Dismissed

B. Ambedkar, v. M.D., Tsrtc., State of T.S.

Telangana HC30 Jul 2018WP/12256/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Court dismissed writ petitions challenging the termination of stall licenses by the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation to renovate a bus station. It held the second respondent had jurisdiction, invoked the termination clause validly, and the public interest outweighed the petitioners' claims.

What did the court decide?

Vacated status quo interim orders and dismissed the writ petitions.

B. Ambedkar, Vs M.D., Tsrtc., State of T.S. — Service and Employment | Telangana HC (2018)

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

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WRIT PETITION No.41067 of 2017 and I.A.No.2 of 2018 In/and W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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COMMON ORDER:

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In W.P.No.41607 of 2017, there are 5 petitioners while in W.P.No.12256 of 2018 there is only one petitioner.

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All of them had been granted licenses by the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (for short “the Corporation) for running various businesses such as water kiosk stall, tea, coffee and snacks stall, ice creams, Swagruha Foods stall, Fruit juice and cool drinks stall, water kiosk, dairy products stall and toys and fancy stores for a period of 5 years in Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station, Hyderabad (for short ‘MGBS’), which licenses are still subsisting.

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The Senior Customer Relation Manager of the Corporation (2^nd respondent) had issued notices dt.25-10-2017 to each of the petitioners in W.P.No.41607 of 2017 and also issued proceedings dt.04-04-2018 to petitioner in WP.No.12256 of 2018.

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In the notice dt.24-10-2017 addressed to the petitioners in W.P.No.41607 of 2015, the 2^nd respondent stated that the Corporation proposed to renovate the Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station so as to extend the waiting area for the passengers to accommodate more number of passengers and also to extend the passage area to facilitate the

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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movement of the passengers; that the stalls allotted to each of the petitioners are required to be got vacated in the interest of the traveling public; Clause 34 of the license agreement deeds entered into by the Corporation with each of the petitioners states that the Corporation reserves the right to terminate the licence by giving one month’s advance notice in case the premises is required for the use of the licensor; and invoking the said clause, it is proposed to terminate the agreement entered into with petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017 so as to extend better amenities to the commuters. It is stated in the said notice that petitioners should treat the said notice as one month advance notice under clause No.34 of the deed of licence.

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As regards the petitioner in W.P.No.12256 of 2018, the Corporation had issued a notice dt.25-10-2017 with the contents identical to that was issued to each of the petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017. The petitioner gave a representation dt.22-11-2017 stating that he would vacate the stall No.24-A allotted to him if the Corporation allots him stall No.31. The representation of the petitioner was referred to the Regional Tender Committee and the petitioner was asked to appear before the Tender Committee, where he again requested to allot stall No.31 to him on a monthly licence fee of Rs.41,786/-. After negotiations by the Tender Committee, petitioner expressed unwillingness to increase the licence fee. So the request of the petitioner was rejected by the regional manager of the Corporation vide proceedings P4/122(71) 2015-RR dt.09-03-2018

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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stating that he was requesting for relocation to a stall which were much bigger than stall No.24-A for which he was paying licence fee of Rs.52,600/-, but was offering a low licence fee of Rs.41,786/- p.m.

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Thereafter, the impugned order dt.4-4-2018 was passed by 2^nd respondent terminating petitioner’s licence referring to the above facts and stating that in view of larger public interest to provide more facilities to passengers, it was decided to terminate petitioner’s licence invoking Clause-34 of the agreement. He was asked to vacate the stall and handover possession to the 2^nd respondent immediately.

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CONTENTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

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Learned counsel for petitioner contends firstly that the person who entered into licence agreement with each of the petitioners was the Regional Manager, Ranga Reddy Region, but the notice dt.25-10-2017 as well as order dt.04-04-2018 was issued by the 2^nd respondent, and the 2^nd respondent had no jurisdiction to terminate the licenses of the petitioners and only Regional Manager of the Corporation was competent to do so.

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He also contended that the allegation in the said proceedings/notices that the Corporation proposed to renovate the bus station so as to extend the existing area for the passengers, is false; the Corporation had earlier renovated the bus station 4 months prior to the issuance of notices dt.25-10-2017 and there is no other renovation work is left; there was no necessity for extending the waiting area of passengers by removing the stalls of the petitioners since the stalls

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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were in the middle of the passenger area and that at the behest of the higher authorities, the 2^nd respondent had issued the said notices to petitioners with an oblique motive to construct big stalls and allot the same to big branded companies. It is alleged that clause No.34 of the licence deed was wrongly invoked and the action of 2^nd respondent in doing so is malicious and is an abuse of power.

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It is alleged that in between the stalls of the petitioners, in the same area, there are other pucca vacant stalls, but they were neither removed nor decided to be removed; and so the requirement stated by the Corporation about providing more waiting area to passengers is only invented to get the petitioners evicted.

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That apart, it is stated that the stalls allotted to the petitioners are small spaces situated on the rear side of the bus station and would not cause any obstruction to the passage of the traveling public and would not be required for any other purpose till the completion of license period of petitioners.

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It is alleged that the Corporation created legitimate expectation in the minds of the petitioners at the time of granting licenses that it would permit them to run their stalls till the expiry of the licence period, that petitioners had invested huge amounts of money on their stalls, and are totally dependent on the stalls for livelihood of their families and they would be deprived of the same, if the Court does not intervene.

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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THE INTERIM ORDER Dt.06-12-2017

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On 06-12-2017, in W.P.No.41067 of 2017, there was a direction to maintain status quo regarding possession of the petitioners over their respective stalls till 12-12-2017 and this was extended from time to time.

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In W.P.No.12256 of 2018 on 10-04-2018 there was a status quo order granted, which was extended from time to time.

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COUNTER AFFIDAVITS OF THE RESPONDENTS

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Counter-affidavits have been filed by respondents in both the Writ Petitions along with material papers refuting the above contentions, and I.A.No.2 of 2018 was filed in W.P.No.12256 of 2018 to vacate the order dt.10-04-2018 passed in I.A.No.1 of 2018 therein.

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The respondents refuted the contentions of the petitioners and stated that the licence of the 1^st petitioner in W.P.No.41067 of 2017 is coming to an end by 27-07-2018.

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They contended that orders of termination of licenses were passed by the Regional Manager, Rnaga Reddy Region in respect of each of the petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017 on 09-03-2018 and these orders have not been questioned by petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017. With regard to the petitioner in W.P.No.12256 of 2018 also it is stated that there was an order passed by the Regional manager terminating the licence of the petitioner on 09-03-2018 and these orders have not been questioned by the petitioner.

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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They contended that even otherwise, the 2^nd respondent is competent authority to issue notices for termination of licenses of the petitioners as per the duties and functions entrusted to him w.e.f. 19-9-2015 by the then Executive Director (E&A) and Secretary to the Corporation to issue notices insofar as the management of the stalls are concerned apart from other job functions. It is therefore stated that 2^nd respondent had jurisdiction to issue notices of termination to the petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017

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Counsel for respondents referred to the proceedings of the Executive Director filed in material papers in W.P.No.41067 of 2017 by respondents with their Counter affidavit showing that the 2^nd respondent is empowered by the Executive Director to take care of the “ Management of the Stalls, Tenders, allotments and rent collections monitoring of prices and quality of eatables and other items sold in MGBS & JBS.”

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Respondents contend that the Corporation had decided to extend better facilities to general public and commuters who utilize the MGBS and decided to renovate and extend the waiting area for passengers in view of the increased volume of passenger traffic and all the stall owners have been issued similar notices and there was no discrimination. The allegation that there are vacant stalls in line with the petitioners which have not been removed, is denied. It is stated that unless the petitioners vacate their stalls, the Corporation cannot undertake the expansion of the waiting area and the Corporation is

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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entitled to rely on Clause No.34 of the licence deed and direct the petitioners to vacate the stalls in their occupation in public interest. It is stated that the personal interest of the petitioners cannot outweigh the interest of the passengers and general public, which is the paramount concern of the Corporation. It is also stated by the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation that no show cause notice prior to invocation of Clause No.34 is contemplated by the licence deed and the request of the petitioners for grant of alternative shops had also been rejected.

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REPLY CONTENTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

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These contentions were refuted by the learned counsel for petitioners, who reiterated that the Regional Manager alone is competent to terminate the licence deeds and the job requirement of “management of stalls” does not mean that the 2^nd respondent can terminate the licenses.

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I have noted the contentions of both sides.

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THE CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT

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The Corporation is a public sector undertaking of the State of Telangana and it runs the MGBS where its buses stop - for people to board and travel to different places within and outside the State of Telangana from Hyderabad.

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For providing food stuffs, consumer items etc., to commuters and passengers, who come to bus station, stalls had been provided for,

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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some of which have been allotted to petitioners by executing licence deeds in their favour for 5 years.

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Admittedly, each of the licenses entered into with the petitioners contains clause No.34, which entitles the Corporation to terminate the licenses by giving one month advance notice in case the licenced premises is required for use of the Corporation. This clause had been invoked by the Corporation in the case of each of the petitioners by notice dt.25-10-2017.

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Request has been made by each of the petitioners to be permitted to allot alternative stalls, but these requests were not accepted by the Corporation vide separate orders dt.9-3-2018 passed by the Regional Manager of the Corporation on the ground that the monthly license fee offered by each of the petitioners to the alternative stall was much lower in quantum compared to the size of the stall, and the Tender Committee did not accept the request of the petitioners. In respect of each petitioner such rejection orders had been passed on 09-03-2018 and none of these orders have been challenged by any of the petitioners.

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The 2^nd respondent then passed the orders dt.04-04-2018 in respect of each of the petitioners invoking the power conferred on him by the Executive Director (E&A) and Secretary to the Corporation dt.19-09-2015 for management of stall.

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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In my opinion, the terms “management of stalls” in the description of various duties entrusted to the 2^nd respondent necessarily involves ‘grant of licenses or termination of licenses for stalls’. So the contention of the counsel for petitioners that he has no such power or jurisdiction, cannot be countenanced.

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As regards the contention that there is no necessity to renovate for extending the waiting area of the passengers or passenger area is concerned, in my considered opinion, it is not for the petitioners to dictate to the Corporation in this regard to facilitate movement of passengers and to accommodate more number of passengers.

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Learned counsel for petitioners does not dispute that the number of passengers traveling through the MGBS has increased over a period of time from the date when the petitioners were granted their respective licenses in 2013 till date. So I find nothing arbitrary or sinister in the action of the Corporation in trying to deal with the said situation by deciding to extend the existing waiting area of passengers to accommodate more passengers and also to extend passenger area to facilitate movement of passengers by removing the stalls in occupation of the petitioners.

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The Corporation cannot be compelled to wait till licenses of each of the petitioners come to an end by afflux of time to undertake the extension. The interest of the passengers and general public would outweigh the personal interest of each of the petitioners.

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MSR,J W.P.No.41067 of 2017 & W.P.No.12256 of 2018

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In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and another¹ it was held that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable in nature and it’s discretion must be exercised on grounds of public policy, public interest and public good and also to promote substantial justice. I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out any case for interference by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution with the impugned action of the respondents.

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In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the claim of the petitioners. Accordingly, the interim orders granted in favour of the petitioners in W.P.No.41067 of 2017 on 06-12-2017 and in favour of the petitioner in I.A.No.1 of 2018 in W.P.No.12256 of 2018 on 10-04-2018, which were being extended from time to time, are hereby vacated. I.A.No.2 of 2018 in W.P.No.12256 of 2018 is allowed.

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Consequently, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. No costs.

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As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.

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__________________________________ JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

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Date: 30-07-2018 Vsv

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1 (2013) 5 SCC 470

B. Ambedkar, v. M.D., Tsrtc., State of T.S.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

B. Ambedkar, v. M.D., Tsrtc., State of T.S.

Case brief

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