The reason in the facts of the judgments is the latches on the part of the Advocate, but here, it is not so. Therefore, the principle laid down in the above judgment cannot be applied to the present facts of the case. In V. Linga Reddy’s case ( 4 supra), referred supra, the Court held that sufficient cause to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice . What constitute sufficient cause always depends upon the facts of a particular case and length of delay is not determining factor. In the above judgments, the Court concluded that the Word sufficient cause must be given liberal construction without adopting pedantic approach, but that does not mean that the Court has to accept whatever the reasons party assigned as sufficient cause to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. When a special reason is assigned i.e., ill health, for a period of 573 days in filing the petition, there must be some material, at least to the satisfaction of the Court to arrive a just conclusion that the plaintiff was prevented by a sufficient cause, which is not beyond her control. In the absence of any material, acceptance of such reason is nothing but jettisoning the law of limitation, as observed by the Apex Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu’s case ( 5 supra). Therefore, the Order passed by the trial Court is erroneous on the face of the record and passing of such an order without any material to
