"lt secms to us clear from these provisions that the summary remedy for cviction ivhich is provided for by Section6 of the act can be rcsorted to by the Government only against persons who arc in unauthorised occupation of any land which is "the property of Govcrnment". In regard to property described in sub-sections (t) and (2) of Section 2, there can be no doubt, difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and, therefore, in respcct of such property, the Government would be free to take recourse to the summary remedy of eviction provided for in Section 6. A person who occupies a part of a public road, street, bridge, the bed of the sea and the like, is in Unauthorised occupation of property which is declared by Sec.2 to be the property of the Government and, therefore, it is in public interest to evict him expeditiously, which can only be done by resorting to the summaq/ remedy provided by the Act. But Section 6(1) which confers the power of summary eviction on the Government limits that power to cases in which a person is in unauthorised occupation of a land 'for rvhich he is liable to pay assessment under Section 3." Section 3, in turn, refers to unauthorised occupation of any land "which is the property of Government'. [f there is a bona fide dispute regarding the title of the Government to any property, the Government cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that, the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by Section 6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona hde claim or title. In the instant case, there is unquestionably a genuine dispute between the State Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots of land were the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings taken by the then Government of Hyderabad arld whether the Osmania University, for whose benefit the plots are alleged to have been acquired, had lost title to the .property by operation of the law of limitation. The suit hled by the University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on the property more than twelve years before the date of the suit and the University was not in possession of the property at any time vrithin that period. Having failed in the suit, the University activated the Government to evict the Nawab and his transferees summarily, which seems to us impermissible. The respondents have a bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted save by the due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. That procedure is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the respondents.'
