Allowed

Sri Varanasi Seeta Rama Deekshitulu v. The District Collector

Telangana HC19 Feb 2013WP/37132/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Hon'ble Court held that land acquisition proceedings lapsed under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as the award was passed beyond the two-year statutory period. The court excluding only the period during which the stay order was in force, rejected the argument to extend exclusion to the period after the order expired but before the writ petition's dismissal.

What did the court decide?

The Writ Petition is allowed to declare the acquisition proceedings lapsed due to violation of the two-year time limit under Section 11-A of the Act.

Sri Varanasi Seeta Rama Deekshitulu Vs The District… — Land Acquisition | Telangana HC (2013)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY

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WRIT PETITION No.37132 OF 2012

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Date:19-02-2013

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BETWEEN: Sri Varanasi Seeta Rama Deekshitulu .. Petitioner AND The District Collector, West Godavari District, Eluru & 2 others. .. Respondents

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Counsel for the petitioner : Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad Counsel for Respondent Nos.1 & 2 : Govt. Pleader for Land Acquisition Counsel for Respondent No.3 : ---

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The Court made the following:

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ORDER:

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This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare that the entire acquisition proceedings, where under an extent of Ac.0-08 Cents in R.S. No.178/2 of Tanuku Revenue Village and Mandal, West Godavari District, was proposed to be acquired, have lapsed as the Award was passed beyond the period of two years as prescribed under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’).

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I have heard Mr. B. Venkateswarlu, learned counsel representing Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition representing respondent Nos.1 and 2 at length.

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The above mentioned property was proposed to be acquired under notification, dated 10-12-2008, issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, and published in Andhra Pradesh Gazette on 12-12-2008 for the purpose of an approach road for a summer storage tank. Questioning the said notification, the petitioner filed writ petition No.27267 of 2009. An order of status quo was granted by this Court on 15-12-2009 for a limited period. The said interim order was extended by orders, dated 20-01-2010, 26-02-2010, 24-06-2010, 08-07-2010 and 25-08-2010. The interim order was finally extended on 13-09-2010 for a period of one week and it has

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expired on 20-09-2010. It needs to be noted that between 15-12-2009 and 20-09-2010, the interim order was not in operation for certain intermittent periods. The writ petition was finally dismissed on merits on 23-12-2010. Feeling aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioner filed Writ Appeal No.362 of 2011, wherein there was no stay. Eventually, the writ appeal was dismissed on 16-11-2012. During the pendency of the writ appeal, respondent No.2 passed the Award on 15-10-2012. The petitioner has filed this writ petition questioning the said Award. As noted above, the sole ground on which this writ petition is filed is that the period of two years as stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act, has expired before the Award was passed.

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At the hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced two submissions viz., i) that the intermittent break periods, during which the interim orders were not extended, are not liable for exclusion while computing the period of two years under Section 11-A of the Act; and ii) that alternatively, even if the break periods are excluded, the period of two years has to be computed at least from 20-09-2010 up to which interim orders were in force and that if the period is so calculated, the Award passed on 15-10-2012 is clearly beyond two years period as stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.

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The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition has stiffly resisted the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that as the respondents were under the bona fide impression that the interim stay was being extended from time to time without any break, the intermittent

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periods during which the interim orders were not extended also need to be excluded. He has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Kolandaivelu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs.

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Government of Tamil Nadu^[1] in support of his submission. The learned Government Pleader has taken this Court through the counter-affidavit and submitted that even though the interim order was last extended on 13-09-2010 for a period of one week, the writ petition was dismissed only on 23-12-2010 and that they were under the impression that the interim order was in force till dismissal of the writ petition. He has, accordingly, submitted that while computing the period of two years, the period up to 23-12-2010 i.e., the date on which the writ petition was dismissed, has to be excluded. He has further submitted that the petitioner, who has filed the writ petition and obtained interim orders from time to time, is not entitled to invoke the benefit of the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya Vs. . State of Gujara t^[2]

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I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.

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Section 11-A of the Act, has stipulated time limit of two years from the publication of declaration for making the Award. However, the Explanation to the said provision laid down that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said

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declaration is stayed by an order of a Court, shall be excluded. If the said explanation is literally construed, it is only the period during which an interim order is passed that has to be excluded. However, in R. Kolandaivelu (1 Supra) the Supreme Court has considered a similar set of facts where the interim stay granted for a period of four weeks was not extended by the High Court, but the Government has filed a vacate stay application which was heard by the High Court and interim order granted earlier and expired was continued till disposal of the writ petition. While repelling the submission that the period during which the interim order was not in operation shall not be excluded for computing the period of two years, the Supreme Court observed as under:

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“16. As noted hereinearlier, at the instance of the appellants, the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and the declaration under Section 6 initially were stayed for four weeks on 11-2-1988, but the interlocutory applications remained pending for final disposal and finally on the applications to vacate the stay order at the instance of the respondent State, the applications to vacate the stay were disposed of, as noted hereinearlier by an order which clearly shows that the order of stay granted initially for four weeks would continue pending further orders. From a perusal of the aforesaid interim order of the High Court passed on 3-7-1991, it is, therefore, evident that there was an order of prohibition from dispossessing the appellants from the acquired lands pending further orders.

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17. In view of our discussions made

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hereinabove and considering the nature of interim order of stay passed by the High Court finally on 3-7-1991, it is abundantly clear that both the parties proceeded on the basis that the interim order of stay had been continuing and the respondents were prohibited from dispossessing the appellants from the acquired lands pending further orders. If that was not the case, the question of filing an application for vacating the order of stay granted in favour of the appellants could not arise at all and there was no occasion for the appellants to contest the application for vacating the stay order on the basis that the interim order of stay was continuing and should be allowed to continue. That apart, it may be stated that although initially the interim order was passed for four weeks, the same interim order which was granted initially was made final until further orders on 3-71991.”

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This judgment is a complete answer to the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the intermittent breaks shall not be excluded.

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The further question, which, however, remains to be considered, is whether the period beyond 20-09-2010 up to which date the interim order was extended, shall be excluded till 23-12-2010 when the writ petition was dismissed.

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As noted above, it is the submission of the learned Government Pleader that he and his clients were under the impression that the interim stay continued till the dismissal of the writ petition. It is also his submission that having filed the writ

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petition and obtained an order, the petitioner cannot be extended the benefit of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. He has placed emphasis on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya’s case (2

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Supra)

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“……. On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by Section 17 or otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder.”

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The above observations of the Apex Court, understood superficially may give an impression that the benefit of the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act is available only to the landholders, who have not obtained any order from the Court. However, on a deeper consideration and understanding of the said judgment, such a proposition could not be read into the judgment. The issue considered by the Supreme Court was whether while computing the period of two years, the period during which an order merely staying dispossession without staying all further proceedings is liable to be excluded or not. The issue whether a person, who has obtained an order from the Court, is entitled to the benefit of the explanation to Section 11-A of the Act, or not has

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not fallen for the Court’s consideration. It is trite that a judgment is an authority on a question, which it has decided, and a judgment cannot be read as a statute. (See: Goan Real Estate & Construction Ltd. v. Union of India^[3] and Natwar Singh v. Director of Enforcemen t^[4] ) . If the contention of the learned Government Pleader is accepted, every person who has questioned the acquisition proceedings and obtained an interim order at one stage or the other has to be non suited subsequently even if the Award is not passed within the prescribed period under Section 11-A of the Act. Such is not the legislative intent. The purpose of stipulation of the period of two years for passing Award under Section 11-A of the Act, is to avoid undue delays in making the Awards and hardship to the landowners. The intendment behind the explanation to the said provision is to save the limitation for passing the Award in cases where orders interfering with the action or proceeding by the Land Acquisition Authorities are passed by the Courts. Therefore, there is no embargo on a person, who has approached this Court and secured an interim order, on invoking the benefit of the Explanation at a subsequent stage if the respondents failed to pass Award within the stipulated time after vacation of the interim order. The learned Government Pleader has not placed before this Court any judgment laying down such proposition.

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The Explanation to Section 11-A of the Act, has excluded only the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration, is stayed by an order of the Court. Even though by the judicial interpretation the Apex Court in

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R. Kolandaivelu (1 Supra) has extended the benefit of the Explanation even during the intermittent periods when the interim order was not in operation, the said benefit cannot be stretched to such extent as to exclude the period even after the expiry of the interim order without further extension till dismissal of the writ petition. Such interpretation would render the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act otiose. Irrespective of whether the respondents have no knowledge of non-extension of interim order, they cannot plead the benefit of exclusion of the period beyond the expiry of the interim order till the dismissal of the writ petition. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the period of two years has to be computed from 21-09-2010 and on such calculation, admittedly the Award which was passed on 15-10-2012 is beyond the period of two years. It must, therefore, be necessarily held that the Award is not valid, as the same was made beyond the stipulated period of two years as envisaged under Section 11-A of the Act.

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For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is allowed as prayed for.

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As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, stand disposed of.

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_____________________ C.V.NAGARJUNA

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REDDY, J February 19, 2013. Mgr/Lur

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