Dismissed

Chintala Madhavi v. S. Venkatamma, / Venkata Lakshmi

Telangana HC5 Jun 2023SA/1350/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed applications for leave to file second appeals by third-party purchasers who bought properties during pending litigation. It held that they were bound by the principle of lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act) and could not set up rights against the plaintiff seeking specific performance. The appeals were dismissed.

What the court decided

AI extract

Chintala Madhavi Vs S. Venkatamma, / Venkata Lakshmi — Specific Performance | Telangana HC (2023)

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

¶2

MONDAY HE FIFTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI

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r.A. NOS. 1 AND 2 0F 2018

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IN/AND

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SECOND APPEAL NO: 1350 OF 2018 AND 1359 OF 2018

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s.A. NO. 1350 0F 2018

¶9

Appeal Under Section 100 of CPC against the order dated 30-10-2012 in A.S.No. 12 ot 2OOG on the file of the Court of the lll Additional District Judge (FTC) Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar preferred against the Judgment and decree dated 24-11-2AOS in O.S.No. 298 of 1997 on the file of the Court of the ll Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District.

¶10

Between:

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1 Chintala Madhavi, Wo. C. Ravikanth, Aged about 37 yars, Occ fvt. E ffifJloyeq N o. 2-2-1 8512476/4, Mallikarjun Nagar, Amberpet, Hyderabad.

¶12

Y. Ramadevi, Wo. Y. Muralidhar, Aged about, 60 years. Occ Housewife, R/o. B-1 -15l22l5,Sama Sarawathi Colony, Karmanghat, Hyderabad

¶13

G. Ramulu, S/o. Venkatappadu, Aged about 45 years, Occ Gardener, 8-4369/PN/338, Peddamma Nagar, Borabanda, Hyderabad.

¶14

M. Venkatesh, Wo. Satyanarayana, Aged.about 41^years, Occ Pvt. Employee, R/o. 7-4, Boyawada, Near Sri Vidya Nikethan School, lbrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District.

¶15

K. Prameela, Wo. K. Krishna Mohan Reddy, Aged, about 36 years, Occ House Wife, Rlo. 1-7-265, Opp Hanuman Temple, Chaitanyapuri, Hyderabad,

¶16

C. Abilash, S/o. C. Prabhakar, Aged about 37 years, Occ Pvt. Employee, R/o. 14-3-1 1115,'Near Arya Samaj, Gosha Mahal, Hyderabad.

¶17

7 K Jagan Mohan Reddy, S/o Ramchandra Reddy, Aged about 43 years, Occ Agriculture, Rlo H.No 1-7-8015, Hanuman Nagar, Opp Hanuman Temple, Dilsuknagar, Hyderabad

¶18

B. Satyanarayana Gir, S/o Late Hari Kishan Gir, Aged about 59 years, Occ Business, R/o H.No 3469/6i46, Plot No. 70, Avanthi Nagar, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad.

¶19

Rajesh Patel, S/o. Govind Patel, Aged about 29 years, Occ Business, R/o. H.No.7-2-11813 and 4, S V. Colony, Bairamalgurda, Hyderabad.

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10.Jangam Vanaja, D/o. late Jangam Rajalingam, Aged about 41 years, Occ Pvt. Service, R/o. H.No. 16-1 17, Sri Krishna Nagar Colony, Near Sai Baba Temple Raod, Opp Poola Reddy Sweet Shop, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad

¶21

Ravula Sukanya, W/o. Ravula Jeevan Prasad. Aged about 38 years, Occ Government Employee, R/o. 16-1^{'l-16/N/'145,} Viswapriya Ravula PIaza, Prasanth Nagar, Moosarambagh, Hyderabad.

¶22

'12. S. t\ilohan Lal Patel, S/o. Vishram Bhai Patel, Aged about 52 years, Occ Business, R/o.Plot No. 28, Shathavahana Nagar, L.B. Nagar, Ranga Reddy District

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l3.Somarapu Maruthi, S/o. S. Chandraiah, Aged about 53 years, Occ Business R/o. Flar No, 301, H.No. 16-1 147716/511, Kamala Gatri Avenue, Opp Universal Gym lVlusarambagh, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad.

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...APPELLANTS/ Third parties

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AND

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S. Venkatamma, @ Venkata Lakshmi, Wo Madhava Reddy, Aged about 50 years, Orc Household, R/o 140 EWSH, New Santhoshnagar Colony, Hyderabad

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S. Laxmamma, Wo. Janga Reddy, Aged about 65 years, Occ Household , R/o To*ur Vi,lase, Hayathnagar Mandal, *rrn"#t135R5[ilt n""pono"nt

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lA NO: 1 OF 2018

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Petition under Section^'151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant leave to the petitioners to frle the Second Appeal against the Decree and Judgment Dt. 30 10.2012 passed in A.S. No. 12 of 20O6 on the file of the Hon'ble Ill Addl. District Judge, (F.T C) Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, without list of documents therein.

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lA NO: 2 OF 2018

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Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 1830 days in filing the second appeal against the Decree and Judgment Dl. 30.1O.2012 passed in A. S. No 1 2 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble lll Addl. District Judge, (F.T.C) Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar pending disposal ofthe above second appeal

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lA NO: 3 OF 2018

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the Decree and Judgment Dt.30.10.2012 passed in A.S. No. 12 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble Ill Addl. District Judge, (F.T.C) Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar pending disposal of the above second appeal .

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SECOND APPEAL NO: 1359 OF 2018

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Appeal Under Section 1O0 of CPC against the order dated 30-10-2012 in A.S.No. 11 of 2006 on the file of the Coud of the lll Additional District Judge (FTC) Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar preferred against the Judgment and decree dated 24-11-2OOS in O.S.No. 8'15 of 1997 on the file of the Court of the Il Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District.

¶36

Between:

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Chintala Madhavi, Wo. C. Ravikanth, Aged about 37 yars, Occ Pvt. Employee, Rl o. 2-2-1 BSl24l7 6/ A, Mallikarjun Nagar, Amberpet, Hyderabad.

¶38

Y. Ramadevi, Wo. Y. Muralidhar, Aged about 60 years, Occ Housewife, R/o 8-1-15l22l5,Sama Sarawathi Colony, Karmanghat, Hyderabad

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G. Ramulu, S/o. Venkatappadu, Aged about 45 years. Occ Gardener, 8-436giPN/338, Peddamma Nagar, Borabanda, Hyderabad

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M. Venkatesh, Wo. Satyanarayana, Aged about 4l years, Occ Pvt. Employee, R/o. 7-4, Boyawada, Near Sri Vidya Nikethan School, lbrahimpatnam, Ranga Reddy District.

¶41

K. Prameela, Wo. K. Krishna Mohan Reddy, Aged about 36 years, Occ House Wife, tr./o. 1-7-265, Opp Hanuman Temple, Chaitanyapuri, Hyderabad

¶42

C. Abilash, S/o. C. Prabhakar, Aged about 37 years, Occ Pvt. Employee, R/o. 14-3-11115, Near Arya Samaj, Goshamahal, Hyderabad.

¶43

K. Jagan Mohan Reddy, S/o Rahichandra Reddy, Aged about 43 years, Occ Agriculture, R/o H.No 1-7-8015, Hanunnan Nagar, Opp Hanuman Temple, Dilsuknagar, Hyderabad

¶44

Satyanarayana Gir, Sio Late Hari Kishan Gir, Aged about 59 yeard, Occ Business, Rl/o H.No 3669/8/46, Plot No. 70, Avanthi Nagar, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad.

¶45

Rajesh Patel, S/o.Govind Patel, Aged about 29 years, Occ Business, Rl/o. H.No 7-2-11813 and 4, S.V. Colony, Bairamalguda, Hyderabad.

¶46

l0.Jangam Vanaja, D/o. late Jangam Rajalingam, Aged about 41 years, Occ Pvt. Service, R/o. H.No. 16-1 17, Sri Krishna Nagar Colony Near Sai Baba Temple Raod, Opp Paola Reddy Sweet Shop, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad.

¶47

Ravula Sukanya, Wo. Ravula Jeevan Prasad, Aged about 38 years, Occ Government Employee, R/o. 1 6-'1 1 -'16/N/145, Viswapriya Ravula Plaza, Prasanth Nagar, Moosarambagh, Hyderabad.

¶48

12.S. Mohan Lal Patel, S/o. Vishram Bhai Patel, Aged about 52 years, Occ Business, R/o.Plot No. 28, Shathavahana Nagar, LB. Nagar, Ranga Reddy District.

¶49

'13. Somarapu Maruthi, S/o. S. Chandraiah, Aged about 53 years, Occ Business R/o. Flat No. 301, H.No, 16-l1477161511, Kamala Gatri Avenue, Opp Universal Gym Musarambagh, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad.

¶50

-..APPELLANTS/ Third Parties

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AND

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S. Venkatamma @ Venkata Lakshmi, Wo.Madhava Reddy, Aged about 50 years, Occ Household, R/o 140 EWSH, New Santhoshnagar Colony, Hyderabad

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2 S. Laxmamma, Wo. Janga Reddy, Aged abcut 65 years, Occ. Household

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3 Malreddy Ram Reddy, S/o. Bal Reddy, Aged about 50 years Occ Agriculture,

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Samreddy Bal Reddy, S/o. Swamy Reddy, Aged about 50 years, Occ Agriculturist, (R2 to R4 are R/o. Torrur Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District)

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G. Madhusudhan Reddy, S/o. Raja Malla Reddy, Aged about 54 years, Occ Business, R/o. H.No. 1-17, Maduranagar, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad.

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K. Ranga Reddy, S/o Venkat Reddy, Aged about 60 years, Occ Agriculture, Rl/o Koheda village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Hyderabad.

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M/s. Srimitra Estates (P) Limited, Rep. by its Managing Director, Office at 16114861C, 1st Floor, Beside Trinetra Super Market, Dilsukhnagar, Hyderabad.

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...RESPONDENTS/ Respondents

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lA NO: 1 OF 2018

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances staled in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be^pleased to^grant leave to the petitioners to file the Second Appeal against the Decree and Judgment Dr. 14.7.2011^passed in A.S No. 11 of 2006 on the file of the^Hon'blelll Addl District Judge, (F.T.C) Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, without list^of documents therein and to pass

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lA NO: 2 OF 2018

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Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the^petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 2201 days in filing the second appeal against Decree and Judgment Dt. 14.7.2011^passed in A.S. No. 1'l of 2006 on the file of Hon'ble lll Addl. District Judge, (F.T.C)Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar pendang disposal of the above Second appeal

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lA NO: 3 OF 2018

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Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the Decree and Judgment DL 14.7.2011 passed in A.S. No. 1 1 of 2006 on the file of the Hon'ble lll Addl. District Judge, (F.T.C) Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar pending disposal of the above second appeal Counsel for the Appellant in both : SRI A. SUDARSHAN REDDY SENIOR

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COUNSEL FOR SRI. G. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY Counsel forthe Respondent No.1 in both : Ms. PRATUSHA BOPPANA Counsel forthe Respondent No.2 in both : SRI M.S. ACHYUT BHARDWAJ

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The Court delivered the following: Common Judgment

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Tl{E IIONOtiRABLE Dr.,lllSTICI. G. RADI{A lL,\l

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l.A.Nos.l and 2 ol'2018

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In/And

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SECOND APPEAL Nos.ll50 of 2018 arrd 1359 of 2018

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COMMON JUDCMENT:

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I.A.No.l of 2018 in S.A.Nos. 1350 of 2018 and 1359 of 2018 are filed by the petitioner Nos. I to 13, who are the third parties to grant leave to them to flle the Second Appeals against the decree and^judgrnent dated 14.07.201 I passed in A.S.No.1 I of 2006 and the decrec and^judgment dated 30.10.2012 passed in A.S.No.l2 of 2006 on the flle ol the lll Additional District.ludge^(tr.T'.C.), Ranga Reddy District at [..I],Nagar.

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I.A.No.2 of 2018 in S.A.Nos.l350 of 2018 and 1.159 of 2018 are filed by the petitioner Nos.l 1o 13, who are the third pa(ies to condone the delay of 1830 and 2210 days respectively in filing the Second Appcals against the decree and^judgment dated 14.07.201 I passed in A.S.No. I I of 2006 and the decree and^judgment dated 30. 10.2012 passed in A.S.No.ll ol2006 on the file ol the III Additional District Judge (ti.T.C.), Ranga Rcddy

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District at L.B.Nagar.

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-'l

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l D,.GRR.t t A .\os.l and ) of)lts ln,ahd S A.No t350 and l359oI2at8

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The petitioner No.6 filed alfidavits in support of the

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applications on his bchalf as well as on behall of all the other petitioners stating that the petitioners were third paft ies/subsequent purchasers of the paft of the suit schedule property. They vvere the absolute owners and possessors of their respective items ol the suit schedule properties in survey No. I 04, Thorrur Village, presently llayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.

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O.S.No.298 of 1997 was filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff for specific perforrnance of agreement of sale dated 01.02.1996 executed by the respondent No.2, who was none other than her mother in respect of Ac. 2 -^{l3 gts. of.land in survey No.I 04, Thorrur Village, HayathnagarMandal,} Ranga Reddy District.

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O.S.No.8l5 of 1997 was filed by the respondent No.1/ptaintiff seeking declaration of the registered sale deed document executed by respondent No.2 in favour ol respondent Nos.3 to 6 as null and void to the extent of Ac.2 - 13 gts. of land in survey No.104, l'homrr Village, Hayathnagar Mandal. Ranga Reddy District against the respondent No.2 as

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Dr 0 t<k.J l 1 'os l an.l : ol )Oll n o,n S,1 .'o lljt) a d lJj9.1:t)l\

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well as respondent Nos.3 to 6. Respondent No.7 was subsequently added as he was a second purchaser fiom respondent Nos.3 to 6.

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Both the suits r.r,ere^jointly decided by a common decree and judgment dated 24.07.2005 by the ll Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District on 24.11.2005, dismissing both of them. Subsequently, respondent No. l/plaintill preferred two appeals - A.S.No. I I of 2006 against the decree and^judgment in O.S.No.815 ol 1997 and A.S.No.l2 of 2006 against the decree and^judgment in O.S.No.298 of 1997. The III Additional District Judge, (F.T.C.), Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar vlde separate judgnrents dared 1,4.07.201 I in A.S.No.ll ol 2006 and vide decree and judgnrent dated 30.10.2012 in A.S.No. l2 of2006, reversed the findings of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District directing the respondent No.2 to execute a registered sale.deed in favour ol respondent No. I (plaintiff) in pursuance of the agreement of sale to the extent of Ac.2 - I 3 gts. within one month lrom the date of the^j udgment and also cancelled the registered sale deed document No.ll68 of 1997 dated 10.04.1997 executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent Nos.3 to 6 to an extent

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-1 DTCRRJ t.A.Nosta'd2o/20t8 ia/a,rl S t No | 350 and ll59 0/2018

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of Ac.2 - l3 gts., out ol the total Ac.6 - l3 gts. in survey No.l04lA, Thorrur Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, L.B. Nagar District.

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During the pendency of O.S.No.8l5 of 1997, the respondent Nos.3 to 6 entered into development agreement with M/s. Sreemitra Estates Private Limited (respondent No.7) for the purpose of developing the land. They developed the said land into plots and sold to various people. The petitioners submitted that they were bonafide purchasers from respondent No.7 and they were ln peacelul possession and enjoyment over their respective plot properties. The respondent No.l/plaintiff under the guise of the orders in the above appeals was trying to interfere with their peaceful possession and enjoyment. They resisted her illegal attempts with 'the support ol the local people. But aggrieved by the interference of the respondent No.1/plaintill, they preferred these Second Appeals raising substantial questions of law for consideration. Since, they were not^parties to both the suit and the first appeals, they were not aware of the filing, pendency and disposal ol first appeals. Since the date of purchase of the plots, they were in possession olthe same. No notices were issued on them either by the trial court or the first appellate court. Subsequently, they came

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)

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b ARRJ I-,l-Nos I and2of)018 dand S.A No I J50 dtu1 I159 of)0t8

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to know that the appeals were allowed by the III Additional District Judge, (F.I'.C.), Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar and prayed to grant leave to them lor filing the Second Appeals against the decree and judgment in A.S.Nos.ll and l2 of 2006 on the file of the III Additionat District Judge, (F.T.C.), Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar.

¶94

The respondent No. 1/plaintiff filed counter alfidavit submitting that no leave could be granted to the petitioners as they were third pafiies to both the original suit as well as the appeals. The petitioners - appellants claimed themselves to be subsequent purchasers of the suit properties. On perusal of the sale deed filed by them, it would show that the sale transactions were /zs pendens and they were not bonafide. They were sham and collusive created to deprive her of the fruits of the litigation. The appellants being transferees pendete /ife were .bound by the^judgment and decree in A.S.Nos.l l and 12 of 2006 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, (F.T.C.), Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar by virtue of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Second Appeals were filed with a delay of 1830 days and 2210 days respectively and the above appeals could not be entertained a1 such distance of time. The petitioners -

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6 Dr.(iRRJ LA.Nas.l a\l 2 af2018 tLland S 4 No.l350 ard 1359 af2AI8

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appellants had not specified the date as to when they beoarne aware of the litigation or when they were served u'ith caveats. The same was necessary for determination of date ol knowledge on the part of the petitioners - appellants which was a decisive lactor to ascertain limitation and bonafides olthe petitioners - appellants.^'lhe lack olthe specific details would clearly establish that the petitioners were concocting reasons to file Second Appeals. She denied that there was illegal intcrlerence on her part. much less on 13.08.2018 as claimed by the petitioners, and contended that ilsuch was the case, she would not have filcd E.P.No.5S of 2017 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar seeking possession ol the property. She contended that no substar-rtial questions of law were made out in the Second Appeals warranting suspension of the judgment and decree in A.S.Nos.l I and 12 ol 2006 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. No leave could be granted to the petitioners - appellants as they were neither parties to the Original Suits nor the Appeal suits or acted with due diligence. As they were transferees pendente 1ltc, they were bound by the^judgments in appeal suits which had attained finality long back. Even otherwise, the

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1 DTCRR.J t .a ^'os^{I otul)of20l8} n/ahd -t .\o. t J 50 ,iad I 159 of 20 tB

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second appeals could not be maintaincd at such a long distance of time, as limitation was a valuable right accruing to a party and the petitioners/appellants did not act with due diligence and no cogent reasons were lurnished to substantiate such delay. There was a presumption in law that purchaser would duly enquire into the title ol the properly belore entering into a sale transaction. The case olthe appellants was that despite due diligence, they did not find out about the litigation.^-I'he respondent No.2 had executed a registered sale deed dated 07.12.201 I in her favor vide document bearing No.4458 of 201 I which would constitute as a public notice. As such, no leave could be granted 10 the petitioners/appellants to file the Second Appeals.

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The petitioners filed a reply to the counter alfldavit filed by respondent No.l submitting that they purchased plots lronr their vendor i.e., M/s. Sreemitra Estates Private Limited in the year 2000 and thereafter. The respondent No.l filed O.S.Nos.298 and 815 of 1997 and both the suits were dismissed on 24.11.2005. The sale deed of M/s. Sreemitra Estates Private Limited was reflecting in the encumbrance certificate. Similarly, all their sales were also reflected in the encumbrance certificate. They were

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8 DT.ARRJ I /1.Nos.t and 2 of20tB i and S /1 No.l350 and l3s9 af 2018

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necessary pafties to thc suit.^'fhe pahanies also reflect M/s. Sreemitra as pattadar from 2005 to 20 l7 and in the possessory column, the property was shown as plots. The Petitioners had purchased plots in Sy.No. 104/A. Some of the petitioners had also constructed cornpound wall in their respective plots. The petitioners' names were reflecting in the encunrbrance certificate from 2001 onwards. The respondent No.l filed A.S.Nos. I I and 12 o12006 on the file of III Additional District Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District, without making the petitioners as paffy respondents inspite of reflecting the petitioners' name in encumbrance ceftificate. The respondent No.2 without having any right executed a registered sale deed in favour of respondent No.l . Basing on the same, the respondent No. I started disturbing the possession of the petitioners' plots after lapse of 7 years i.e, in the year 2017 and demolished the cornpound wall constructed by the Petitioner No. 12. The Petitioner No. I 2 fi led a complaint against the respondent No. 1 on 21.11.2017 on the file of P.S. Hayathnagar and the same was pending before the VII Metropolitan Magistrate at Hayathnagar. The respondent No.l filed a Caveat Petition on the file of the Hon'ble Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District against the petitioners. The said Caveat Petition was sent

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() DTGRRJ It\osIad20/2018 n/aNl Si1 No 13tt)dnd ll59al)018

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through Registered Post on 08.03.2018 and the same was received by the petitioners on 12.03.2018. ln the said Caveat Petition, the respondent No.l mentioned about the^judgment and decree in A.S.Nos. I I and 12 of 2006. Immediately knowing about the said flrst appeals, the petitioners approached the Hon'ble III Additionat District Judge, Ranga Reddy District and obtained certified copies of the said^judgments and decrees. As such, the Second Appeals were filed with a delay ol 2210 and 1830 days. The respondent No.l intentionally not made the pctitioners as respondents in the First Appeals, though their names werc reflecting in thc encumbrance certificate and plots were also shown in the pahanies. The sale deed dt.07 .12.2011 executed by the respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.l was collusive. The respondent No.2 filed u'ritten statement denying entering into Agreement of Sale with the plaintill but made a volte-face at the time of cross examination. The respondent No.2 in her pleadings stated that from the sale consideration received lrom her vendor, the respondent No.2 and her family members purchased lands at Khanapur Village, Ibrahimpatnam Mandal and they were cultivating the same. The entire suits and appeals were collusive. The petitioners/appe llants had purchased small extents from

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l0 Dr.(; RRJ I A.Nos I and 2 oI20t8 in/and S.a Na.l3s0 ad li59 oI20l3

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their savings. They were necessary and proper parties and prayed to allow the applications.

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Heard the learned senior counsel lor the appellants, Sri A. Sudarshan Reddy and the leamed counsel for the respondent No.l, Ms. Pratusha Boppana.

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I l. Perused the record.

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The leamed counsel for the petitioners contended that the agreement of sale dated 01.02.1996 was executed by the respondent No.2 alone to the respondent No.l, but the sale deed document N,r. I 168 of 1997 dated 10.04.1997 was executed by the respondent No.2 in favour. ol respondent Nos.3 to 6, along with her husband and two sons, whether the respondent No.2, who was the mother of the respondent No.1 has exclusive right to execute the agreement of sale in favour of respondent No.l was a substantial question of law to be decided by this Court; the respondent No.2 denied executing the agreement of sale to the respondent No.l/ plaintiff in her written statement but stated in her evidence admitting execution of the same Thus, there was a collusion in between the responde nt Nos. I and 2.

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¶112

t)r^(;RR.t I1\i, Ia d : ol :0ll r|a.l \l t\o.J J50 und lJi9 af 2Al'\

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As soon as both the appeals are allowed cancelling the registered sale deed in lavour of the subsequent purchasers i.e., respondent Nos.3 to 6, the respondent No.2 executed a registered sale deed in lavour ol the respondent No.l on 07.12.201l, but possession was not delivered to respondent No. I /palintiff as the respondent No.2 was not in possession of the suit schedule plots. An execution petition was filed urus by the respondent No.l before the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District vrde E.P.No.58 ol 2017 in the year 2017, after a gap ofl several years. The petitioners were purchasers of the plots, which rvas within the knowledge of the respondent No.l/plainti{I, but the petitioners came to know about the disposal of the appeals only when the respondent No. I filed caveat petitions which were received by the petitioners on 12.03.2018. The petitioners were bonafide purchasers. The litigation between the respondent Nos. I and 2 was collusive. The trial court dismissed the suits observing that there was a semblance of fraud. The petitioners were purchasers between 10.04.1997 and 201 I . The encumbrance certificate was reflecting the name of their vendor and the pahanies were showing the nature of the propefty as plots. The petitioners were entitled to protecl their propefiy. They could not be

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I] L1 'or I ad L' :^,)t I;RII :0lSJ ,l arul 5.1 \b 1 50 atld lSjt)ot)ol9

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throun ou1 a1 the threshold. A well considered .iudgment o1'thc trial courl was reversed by the first appellate court and as it was a collusive suit between the respondent No.2 (mother) and the respondent No I (daughtcr), prayed to allow the applications filed by the petitioners granting leave to the petitioners to preler the Second Appeals.

¶116

l-eamed counsel for the respondent No.l/plaintiff on the other hand contended that the petitioners were pendente /ile purchasers, they were bound by the doctrine ol lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, I 882. The encumbrance certificate was reflecting the name of respondent No. l/plaintiff since 07.12.2011 (date of execution of sale deed by the respondent No.2 in favour ofthe respondent No.1). No due diligence was conducted by the petitioners/appellants in purchasing the property and relied upon the^judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gurmit Singh

¶117

Bhatia Vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and Ors.r, Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P. Lakshmi Ammal (D) through Lrs. And Ors.2 and of the^judgment of the High Court of Altahabad in Ram Peary and Ors. Vs. Gauri and Ors.3.

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¶123

Admittedly, the petitioners were not parties to the original suits as well as the appeal su its Original suits rl'erc Ii led by lcspondent No. l/plaintiff against the respondent No.2 virle O.S.No.298 ol 1997 for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 0l .02. 1996 executed by the respondent No.2 in her favour in respect of Ac.2 - 13 gts. in survey No.104/A, Thorrur Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and O.S.No.8l5 of 1997 was filed by the respondent No. l/plaintiff against the respondent Nos.2 to 7 seeking declaration that the registered sale deed bearing document No.l168 of 1991 dated 10.04.1997 executed by the respondent No.2 along with her husband and two sons in favour of the respondent Nos.3 to 6 as null and void to the extent ol Ac.2 - 13 gts. in survey No. 104/A situated at Thorrur Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The respondent No.2 alienated an extent of Ac.6^- l3 gts. to respondent Nos.3 to 6 on 10.04. I 997. The respondent No.7 was impleaded as defendant No.6 in O.S.No.8l5 ol 1997 on 06.03.1998, but he remained ex-parte.

¶124

l4 b.GRR,J tA.NosIad)ol2018 tn/and S A .\o.l350 and ll5g ol )018

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lhe Hon'ble Apex Court in Gurmit Singh l]hatia Vs. Kiran

¶126

Kant Robinson and Ors. (l supra) wherein as per the facts olthe said case, the plaintills filed a suit against the original owner - vendor - delendant No.l lor specific performance of agreement of sale with respect to the suit property dated 0i.05.2005 and the vendor executed the sale deed in favour of the appellant by sale deed dated 10.07.2008 and after apploximately four years, the appellanl filed an application before the trial Court under Order I Rule l0 ol the Code of Civil Procedure for his impleadment as a defendant, the trial court despite the opposition by the original ptaintilfs allowed the said application which was set aside by the High Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court considering whether the plaintiffs could be compelled to implead a person against their wish in a suit for specific performance, particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief was claimed by them, held that the parties claiming an independent title anil possession adverse to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract are not proper parties and if such party is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged to a suit for title and possession, which was impermissible. A third party or a stranger could not be added in a suit for

¶127

¶128

t5 t)r^(]RR.J t 1 .t I d",l: oJ )A13 nt anJ \ t ,) l);ttdrll lJi') ol )()1.i

¶129

specific pertbrmance, merely in order to find out who was in possession ol the contracted property or to avoid multiplicity ol the suits. A third parry or a stranger to a contract could not be added so as to conveft a suit ol one character into a suit of different character. It was turrher observed and held that in a suit for specific perlormance of the contract to sell, the /rs' between the vendor and the persons in whose lavour agreement to sell is executed shall only bc gone into and it is also not open to the Court to decide rvliether any other parties have acquired any title and possession of the contracted property. It is further observed and held by the Court that il the plaintilf who has flled a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell, even alier receiving the notice of claim of title and possession by other persons (not parties to the suit and even not pafties to the agreentent to sell lor which a decree lor specific performance is sought) does not want to join them in the pending suit, it is always done at the risk of the plaintiff because he cannot be forced to join the third parties as party defendants in such suit. The aforesaid observations are made considering the principle that plaintiff is the dominus litis and could not be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law. The

¶130

l6 DI CRRJ ls,\osIad)0[2018 ln,d,1d S A No l3s0 aad l3ig of20l8

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appellant could not be inrpleaded as a defendant in the suit filed by the original plaintills lor spccific perfon'nance of the contract between the original plaintills and original dcl'endant No.1 and in a suit for specific performance ofthe contracl to which the appellant is not a pafty and that too against the wish of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs could not be forced to add party against whom he does not \'ant to fight and observed that the appellant could not be impleaded as a del'endant in the suit for specific performance of the contract between the original plaintiffs and original defendant No. I against the wish olthc plaintiffs.

¶132

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Guruswamy Nadar Vs. P Lakshmi Ammal (D) through Lrs. And Ors. (2 supra) wherein as per the facts ofthe said case, thc second purchase by the appellant was on 5.5.1975 i.e. two days after the filing of the suit for specific performance on 3.5.1975, held that:

¶133

"....1hough the applicability olSection 52 ofthe Transfer ol Property Act, 1882 was not considered by the trial court, however. the first appellate court i.e. leamed Single Judge whilc granting the decree for specific perlormance found that the subsequenl purchase made by the appellantdelcndant was also bona lide lbr value and without notice of the agreement to scll but the said sale was subordinate

¶134

¶135

It t;RR., I .t ,), I n,d: al at)/' lll n ,i .\ 1 .\o l lit) n l l;9 o.1 )t11.\

¶136

to thc decree that could be made in the suil for specific perfbrmance which was instituted prior to the sale in t'avour ol the second purchaser, The main argument which was advanced belore learned Single^judge was that Scction l9 ol the Specific Reliel'Act. 1963 provides that a decree lor specific perfbrmance against a subsequent purchaser fbr bona fide who has paid the money in good faith rvithout notice of the original contract can be enlbrccd as the same is binding on thc vendor as rvell as against the whole rvorld. As against this. it was contended by thc respondents that Section 52 of the Transfcr of Property Act which lays down the principle of lis pendens that when a suit is pending during the pendency of such suit if a sale is made in lavour of other person, then the principle of lis pcndens would be attracted. In support of this proposition a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and others I AIR 1978 All. 318] as well as a Division Bench judgment ol the Madras High Court was pressed into service. Therefore, the question before us in this case is what is the eflect olthe lis pendens on the subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the second purchaser. Section l9of the Specific Relief Act clearly says subsequent sale can be enlorced for good and sufficient reason but in the present case, there is no dif{iculty because the suit was filed on 3.5.1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second sale took place on 5.5.1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the second sale was definitely after the filing ol the suit in question. Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before the second sale ofthe property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the overriding effecl on the first sale. The principle of lis pendens is still settlBd$rinciple of law.

¶137

Dr 6RR,J I A Nos.l anl2 oI10l8 n/and S.A No.l350 and 1159 ol2018

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rit

¶139

...Normall,y. as a public policv once a suit has been flled pertaining to anl,suhject rratter olthe propert),. in order to put an end to such kind o1' Iitigation, the principle o[ lis pendens has bcen evoh,ed so that the litigation may finally terminate without intcrvention ol a third party. This is because ol public policl, otherrlise no Iitigation will come to an end. l herefore. in order to discourage that same subject mattcr of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a third person. this kind ol transaction is to be checked. Other"vise. litigation will ncver come to an end."

¶140

And hetd that the principle ol lis pendens would be applicable as the

¶141

second sale has taken place after the filing of the suit

¶142

As per the lacts of this case, the petitioners purchased the property from respondent No.7 and contending that they were bonafide purchasers for value without notice ol prior agreement of sale in favour of the respondent No. l/plaintifL But their vendor - respondent No.7 was a party to the litigation and he remained ex-parte. Though the petitioners purchased the property bonafidely without notice of the litigation, the principle of lis pendens is applicable to the petitioners also notwithstanding the fact that under Section l9(b) ofthe Specific Relief Act, their rights could

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be protected.

¶144

¶145

DI GRR J t.1.\ostu"l)of)qlE l,Ldnd \ ) \o ll;0a\l t)t9of2qtE

¶146

¶147

The lull bench olthe Allahabad High Court in Ram Peary and

¶148

Ors. Vs. Gauri and Ors. (3 supra) held that:

¶149

Section l9(b) ol'the Act saYs that Specific perlormance ol'a contract rnar be enlorccd against (a) either party thereto; (b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequerltly to the contract, except a transferee for value rvho has paid his moncl.in good faith and without noticc ol the original contract.

¶150

1'hc principle on which the doctrine rests was spoken by Cranwonh L. C. in the leading case of Bellamy v. Sabine (( I 857)' 44 ER 842 at p. 843) as follows:

¶151

"lt is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as aflbcting a purchaser through the doctrine ol notice, though undoubtedly the language of the Cou(s often so describes its operation. It afl'ects him not becausc it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parlies to give to others. pending the litigation, rights to lhe propeny in dispute. so as to prej udice the opposite party.

¶152

Where a litigation is pending between a plaintill and a defendant as to-the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind required that the decision of the Cou( in the suit shall be binding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings, lf this^were not so. there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end."

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¶154

Dt.GRR.J Lt Nos. t and ) of20l8 odond S t t350 and I159 of20t8 ^'o

¶155

The Privy Council had adoptcd the same principlc in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Munshi Frag Narain⁽⁽ 1907) 34 Ind App 102) r.vhere thcv lay stress on the necessity lor final adjudication and observed that otherwise there rvould be no end to litigation and.lustice would be del'eatcd.

¶156

Story in his work on Equity lllrd Edition para 406 expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows t-

¶157

"Ordinarily. it is true that thc.ludgmcnt of a court binds only the partics and their privies in representations or estate. But hc who purchases during the pendencl- of an action, is held bound by the^judgment that may be against thc pcrson from whom he derives title. The Iitigating parties arc exempted from raking any notice of the title so acquired: and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase uithout any noticc, the rule may operate very hardly, But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise, alienations made during an action might deleat its whole purpose, and thcre would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendente lite, nihil innoveturi the effect of which is not to annullhe conveyance, but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As to the rights of these panies, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them.

¶158

ln the light ofthese principles we have^got to consider whether in the event o[ a conflict arising between the doctrine of lis pendens enshrined in S. 52 of thc Transfer ol Property Actand thc rule availing a subsequent

¶159

DT.CRR.J tANostaNlJ0[2018 n/atul S.A No.1350 an.l t359 o/2O18

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¶161

transferee without notice. containcd in Section l9(b) ofthe Specific Relicf Act either the one or the other should prevail. Ordinarilv. it is truc that the title acquired by the subsequent purchaser is good, the sale to him being not void. But he lvho pruchases during the pendency of the suit is bound by thc dccree, that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from the necessity of taking any notice of a title so acquired (see Samarendra Nath Sinha v. Krishna Kumar Nag^(A IR I 967 SC 14.10)), As to thc vendor and the prior contractor it is as if no such title existed. Section 52 places a complete embargo on the transfer ol any right to immoveable property pending suit, which is directly and specifically in qucstion in such a litigation; it enacts that during the pendency of thc suit in which any right to immoveable propenl, is "directly and specilically in question, the property cannol be transferred or otherwise alienated by any party to the suit so as to allect the rights ofany other party thereto under any decree."

¶162

Thus, in the present case it may be that the subsequent transferee was entirely, ignorant ofany right on the part ofl contractor, and also of the pcndency of the suit filed against the vendor by such contractor, yet as the transfer was made to him by the vendor after the institution of the suit of the contractor and, while it was pending, the subsequent purchaser cannot sct up against the contractor any right from which his vendor is excluded by the decree. The title of the subsequent purchaser is good against him on the ground of breach of covenant, but against the plaintiff contractor who seeks specific performance of the contract against the vendor, the subsequent transferee can^' be in no way'better position than the vendor himself. It is well settled that in a suit tbr specific performance of contract in respect ol' immoveable property a right to immoveable property is directly and 'specifically in

¶163

¶164

Dt GRR.J tA:tostatd)of)018 n/an l S.l \a llj0and l3jrof20l8

¶165

question, (see Cauri Dutt Mahra.j v. Sheikh Sukur Mohammad ,(75 Ind App 165) s (AIR IMB PC I47)).

¶166

...1n our opinion, therefore, when the doctrinc of Iis pendens rendcrs a transfer made during the pendcncl' of the suit subservient to the rights of the plaintifl' secking specific perlormance of a prior contract entered into by the vendor in his favour and when bn account of the operation of the doctrine o{'lis^pendens such conveyance is treated as if it had never any existence, the subsequent transferee. even though he had obtained the transl'er without notice of the original contract, cannot set up against plaintitfcontractor any right; for it would deleat the rulc ol lis pendens wlrich is founded upon public policy. And considered in that manner, Section 52 olthc l. P. Act is not subject to S, l9(b) olthe Specilic RelielAct.

¶167

We may yet arrive to a similar conclusion in a dilferenl manner. "A^judgment inter pa(cs raises an estoppel only against the panies to the proceeding in which it is given, and their privies. for example. those claiming or deriving title under them."^(Halsbury's Laws of England, l'hird Edition, Volume 15,^para 372). The transferee pendente lite would be treated as a representative in interest of thc parties to the suit and the^judgment which has been pronounced, in the absence of fraud and collusion, would have the effect of finally determining the rights of the parties and the cause of action which would sustain the suit in which the doctrine of lis pendens applied would bc merged in the^judgment duly pronounced in what may be described as the previously decided suit. The decision being res judicata would bind not only the parties thereto but also the transferees pendente lite from them.

¶168

(

¶169

¶170

DrcR&J I .4 Nos I dnd 2 of20l6 in/and S ).);o t tto and t359oI2018

¶171

In a case to rvhich besides thc rendor the subsequent translerce is also irnplcaded in the array ol the defendants, the^judgnrent is final and binding not only on the parties to the original contract but also the transferee pendents l;tc fiom vendor. Ihe conveyance in favour ofthe subsequent purchaser is treated as il'it never had any existence. Iherc rvould then be no lis or action which would survive, cnabling the subsequent purchaser to take the detlnce ol bona llde transler for value without notice ol the original contract. Accordingly, we take the vierv that lis pendens affecls the translerce pendente lite and Section 52 of the^'l'. P. Act is not subjcct to Section l9(b) olthe new Specific lleliclAct. Thc conveyance in favour o[the subsequent purchaser pending the suit brought by the plaintilf contractor lor specific performance of the contract between him and the vendor is taken "as il it had ncver any existcnce.""

¶172

In the present case, the petitioners are subsequent transferees,

¶173

who purchased the properties during the pendency of the appeals from the respondent No.7. Their rights are subservient to the rights of the plaintiff, seeking specific performance of a frrior contract entered by the respondent No.2 in her favour. The petitioners even though they had purchased the property without notice of the original contract cannot set up any right against the respondent No.l /plaintil'f as the same was govemed by the rule of lis pendens. Thcy are bound by the judgment passed against their predecessors in interest (respondent No.7). The

¶174

l4 t). CRR-J It,n!n.!:af:nl8 rid.1 : .1 \i I ..:0 anl llit) af:Al8

¶175

petitioners are at liberty to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of the Code ol Civil Proccdure, il they^are available to them or can file an independent suit for declaration and possession against the respondent Nos. I to 7, but the scope of the suit for specific performance ol the contract for sale cannot be enlarged to a suit for title and possession by granting leave to defend to them to file the Second Appeals. Hence, I.A.No.1 of 2018 in S.A.Nos. 1350 and 1359 of 201 8 filed to grant leave to the petitioners to file the Second Appeals against the decree and^judgment in A.S.Nos.l I and l2 of 2006 and on the file of the III Additional District Judge (F.T.C.), Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar are dismissed. Consequently, the I.A.No.2 of 2018 filed to condone the delay of 1830 and2210 days in filing the Second Appeals are also dismissed. In view of dismissal ol the above applications, the Second Appeals are also dismissed.

¶176

In the result, the I.A.No.l of 2018 in S.A.No. 1350 of 2018 and I.A.No.1 of 2018 in S.A.No.l359 of 2018 filed^{to grant} leave to the petitioners to file Second Appeals are dismissed. Consequently, the I.A.No.2 of 2018 in S.A.No. 1350 of 2018 and I.A.No.2 of 2018 in I

¶177

DTGRRJ t.4 Nos t u"n 2 of2018 nlen.l 5 | \o ljj(ldnd ll59af2018

¶178

1.5

¶179

S.A.No.1359 of 2018 filed to condone^the dela-v^{o1'1830 and 22 l0 days}

¶180

respectively in filing the Second Appeals arc also dismissed. In view of dismissal ol the above applications, the Second Appeals are also

¶181

dismissed. No order as to costs.

¶182

Miscellaneous Applications, ilanl'^pending, shall stand closed.

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Sd/. K SRIMV o JOINT REGIST

///TRUE COPY'

StTCTION }:.FICER

I The III Additional District Judge ( FTC) Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar 2. The II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L B.Nagar. 3. One CC to Sri G- Madhusudhan Reddy, Advocate (OPUC)

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