discretion and it is not an absolute impediment. It observed that there can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action etc., and if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion, more so, when no third party interest is involved. It held that the petition of the appellants therein is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and also since the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. It held that there is no period of limitation for Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of certain length of time; and there may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. It held that it is a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. It found fault with the High Court in non-suiting the appellants therein on the ground of delay, and pointed out that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted with each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of non-deliberate delay.
