A claim to a one-fifth share in family property failed because an ancient oral partition was established. The court upheld rejection of the coparcenary claim, accepted the previous partition, and dismissed the appeal, confirming dismissal of the partition suit.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY APPEAL SUIT No. 482 OF 1995
JUDGMENT:
The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Original Suit No.87 of 1980, on the file of Subordinate Judge (Now Senior Civil Judge), Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District, preferred this Appeal against the impugned decree and judgment dated 15.03.1994, wherein the Suit filed for partition of suit schedule property into 5 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to the plaintiffs, was dismissed.
2. The appellants herein were the plaintiffs and the respondents herein were the defendants before the trial Court, in Original Suit No.87 of 1980. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter will be referred as arrayed before the trial Court.
3. The plaintiffs filed the Suit, claiming partition of schedule property into 5 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to them and for future profits alleging that late Laveti Chandraiah had 5 sons by name Lingaraju, who is the husband of the 1st plaintiff and father of other plaintiffs, Laveti Satyanarayanachari, Laveti Narayanachari, Laveti Lakshmanachari and Laveti Kedarachari. Laveti Chandramma, 1st plaintiff, married Laveti Lingaraju and during their wedlock, they gave birth to plaintiffs 2 to 6. Thus, the 1st plaintiff is the wife and the other plaintiffs were the children of Laveti Lingaraju, who was not heard of, since 1991 or 1992. Laveti Chandraiah succeeded entire estate of his father, late Bojannachari, who acquired considerable property including the schedule property. After death of Bojannachari, Chandraiah and his wife and his undivided sons and all the defendants herein constituted as Hindu Coparcenary with the joint assertions and with the aid of ancestral nucleus, acquired additional property in the name of Chandraiah, being the elder member of the family. Late Chandraiah also constructed a building at
Bhavanipatnam, which remained incomplete on account of his sudden death. Thus, the property is ancestral property, acquired with the aid of ancestral nucleus.
4. Chandraiah died about 10 years ago, prior to filing of the suit, leaving behind his 5 sons, who succeeded the entire estate of the Chandraiah, as there were no female issues.
5. All the sons of Chandraiah have been working at different places while keeping the schedule property as joint, 4th defendant has been looking after the property on behalf of all his brothers. Thus, the entire schedule property is the joint family property having 1/5th share each. Lingaraju, husband of 1st plaintiff and father of other plaintiffs, is entitled to 1/5th share in the property and he was in joint possession and enjoyment of the property as coparcener, along with his brothers. Lingaraju died intestate during pilgrimage, leaving behind the plaintiffs, who succeeded to his 1/5th undivided share in the schedule property. Thus, the plaintiffs became entitled to 1/5th share in the suit schedule property.
6. The 4th defendant was managing the property on behalf of the remaining co-sharers, subsequent to death of Lingaraju, and paying share to the plaintiffs and other co-sharers, every year, from the profits of the property. The 4th defendant brought the 2nd plaintiff, to his house at Parvathipuram about 6 years prior to filing of the Suit, promising to educate him, but used him as an agent to look after the land in Vuddavolu village and failed to deliver due share of produce to the plaintiffs. Thereupon, the plaintiffs suspecting the bona-fides of the 4th defendant, raised a dispute before the village elders by name Pola Raminaidu, Banala Raminaidu, and others demanding the defendants to cooperate for partition and separate possession of their share in the
property, but 4th defendant refused and did not cooperate for partition of the schedule property and refused to give any share, despite advise of the elders. On the other hand, the 4th defendant demanded the plaintiffs to relinquish their legitimate share receiving Rs.20,000/-, for which the plaintiffs did not agree.
7. As the attempts of the plaintiffs for partition of the schedule property referring the matter to the elders became futile, the plaintiffs got issued a legal notice demanding all the defendants to co-operate for partition of the schedule property into 5 equal shares and for allotment of one such share to them and for separate possession, but there was no response from the defendants. Hence, plaintiffs filed the suit for the reliefs stated above.
8. The 4th defendant filed written statement, which was adopted by defendants 1 to 3, wherein the 4th defendant while admitting the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants, denied the material allegations made in the plaint and raised several contentions refuting the claim of the plaintiffs, which are as follows:
c) During 1945, Lingaraju expressed his desire to separate from the joint family and separated from his father and brothers and at the time of separation, he was given Ac.9.00 cents of land, gold and cash towards his major share by late Chandraiah and also paid amount
towards share in the house property, since then Lingaraju has been in possession and enjoyment of the share given to him, living separately from his father and brothers. Thus, there is a partition or separation from the family by Lingaraju in the year 1945 itself. Thereafter, Lingaraju sold some of his property, out of the property allotted to him, for discharge of the family debts and for the benefit of his family members to Gottipalli Parayya of Uddavolu village and the remaining property to the 2nd defendant under registered sale deeds and the same is within the knowledge of the 1st plaintiff, who was no other than the wife of Lingaraju. Thus, since 1945 Lingaraju is ceased to be a member of coparcenary or joint family and living separately. Thereby, the question of succeeding any property by the plaintiffs, consequent upon the death of Lingaraju, does not arise and the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any partition in the schedule property, thereby the suit is not maintainable. d) After death of Chandraiah, defendants also divided their property and are living separately with separate mess enjoying the property allotted to them, independently. The 4th defendant never managed the property on behalf of his brothers including the share of the plaintiffs and thereby the question of failure of the 4th defendant to deliver share of produce in the property does not arise;
e) Late Lingaraju gifted some of his property to his daughters towards Pasupu Kunkuma, but suppressing the daughters of Lingaraju, the plaintiffs herein, filed the present suit. Basing on the above contentions, defendants sought to dismiss
the suit.
9. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:
1. Whether the death of Laveti Lingaraju is true?
2. Whether the plaintiffs’ are entitled to file the suit?
3. Whether the partition pleaded in the written statement is true?
4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any share in the suit properties?
5. To what relief?
10. During course of trial, on behalf of plaintiffs, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-13 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-19 were marked.
11. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree for partition, allotted 1/5th share in the schedule property, but an appeal was preferred in A.S. No.76 of 1987, by the defendants, on the file of Additional District Judge’s Court, Vizianagaram, and the plaint schedule was amended adding some of the property to plaint A Schedule lands, thereupon the appellate Court, after hearing both the counsel, remanded the matter to the trial Court with a direction to afford opportunity to adduce evidence and dispose of the suit, in accordance with law.
12. After remanding the suit to the trial Court by the Additional District Judge’s Court, Vizianagaram, the 2nd defendant filed additional written statement, which was adopted by other defendants, wherein the defendants specifically contended that all the items shown as Item Nos.1 to 23 of Lot No-III of plaint A schedule property do not belong to the family of plaintiffs and defendants. The lands covered by Survey No.114/2, 117/2, 122/4, 168/12, 181/19 and 182/1 alone belong to their family and they were acquired by late Chandraiah, independently.
The extents of Survey No.191/9 mentioned in the plaint schedule is not correct and above 6 items were allotted to the defendants 1 to 4, and they were in possession and enjoyment of the same. Thus, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any share in any items of Lot No-III.
13. Basing on amendment of plaint and additional written statement filed by the defendants, the trial Court framed the following additional issue:
Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for share in Lot-3 of plaint A schedule properties?
14. After remand, PW.2 was recalled and further examined, marked Ex.A-14. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were recalled and further examined, marked Exs.B-20 and 21.
15. Upon hearing argument of both the counsel, considering oral and documentary evidence available on record, the trial Court held issue Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, whereas additional issue was held against the plaintiffs holding Lingaraju already separated from his father in the year 1945 and sold part of the property allotted him to Paraiah, under Exs.B-1 to B-3 and accepted the plea of previous partition pleaded by the defendants and dismissed the Suit.
16. Aggrieved by the impugned decree and judgment of the trial Court, the present Appeal is preferred on various grounds before the District Judge, Vizianagaram. Later, on the point of pecuniary jurisdiction, it was presented before this Court. The main contentions raised in the grounds of Appeal are as follows:
a) The trial Court did not consider the evidence, more particularly, the alleged separation of Lingaraju from his father, in proper perspective. If really, the property was self acquired property of Chandraiah, the question of giving Ac.9.00 cents
of land, gold and cash etc., in the year 1945 during life time of Chandraiah does not arise. Basing on the said allotment, the trial Court would have concluded that the property is ancestral property of Chandraiah, where Lingarraju and defendants are entitled to claim share;
b) The trial Court did not consider the specific plea that Exs.B1 to B-3 were not executed by Lingaraju, husband of PW.1, and they are forged documents. The trial Court did not consider the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to prove Exs.B-1 to B-3 as forged documents;
c) The trial Court did not insist for production of the partition deed between Lingaraju and Chandraiah and for such nonproduction, the Court should have drawn an adverse inference against the defendants and would have held that the property remained joint.
d) The finding of the trial Court that partition is oral is not based on any material and apart from that, the defendants who pleaded about execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 did not take any steps to prove execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3, but on wrong appreciation of evidence, with reference to plea, dismissed the Suit denying share in the schedule property. Similarly, the other documents Exs.B-1, B-17 to B-19, B-21, B-24 and Ex.A-14 were not considered, in proper perspective, and committed a grave error in dismissing the Suit, finally prayed to allow the Appeal setting-aside the impugned decree and judgment of the trial Court.
17. During course of argument, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs – appellants almost reiterated the contentions raised in the grounds of Appeal and the main attempt of counsel for the appellants is that if really the property is not the ancestral property, the question of allotting Ac.9.00 cents to Lingaraju during the life time of Chandraiah does not arise and at best, after death of Chandraiah, his son Lingaraju is entitled to claim share, if it is separate or self acquired
property of Chandraiah. Alleged allotment of Ac.9.00 cents of land, gold, cash etc., itself is suffice to conclude that the suit schedule property is the ancestral property, but this was not considered properly. The trial Court also failed to take into consideration Exs.B-1 to B-3 and the specific plea of the plaintiffs that they were not executed and they are forged documents as Lingaraju was not heard even prior to the alleged execution of documents. Thus, the trial Court committed a grave error in dismissing the Suit and prayed to allow this appeal by setting-aside the impugned decree and judgment passed by the trial Court.
18. Considering rival contentions, perusing oral and documentary evidence and the impugned decree and judgment, the points that arise for consideration in this Appeal are as follows:
1) Whether schedule property is the coparcenary property of the plaintiffs, Lingaraju and defendants 1 and 2? If so, whether the ancient partition pleaded by the defendants is true?
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim any share in the schedule property?
19. POINT No.1: The suit is filed by the wife and children of Lingaraju claiming partition contending that the suit schedule property is the Hindu Undivided Joint Family property belonging to husband of the 1st plaintiff and father of the other plaintiffs by name Linga Raju, who was not heard for more than 15 years, by the date of filing the Suit before the trial Court. Therefore, Lingaraju was presumed to have died. Consequently, the 1st plaintiff, being the wife and the other plaintiffs, being the children are entitled to succeed the estate of Lingaraju, as the property is the Hindu Undivided Joint Family property. The defendants refuted the said contention contending that the schedule property is the separate property of Chandraiah, father of
Lingaraju and defendants, but long back Lingaraju separated from his father, Chandraiah, took some movable and immovable property, towards his share, since then he was living separately and later, he sold away the property allotted to 2nd defendant and mother-in-law of 3rd defendant under different registered sale deeds, which are marked as Exs.B-1 to B-3. Therefore, the partition is ancient and consequently the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any share in the schedule property which belong to defendants.
20. The trial Court believed the ancient previous partition, as pleaded by the defendants and declined to grant decree for partition of schedule property into 5 equal shares, considering various circumstances which led the trial Court to believe the partition pleaded by the defendants between Lingaraju and his father Chandraiah. The said finding is challenged now contending that the property is the coparcenary property and with the aid of ancestral nucleus, other property was acquired by Chandraiah during his life time, who died in the year 1968. Therefore, entire schedule property became the Hindu Undivided coparcenary property and entitled to claim share by the plaintiffs, but the trial Court on erroneous appreciation of evidence, particularly, Exs.B-1 to B-3 which are forged documents, believed the previous ancient partition pleaded by the defendants. If Exs.B-1 to B-3 are excluded from consideration, as they are forged documents, absolutely there is no evidence to establish the previous ancient partition pleaded by the defendants. In such case, the plaintiffs are entitled to their legitimate share in the entire property and prayed to grant a decree in their favour.
21. In view of the specific contentions, I must necessarily advert to the oral evidence and reappraise the same, afresh, to come to an independent conclusion. The basis for previous ancient partition pleaded by the defendants is Exs.B-1 to B-3 and recitals contained
therein. It is settled law that when the plaintiffs being members of family pleaded that the property is the joint family property, it is for the defendants, who pleaded partition to establish the same, apart from that when the plaintiffs pleaded that Lingaraju acquired property from his ancestors with the aid of ancestral nucleus and purchased the property, the initial onus of proof is on the plaintiffs to prove that part of the schedule property is the coparcenary property inherited from Chandraiah, from his ancestors and that the remaining property was purchased with the aid of joint family nucleus.
22. To substantiate the contentions, the 1st plaintiff Laveti Chandramma was examined as PW.1 and her specific contention is that the suit property is the joint family property of her husband and also defendants 1 to 4 and that during the life time of her father-in-law, defendants 1 to 3 are employed in the Government service and they shifted their residence to Bhavanipatnam, which is in Orissa. The schedule Lot Nos.1 and 2 are houses one at Bhavanipatnam, and other at Uddavolu village in Parvathipuram taluk and that they belong to joint family. She further testified that the schedule property is in the management of 4th defendant and 4th defendant used to pay 10 to 15 puttis of paddy every year.
23. Thus, it is clear from the testimony of PW.1 that the property is the joint family property and not Hindu Undivided coparcenary property. She got issued a legal notice before filing the suit, which is marked as Ex.A-1 wherein her contention was that Chandraiah succeeded the estate of his father, late Bojannachari and later acquired other items of the property with the ancestral nucleus and from other joint assertions. Thus, the earliest plea in the legal notice is that the property is the Hindu Undivided coparcenary property and or acquired with the aid of joint family nucleus, but when I adverted to the evidence of PW.1, she totally denied her version and contended that
the property belongs to joint family of Chandraiah and defendants 1 and 2. There is lot of difference between the Hindu Undivided coparcenary and joint family property. In the plaint, the specific plea of the plaintiff is that Laveti Chandraiah succeeded the entire estate of his father late Bojannachari and thereby husband of PW.1, Lingaraju, by birth acquired right in the joint family. Thus, the property is Hindu Undivided coparcenary property, not joint family property. If really the earliest plea of Hindu Undivided coparcenary is accepted, there must be some evidence on record to prove that the deceased Chandraiah inherited any property from his father by producing at least documentary evidence, but obviously for different reasons, no iota of evidence is brought on record to establish that Chandraiah inherited any property from his father late Bhojannachari and that Chandraiah acquired the other items of property with the aid of coparcenary nucleus. In the absence of any evidence on record, basing on the oral testimony of PW.1, it is difficult for the Court to conclude that the suit schedule property is the Hindu Undivided coparcenary property. The latest plea in the evidence is that it is joint family property and it is totally inconsistent with the earliest plea that the schedule property is Hindu Undivided coparcenary property.
24. There is a clear difference between Hindu coparcenery and Hindu Joint family. A Hindu joint family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor, and includes their wives and unmarried daughters. A Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the Hindu joint family, it includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property, these being sons, grandsons and great-grandsons of the holder of the joint property for the time being. A joint Hindu family or coparcenary is a creature of Hindu law and it cannot be created or constituted by an agreement of parties.
25. A joint Hindu family comprises individuals, every one of
whom is a descendant of the common ancestor in an unbroken male line. Daughters born to such persons are also members of such family but they cease to be so on marriage. In the same way, wives of the male members become members of the family. The joint family also includes sons incorporated into the family by adoption. The joint family, therefore, includes all dependent members of the family including those who are entitled to residence in the family dwelling-house and to maintenance out of the coparcenary property. The commonness, the common worship, the common residence, coupled with the ties of blood and introductions into the family by marriage and adoption make them members of a joint family. Mitakshara coparcenary is a relic of the archaic institution of ownership by communities as opposed to the modern conception of individual ownership. A coparcenary is formed as soon as on the death of a common ancestor his property devolves on his male heirs, who form, as it were, a single body. The heirs take the property as one heir and no one has any defined share therein. His interest is a fluctuating one, which may be enlarged by deaths of coparceners and diminished by births and adoption into the family. The share of an individual member is determined only at the time of partition or severance of the joint family and until the happening of that event on the death of a coparcener his interest does not devolve on his heirs but passes to the remaining coparcener by right of survivorship.
26. The coparcenary is a smaller body than the joint family and consists of male persons only, however, after amendment to Hindu Succession Act, daughters also. All members of the coparcenary are undoubtedly members of the family, but all members of the family are not necessarily coparceners. A coparcener is one who has acquired an undefined interest in the family property. Such interest is acquired by inheritance from male ancestors or by devolution of
interest on the death of a male coparcener or on birth or adoption in the joint family. Coparceners include only those male persons, now female who by virtue of relationship have a right to enjoy and hold the joint property, to restrain the acts of each other in respect of it, to burden it with their debts and at their pleasure to have it partitioned. A coparcenary is intimately associated with coparcenary property. If the joint family has no estate of its own, there is no coparcenary. Even if the members of the joint family have separate property of their own, there is joint family but no coparcenary. As soon as the holder of separate property dies and the property devolves on his male descendants by inheritance the coparcenary is formed. So a coparcenary comes into existence for the first time on the death of a male ancestor when his lineal male descendants succeed in a body. If the ancestor dies without leaving any property, his descendants may form a joint family, but there cannot be any coparcenary. So there may be joint family without any family property, but there cannot be any coparcenary without coparcenary property. Thus, there is a clear distinction between the coparcenary property and the joint family property.
27. Thus, in view of the settled difference between Hindu Undivided Coparcenary and Joint family either of the pleas of the defendants are not acceptable for the reason that there is no evidence in support of Hindu Undivided Coparcenary and no plea in support of the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs to the effect that the schedule property is the joint family property.
28. The plaintiffs also examined two other witnesses to prove that the schedule property is either joint family property or Hindu Undivided coparcenary property. PW.2 is one Laveti Dharmarao Achari, aged 28 years by the date of his examination on 29.10.1986. Thus, by the date of alleged death of father of Lingaraju in the year 1961 or 1962, he
might be aged 2 or 3 years old. However, the age of the 2nd plaintiff was mentioned in the plaint as 20 years in 1980 that means he might have born in the year 1960. His evidence is only based on the information he received without having any personal knowledge. By the date when his father left the house, he was aged 3 years and is staying for the last 3 years at Uddavolu village, assisted 4th defendant in agricultural operations and also about delivery of paddy bags. Even assuming for a moment that PW.2 was aged 3 years by the date when his father left the house, he is not supposed to have personal knowledge about the nature of the property possessed by Chandraiah. Therefore, basing on the testimony of PW.2, it is difficult to believe that the schedule property is Hindu Undivided coparcenary property or not joint family property. He placed reliance on Ex.A-14, adangal register. Even according to the contents of Ex.A-14, most of the property is in the name of Chandraiah not in the name of his father late Bhojannachari.
29. When I adverted to the evidence of PW.3, he is only a villager whose evidence inspires no credence for the reason that he is helping the plaintiffs in the litigation, as admitted by him in the examination-inchief. However, he did not gather any particulars of the schedule property and about his visiting to Uddavolu village one to three times about 15 years ago. Therefore, his evidence is of no avail to prove the nature of property shown in the plaint schedule. In the evidence of PW.1, though she contended that the schedule property was not ancestral property or joint family, did not state anything about the nature of property and admitted that PW.1, her husband and children used to live at Bhavanipatnam for more than 25 years and her husband was not heard for the last 25 years. Therefore, there is any amount of doubt about Lingaraju and defendants 1 and 2 living jointly or at least during the life time of Chandraiah and acquiring any property. In the entire evidence, PWs.1 to 3 did not disclose the nature
of profession of deceased Lingaraju and the amount contributed for purchasing or acquiring any of the items of schedule property along with Chandraiah. Except a bare allegation in the plaint and in the evidence that the property is Hindu Undivided Coparcenary property, no iota of documentary evidence is brought on record to establish the same. Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the schedule property is the Hindu Undivided coparcenary property. Accordingly, the trial Court rightly held that the schedule property is not the Hindu Undivided coparcenary property. This finding does not call for interference of this Court, even after reappraisal of entire evidence once again by this Court.
30. Coming to the evidence of PW.1 on record, it is clear that the schedule property is the joint family property of deceased Lingaraju and Chandraiah and his brothers, defendants 1 and 2. It is also admitted that Lingaraju separated from Chandraiah in or about 1945 taking his share in the joint family. Thus, the defendants due to pleading ancient oral partition, no further proof is required that the schedule property is the joint family property of Chandraiah, Lingaraju and defendants 1 and 2, brothers of D-2. If really the property was not joint family property, the question of giving share to Lingaraju during his life time by Chandraiah does not arise. Allotting share to Lingaraju by Chandraiah long ago, more particularly, the property covered by Exs.B-1 to B-3 itself is sufficient to conclude that the schedule property is the joint family property. Therefore, the contention of the plaintiffs that the schedule property is the joint family property of Chandraiah inclusive of his children possessed property. The only defence set up by the defendants is that Lingaraju separated from joint family in the year 1945 and shifted his residence to Bhavanipatnam, which is in Orissa State and living there with his wife and children. Shifting family to Bhavanipatnam by Lingaraju is an undisputed fact and he was not heard for more than 7 years. In fact the trial Court drawn the
presumption available under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, and concluded that Lingaraju is presumed to have died as he was not heard for more than 7 years by the persons who are expected to hear about his whereabouts. This presumption drawn by the trial Court is not challenged in this Appeal.
31. When the defendants set up the previous oral ancient partition of joint family property and allottied certain property to Lingaraju by Chandraiah, the initial onus of proof is on the defendants to substantiate their contention. To prove their contention, DWs.1 to 3 were examined, marked several documents. DW.1 is 4th defendant, who was aged 38 years as on 03.07.1987. Therefore, he might have born before 1950, but whereas the alleged partition took place in the year 1945. In the evidence of DW.1 it is specifically testified that his father Chandraiah did not inherit any property from his father, late Bojannachari, and admitted that the property of the family was acquired by his father. Therefore the schedule property and other property is self acquired property of Chandraiah. Brother of DW.1, Lingaraju separated from his father and other brothers, even before DW.1 was born and that Lingaraju was given Ac.9.00 cents of wet and dry land including his major share, but no house property was given and in lieu of it, monetary compensation was paid to Lingaraju. For some time he was in enjoyment of the share of property later, sold his part of the property to Gottupalli Parayya and some other property was sold to brother of DW.1 Narayanachari, who is 2nd defendant in this Suit. By the date of those alienations, the 3rd plaintiff was not even born. Lingaraju sold the property by executing registered sale deed dated 08.02.1961, marked as Ex.B-1, for Rs.4,000/- and registered sale deeds dated 11.01.1959 in favour of Chandramma, wife of Parayya, marked as Exs.B-2 and B-3. Thus, Lingaraju sold away his entire property under Exs.B-1 to B-3, the predecessors or successors are in possession and enjoyment of the property covered by Exs.B-1 to
B-3 in the year 1959 and 1961 and paying land revenue to the Revenue Authorities under Exs.B-4 to B-13. DW.1 himself is the absolute owner of C schedule property as he purchased C schedule property and in the partition Lot No.1 of B schedule was allotted to him, as Lot No.2-B was allotted to 2nd defendant, after death of Chandraiah and the partition is only between the undivided brothers excluding Lingaraju, he denied payment or delivery of any paddy or value to the plaintiffs towards their share in the agricultural property. Thus, DW.1 denied continuation of Lingaraju as member of the joint family and thereafter the defendants while contending that there was a partition between Lingaraju and his father Chandraiah long prior to filing of the suit i.e., almost in the year 1945. However, the oral evidence of DW.1 is not worthy of credence for the reason that by the date of alleged partition, he was not even born according to his own admission, but, at best the documentary evidence marked as Exs.B-1 to B-3 and B-4 to B-13 can be looked into to decide whether there was a partition between Chandraiah and Lingaraju. In the cross-examination of DW.1, the counsel for the plaintiffs elicited that DW.1 does not know anything about the share of property possessed by his father Chandraiah, after the alleged partition. However, he admitted that by the date of execution of Ex.A-1, DW.1 was studying 9th class at Parvathipuram, so he came to know about the sale of property under Ex.B-1. Ex.A-14, 10(1) account discloses the name of his father as pattedar and occupier of the land. Even after his death, since the name of DW.1 was not mutated in the revenue records but, whereas in Ex.A-13, names of all the defendants were shown and land ceiling declaration was filed by his father, the schedule property is included in the separate holding of Chandraiah only. On close analysis of entire evidence of DW.1, it is clear that he has no personal knowledge about partition but basing on the documentary evidence Exs.B-1 to B-14, he is contending that Lingaraju separated from his father Chandraiah even before his birth i.e., almost in or about 1945. His oral evidence
though not sufficient to believe the partition but the documents produced by DW.1 are relevant to decide whether Lingaraju separated from his father Chandraiah or not. So, the evidentiary value of documents produced by the defendants and other documents will be discussed at later stage.
32. DW.2 is the son of Former Karanam of Uddavolu village; he was examined only to prove the writing of Exs.B-1 to B-3. He being the son of the scribe of the documents could identify his father’s hand writing on Exs.B-1 to B-3. So also on Ex.B-4 to B-13 since those receipts were issued by the village Munsif. Thus, DW.2 proved scribing of Exs.B-1 to B-3 and payment of land revenue and issuance of land revenue receipts by the village Munsif. Examination of a person who can identify the writing of the scribe is one of the modes of proof of document as held by the Apex Court in State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ra m[1] .
33. Therefore, execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 is proved. DW.2 admitted that he does not know anything about separation of Lingaraju from his father and allotment of any property towards the share of Lingaraju and according to the cross-examination, he was present at the time when the partition between the defendants took place, but no partition deed was executed and that the property is the self acquired property of Chandraiah, as he purchased under sale deeds, but admitted that he did not saw the sale deeds. At best, the evidence of DW.2 is helpful only to identify the writing on Exs.B-1 to B-13.
34. DW.3 is the son of Paraiah and Chandramma is his mother, who purchased part of the property under Ex.B-3 and Exs.B-18 to 19 are the land revenue receipts in the name of Chandramma, who was blind by the date of his examination. The total extent covered by Ex.B3 is Ac.1 ½ cents of land. The evidence of DW.3 is helpful to prove purchase of the property by his mother Chandramma, who became
blind later, more particularly, on the date of execution of Ex.B-3. The entire oral evidence is only in support of the specific contentions of both the parties. The facts elicited in the cross-examination are not worthy of consideration to decide the real dispute. However, the documentary evidence on record is vital to decide the real dispute. Therefore, I would like to advert to the documents produced by both the parties either to believe or disbelieve the previous partition pleaded between Chandraiah and Lingaraju.
35. Ex.B-1 is the registered sale deed dated 08.02.1961, executed by Laveti Lingaraju in favour of Narayanachary executed by Lingaraju and his undivided minor son Manmadha Rao, represented by Lingaraju, and the total extent covered by Ex.B-1 is Ac.9.00 cents which is not part of the schedule property. Similarly, Ex.B-2 is registered sale deed dated 11.01.1959 executed by Laveti Lingaraju and Laveti Manmadha Rao, being minor represented by his father Lingaraju, for Rs.500/- evidencing sale of Ac.0.30 cents of land in favour of Chandramma, mother of DW.3. Ex.B-3 is another registered sale deed dated 11.01.1959, for Rs.500/-, executed by Lingaraju, Manmadha Rao, being minor represented by his father Lingaraju, conveying agricultural land in favour of Chandramma, mother of DW.3. In all the documents, the source of title of Lingaraju was mentioned as the property purchased by Chandraiah from Gorle Channappadu and others under registered document bearing No.2236/1943 and later partition between the members of the family, allotted the same to the share of Lingaraju. The recitals of Exs.B-1 to B-3, regarding source of title, discloses that the property was allotted to the share of Lingaraju though it was purchased by Chandraiah from different persons, in the partition, so, the sale deeds were in the name of Chandraiah. Taking advantage of the recitals regarding source of title of Lingaraju, the defendants contended that there is a partition between Chandraiah and Lingaraju. Undoubtedly the recitals in
Exs.B-1 to B-3 disclose that the property was allotted to the share of Lingaraju in the partition between his brothers. If really there was no partition or separation of Lingaraju from his father taking certain property, the question of mentioning source of title, as mentioned in Exs.B-1 to B-3, does not arise, more particularly, when the documents stood in the name of Chandraiah, father of defendants 1 and 2 and Lingaraju. This is a strong circumstance to believe that there was a partition between Lingaraju and his father Chandraiah long prior to execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 in 1959 and 1961, respectively. Payment of land revenue under Exs.B-4 to B-21 by DW.1 and Chandramma is another strong piece of evidence to believe that Lingaraju separated from his father after taking certain share in the property long prior to execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 itself.
36. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs before the trial Court contended that the documents marked as Exs.B-1 to B-3 are forged documents. In fact, by the date of execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3, there were no differences or disputes between the families of Lingarajau and defendants and for the first time, notice was got issued by the plaintiffs on 18.01.1980, marked as Ex.A-1. From the date of issue of Ex.A-1, there were disputes. When the disputes arose just prior to issue of legal notice, there is no need to create registered sale deeds long prior to issue of legal notice in August, 1980. It is evident from the record that Exs.B-1 to B-3 were executed almost 20 years prior to issuance of legal notice i.e., when the disputes arose between the plaintiffs and defendants. The signatures on Exs.B-1 to B-3 were not specifically denied by the plaintiffs and on the other hand, the execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 was proved by examining DW.2. Added to that, payment of land revenue by the defendants and Chandramma, is another strong circumstance to believe the partition. In fact, it is impossible for anybody to prove the ancient oral partition by adducing direct evidence. So, the Court has to appraise the entire evidence and
decide the previous ancient partition pleaded by the defendants. The principles applicable to ancient documents can be applied to ancient partition as held by a Division Bench of this Court in C. Bommul Reddy Vs. C.R. Bommul Reddy[2] held as follows:
“In a case, where an ancient partition is pleaded there can be no precise evidence regarding the actual partition and the details of that partition the principles are applicable to ancient transactions would apply for proof of ancient partition and normally the gaps in evidence can be filled by inferences and presumptions drawn properly from the evidence produced before the Court. The normal course of human conduct should also be taken into account in dealing with such question.”
37. From the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the decision cited supra, the Courts cannot insist direct evidence, even if there are any gaps in the evidence, the Court can draw inferences about the previous partition and fill the gaps. Therefore, keeping in mind the above principles, the trial Court believed the ancient partition basing on Exs.B-1 to B-21. Long separate enjoyment by paying land revenue is another strong circumstance to believe the previous partition, as held by the Apex Court in Digambar Adhar Patil Vs. Devram Girdhar Patil (died) and anothe r[3] , wherein it was held as follows at para 5 :
“Under Hindu Law, it is not necessary that the partition should be effected by a registered partition deed. Even a family arrangement is enough to effectuate the partition between coparceners and to confer right to a separate share and enjoyment thereof.”
38. In the instant case on hand, the documentary evidence on record established separate enjoyment of property by Lingaraju, after separating from his father, Chandraiah, recitals of Exs.B-1 to B-3, supported separate enjoyment till the property covered by Exs.B-1 to B-3 was sold by Lingaraju and his minor son, represented by
Lingaraju, being the guardian and that itself is sufficient to believe the previous partition. Apart from that the entries in revenue records and payment of land revenue to the revenue authorities, separately under different revenue receipts, marked as Exs.B-4 to B-23 is relevant piece of evidence as per the principle laid down in the above judgment. Payment of land revenue for the property, separately, even after sale of the land by Lingaraju, mutation of names in the revenue records are sufficient to prove the previous partition between Lingaraju and Chandraiah.
39. In another judgment of the Bombay High Court in Smt. P. N. Wankudre Vs. C.S. Wankudre and others[4] , it was held as follows:
“When all the members divided the properties by family arrangement and were put in possession and enjoyment of piece of property and all members of the family were signatories to said arrangement and the partition was acted upon by the parties, no objection was raised for number of years. In such circumstances even assuming that documents were required to be registered, conduct of members would operate as an estoppel preventing them from resiling from said arrangements. One member cannot seek injunction or restraint order in respect of property partitioned and mutated in favour of another member.”
40. Though the point involved in above decision is different, but incidentally the High Court of Bombay held that though the document is inadmissible in evidence, the conduct of parties would operate as estoppel and cannot resile from the partition of property. In the instant case on hand, the defendants pleaded ancient partition, dividing the property between Lingaraju and Chandraiah and allotment of Ac.9.00 cents of land towards his major share and later, execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3 and payment of land revenue by the purchasers under Exs.B-1 to B-3, marked as Exs.B-4 to B-21. Thus, the evidence on record, even if there is no documentary evidence to prove the alleged partition, the conduct of the parties, more particularly, allotment of the property
after separating as incorporated in the sale deeds mentioning the name of the boundary owner as one of the members of the branches including the documents executed by the 1st plaintiff’s husband and father of the other plaintiffs is a strong circumstantial evidence on record. In fact, the Bombay High Court judgment is not binding a precedent, but it has got only persuasive value.
41. In another judgment in Pitambar Kar Vs. Trilochan Kar and others[5] , wherein the Orissa High Court held as follows :
“When a previous partition by metes and bounds is proved by long separate possession of lands and separate living among co-sharers and inter-se between two co-sharers was taken place and its evidence of severance of joint status among the members.”
42. The sum and substance of the principles laid down in the above decision is that entries in revenue record of rights and conduct of the parties is relevant to decide the previous partition, when it is not evidenced by any document. But, the counsel for the plaintiffs specifically contended that the entries in revenue records are for collection of land revenue, would not create any title to the property, placed reliance on a decision of the Apex court in Jattu Ram Vs.
Hakam Singh and others[6] , wherein it was held that entries in Jamabandi records are not proof of title and creates no title. The defendants are not relying on the entries in Jamabandi register or in the adangal pahanies pertaining to the schedule property, marked as Ex.A-14, to claim that there is a previous partition. Strangely, in the present case on hand, the boundaries mentioned in Exs.B-1 to B-3 also establish that the property was partitioned between Lingaraju and his father. The evidence adduced by the defendants is probable to the natural circumstances, for the reason that purchasers under Exs.B-1 to B-3 are enjoying the property since 1959 and 1961. If really, the property was not partitioned, the plaintiffs would have claimed share in
the property covered by Exs.B-1 to B-3. Failure to include property covered by Exs.B-1 to B-3 in the plaint schedule is another strong circumstance to believe that Lingaraju separated from his father Chandraiah long prior to execution of Exs.B-1 and B-2.
43. When once the defendants discharged their onus by producing satisfactory and cogent evidence to establish the ancient oral previous partition, the onus of proof will automatically shifts on to the plaintiffs to rebut the same. However, no evidence was adduced to disprove the ancient previous partition pleaded by defendants and allotment of property covered by Exs.B-1 to B-3 to the share of Lingaraju. However, denied the partition pleaded by the defendants, when a suggestion was put to PWs.1 and 2 that itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the partition. As seen from the recitals of Ex.B-1 sale deed, one of the boundaries was mentioned as remaining half share of Ac.1.50 cents of dry land and Ac.3.00 cents of wet land after excluding half share of Ac.1.50 cents of dry land and Ac.3.00 cents of wet land belonging to the 2nd defendant and others representing their half share. Specific mention about the boundary in the sale deed executed by Lingaraju, which took place long prior to filing of the suit is another strong circumstance to believe the partition and it is probable to the natural circumstances of the case and human conduct, apart from that PW.2 was not even born by the date of execution of Exs.B-1 and B-3 and whatever he stated is of no avail to disbelieve the recitals of Exs.B-1 to B-3.
44. One of the contentions of learned counsel for the plaintiffs – appellants is that when DWs.1 to 3 state that there is a partition list, non production of it creates any amount of suspicion and the Court has to draw an adverse inference, but the trial Court refused to draw an adverse inference for the reason that the witnesses were not even born by the date of alleged partition, according to their own admission. However, it is settled law that drawing of adverse inference is
discretion of the Court. Merely, because the documents allegedly executed were not produced, the Court cannot draw an adverse inference. In a recent judgment of the Apex Court in Mahendra L. Jain and others Vs. Indore Development Authority and others[7] , it was held as follows :
“Mere non-production of documents would not result in adverse inference. If a document was called for in the absence of any pleadings, the same was not relevant. An adverse inference need not necessarily be drawn only because it would be lawful to do so.”
45. If the principle laid down in the above judgment is applied to the present facts of the case, unless a notice is given to cause production of a document, if it was not produced, then only an adverse inference is to be drawn, but here no notice was issued to cause production of document under Order 12 Rule 8 of C.P.C. Therefore, question of drawing adverse inference does not arise. Hence, the trial Court rightly declined to draw such an adverse inference for non production of the alleged partition list and rightly concluded that there was an earlier oral partition which took place long prior to execution of Exs.B-1 to B-3.
46. In view of the voluminous documentary evidence on record and for the failure of the plaintiffs to prove that Lingaraju was not separated from his father, taking any property towards his share, this Court has no option except to believe the plea of the defendants regarding previous partition between Lingaraju and his father Chandraiah. Thus, the trial Court rightly believed the previous partition and did commit no error in dismissing the Suit. Even after reappraisal of entire evidence with reference to the grounds urged in the grounds of appeal, I find no error apparent on the face of the record, warranting interference if this Court. Hence, I find no merit in the contentions of learned counsel for the plaintiffs – appellants and thereby the finding recorded by the trial
Court is hereby confirmed. Accordingly, the point is answered.
47. POINT No.2: When the defendants proved the previous partition between the Chandraiah and Lingaraju, as pleaded in the written statement, the defendants, at best, are entitled to claim share in the property allotted to his father, if any, available as on the date of filing the Suit, and they are not entitled to claim any share in the schedule property as the property is the separate property of Chandraiah, which is inherited by the defendants after his death. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any share in the property, as on the date of filing the suit. Hence, I hold that the plaintiffs – appellants are not entitled to claim partition of the schedule property.
48. On close analysis of the entire evidence available on record, both oral and documentary evidence, I find no grounds to interfere with the finding recorded by the trial Court and the findings recorded by the trial Court are totally in accordance with law, and thereby the appeal deserves to be dismissed as it is devoid of merits. Accordingly, the point is held against the plaintiffs -appellants and in favour of the defendants.
In the result, the appeal suit is dismissed confirming the impugned decree and judgment dated 15.03.1994 passed in Original Suit No.87 of 1980 by the learned Subordinate Judge, Parvathipuram, Vizianagaram District.
In consequence, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Appeal, shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY, J
Date: 17-04-2014.
Dsh
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
193
APPEAL SUIT No. 482 OF 1995
Date. 17-04-2014
DSH
3 issues framed by the court
Was the schedule property proved to be Hindu undivided coparcenary property?
Was the ancient oral partition proved, defeating the plaintiffs' claim to a further share?
Could an adverse inference be drawn for non-production of the alleged partition list without notice to produce it?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali RamApplied¶66
AIR 1979 SC 14 · Who else cites this
C. Bommul Reddy Vs. C.R. Bommul ReddyApplied¶73
1989 (3) ALT 365
Digambar Adhar Patil Vs. Devram Girdhar Patil (died) and anotherApplied¶75
AIR 1995 SC 1728 · Who else cites this
Smt. P. N. Wankudre Vs. C.S. Wankudre and othersRelied on¶79
AIR 2002 Bombay 129 · Who else cites this
Pitambar Kar Vs. Trilochan Kar and othersRelied on¶83
AIR 2003 Orissa 104 · Who else cites this
Jattu Ram Vs. Hakam Singh and othersDistinguished¶86
(1993) 4 SCC 403 · Who else cites this
Mahendra L. Jain and others Vs. Indore Development Authority and othersApplied¶90
2005 (1) SCC 639 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Laveti Chandramma
Laveti Dharmarao Achari
Laveti Satyanarayanachari
Laveti Narayanachari
Laveti Lakshmanachari
Laveti Kedarachari
M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
