9

¶43

[)urin I the stage ol' admission, prc lir.t in alr ob.iecrior.r \, ils raised b5 Res rr.ndent No. I reearding thc nraintai rirbilitl of the present writ p:t tion. It was contcnded that tlre pe it ion,:r has an efficacior.rs a[1 'rr rative remedv under Section I 9 ot t]r e ./rct. I 999. Therefore,. on tearing the leamed counsel for the part i,:s, this courl rescrved ihe n'at..er for orders to dccide the prciirninari objection of mair.rtaina bilitv o^-the writ petition

¶44

¶45

Since only the question ol'r-naintainability is to be decided,

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this Court deems it appropriate uot to go into to the merits of the dispute and other contentions raised bv the Petitioners herein

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8. Contentions of thc Petitioners

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The present writ petition is u-raintainable as the impugned order was passed without^jurisdiction under Section 6(3) of, the Act, 1999 which was subsequently omitted. Pending proceedings cease to exist under a provision that is omitted

¶49

. Section 6 of the Gencral Clauscs Act, I 897^(hereinafter refened to as 'the Act, 1897') is not applicable to omissions and it only applicable to repeals. Reliance is placed on RayalaCorpn.^(P)'

¶50

Ltd. v. Director of Enforcementr.

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lu. Existence of an altemative remedy is not a bar to file a^writ petition.

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9.Contentions ofRespondent Nos. I &²

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i. The present writ petition is not maintainable as^the Petitioners have an efficacious and alternative remedy under Section 19 ofthe Act, 1999

¶54

\rgos)^{z scc +rz}

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iI l'roct:edin.:s *ltich arc pendinu urrde l a i.r.or isiorr uhich is rul,scquc.ll) o.tiLted cio .oL ccase lo,:rist ancl lrr.c sarccl niicl Scction 6 o1- tl-re Act. lg9 7. [ie iirncc is Placcd o11 lil,rt. Boards (P) Ltd. v. CITrand Shlcr_. Ilhagu,ati Stcel I tolling Mills r,. CCE-r.

¶57

Findinss r f rr hc Court:-

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I()..\s stated abo'e, the o,ly issue to rc cleti<:cd is ri.cthcr tlrc l)r-cser)t^\'r.t:er ition is ntarntainable. lt is tr.itc larv .11n1 .r rrrit petition should not br: cntertained in case an efficaci()us ill.(li.natr\ e rcntccll, is availiLtrle. \,here a statute provides fbr an appc;. I rrrechanism to irnpugn arr crder or any proceedings, a party (.an rot bv_pass sr-rch nrcchunisnt by directly approaching the FIigh Cour r.rncl,:r Article 226 o['the^(]on: titutior-r ol'India. I{owever, a party can iL.rproach thc t Iigh court direi tl., against an order, if such ordcr vio iLtes Iundamental rights o1' th: oarty belore the couft; or such order i.; pirssed r.r,ithout jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or srrch orrl.:r r.ras passed in breacl o1- 1: rirrciples ol' natural justice; or if the pi r1y t. ling rhe writ petition cha [cnges the constitutionality of any larv.

¶59

r(2015) 1t scc :r 3 '1:orol : scc oz

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I l. A full bench ol thc Sttpt'ctnc C'ourt in^Assistant Commissioner of State l'ax v. Commercial^{Steel Limited j heid that} a u,rit petition, in presence of an altcrnativc^{retrcdy',is maintainable} only in exceptional cases. The relevant^{paragraph is extracted below:}

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ll. The respondent had a statutory remedl^{under scction107. lnstead} of availing of the remedy, the^{rcspondcntinstitutcda pctitionunder} Article 226. The existence of^an altcrnate^{renredv is not an absolute} bar to thc maintainabili tY of a writ Dctiaion^{undcr Articlc 226 of} the Constitution. But a^{writnctition can be cntertained in} excer) tional circumstances whcre^{therc is:}

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ab h of fundamental ri hts ll a violation of the rlncl les of natura I ustlcc ( iii) an excess of iurisdictio n: or

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(iv) a challen se to the vires of the stalute 0r dclcg ated lcsislation.

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Therefore, to decide the maintainability^{of the present writ petition,} this Court has to decide whether^{the impugnedorder was passed} without jurisdiction.

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It is relevant to note that^{Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 deals} with the power of the Reserve Bank^{of India to formulateRegulations} to regulate, prohibit and restrict^{capitalaccounttransactions Section} 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 deals with^{the power of the ReserveBank of} Indiato regulate, prohibit and^{restrict transferor issueof any security}

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ozozr Scc otdnoec egq.

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b1 l pcr:ou r--:ide nt c,trtsidc Lldia. For^{thc sltkcc Ic<ltlrctlicllce.}

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Scclion 6( i) ol tl c Act. I()99 as it stcxtd thcn^rs ertt'actt^{rl bclorr}

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'-il I \ it rt t prcjLrdLce lo the tcneralitv o1' tlte pror i:i rrts (,1 \Lrh-

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.i!'c.r(rn ( t. tlrt [lcscrrc I]ank rtral . by- rcgulatio'rs. prtlliLrit. 'c:triet rr r( rt.la(r I rc lbllo!itrc

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(a) rrar)s L lr issuc ol'any fbrcign security hy ir pcr!,o!' resi,iertt in lnd r a:

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(b) trans cr or issuc ol irnv sccurity by a pcrson rcs tl::nl rutsidc lnc ia:

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(c) rrans r )r LSSLIc ()t an) securit) or forcign secttrilv bv rtlr lrunch. olllce or rg,:ntr in [:rilia ol'a^pcrson rcsidcnt outsicle lnt ir

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(cll anr rirrl)\iug i,r lcncling rn loreign crchange itt ultrtcr,--r lirrrtt ol hr^,.rlrrtcrc- nanre calletl.

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rc i n\ \r' rr'rrirrrt ,rt l..rrding in rupces irt \rtJl(,'t 9111 ,r1 lrr

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ullrler o r-anrc callcd bctucen a person rcsidcnl in I'rdil and^tr pcrs()n r( siilcrt outsidc India:

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(fl dcpc its betwcen pcrsons resident in India rnd pe-:n'ns rcsi(lcnt ortside I tci a:

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(g)cxp() t. inrport or holding olcurrency or currencv n( lcil

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(h) lran. Lo ol- irrrnorablc propcrty outside lndia, othrr than a lcirse nc,t cxce :d ng fivc^vears. by a^person resident in lndia;

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1ir^{acqu ;itiorr or trmsl'erof inrmovablepropc(',in [n lir.. otherthan} a lease : ot exceedir.rg iire ycars. by a^person resident crr :;idc Indil: (-j )girrrqr1-i guaranlce or suret\ in respect o1'atry dcb.,rbliluti0rr or orhcr li.: rilit) incurred -

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(i) trl a rerson residcnt in India and owed to a pcrson rr;ident outside lrxlia: c,

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(ii) b-v ir ptrs,rn resident outside lndia."

¶85

¶86

It is also relevant to note that Section 6(3) ol rhe Act. 1999 was omitted from the Act, 1999 in its entiretryitie Acr No. 20 ol 2015 which was brought inro effect fiom 15.10.2019.

¶87

In the present case, proceedings against the petitioners were initiated on 12.07.2017 when a complaint was tjled with the ED. It is clear that Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 rvas in fbrce when the proceedings were initiated against the petitioners. It was only after Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted that the impugned order dated 04.01 .2023 was passed.

¶88

As stated above, the Petitionerscontend that as Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted, any pending proceedings in relation to the contravention olthe said section will cease to cxist. T'o buttress the said contention, the Petitioners contend that pending proceedings under an omitted provision are not saved by Section 6 of the Act, lg97 as it is only applicable to repeals and not omissions. T'his Court does not agree with the contentions raised by the Petitioners lor the reasons stated herein below.

¶89

It is relevant to note that the Parliament has the power to enact laws and bring them into existence and it also has the power to repeal or delete them from existence. IJowever, such repealed or

¶90

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de lcted^{pIoVisit 11:,l1rc g.clteriltly savcd irud cor.ttitrueto 'r|pir to} pcrrdinu pr'()ccc(^{irlgs. I he itlea belrindsuchsavirlg sucli rr ovi;ion(s)is} to not clisr.rrh^{t: e rightsancl obligations that havc' alrca:' accrueclot.t} parlies.^{(it:tterltl v a rcl.rcltlitle statlltealsoincludesa s:rr it:gs :lauseb-v-,} virlue ol^,r hiclr^{tlrc repealcdprovisionscotltintle to ap rlv to pcndirlg} proceetlinus. []^)\rrc\1e1 ,^{thcrc nlay be cases wherc the Ie1';isllrture lails} to includrr a^{sl vittL,sclatrsedue to inadvenenct' and t['e samelllay} rcsult in^{irr.iusrc,r to th(' palties otl wholn riglrtsund:r tht: repcaled} proi,isious alrc^{xlv irccrlle(l'fo ovcrcomesuchcitses' li::ticn (r of thc}

¶92

Act. I^{U9-/ tvrs et.acted antl tlte satlle is extracted below:}

¶93

F.llccr o r(pcal.^{\hcre this .\ct, or any Centli'l Act ('l Lcgtllatl()11} niad-' irliet^t lc^{c() llI lllellccllrc Irt oI this Act,repealsu J enactlnent} hitlrt:r1o nll d.^{ot lrereal.tcrto bc nrade. then, unlcss ir difl-e..:rrtintention} appi ars. tlr :^{repeal shrtll not}

¶94

(l) r'evivc^p,"thing not^{in lorceor existing at th' timelr' rvl'ichthc} repe al takt^{s r:l'llct; or}

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(b) aff-ect ht^{previousolleralion ofanyenactmcnt so rep(ale('oran)} thing dul'^{dr,nc or-sultcrcdthereunder,or}

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(c) afltct rnv right. privilcge. obligation^{or Iiabihtyacqri:ed'accrued} or incurrc I r^{ndcratrl ellactmcnlso rcpealed: or}

¶97

(d) alt'cct ar y oenalty. lbrfciture or^{punishmentincunerl} 'n^rcspectof anl ol'1tIr;e^{conrlnittctlagainst ally enactmcntso IepcaleJ; or}

¶98

(e) ll'lcct arrf invcstig.trion.^{legal proceeding or renled" Ln r(specl of'} an,, sucl:^{nght. privilegc. obligation, tiabiliq',penaltl,} ''orf':iturc^or puuishm,^{nt as aforcsaid:}

¶99

¶100

and an1, strch investigation, legal procceding ol. relncdv ntav he instituted. continucd or enlbrced, and any such penalt1,. lbr[,iture or. punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Acr or Rcguiation had not been passed.

¶101

lt is relevanr ro note that Section 6 of the Act, lg97 provides lor the eflect of a repealed statute and how it is saved in relation to pending proceedings.Explaining the effect ofrepeal of a provision and its saving, the Supreme Court in State of Manipur v.

¶102

Su rj a ku ma rOkra m^5he ld as follows:

¶103

Thc power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extcnsir,c with its power to enacl a law. The clfect of repealing oI a slarurc is lo obliterate it completely fiom the records of parliament.While rcpcaling a statute, the Legislature is competent to introduce a clausc, saving an1 right, privilege, liability, penalty, ao or deed duly done and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy arising therelrom, under the repealed statute. T.here is a distinction between declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute by the Legislature. On declaration of a statute as unconst.itutional. it becomes void ab initio. Saving past transactions are within the exclusive domain of the Court. On the other hand, though the consequence of repeal is also obliteration of the statute with retrospective effect on pasr transactions, the Legislature is empowered to introduce a saving clause in the repealing Act. Even in cases where a saving clause is not made. the provisions of the General Clauses Act are applicable to central statutes and the principles of the General Clauses Act can be madc applicable to statutes made by the State Legislaturcs as well (Sec

¶104

2022 SCC Online SC 130

¶105

¶106

'..\tttlt t)l l'tt' ,ti, , . llttfitLi \ir13h^{(sLrpra)) lt ts t'cleY int tc: tI c al illis} p()inr ,rlilt^1l c^{\lltrlillttr Legisletulc ct'lactcd thc \iarll)lrr(lL'lel'ai} fl:rrsc. .\lL.^{i()tr6.rrhich.altle illt() lirrce trn i0'(ll 196('' b' ''hicnthc} prLrr is rttr:- c tl,c '.icrlcral^{( Iauscs Act' 1897ucrc nladc illrl) ical'lc tLl} thc stalutcs,^{l t re \1,Illil)u1Lelislatutc'}

¶107

Explainirrg^{tlte s,. oSrc ancl applicability of Sectionol () ot the Act'} 1897, the Suprr^{n'e Court in Ambalal SarabhaiEntu priscsLtd' v'} Amrit Lal &^{Co.6. held that pending proceedings rLtrrler a statute} rvhiclt subscrlr.r^{rtrtlr l-cllcalcd arc' savcd'lhe relel'ant;'rLragraphsare} ext[acted^{be lo.::}

¶108

lhc^{op,lrr lq uol.ds ,rl'scctiotr 6 specily thc ficid over} 'r'hith^{it is} opcrati\c. L^{s rrpetltlirc orc'r all thc enactments un'ler tlreC cneral} ('lau.cs \c . t ctttral ,{cl or rcgl'.tlations^{utadcaftcrthecrll f lrlcnce tllellt} olthc(;cnrril(lllrLrscs,\ct.lttllsoclarificsincase()f1'Iicalolall)' provision Ln(lcr^{thc llirre-saitiAcr or regulation'utrles;} 'r^diU'erent intentiort a rp:als^{liotr.t strch rcpeal-it would have no} ':11:':t^{over the} nratters co^{ercd in its clattscs r'iz.(lr) to (?) lt clearly spelt'ieslhat the} rLrpeal slle^{Irot re\i\crtnrthitlg not in forceor in existtlt' e o" afl'ect} thc lrcvrc,^is op3ratioll^{ol-an1 cnactment so repealedol ur"'thing duly} don,:^,.tr sr fl^{:red or afTcct any right. privilege' obligaliorr or iabititl} acquired. lc,lrued^{or incurred undcr the repealedstalu'o affect any} pcnalty, 1'rrlciture^{or punishmcntincurrcdin respect ol :rny offencc} conrmiLtet tLncer^{thc Icpealed statuteand also docstro aflecl anv} irrr:stiira-, or.legal^{proccedingor rcmedf in respcctof'zn'sur:h riglil'} pri'.'ilegc. ortiqation. liirbility.^{penalty,forfeitureor ltttttish.ncntas} a{bresa id^'l htts thc^{ccntral theme whichsPclls out rs that anv} inr estiga^:io n or Icg alorocccd^{ins Dcndingmav betc ntinucdand} '(2001r8 !,CC l9'

¶109

)

¶110

cn[orced as if the reDcalins Act or rcgulation had not comc rnt0 frrrcc. 2 ne rule tnv of n c o a sta tu n t rct s tv o ti does q a t nd rat roc wh m 2) if rh ct twcre ti kt il o ld a rh a wh h I n if cl c) not o t a lis co tit th iscd rh t riil of n the la s A ls ve end una h h com m m cr t cu t' nsu tc ti tit Wc find clause (c) of Section 6. refers a thc words "any right, privilege, obligarion .. acquired or accruect, under the repeale<i starute would not be aflec ted by the repealing s[ature. Wc may hasten to clarify here, mere extstence of a right not beirrg "acquired', or'.accrued,, on the date of thc repeal would not get protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act Therefore, it is clear that Section 6 of the Act, lg97 saves any proceedings pending under a statute which has been repealed. The quesrion then would be whether Section 6 of the Act, lg97 applies only to repeal of a provision or also to a provision that is omitted. In other words, the question would be whether pending proceedings under a provision that is subsequentry omitted are saved under Section 6 of the Act, 1g97.

¶111

i8.,.\ss1rl'rclallorc.ircctlt.clirtqtothePetitioneis.jCCtiollr)O1. the Act.^{I lit)'7 ,l<r-.sn()t iil\ c} llcnclinq^{ploccedillgsLln(l(ll' illl olnitte(l} pror ision. Ii^{i:,e ontctlclcrl that Scctioll6 of thc n c[] 89 iis onl!'} applicable^{to rc lca[:tl prrlvisions atld not onlittcd pror i;i rns lLeliance} s,as plec-'d ot^{lrt: [bllorvirlg paragraphol a Constitutirl-rBench} dec ision in^{Ra'a\aCorPn.(suPra):}

¶112

Relelerr:,--^{was nc\llradeto a decision ol theN4adhla Pradesh} I{igh^{(our itrS'tr/c rt' \lrtLlbal'rudashvllirtlul\ut"tulr All'195()} IVll' ljl^btr .^{thc-casaitrlhc accLtsed rras sottglll tr; bc prr'ecutt-dtilr} an o 1'errce^{tLr rishablettttclct atl \ct o11 tllc re peal or'rvltict !'ccti'lrr6 ol'} rhc⁽ ieircrit^{( laLlse s Acthail hecn madc applicablclnth,: case bcforc} g!-:Scctior^(l of^{thc (;cncral('huscs Ac' cannot obvioltl'varroh'on} thc omissi^{rn of ltulel-12-Aof the I)IRsfor thc trvo oh'} 't0lls l casons 6 only^{a pDlicsto reDeals and not to ot} ri.siolrs. and !h_ut_!rS!j^tn 4pdt$-'r'Er1..1[lrg-Igl294!-Lo[^{a Central Act or Rcurrl:!.]j'qn-!tnd not} gfu-ICl". f^{iectiorr(r ol'thc (iettcralClauscsAct hacl [..,e:r applied'no} doubt tht;^{complairlt againstthe two accuscd for lhe o[fencc} purrishirbl : t,ncler^{l{ulc132-Aof the DIRs could havc l)() n irrstitutcd} evcn altet^{thc repcal.)l thatrule'}

¶113

In th: context^{of ornission of a pro\ isiott ilrd rLppticability} ofSection6ol.theAct'l8gT,itisalsoreleranttrl.list:ussanother constitution^{B,:nchdecision in Kolhapur canesug:rrw'lrksl,td. v.} Union of In^{ii,r7. u'hercin the SupremeCoufl lffirrn:<ith': decision in}

¶114

'(zooo)^{u scc s:}

¶115

¶116

Rayala Corpn. (supra)and held that pending proceedings under a

¶117

provision that is omitted are not saved under Section 6 of the Act,

¶118

The relcvant paragraphs are extracted below:

¶119

In para 2l ofthejudgment the Full Bench has noted the dccision of a Constitution Bench of this Court inChief Inspector of Minesv. Karam Chand ?'hapar IAIR 196l SC 8381 and has relied upon the principles laid down therein. The F'ull Bench overlooked the position that thar was a case undcr Section 24 of thc General Clauses Act which makes provision for continuation of orders, notification, scheme. rlrle, forn or bye-larv, issucd under the rcpealcd Act or regulation uncier an Act after its repeal and re-enactment. [n that case Scction 6 did not come up Ibr consideration.^'l'herefore thc ratio of that case is not applicablc to thc prcsent case. With respect we agree with the principlcs laid dor.r,n by the Constitution Bench in RayalaCorpn. case[(1969) 2 SCC 412 : (1970) I SCR 639] . In our considered view the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the case on hand.

¶120

The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never becn passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions ofSection 6(l). Ifa provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in lavour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted aflerwards. Savings of the natue contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. l'hus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largcly dcpends on the savings applicable. In a case where a

¶121

t',

¶122

parlicular l)^(), is orl itt .t:tltttrli:^;s ontittcd^{arrd ilits plateltrlo(ltct} pr,lri.ror,, c alttl! \iLll lile \illlia c()lllillgclic<sup>is itt rrlr-Lt':tt[ \ltll()Lll il srti ittL cla. sr.' irt tar,rLtr^(rl' pcllrllllg PrrlccL'dln!<sup>lil('r ti rtt irc rc.rsonabl\ rn cr-cd lhat thc itrlctrtion^{of tilc lcgrslalulcliLhal tlla} pcnd rg pn c(cdrrlc.:; slttll Itor conlillLlc^{hut licsh} Pro(crii^{iILgs lbr tilc} sarnc plrrp()^.c mlrl^{bc irrittatcrl utttlcr thc ttervprttr i.ttltt.} lE. In tlre )l(sert caISc. as^{tl,-)[c(l callicr.Seclion6 of tl,c (ienela]} ('iau;cs \t has no applicatrittt.^'l'herc is rxr sar ing provis t'r, in lavour ol pcnding 11,rct'cdings.^{'fhcrefore action for realisrtion of tl.tc rmotttlt} rcfundcd < rn onlv be takcn ttndcr thc^{ncw proi'tsitlt.tittLcct'rdat;cc} rr ith the tcr n:, tl-Lcrcol-

¶123

20.^(ro, )g L-') the decisions in Kolhapur^{Canesugitt' (supra)} andRayalaCo^{'pn. (supra). orlc nlight reacha c{)llcltls i(rn tilat Section} 6 ol the 1\ct. 1897 docs^{not appt.' to olllittcdprovillotr:;arld only.,} applies to rep^ra e(l^{pro',,isions. I lowevcr.stlch a conclu jiorr vvouldbe} misplaced an( \r/rong in light of^{thc decisiorls of the Sr|fe1'lsCourt in}

¶124

Fibre Board-s^(supra) and Shree^{llhagu'ati(supra).}

¶125

2 i. fht Supreme Court in Fibre Boards^{(supra)corsideredthe} question whet he r Section 6 of'the Act, 1897^{is applica[,le t< provisions} that are ornj ted.^'fhe Court held^{that omissron} o'^a f^rovisionis tantamount t( e xpress repeal. Therefore.^{Sectiorl 6 ol l:te r\ct, 1897 is} applicablc to p"ovisions that are omitted.^{Discussinl3.hc decision in} RayalaCorp r. (supra ), the^(loult held that^{the fincli rg thrrt} Scction 6

¶126

¶127

of thc Act, 1897 is not applicable to omissions is only ohiter diuum and not Lhe rati<t decidendi ol the case. It held that the finding in Kolhapur Canesugar (supra) andRayalaCorpn. (supra)regarding the non-applicability of Section 6 ol the Act, 1897 to omission ol a provision is per incuriarz. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

¶128

25,|n RayalaCorpn.^(P) Ltd. [(1969) 2 S(]C 4l2l , what fell for dccision u,as u'hcthr-r procccdings could be validll' continued on a complaint in respect ol- a charge made under Rule 132-,4 of the Delence ol India Rules, which ceascd to be in existence before the accused werc convicted in respect of the chargc made under the said Rule. The said Rule !32-A was omitted by a Notification dated 30-31966. What was decidcd in thal casc is se1 out by paru 17 of the said judgment, which is as lollows: (SCC p. a2a)

¶129

"/Z Reference^was next made to a decision ofthe Madhya Pradesh High Court ia State of M.P. v. I'liralalSutwala [958 SCC Online MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 931 but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for an otlencc punishable under an Act on the repeal of which Section 6 ofthe General Clauses Act had been made applicable. In the case before us, Section 6 of the Cencral Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the omission of Rule 132-4 of the DIRs for the two obvious reasons that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a Rule. IlSection 6 ofthe Gencral Clauses Act had been applied, no doubt this complaint against the two accused for the offence punishable under Rule 132-A ofthe DlRs could have been instituted even after the repeal ofthat Rule."

¶130

¶131

¶132

lir. It rrrll rc cl,:ar lionr u leading oi^{thisparar:ra:rhlh.rt} trc \ladlrra I'rarleslr ul⁽ riLrrl .ludurrcnl urts dislinguished h1' tltc :^{orrsrtLrti()rl} IJcnr:h or.r tr, Lr sroLrnds Onc bcirt{r t}rat Secliot^{(r r} f l r,:^{( ictrcral} ( larscs r\r t rlor's rtot applr to a rtrlc bttt otti) apltlics trr t r'cnlral '\ct ()r Reeulal or - and sccontllr.lhat Scctron^(r itsr'll-$,rr,tl.l 111-r I ortll to a ''r-cpeal D,,t o 'art ittttissior". ll)i\ slatcnrent ol ltrr u,Ir l,rllo.rcd lrr anothcr'⁽ or stitution Ilcn.:h in Kollruptr^('unt tt.tL'rt'^I 'rtrA.t l.ttl. ..1s. [t]0(r )) I S('( 5361 .^,\fier sctting oul^para I7 )i^(hc earlie'r jrrdgrncnt. Lh,l seconC ('onslrluti(,n Bcnch .judgnrc rt stat(:, ils l)llo\s: (SC(' p. 51 0. para 3.i)

¶133

''JJ lr: ;anr ll of the .judgnrcnt thc Full Bencl- Sutrtasltro ('entt:ttt o' d ('hentital lndtrslrits Ltd.'.^(,'t1ion of Indirt. (19()l) l(iui LR 5 : (1,rg:i) 79 t:l.l 3671 lias rroted the dccisi,rn^()[ iL^{('on:tirurion} Ilench ,rl tl'is CoLrrt n( hicl lr:spactrtr rrl \lirt.s,..l'rr trrtt⁽ hrtnd 'l'harytr [/t tR l()61 S(' 83li : (1961) 2 Cri L.l ll an,1 hls r,) ijrl uporl the prirciplcs [a d lorin thelcin. Thc l]ull [:]cnch oretlookeI thc 1rositiol that that rr as a case under Scction 2:1 of the Gcncnrl⁽ llus:r;,\ct *hich rnakcs pr,: vir;ion lbr contirrrration ol' orders. noti flaatior), r;r:hcnte. rtrle. lbm or b e-lar,''. isstred undel thc repealcd Act o, rcgulrrti,rrr Lurder un ,\ct alicr ts repeal and rc-enactnrent. Irr that ca'e Sccril r^(r did not conre lrp [br consideration. Therelore the lalio of thirl cas( is not applicabl( 1c the present case. With respect we a1 ree r,,ith thc principles lrrid dorvn by thc Constitution [Jcrch in l! n,ul'tCorpn ca.ra [(l9l 9) 2 SCC 412] . ln our considcred vicr,. thc rrti,r ol the said r.lecision -. lu:rre lv apf lies to the casc on hand.''

¶134

27.Kulha1'ut Cunesugar llktrks Lrd. [(2000) 2 SCt] 5l(rl^jr-Cgn ent also cor.rcernc( i:self u,ith the applicability o9 5"s1i,rn 6 cf the General CleLuscs,lct to the dcletion of Rulcs l0 and 10-,\ of thr: l r:ntlul Ercisc Rules ru^.-ti-1977.

¶135

¶136

An atternpt was madc in Gene ral l;inctrtcc Co. t'. CI'l LQ002\ 7 SCC ll to refer rhese r\o.iudgrnerlts [( 1969) 2 SCC 1!2j , [(2000) 2 SCIC 516] to a iarger Bench on thc point that an oniission would not amount to a repeal lor thc purposc ol Scction 6 ol'thc Gencral Clauses Act. Though the Court tbund substancc in thc argument favouring the relerence to a largcr Bench. ultinratcly it dccided lhat the prosecution in cases of non-compliancc with the provision thercin contained was only transitional and cases covercd by it wcre lcw and far between, and hence found on lacts that it was not an appropriate case for reference to a larger Bench.

¶137

We may also point out that in G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory lnterpretatbn, l2th Edn.. the lcamed author has criticised the aforesaid^judgments in the lt-rllouing lerms:

¶138

"Section 6 ol the Gcneral Clauscs Act applies to all types of repeals. The section applies whether the rcpeal be express or implied, entire or partial or ',vliethcr it be rcpcal simpliciter or repeal accompanied by fresh legislation.^'fhc section also applies^{when a} temporary statute is repealed betbre its expiry. but it has no application when such a statute is not repealed but comes to an end by expiry. The section on its own terms is limited to a repeal brought about by^a Central Act or Regulation. A rule made under an Act^is not^{a Central} Act or Regulation and if a rule be repealed by another rule,^{Section 6} of the General Clauscs Act will not be attracted. It has been^{so held} in two Constitution Bench decisions. The^passing observation in^these cases that^'Section 6 only applies to^rcpcals and not to^omissions' needs reconsideration lor omission ol a^provision results in abrogation or obliteration. of that provision in the^same way as it^happens in repeal. The stress in these cases rvas on thc^question that a'rule' not being a Central Act or Regulation, as defined in the General Clauses Act, omission or repeal of a 'rule' by another^'rule' does not attract Section 6 ol the Act and proceedings initiated under the omitted rule

¶139

¶140

ealr)ot e(,tt lui ulllL\ thc ttcrr rtLlc cttntains lt ,.tr:l]l rItus( l() tllltl e lli'eI rirt pl).^(,9i-9E.)

¶141

i0 In i I rr t l rrhat lta. bccn sratcrl hcrcrn.rhi.r,.:. )cr.l1rPs lltc r1t;'ropria e -orlrsc il) llte prcsctrt case rr,ould Itavc br:r.r to r:lcr thc afo,csaid u(lqn1crlt tr) il iargcr Ilcnch. Btrt rlc rio rrot lj:rj tltc nccd to dtt .it in r' €' ofly[31 is sratcd br us hcrcinbel,rrr.

¶142

ll ljirst:nc [rrrenr.sl. it *il] bc uo(iccd that t\(, rca!() rs \c.,.i ur\erl tn llu.t,ulu^'orpa. (1,) t.td l\1969) 2 SCC 4l2l tt,r tli:;r n.urishing thc 1\4adh1a Ira.lesh i61lr Court judgrnent [1958 SCC ()ll irc ,r t) 149 : ,\llt t95(^\4P 911 Ordinarill,. both rcasons r,..ouid il nr rhe rali() ,lecidend fi,r rhc saicl ilecision and both rcasors u,r:ul,i hc bindin!. Lrp(,, u5 l, uc- ll,d that.,ce it is held that Sccri.. (, ri the (icncral ClaLrscs^,.cr rroultl itsell not appJ1, to a nrlc rrltich : sLrlttrdinzttc lcg slatior a; it applies only ro a ('cntral r\ct or Rt.gulatir,n ir r,oLtld bc rvh,.rllv ur necossar_'to state lhat on a construction ol the ri,rrrl ,rcpL,al..

¶143

n Scctior (, cf thc Gcneral ('lauscs Act.^{,.onti:sions.} rira(ir: bv thc lcgLslaturr '.rLld not lrc included. Assume. on thc othcr h rnd. tlraf thc (lonstituli rn llench hatl given two reasons lor tht.non-a;l.licabilitv ol. Scrlion^(r or'tlre (ierleral Clauses Act. ln such a situat 0 r. ol),i()uslY hoth reas,,nr; would be ratio decidendi ancl woultl be binrlirrg uporr .r subsequer t Ilench llowever. once it is fbund rhar Sr:r:rion 6 itselfrvould no apply. it r.lould be wholly superfluotLs t,r lurth:- statc that on rrn interpr;t:rtion of thc word "repeal", an^..omission, rr:ulr not be rncLuded. l': are. thcrelore, of the view that the second sc _cal ed ratio of thc C( nstitution Bcnch in RayalaCorpn. (p) Lt.l. l(l (.,69) 2 SC(. ,1121 canr ot bi: said to be a ratio decidendi at all and is reallv in the naturc of )b ter dic(a

¶144

Sccorll,,. u,e lind no rcference to Scction 6-r\ of :he (icncr.al (llaruscs .' ct in eithcr ol'thesc Constitution Bcncrr jrrdqrrr:nts Section 6-,| rcad. as follows

¶145

¶146

I ,i

¶147

"6-A.Repeal of .,bt muking ta-(uul umendnlent in /1ct or Regulatit>n.-Where anr f enlral Act or l{e'qulation nraric atier the commencenient ot'this Act rcpeals xn), enxctment by^whrch the text ol any Central Act or Regulation^was anrcndcd b1 thc^{exprcssomission.} insertion or substitution ofany rnatter. then. unless a diflcrent^intention appcars, the repcal shall not atl'ect the continuance of an1'^such amendment made by the enactment so rcpealcd^and in^{operation at the} time of such repeal."

¶148

A reading of this Section^would show^{that a repealbyan amending} Act can be by way of an express omission. This being^{the case,} obviously the word "rcpeal" in both^Section 6^{and Section 24 rvould.} therefore, include repcals by express ontission. The^{abscnce of any} refcrence to Section 6-A. thorefore.^{againundoes thc binding effect of} these two^judgments ort an application of^{tlre pcr incuriamprinciplc} I In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya l-al.^{(1975],2 SCC 232: (1975)3} SCR p. 834, Krishna lycr, J., succinctly laid down^{whatis meantby} the^''per incuriam" principle. Hc^{stated:(SCC p.235, para7 : SCR p.} 837)'7. ... We do not intend to detract liom^{the rulc that,in} exceptional instances,^where by^{obviousinadvertence or oversighta} judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the^{reasoningand result reached,it may} not have sway of binding^precedents. [t^{should be a glaringcase, an} obtrusive omission. No^such situation^{presentsitsell here and we do} not embark on the principle^{of judgment per incuriam."(emphasis} supplied)An interesting^application of^{thc said principleis contained} in State of L/.P. v. Syntherics^{and Chemicals Ltd., (1991)4 SCC t39:} (1991) 3 SCR 64, where a Division Bench of^this Court^{held that one} particular conclusion of a Bench of seven^Jtdges lSynthetics^and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of^{U.P.,(1990) I SCCl09l was per incuriam} see: the discussion at^{SCR pp. 80, 8l and9l: SCCpp. l5l, 152 and} - pp. 161-162, paras 36 to 42 of thc said^judgment.l

¶149

¶150

ll. ..,ta n. in Shree tlhagn,ati (supra). thc liuprr.rne Courr ciiscuss-'cl i(' iiccisio. end cia.ificd irs dcci:.io. i: I.'irrrc ll,arrrs (supra).'l lrL c rrrl rcircr.atc'd that Sectio. 5 o|thc Act, Iir!7 is cqLralry rpplicairlc t<r .r-rissior of a provision. rhe C,rur.t ar:,r h:rd that tric clflct .1- *<."cls^,or,il, and^,rcpeal, is the s.rme z r; bo_h result i. cleletror oi'a pr o'isitx. fherefore, it cannot be sairl tlat Siection 6 of lhe tcr i89- i; rrot applicable to onrission of r pror rs,ion .l-lre (.ourt tirscusst:d i. r craiItirc c]ecisiorr o.Rayaracorprr, (su,r'a)ard hercr that thc saiti dec. sion did not consider Section 6A ol thc Act. Ig97. therctbrc. rva . rigirtll, htld pcr int:uriom in Fibre Iloz rrls (srrpra). I_hc rclcr unt parar rt phs are extracted below:

¶151

F'irst. rr m,ry be stated that the juclgment of this riourt i.t t.ibr: Rtnrtl Ltt.s,l[.iht'^t)old: (p) l_t(t .(.17'. (2015) l0 S(.(. ]l: : (Jr)15) -_i76 llR -5961 has laken the 'ierv that an .,omissi.n.. r,nrr,k irnt(),nt [o a "repcirl ',. rficr relcrring t. se,cral authorities of thir rro.rt. (i.p. Sinlh's 1',' incipres o1' statutory [nterprerotion, Secti.r: li-A or- tirc (icneral ,. lauscs Acr, 1g97. and a passage in [Iulsht t1,,s low.s o/. linplund. Ultinlately. this Court arrivecl at the conchr,; ou that an 'onrission \ould anroLlnt to a ,.rcpeal., for the prLrposr: cl.scttion 24 o1'^,hc Cr nc ral Clauses Act. Since thc same exprest ion. namcly. "repcal ' rrsed both in section 6 and Section 24 .,r lrre (icncral ( larrsc-s r',11. thc construction of the said expression in fr.th sections u'ot,ld. t' :r,:fore. inciude u.ithin it .,omissions,. n ir, c rr the lcuisl:rturt.

¶152

¶153

E. Shri Aggaru'al, horrcver, argued tlrat therc is a i'undarncrrtal distinction between a^"repeal" and an "omission" in that in thc casc of a^"repeal" the statute is oblitcrated liom thc verr beginning r.r,hercas in the casc of an^"omission" what gets omitted is only tiom the date ol "omission" and not bclore. This bcing the case. it is cicar that things already done in the case of an "omission" r.r,ouid be savcd. However. a "repeal" without a savings clause like Section 6 ofthe General Clauses Act would not so save things alrcady done under the repcaled statute. He further argued that Section 6-4 which rvas relied upon by thc Bcnch in Fibre Board case fFibre Boartls (P) Ltd. v.('lT, (2015) l0 SCC 333 : (2015) 376lTR 5961 did not state that an ''omission" rvould bc included within the expression^''repeal". but thaL il Section 6-A were carefully read, an "omission" would only be includcd in an "amendment" which. under the scction. can bc b) r,r,al o1'omission. inscrtion or substitution. Therefore. it is lallacious to state that Seclion 6-A would lead to the conclusion that^"ornissions" are included in "repeals". He fu(her argued that in any cvent, the true ratio decidendi of the Constitution Bench decision in RoyalaCorpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement lRayalaCorpn.^(P) l.td. v. Director of Enforcement,⁽¹⁹⁶⁹⁾ 2 SCC 4l2l , is that an "omission" camot amount to a "repea[" inasmuch as the first reason given for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court lrdg.ent fstate of M.P. v. HiralalSunvala, 1958 SCC Online MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93] in that case was that Section 6 cannot apply to the omission of a rule because an "omission" is not a "repeal". He further argued that as the Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision was put forward by the respondent in that case in support of their argument, the Constitution Bench's dealing with the said decision in order to ovcrcome it^would necessarily be the ratio decidendi of thc^said decision. and^{being a} Constitution Bench decision, would be binding upon this^Bench. lle further referred to Section 3l of' the Prcvention of Comrption Act,

¶154

¶155

()1.. 'rl -1 . it Itis ,rpipittn. rit:lk.s it ciaill. that i,ullilLr r. tt lr.ll I1r\ uI( at:1()(, itlLI a r.cDclrl Llr(lct \cciicD (r 0l'fhe iicnc.tIr-larses.\cL 'r.rrlii r,rL rl,Il' rr) ()rir.siori:. c lrirs riritl)cr a19Lr,(l thlrt il nrl,r l_.c trur: llral tltr r. Iriesii)lt^-r(.ltaJl'- i\ ,orrilall\ Lrscd rrlrLlr an e tI rc r llt.te t\ rlottc it',ir ,rilh. .r, ,rp1.165g1l tp lrp,.orr.rissi<,n" rrtticlt i: iLpuli-,ii pllr \ll(n firn o lirc statLrle is dclr:ted. hut siii(l that hrs is tr,t in,.irriablr llte .as,-. . nr r( 1cnL.(l t() Sccti(rlt I ol'iirc Contrac r\ct. ll /.j irr rrhiclr !racLr1leitl. r tcnti(rnc{l tr.r thc schedule are rcpeale(l not ir t tcir :n[irr:t\ but onl', t(r tllr, e\Lcllt pr.ovidcd and, therefo"c. ar5r(rd tlat tlle crn.essio^"rcpi:als" u'ill apph also to a part ,,f:r (nactltcnt as t,pl].,srti I 1l e (ItaClntrtlt :rS a |vholc.

¶156

Il. lrti,rrr i ri. ir rs clr:rrr tltat r|hcn Scction 6 oJ-the ( jc;reri L.laus(] s .\ut sl)carl.\ (rl th- r:pc-rl ()l' an\ cnactr1lcllt. it t.e[.en I.lot ln(.l.cl_, t() thc ( ' i I i t ( : I I I ! r I I I :rs a rrholr'hu1 .tlsrr Io anv proyision C0ntair-,e:l n ntrr .{ct. I hLr:. it i:, cl,'rrr tltal I a palr of a stature is deleL,_.d. Sr.,r li rn 6 rvoLrll lllrll('tltclu.. altplr SceLl,tfl|r,. ii is clear. aS h2S tee,l state(J l.,rcli,rring to a pass: cc il lfdl.,htrrv,.s Lavs of tingland in t|ibre l:i py11 l];167_p llrru,cl; rl' l.ttl t.(.tl . (2015) 10 SCC j33 : (2{)15) 37r. lt t .s961 .lrrrigmcrrl-^hrrt ,hc erpression',omission,.is nothing bu ; paticLrlar lirnrr ol v urJs cvincing an intet)tion to abrogate utn r)rlctnLenl or Jrr)rtro^{! rercol.} Ilris is rnade lurther cljar by thi.: Legul 'I ltc.tuunr.s [)clrrxc Fdirion) by William C. Burton. 1979 l:rliticn. l.he c..pr:ssior^{'(lclcre '} rs dcfined by the Thesatrrus as ibllows:

¶157

' Dclct. Blot out. cancel. censor, cross off, cr!)ss out. ( ut. (ut outdclc. discl d. do arvav with. drop, edit out, efface, clicjc, elirninate, erarlrcarc. .^.a.re- crcisr.. cxpel. cxpunge, extirpate, get ricl ll. lea,,c out. rnod 1r hr 'xi is ons. ohliterate. omil. rerr,oyc, rub ()ut. rul() (.ut. ricratcl.l orl. riLrile r l-1. take oul. rveed. wipe out..,

¶158

Likc'r'ise ll e expressi()n^,.onrit" is also defined b, this.ll:satrus as toIlor.r,s.

¶159

¶160

-'Onr it:-'-Abstain fionr insening. bypass. cast aside, counr out. cur ovt. dclate, discard, dodge. drop- exclude. liril to do- laii to include- fail to inscrt. fail to mention. leave out. leave undone. lct go. let pass. let slip. miss. neglect, omittere. pass ovet. praetermittere. skip. siight. transire."

¶161

And the exprcssion^";cpeal" is dellncd as lbllo*,s:

¶162

''Repeal:--Abolish.abrogare. abrogate, annul. avoid, cancel. counter-mand, declarc nulI and void, deletc. eliminate, formally withdraw, invalidate, make void, negatc, nullily, obliterate, officially withdraw, overridc, overrule, quash. rccall, rcndcr invaiid. rescind, rescindere, retract. reverse, revoke. sel aside, vacate. r,oid, withdraw.''

¶163

On a conjoint reading of the three expressions "delcte". "omif', and "repeal", it becomcs clear that "deletc" and "omit" arc used interchangeably, so that when the expression "rcpeal" refers to 'dclete" it would necessarily take within its ken an omission as well. 'lhis being the case, we do not find any substance in the argument that a ''repeal" amounts to an obliteration from the very beginning, whereas an "omission" is only in futuro. If the expression "delete" would amount to a "repeal", which the appcllant's counsel does not deny, it is clear that a conjoint readiog of Halsbury's Laws of England and the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove both lead to the same result, namely, that an "omission" being tantamount to a "deletion" is a form ol repeal.

¶164

The learned counsel's second argument that Section 6-.4 of the Ceneral Clauses Act when it speaks of an "omission" only speaks of an "amendment" which omits and, therefore does not refei to a repeal, is equally fallacious. ln Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India lBhogat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, 1988 Supp SCC 30 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 404 : (19E8) 6 ATC 7831 , this Court held that therc is no real

¶165

di'tit'clion^je1\ac il r,'lrctl^{atld an} lttttcntlttlctlt^{iln(l thllt" t I ctltilltct.it-} is in l'lct:r \rd(r leDrl^{rrlticltlttclLrtlcs} dclctiort o^{a prc\iiidllirl Jrl} c\ist nr^\Lir ir1-'. n llrc slirl iutlrttttcttt.^{tbi:; ('ourt hcd: tS[ (pp 10-41-} pirras l7-ll )

¶166

"/-. h -,,r nliittcr''rl lcgislrrtirc practicc to lllo'idL r,vltic ct rrclitlg irn anrcrrdr' :.t .t,. ll'l ,i lttr cristittg 1'ttitvistttrt^shall b:^dclct,:,i ani^{i, ne\} pror ision : Lll-stitLrlc(l \ucir ilcl,-'tiott iias lhc cfle-'t^o1' lcl eal ol'^the c\istin{.r. pr( r isic,n.^Such a latr tttat^{alsoprovidc fo" thc inlr',,ductionol'} a lre!v pro\isiirn. /hcr,: is no t.'ttl .li.tlinclion^{ba[u":en'rectctl} 'nd^ttrt Lu)t('ltLlDlr't t lr .\t,tlttrlrtn;l'.s .\loftttttry^{('on\lr1(li, )11.} ird dn.-^\Iol.I ar p. J7a. Le lczrnrcd r-rttiror ultkes the follorving^statcrner l^{)f la\:}

¶167

'l hc d stirrc,.ion bctrrcen rcp.-al rtnd amcndnrent^{aslh3s,-'terrr)s atc} uscci by tl c.rurls- is irrbi(t:rrv.^{Naturally'thetrsr: r,lthese.r mrs by thc} cr)Llr1 is t, st,.l larg,-'1, Lrrt hrtu the legislaturc: Ilavc lr)'(llop:d^alld appli.'il ll s( t(nls rn lat,ellirg thcir ctt:tcturcnts \IhetL se,:tion^is bcing ircl:,'tl t() Jn .,\cl or a provision adcled to a s:ctiott-^the lcgislatrLlc. roururorrlr entitlcd the Act as an an),lndmerl ...^Whcna provrsion s .rithtlraun ihrm a section. the lcgislaturcs crI the Act an anrcndnrcr I particLrlarlr^rrhen a provisiotr is addcd to replilce^{thc onc} u,ithdraur Ilo*crcr ulrcn an entirc Act or scct^()rl is iLbrogated and no ne! ric ion is adtlcd to rcplace it. legislaturcs lat:cl thc Act accomplisrirrg this result a rcpeal. Thus as used by th:^{legi:,latures.} alncndrnc Lt and rcpcal rnay dilfer in kind-ailclition i: opposed to rvithdrauiI .rr onl,- in deglcc abrogation ol parl ,,6 t. settion as opposcrl tr l brogatior ol'a uholc section or Act: or nlcrl conrnronly. in t,oth k, rd and dcgree addition ola^{provision lo} a seclit'n to rcplace a provisr, n b€ing abrogated as opposed by abrogation o[ it whole scclion o ar] nct. Ihis arbitrarv distinction^{has lteetr fcll,rrvcrl} by the coLrfts, ar d th:y har,e develtiped separate rules ol ccrL:rtruction for .acl.i. llo, .e cr. the)' liur c rccosniscd that {iequcrtly an^1.r:t pr rporlinu lo he irn ln cndnrcrll hrs thc same qualitative^{e I} {'ect irs r rep:al-- the

¶168

¶169

abrogation of- an exisling statutory provision --urnd have therefbrc applled thc term "implied repeal" and the rrrlcs oi' consrructicrn applrcable to repcais to such anlendmcnts.'

¶170

Amendntanl is. in.fact, a^y,ider ternt und it includes abrogatbn or cleletion o.l o provi\ion in an exisling stututc.lf the arnendment of ar: existing law is small. the Act professes to amcndi il it is exrerrsive, it rcpeals a lau' and rc-enacts it. An amendment ol substantive larl, is not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by nccessary implication inferred."

¶171

l5- It is clcar. thereforc. that when this Court referred (o Section 6-A oi' the Gcnerai Clauses Act in Fibre Board case fFibre Boards (|'}1 Lrd v.CII'. (2015) l0 SCC 333 : (2015) 376lTR 5961 and held that Scction 6-A shows that a repeal can be by way,of an express orrission, obr iousl)., "vhat rvas meant was that an amendment which repe aled a provision could do so by way of an express omission, 1'his being the case. it is clcar that Scction 6-A undisputedly leads to the conclusion that a rcpeal rvould include a repeal by way ofan express omission.

¶172

16.'l'hc leamed counsel then argued that while distinguishing the Madhya Pradcsh High Court judgment lState o/ M.P v. HiralalSurwala, 1958 SCC Online MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 931 in RayalaCorpn. fRayalaCorpn. (l) Ltd. v. Director ,tf Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 4l2l a Constitution Bench of this Court exprcssly held as the first reason that Section 6 applies only to repeals and not to omissions. The Fibre Board lFibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) l0 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 5961 judgment has clearly held as follows: (SCC p. 354, para 3l)

¶173

"J1. First and foremost, it witt be noticed that two reasons were given in RayalaCorpn. (P) Ltd. [RayalaCorpn. (P) Ltd.v. Director of En"forcemenr, (1969) 2 SCC 4l2l lor distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of lul.P. v. HiralalSutwola, 1958 SCC Online MP 149 : AIR I 959 MP 931 . Ordinarily, both reasons

¶174

\(rrrl( li)-ll ilt^. r.tri,) r.l, erJc-r,lr ior tlrc sai:i il11j'io,r ur^,.1 [o h rr'usors rroulrl hc Lr, tl;ne ttDort tt:. llttl \c llttd lltal rrttce it : llelrl irlilt:itlcli()ll (r oitlrc (icr crrl ( lJLrs,r. \ct \i\uirl rt.;cll ttol appll lo e rrl, \irich is subor.linalc lt'ci;latior lrs it iipnlics or-Ll\ to iL^(crllr-? r\cl^.rr Ilegultrtion. ir uould lrc^rrhollr unlecessar)' t(, slitlc 1)al otl^a crr.rst uctio o: tlrc uorl lcPc:rl rt^Scclron 6 ol tlrc^{(icnr. Ll (' auscs} Acl.^'onrisr rr-, rs' nlrd-: hr tltc icgisllturc rrrr'.rld n(,t [(] ijlc udcd. Assunrc. ol) tlr3^(rllrer lrarrd. thlt the⁽ onstitution Bcnclr hac. sirtn tr."o reasons for tlr,: riln-applrcabilrtr rrl Scction^(r of thc^{(icn:r:tl (,lar:scs} Act. In srr h a sitrratiLrrr. oh\i(rLr\l\ both rcasors^rvorlri bc ratitr dccidcndi ir rl rv,.rrrltl [.e hirri]inl^rrpon a srrirst'qrt':nI Bcnc'r Ho,rcve^r. once it is )lrnd tllat Scctior tr^{it.ell'rvoulLl} not rppl1 . il urrrrltl bc rrhollr sup, rlluoLrs 1o lirltlrer stirtc tlilt on an intcrpretaLior :f tlr( \'ord 'rcpeal-. arL o ni;sion' tritLtltl ttol be irrcludcd. Wc i,rc. thert, orc-. of thc vicw that th,: sccourl so-cal['r] ratio ol the^{( 'onstil} l rli.)n Llench in Rt,..trrla( rltn. ll') l.li. lRuttlu('rtrpn.^(P)t,td.r'. Dtrcttrtr o/ l')tllb. ce tnet 1. .l()(r()) I S(⁽ l lJl carnot bc silid to be rL ra ic, dccidcndi at all and i' rcrlly in thc naturer ol'obiter dicta."

¶175

N4crely bccausc thc⁽ onstitution flcnch relcrred to a reptal not alnolrnting xr an omissiolr as llrc ljrst reason^qiverr lor d i:; .ingrLishing the Macl rl,r I'radeslr Iligh^{('ourtjLrdgment} Slute q/ ,\1.P. v. H al,rlSutvt'dlt. 1958 SCC^()nlinc MP 119 . ,\tll. l9;j9 Ml) 9:ll^,\ould rot undo thc cl]'ect o{'Il ll para l7 : S('C^,:ar;r .r I o l'Fl6rc Board cus,, ll'ibtc llounl.s^(P) l.td.v.clT,(2015) l0SCC l.]3:(2015) 376 Il'R.r)61 rvhich- as has alread) been stated. clearll mal:es thc distinctior bctween Section 6 not applying at all irnd Sc,: irn^(, being construed 11 ir parlicular rnanncr. Obviously. il thc scctio r^ur'er'( not to appl) at ai . ilny constructron ol thc sectiorl *ould teccssi.ti^y b,: in the naturc olc ril:r Cicta.

¶176

¶177

It is settlcd larr that Parlramcnt is ptesumcd to know the law when it cnacts a partrcular^piece ol'lcgislation. .I he Prevention of Conuption Act was passetl in the )'ear 1988, that is long alter 1969 when thc Constitution Bench decision in Rowtla('oypn lRayaiaCorpn.^(P.1 Ltd. v. [)trector of En[orcantent, ( t969) 2 SCC 412] had been delivcred. lt is- therelorc. Dresumed that Parliamen( enacted Section 3l knowing thar thc decision in RnyalaCorpn. lRayalaCorpn.^(P) Ltd. v. Director o.f linforcenent, (1969) 2 SCC 4l2l had stated that an omission would not amount to a repeal and it is for this reason that Section 3l lr'as cnacted. I'his again docs not take us further as this statement of thc law in RayalaCorpn. lRayalaCorpn.^(P) Lrd. v. l)iret'ror ol lin/itrcament. (1969) 2 SCC 4l2l is no longer the law dcclared by thc Supremc Courl aftcr the decision in Fibre Board casefl"ibrc Bourd.s 1P1 Lrd.v.OlT. (2015) l0 SCC 333:(2015)376 ITR 5961 .'l'his rcason therelorc again cannot avail the appellant.

¶178

The referencc to the savings provision in Section I of the Contract Act, 1872 again does not take us very much further as the expression "repeal" as has becn^pointed out above can be of^part of^{an enactment} also. This being the case, when the legislature uses the word "omif'it usually does so when it wishes to delete a particular section as opposed to deleting an entire Act. As has been noticed both inFibre Board casefFibre Boards (l') Lrd. v . CIT,⁽²⁰¹ 5) l0 scc 333 :⁽²⁰¹⁵⁾ 376 ITR 596] and hereinabove, these are all expressions which only^go to lorm and not to srrbstance. Even assuming for the sake of argument that we were inclined to agree with Shri Aggarwal, given the force of his inexorable logic. this Coun has laid down the parameters of when it would be expcdient to have a relook at a particular decision in Keshav Mills Co. t.rd. v. CIT fKeshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT,⁽¹⁹⁶⁵⁾ 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 16361 , as follows:^(SCR pp. 921-22: AIP. pp. 1643-44, para 23)

¶179

¶180

"i-l lr .l:aling r Llt titc rlrrt:trrn as to rihctltcr t)t. (.a il d.:cr:;rons t'l' tlris⁽ r url il.('ir .lr'ltutt.::t \lillt tu',. i\r'rr ./r,h tr.g,,' I uiil .!ill' i.td.',.(l. l9-59) .17 IlRllrS(11 and I'trlLi,l rtt 1.,t,^{.ustll't,tlutl} 'I urkev ll, L.)y,: Illttk'. ( o. l.tl . ( 17. I()(rl Srrprr (llSl { 8ll : AII{ l96l S( "lsll . sl,oLrirl bc rce Lrrr'iil.-r'cd lr':tl t,:r is,:ri l-r u.. rre ,rLrqht itr lrc r:lear i !r tlrc approach rihrch should [.- adop'ed in srch cl.scs. i\4 r l'alkhival; h:rs not d s|uted tlt. lirct thar- in a pl rltcr c:si. th:s Clorrrt Iras inhcr, r)t.iurisdiction to reconsider and rcvisc its cirrl,r:r drcisions. and so, tlr^j i bstract^(lucstiolt as to whctltcr srrcll .l llowcr^../estrj io this (--ourt ()r' r() necd not detaitr irs. in e\cr(t:ins this intr-reni porvcr. Iror',erer. hir^{(lorrrl,.()uld} natrlltll\ Iikc t..r irnlxrre (etlit,l.ra.itsol)able lirn tatior, :rnrl rvoLrltl bc rtlrrclanr ro entctrairi ;-l:rrs iirr the rcconsidcr :ttron and rgrisirrr. ol its carlicr rlc,.isions. utlc;s it is satiificd I rat thcre ard conlpellir! xrld suL,sttrlltral easoll: [.) do stl. It is gelleral ilr lir ial crpcrierrce that in utatters ol'lau inrolr ilg q rcslions ol r:ortslrL cl r.lg stalut()r\ or donsttlution.rl ltrirri:ions- t!'..) \i:\s trc oft€n rcas rrr,rbly possible and uhcn ludiciiLl approach lrir.i to lrakc a choice bc u':en the two reasonithl, possiblc viErws. tlr,: prcccss of decision-r raliing is oltcn vcrv dillicult and dclic;rte. Wlrr:Lr th s Court Ircars app, alj agaiusl tlccisiolrs ol'the tligh (oults and is required to considerr lrc propricl\ or correctuess ol'tlrc rier,, takcr l.,r,tlrc I{igh Coruls on ary point ol'larv, it uould be opcn to tltis CoI rt to hold that thorrgh th r icw takcn b1. the Iligh Court is rcasonlbll posstble, the alternativ( r ew which is also rcasonably possibk is bct r't. anc. should he preferr rd [n such a casc, thc choice is betr,reen thc^.,r:r.r' trken b1 the High l(.un whosc .judgr.ncnl is under appeal. and llt, alt:rnativc vic\ rlhi :h appears to this Court to bc nrore rceso'r:blc; and in accepting its own i,icu' in prclercnce to that of thc [{i g,t Court, this Corrt \vor lcl ber discharging its dutv as a court ol appcal ltut rliflercnt considerat ons must inevitabll arisc .,lhcrc a pr.er ious d,:,:isiorr of this (,'orrrt has; taictl a partlculaL vicir as to titc consttuclion ()l a statutorv

¶181

It)

¶182

provision as. fbr instancc. Scction 66(4) ol thc Act. Whcn it is urged that thc vicrv alrcadr taken bl' thrs^('ourt shoLrld bc reviewcci anci revised it ma] nor neccssarilt' bc an adcquate reason lor such review and revision to hold that though the carlicr vicw' is a reasonably possiblc view, thc altcrnativc view *hich is prcssed on thc subsequenr occasion is more reasonrblc- In reviewing and revising its earlicr decision, this Court shouid ask itself whethcr in the interests of the public good or lor anv othcr valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that thc earlier dccision should bc revised. When this Court decides questions of lau'. its clecisions are, under Article l4l, binding on all courts within the rerritorl, of lndia, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an clemcnt ol'cenainly and continuity in the interpretation of law in the countrl . Irrcqucnt excrcise by this Court ol' its power to review its earlicr decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Courl to be rnore reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce conlusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Couft is satisllcd that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hcsitatc to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounccd to be plainly crroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully^justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations -What is the nature of the infimlity or error on^which a^plea for^{review and} revision of the earlier vieu, is bascd? On^the earlier occasion, did^some patent aspects of thc question remain unnoticcd. or^was the attention of the Court not drau,n to any relevaltt and material statutory provision,

¶183

¶184

or \rrs rllr l'r'cvious.lcr:isiott of this Cotrrt hcltrrrg^,rtt lr. p('lllt tt()t rr,rlirecl . I. tl c^(,our1 helrirtu sLrclt plea lirirll una rnr(rll: Il.t1 tir.lc ii srrch ar c-or in llrc crrllier r icrr') \'hat rtirrlrl lr. tltc irDlict,rl lhc clrtrr on tlr rcncnrl a,-lnrinislration ol'la,,r or or^p rhlrc^q rr,,l'.) llas tlrc e.rrli:r'ticr: si()n bccn lirllorrc.l ort sLttrseqttcnl occlLsirrtt: 'ttcr lrr this ( ou1 o| l i he lligh ( ourts.) ,\rtl. \r'uld tlrc rc,crr.i )l Lhc .-rrlicr decirior, li ad to publi. incorrcnicnce- lrarrlsiril., ,rr rrrsclrrcl'.' llrcse and othcr re cvant considcrations nlust bc ctrclLrllr br,r rc irt nrir.td rvlierevcr hir; Court is called Lrpon to exelcise rls.jrrrisdicti.'ir to rcricrr ln,.l 'evise t. carlicr decisiort:.^'

¶185

At t ri:; stage, it is rclevant to notc that thc S rl renrc^(loLrrt in Chandpaklal lrrmanlal Shah r,. Reliancc tntlustrics I-t(l.shcld that pcnding ploc, erlings cannot be quashed ol ser asid(' rnercl), cn fhc ground that tle rrovision undcr \hich procecdi,rgs u':r,: iiriliated r.r as later repealed^'l his means thal pending procecdrngs a',j sa\ed, despite the provision -rnder u'hich they were initiated is onritlr,l.'Ihc relevant

¶186

paragraph is e rtracted below:

¶187

(r. 11 is no nlcossary to go into all the rival contcntiorls ln ortr vicw. thc lnatte c-rn be decidcd on a short point. lhc clrarl.r: against the res;rontler:i; of evasion of dut1,. The ingredicnt of the cll-encc is the evasion.^'hc omission of' a procedural rulc lbr ar atl rrlr th: credit cannot in m'./ nlanner aflect the said chargc.^-l he prosccu.icn ciLnrrot be dcprived I f,)pportunit)^(o provc evasion shich hr itsclf rs an tllcncc. In this vi,, !\ :)f the nlaltcr. therg rr as ns jtrstificatii,n l,rr t rc I IiE h^(lourt

¶188

(2017) 9 S:C 309

¶189

to quash thc charge mctell on thc^grotrrtd ol'Rulc^{5(r-A having been} onr itted.

¶190

In Har Naraini Dcvi^v. Union of^{Indiae,the Supreme}

¶191

Court again held that Section⁶ olthe^{Act, 1897 is equallyapplicable} to an omission.Theretbre, such omissiort^{or dclction or repeal cantrot} aflect the previous operation ol such^{orritted/deleted/repealed} provision. The relevant paragraphs are extracted^below:

¶192

By virtue of Section 6 of^{the (iencral ClausesAct. the repeal of an} enactment would not allcct^{thc prcvlous operation of suchan} enactment. lnshree BhagwLrri^{Steel Rolling \ltlls v. CCE,this Court} has held that repeal is to be trcatcd^{similarll'asan omissionand} Section 6 of the Gencral^{Clauses Act uouldapply equally to an} omission as it would apply to a^{repeal.Ort account of Sections 6(b)} and 6(c) of General Clauses^{Act. the ornission of Scction 4(2) of 1956} Act cannot affect the^{prcvious operation of the said Sootion 4(2).. . ... '} 28. The detetion of Section^{4(2) took placcw.e.f 09.09.2005.} Therefore, the effect of the^{dcletron can only bc in respect of} successions which opened on^{or alter09.092005' 'l-his is because} under Section 6(b)^{and 6(c) of the General ClauscsAct repeal cannot} affect the previous operation^{of any enactmentsorepealed and cannot} affect the previous^{operationof any enactment so repealed and cannot} affect any right which^{may have been acquiredor accrued' In the} present case, it is to be hetd that^{succession has openedprior to} 09.09.2005, the rights of^{the descendants in tcrms of Section 50} became crystallized on^{account of thc said Section read withSection} 4(2) of the 1956 Act.^{'l'herefore' thc dclctionof Section4(2) cannot} have retrospective efl'ect.

¶193

s2022 Sk OflLine SC 1265

¶194

.lherc.ile, it is clear tirrrtr thc afitr.csairl rlis,,.rr.;iorr thirt Scctioir (r ol tlrc A cr 1897 is aprpiicablc. to or.nission r1 a pror.ision h1 thc lr'r-gisl tr'rrc' In .lhcr u'o'ris. Scctio, 6 cr- t r( ,\rr. rr'(()7 srrrcs .i! tlrc fcirilirg^{pr.ccetlir.{s} unc{cr a pro'i:;ion that rra:. rir:bi.rlLlertl! orrritted. Nori o ring to the thcts oi rhe casc. it ii rL,.rr in rlisptrtc rhat thc F,rocerdrngs for^violations of Secrion 6{j)ib) - f.tl c r\ct. lc)9!) $.ere irritiatt d in the year 2017 When the procr-'eriirrrls u.c.r.c irritiated aqtinsl thc Pi tirioners. Section 5(3) of the Act. l(,(),) ,..r\ stili in lirrce . 'l hclel rr':. bv virtue of Section 6 ol thc ,\cl 897 thc irrocecdings ac.rrir.ls rhc [)etitioners art, saved and carrr.cl bc disturbcd nrtrely t,ecaus: ljection 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was suhscr.Lrcntl],ontitted. A.ccor'< ing to this cou11. Responderrt No. I was uerl rvithin his .itrrisdir^ti,rn to pass the irnpugned order dzrr,.,,l 04.01 .l0l j. As the Petitior rer', has a, cffective alternative re,tcdl i,: :lrc fb,r ol.an appeal under l,er;tion l9 of the Act, 1999, this (,ourt, irL light of thc decision ir: Ass stant Commissioner of State ,l-ar (supr:r) holds that the p.L'sent writ petition is not rnaintainabrc. 'r'he r.efoie. the prcsent writ pe ition is liable to be dismissed.

¶195

tkh

¶196

¶197