Dismissed

Poonam Agarwal v. Neeraj Agarwal

Telangana HC25 Feb 2014CMA/1049/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a civil miscellaneous appeal, the High Court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant an interim injunction. The Court held that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction over a general property dispute and that the Civil Court could not intervene against a bank's action under the SARFAESI Act when DRT proceedings were pending.

What did the court decide?

None; The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Poonam Agarwal Vs Neeraj Agarwal — Banking and Recovery | Telangana HC (2014)

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*** THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G.ROHINI AND HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY + CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.1049 of 2013** % Date: 25.2.2014 # Poonam Agarwal, W/o.Sri Neeraj Agarwal … Appellant./ Petitioner/Plaintiff AND $ Neeraj Agarwal, S/o. Sri shyam Sunder Agarwal And others … Respondents/ Respondents/Defendants ! Counsel for the Appellant : Mr.Damodar Mundra ^ Counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 : --Counsel for the respondent No.5 : Mr.Deepak Bhattacharjee < GIST: > HEAD NOTE: ? CASES REFERRED: 1) 2003 (3) ALLD 369 2) 2001 (1) ALT 739 (D.B) 3) (2004) 4 SCC 311

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4) AIR 1955 Mad 135 5) (1859) 7 WR 213, at p.249 6) (2011) 2 SCC 782

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7) AIR 2014 SC 371

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8) (1995) 5 SCC 545

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9) 1990 (Supp) SCC 727

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10) (2013) 9 SCC 221 THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G.ROHINI

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AND

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY

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CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.1049 OF 2013

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February 25, 2014

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Between:

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Poonam Agarwal, W/o.Sri Neeraj Agarwal

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… Appellant./ Petitioner/Plaintiff

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AND

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Neeraj Agarwal, S/o. Sri shyam Sunder Agarwal And others

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… Respondents/ Respondents/Defendants

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THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G.ROHINI AND

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY

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CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.1049 OF 2013

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JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice T.Sunil Chowdary)

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This civil miscellaneous appeal is filed under Order XLIII Rule 1 of CPC assailing the order dated 29.10.2013 in I.A.No.737 of 2011 in O.P.No.1153 of 2011 on the file of the Judge, Additional Family Court at Hyderabad. By the impugned order, the trial court rejected the petitioner’s application under Order XXXIX

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rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking interim injunction restraining the respondents and their men from alienating or creating any third party interest-cum-encumbrance in the petition schedule property pending disposal of the O.P. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed in the suit.

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2. The averments in the petition, in brief, are as follows. The marriage of the petitioner was performed with the first respondent on 31.5.2001 at Tivoli Gardens, Sikh Village, Secunderabad as per Hindu Rites and Custom. Out of the lawful wedlock, the petitioner and first respondent were blessed with three children by name Baby Riya, Baby Kali and Master Kushal. The second respondent is the father-in-law, and respondent Nos.3 and 4 are brothers-in-law of the petitioner. The family members of the petitioner gave an amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs to the first respondent as customary gift during ‘Phaldan Ceremony’ on the date of engagement. The father of the petitioner deposited an amount of Rs.2.00 lakhs in the name of Riya, and Rs.5.00 lakhs in the name of Kali. The petitioner’s father died on 13.12.1999. The brothers of petitioner could not maintain the business of oil mill and oil trading and they sold away machinery of Jail Hind Oil Mill for Rs.1,86,00,000/- in June, 2007 and the sale proceeds were distributed among the petitioner, her brothers and sisters. The petitioner got 1/4^th amount i.e., Rs.46,50,000/-. The petitioner provided an amount of Rs.63,50,001/- to the respondent Nos.1 to 4, who in turn purchased house bearing No.6-3-600/A/5, plot No.7, Hill Top Colony, admeasuring 360 Sq.yards in the name of first respondent. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 invested the money in various businesses for better returns. The properties

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shown in ‘A’ to ‘E’ schedule are purchased out of Streedhana amount of the petitioner. At the time of purchase, the respondent Nos.1 to 4 assured the petitioner that they would allot share to the petitioner at the time of partition. In order to extend the business in M/s.Neeraj Pipes Limited (hereafter, NPL), respondent Nos.1 to 4 pressurised the petitioner and her family members to obtain loan and got mortgaged the schedule properties to fifth respondent Bank. At the instigation of third respondent, the first respondent influenced the petitioner to sign on certain papers by coercion. At the instance of third respondent, the first respondent threatened the petitioner to give divorce. A meeting was arranged by the community elders and other family members to settle the issue. In the said meeting, the family members agreed to pay an amount of Rs.5.00 lakhs to the petitioner. In the month of June, 2011, the petitioner requested the first respondent for the amounts towards school fee of her children. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 necked out the petitioner from the matrimonial house on 24.6.2011. The petitioner was forced to reside at her parents’ house along with children. The petitioner came to know that the respondent Nos.1 to 4 are trying to create third party interest in respect of petition schedule properties and to deprive the right of the petitioner. The first respondent filed O.P. No.1109 of 2011 on the file of Family Court, Hyderabad. The fifth respondent has no right to claim the properties which are streedhana properties of the petitioner. The first respondent has admitted the ownership of the petitioner over the petition schedule properties. The petitioner is no way responsible for the loan obtained from the fifth respondent. Hence the petition.

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3. The respondent Nos.1 to 4 remained ex parte. The fifth

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respondent filed counter denying all the averments made in the petition, inter alia contending that NPL availed OCC limit of Rs.37.00 lakhs and executed relevant loan documents on 14.9.1998 at Canara Bank, Rajendranagar Branch. Subsequently the limits were renewed from time to time and the loan account was transferred to SME Branch of fifth respondent Bank on 01.7.2009 at the request of NPL. The loan was secured by personal guarantee, hypothecation of stock, goods, book debts and on the security of immovable properties referred in ‘B’ schedule. The demand notices were issued under Section 13(2) of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short `the SARFAESI Act'), dated 26.3.2011 and 28.3.2011 to the principal borrower, guarantor and other family members making demand to

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liquidate the following liabilities.

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Nature of limit	Limit lakhs	Liability in Rs.
OCC/ODBD ADHOC	700.00 120.00	11,20,46,220/-
ILC/(DA/DP)	200.00	Rs.160.00 lakhs d e v o l v e d liability debited to OCC account
Term Loan 1	300.00	1,87,96,045/-
Term Loan 2	185.00	1,28,02,210/-
HL in the joint name of all the four Directors of the company and four other family members	86.00	97,87,916/-

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The account is not being operated since 24.12.2010 and receivable were not routed through the loan account. On the inspection carried on 27.1.2011, it is found the factory was not running and the stock available was not worth to account. A notice was issued on 09.3.2011 to regularise the account. As the

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account was irregular, as per LPA norms the account was declared as ‘non-performing asset’ (NPA). The respondent issued demand notice and on receiving the notice a reply was received from NPL and Pankaj Agarwal. In compliance of Section 13(3)(a) of SARFAESI Act, the reply was given to both principal borrower and guarantor separately. In spite of demand the liability was not liquidated. In view of the circumstances, possession notice was issued on 09.6.2011 and the same was published in Indian Express and Andhra Jyothi on 11.6.2011. The tender-cum-auction sale notice dated 13.8.2011 was issued by following the procedure in SARFAESI Act. The tender-cum-sale notice was published in The Hindu and Andhra Jyothi on 14.8.2011. The auction of the properties was fixed on 16.9.2011. The fifth respondent Bank followed the procedure scrupulously without any violation. The fifth respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (RD Act) and the application is numbered as O.A.No.456 of 2011. The petition before the Family Court is not maintainable as it is without jurisdiction in view of Sections 18 and 34 of RD Act. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in respect of any matter which the DRT or DRAT has jurisdiction. The petitioner herein is defendant No.7 in O.A.No.456 of 2011. All the properties in the petition namely the house No.6-3-600/A/5 is ‘F’ schedule property; the property house No.6-3-594/7 is ‘B’ schedule property in O.A.No.456 of 2011; petition schedule ‘D’ property is ‘C’ schedule in O.A.; the petition schedule ‘E’ property is ‘G’ schedule property in O.A. The reliefs sought by the petitioner are with regard to properties in the O.A. The fifth respondent Bank initiated proceedings for recovery of

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Rs.11,20,46,220/- in case of OCC/ODBD/ILC loan facilities; Rs.1,87,96,045/- in case of term loan 1; and Rs.1,28,02,210/- in case of term loan 2 with interest at 19% per annum compounded monthly from the date of application till full payment. The purpose of filing of main petition is to defeat the recovery and it is against the public interest.

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4. In the trial court, on behalf of the petitioner, no oral evidence was adduced but Exs.P1 to P16 were marked. On behalf of the fifth respondent, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced.

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5. Basing on the material available on record, the trial court arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled for interim injunction and dismissed the same.

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6. Heard Sri Damodar Mundra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the fifth respondent.

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7. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the trial court has not exercised its discretion basing on sound principles of law and dismissed the petition on erroneous grounds. Per contra, the learned counsel for fifth respondent submitted that that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant interim injunction in view of the pendency of O.A.No.456 of 2011 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

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8. Now, the points that would arise for consideration in this appeal are:

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1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for interim injunction as prayed for?

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2. Whether the order under appeal is sustainable in law?

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Point Nos.1 and 2:

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9. As per the averments of the petition, it is clear that the first respondent is the husband, 3^rd respondent is father-in-law and respondents 2 and 4 are brothers-in-law of the petitioner. During their wedlock, petitioner and the first respondent were blessed with three children. Exs.P.7, P.8 are the birth certificates of their children.

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10. A perusal of Exs.P.2 to P.6 clearly reveals that the first respondent filed O.P.No.1109 of 2011 on the file of the Family Court, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against the petitioner seeking divorce. The contention of the petitioner that her father is no more is supported by Ex.P.15 death certificate.

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11. Establishment of prima facie case, balance of convenience and the irreparable loss likely to be caused to the petitioner are sine qua non for grant of the relief of interim injunction. Let us consider the facts of the case, in the light of the above cardinal principles of law.

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12. A perusal of the record reveals that fifth respondent herein filed O.A.No.456 of 2011 on the file of the Debt Recovery Tribunal against the petitioner and the respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein and others. The learned counsel for the fifth respondent submitted that Section 17 of the RD Act ousts the jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore, the suit filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that mere pendency of the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal would not

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automatically oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court. To substantiate his argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the ratio laid down in ICICI Bank

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Limited, Bangalore v V.T. Prakas h^[1] . As per the principle enunciated in the said case, a third party to the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal is entitled to file a claim petition. If the claim petition is dismissed, the aggrieved party may institute a suit as per Rule 11 (6) of the II Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with Section 29 of the RD Act.

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13. As per the averments in the counter, the petitioner is the seventh defendant in O.A.No.456 of 2011. It is not the case of the petitioner that she filed a claim or objections petition and the same was dismissed by the concerned authority. Therefore, we are of the view that the facts of the case on hand are entirely different from the facts of the case in the decision cited supra. Hence we are of the considered view that the above decision relied on by the learned counsel is no way helpful to the petitioner.

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14. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted with a laudable object of promoting conciliation and to secure speedy settlement of disputes in family matters. Unlike a civil Court, the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain suits of all nature. The jurisdiction of the Family Court is restricted to particular types of cases only. The Family Court has to satisfy itself, before taking cognizance, that the lis and the relief sought by the parties fall within the ambit of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. Section 7 thereof reads as under:

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Section 7: Jurisdiction.-

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(1) Subject to the other provision of this Act, a Family Court shall-

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(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and

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(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.

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Explanation.-- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub- section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:-

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(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;

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(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;

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(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;

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(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;

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(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;

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(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;

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(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.

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(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise--

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(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ); and

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(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.

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15. A glance at the Section 7 of the Family Courts Act clearly

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manifests that the lis involved and the relief sought by the petitioner falls outside the purview of the explanation to Section 7 (1) (a), (b), (d) (e), (f) and (g). A careful reading of explanation to sub-clause (c) of Sub-clause (1) of Section 7 connotes that if the lis pertains to the property of the parties or either of them, the Family Court can entertain the proceedings. The Parliament in its wisdom incorporated the words “with respect to the properties of the parties or either of them”, which clearly manifests that the property dispute of general nature falls outside the purview of the Family Court. As observed earlier, the Act was enacted to provide speedy and inexpensive justice relating to family disputes. The underlying object of the Family Court Act is to persuade and conciliate the parties so as to remain them unite in the interest of family in particular and the society as a whole. The fact that adversarial system may not yield fruitful results in the family matters appears to be one of the reasons for establishment of Family Courts. Therefore, the explanation (c) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act made it clear that Family Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the property disputes of spouses only. Explanation (c) does not offer any difficulty, inasmuch as it is made explicitly clear that the suit or proceeding should be brought out by the parties to a marriage with respect to the properties of either of them. The intention of the legislature in enacting Family Courts Act is not to burden the Family Courts by tagging on the cases of general nature. To fortify our view, we are placing reliance on P.Srihari v P.Sukund a^[2] wherein this Court held at para – 5 of the order as under:

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5. In view of the above, the essential ingredient should be a dispute between the husband and the wife and the said dispute can be with regard to their marital status, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, child custody,

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maintenance, as also property sharing. But, in no event, the Family Court can have jurisdiction if the above dispute is absent. By no stretch of imagination, can the Family Court assume jurisdiction, if there is a dispute between the brothers, sisters, mothers, fathers etc., concerning property and the case on hand being one such, the Family Court had clearly no jurisdiction.

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16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.46.50 lakhs from her brothers in the month of June. 2007 with which the respondents 1 to 4 have purchased the house bearing D.No.6-3-600/A-5, Plot No.7, Hill Top Colony, Hyderabad. A perusal of Exs.P9 to P13 sale deeds reveals that the respondents 1 to 4 have purchased properties in their names in different years. Unless and until the contrary is proved, the Court can place reliance on the recitals of the registered document. Ex.P14 is an agreement purported to have been entered into between the petitioner and respondents 1 to 4. This document prima facie would not help the petitioner to establish that the petition schedule properties were purchased by the respondents 1 to 4 with her streedhana money. There is no proper foundation or explanation in the petition how the petitioner is entitled to 1/4^th share in the petition schedule property. Even assuming without conceding that the respondents have utilised the streedhana money of the petitioner, whether that itself creates any vested right to the petitioner to claim share in the petition schedule property is prima facie doubtful.

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17. A perusal of the record reveals that the respondents 1 to 4 are carrying on the business in the name and style of M/s. Neeraja Pipes Limited. The respondents 1 to 4 approached the 5^th respondent, who in turn granted OCC limit of Rs.37 lakhs on 14.09.1998 after execution of necessary documents by them. A

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perusal of the record further reveals that the loan amount was enhanced from time to time at the instance of the said NPL. The fact remains that the respondents 1 to 4 have obtained the loan from the 5^th respondent bank much prior to the marriage of the petitioner with the first respondent. As seen from the averments in the counter, the respondents 1 to 4 are not operating the account with effect from 24.12.2010. The account of the respondents 1 to 4 was classified as NPA on 25.03.2011. The 5^th respondent got issued demand notices on 26.03.2011 and 28.03.2011 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the respondents 1 to 4, the petitioner and others. After receipt of objections from respondents 1 to 4, the authorised officer has passed appropriate orders and communicated the same as contemplated under Section 13 (3) (a) of the SARFAESI Act. A perusal of the record reveals that the possession notice was also served on respondents 1 to 4 and the petitioner. After strictly adhering to the procedure contemplated under the SARFAESI Act, the bank got published auction notice dated 13.08.2011 so as to sell the petition schedule properties in the public auction to be held on 16.09.2011 for recovery of about Rs.13.00 crores from the petitioner, respondent Nos.1 to 4 and others.

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18. A perusal of Ex.P4 reveals that first respondent filed divorce petition O.P.No.1109 of 2011 (hereafter, Divorce O.P.) against the petitioner in the month of August, 2011. A perusal of Ex.P5 notice reveals that the matter was posted to13.9.2011 for first appearance of the petitioner. A perusal of the record reveals that the petitioner filed the Partition O.P. in the month of September, 2011. There is no exchange of legal notices between the parties prior to filing of Divorce O.P. and Partition O.P. By

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the date of filing of Partition O.P., the fifth respondent Bank filed O.A.No.456 of 2011 and brought the schedule properties for sale. The schedule properties in Partition O.P. and the schedule properties in O.A. No.456 of 2011 are one and the same. It appears that the petitioner and first respondent approached the Family Court after publication of auction notice by the 5^th respondent. At the time of arguments, learned counsel for fifth respondent submitted that the Bank could not conduct auction in view of ex parte interim injunction granted in favour of the petitioner in the Partition O.P.

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19. The learned counsel for the fifth respondent vehemently argued that in view of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, the petitioner is not entitled for interim injunction. A perusal of Section 34 clearly manifests that no injunction shall be granted by any Court or authority in respect of an action taken or to be taken in pursuance of the powers conferred by or under the SARFAESI Act or under RD Act. By the time of filing of the Divorce O.P. and Partition O.P., the fifth respondent filed O.A.No.456 of 2011 and the same is pending before the DRT, Hyderabad. In such circumstances, the pertinent question that would arise for consideration is, whether the petitioner is entitled for the interim injunction? T o resolve this question, we are placing reliance on

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Mardia Chemicals v Union of Indi a^[3] . Paras 50 and 51 are relevant and are extracted hereunder.

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50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13, it

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is submitted by Mr Salve, one of the counsel for the respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken “or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act”. That is to say, the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13.

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51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely, V. Narasimhachariar v Egmore

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Benefit Society^[4] , AIR at pp. 141 and 144, a judgment of the learned Single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: (AIR p. 143)

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“22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the

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mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of

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which relief is sought: Adams v. Scot t^[5] . I need not point out that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing moneys on mortgages rely. (See Ghose, Rashbehary: Law of Mortgages, Vol. II, 4th Edn., p. 784.)”

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(emphasis supplied)

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20. I n Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v State of

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Maharashtr a^[6] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 22, held as follows.

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We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation of law on the point. It is manifest that an action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT.

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21. In a recent decision in Jagdish Singh v Heeralal^[7] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when the property in question was sold by the bank following the provisions under the SARFAESI Act, the suit for partition and perpetual injunction by respondent Nos.1 to 5 to declare the property as Hindu Undivided Family property was not tenable. After referring relevant case law on the subject, the Supreme Court in para 22 held as follows.

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22. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the

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secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower’s debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression ‘in respect of any matter’ referred to in Section 34 would take in the “measures” provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any “measures” taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well.

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(emphasis supplied)

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22. If the petitioner opines that the fifth respondent has not followed the procedure contemplated under Sections 13 and 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the remedy available to the petitioner is to approach the DRT by invoking the provisions under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner being a party to O.A.No.456 of 2011 did not choose to challenge the legality of the orders passed by the Authorized Officer under Sections 13 and 14 of the

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SARFAESI Act. In view of the same and of the principles enunciated in Mardia Chemicals, Kanaiyalal and Jagdish Singh, we are of the considered view that the Civil Court cannot grant interim injunction to circumvent or nullify the orders passed by the DRT, while exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it under Section 17 of the RD Act. The above principle equally applies to the steps taken by the Bank by following the procedure prescribed under the SARFAESI Act. As observed earlier, the maintainability of the Partition O.P. before the Family Court, in view of pendency of O.A. No.456 of 2011 before the DRT, is very much doubtful so far as against respondent Nos.2 to 4 are concerned in general and 5^th respondent in particular. If really, the petitioner and respondent Nos.1 to 4 were in loggerheads, the possibility of contesting the partition proceedings by respondent Nos.1 to 4 is more probable. For the reasons best known, respondent Nos.1 to 4 remained ex parte. The petitioner is also one of the guarantors for the loan secured by respondent Nos.1 to 4. It is not mentioned in the petition that respondent Nos.1 to 4 are trying to alienate the property to specific third parties with an evil motive to deprive the legitimate right of the petitioner over the petition schedule properties.

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23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v Coca Cola Co.,^[8] while dealing with grant of or vacating the interim injunction, held as follows.

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In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other

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considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings.

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24. In the instant case, the maintainability of Partition O.P. itself is in question in view of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act, Section 17 of the RD Act as well as Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. If the court grants interim injunction, certainly it would amount to stalling of the proceedings in O.A. No.456 of 2011.

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25. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner failed to prove the ingredients for granting interim injunction. The trial court exercised its discretion keeping in mind various provisions involved in this case and also basing on sound principles of law.

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26. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion in view of

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the principle enunciated in Wander Ltd. v Antox P. Lt d^[9] and Mohd. Mehtab Khan v Khushnuma Ibrahim^[10] . Therefore, we are of the considered view that it is not a fit case to interfere with the well considered order under appeal.

¶98

27. In the result, this civil miscellaneous appeal is dismissed confirming the order dated 29.10.2013 in I.A.No.737 of 2011 in O.P.No.1153 of 2011 on the file of the Judge, Additional Family Court at Hyderabad. There shall be no order as to costs.

¶99

28. Consequently, the miscellaneous petitions if any pending in this appeal shall stand closed.

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_____________ G.ROHINI, J

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_____________________ T.SUNIL CHOWDARY, J Dated: 25.02.2014 YS

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NOTE:

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Mark L.R. Copy : YES / NO

¶104

[1] 2003 (3) ALLD 369 [2] 2001 (1) ALT 739 (D.B) [3] (2004) 4 SCC 311 [4] AIR 1955 Mad 135 [5] (1859) 7 WR 213, at p.249 [6] (2011) 2 SCC 782 [7] AIR 2014 SC 371 [8] (1995) 5 SCC 545 [9] 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 [10] (2013) 9 SCC 221

Poonam Agarwal v. Neeraj Agarwal

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Poonam Agarwal v. Neeraj Agarwal

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