Dismissed

V. Nagamuni Reddy v. Sri Jhon Samson (Commissioner)

Telangana HC10 Sept 2012CC/644/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this contempt case, the Court examined whether the Kadapa Municipal Corporation violated an order directing it to follow legal procedure before demolishing a compound wall alleged to encroach on public land. The Court found the demolition unwarranted as statutory notice and findings on objections were missing. The respondent was held guilty of wilful contempt for disobedience and filing a false affidavit. The belated apology was rejected, and the contemnor was sentenced to detention in civil prison for 15 days.

What did the court decide?

Respondent sentenced to detention in civil prison for 15 days with subsistence allowance of Rs.250/- per day borne by the State; sentence execution suspended for one month.

V. Nagamuni Reddy Vs Sri Jhon Samson (Commissioner) — Contempt of Court | Telangana HC (2012)

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN

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CONTEMPT CASE No.644 of 2011

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ORDER:

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The order of this Court, violation of which has resulted in the present contempt case being filed, is the order in W.P.No.12305 of 2009 dated 26.04.2010, which required the respondent herein (Commissioner, Kadapa Municipal Corporation) to give the petitioner, and the third respondent in the Writ Petition, an opportunity of being heard; permit them to furnish documentary evidence to show that the compound wall was/was not constructed on a public road; and, thereafter, take action in accordance with the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 (the Act) as extended to the Kadapa Municipal Corporation. The entire exercise, culminating in action being taken, was required to be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.

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The respondent-contemnor issued notice dated 13.05.2010 calling upon the petitioner, and the third respondent in the Writ Petition, to furnish documents in respect of the compound wall constructed at D.No.1/441-16-1, Maruthi Nagar, Kadapa within one week from the date of receipt of the notice. The petitioner, vide letter dated 26.05.2010 which was received by the respondent on 29.05.2010, submitted his objections thereto. Thereafter, the respondent issued proceedings dated 28.07.2010, under Section 405 and 406 of the GHMC Act, informing the petitioner that the compound wall constructed by him had encroached upon the public road as also municipal land and, thereby, the provisions of Sections 405 and 406 of the Act were violated. The petitioner was called upon to remove the encroachments within seven days, and to inform the same to the Municipal Corporation, otherwise removal/demolition charges would be recovered from him as per the provisions of the Act. This proceedings dated 28.07.2010 makes no reference either to the notice

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issued earlier on 13.05.2010, or to the objections submitted by the petitioner vide his letter dated 26.05.2010. While the said proceedings dated 28.07.2010 does not make any reference to any survey having been conducted, Learned Government Pleader would submit that a survey was conducted earlier on 21.07.2010.

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Curiously, the respondent did not take any action pursuant to the proceedings dated 28.07.2010. While admitting that no orders were passed by the respondent, on the petitioner’s objections in his letter dated 26.5.2010, Learned Government Pleader would submit that the petitioner had, subsequently, approached the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa, and had filed O.S.No.522 of 2010; the Learned Junior Civil Judge, by order dated 25.08.2010, had granted interim injunction; and, thereafter, on a vacate stay petition being filed, and the order of this Court having been brought to his notice, the Learned Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa, in his order in I.A.No.1134 of 2011 in O.S.No.522 of 2010 dated 17.03.2011, had observed that the documents issued by the Municipal Corporation was only in compliance with the order of the High Court; and the petitioner had filed the suit, and had obtained ad-interim injunction, suppressing the fact of filing the Writ Petition before this Court which showed his unfairness. The Learned Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa vacated the adinterim injunction order passed earlier on 25.08.2010. Learned Government Pleader would submit that, even subsequent thereto, a resurvey was conducted on 25/26.03.2011 by the Town Surveyor; the Surveyor had submitted his report dated 28.03.2011; thereafter, by his endorsement dated 29.03.2011, the respondent-contemnor had directed that the compound wall be removed without further delay; and the compound wall was demolished on 30.3.2011.

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The respondent-contemnor, in his counter affidavit dated 18.07.2011, had referred to the fact that the petitioner had appeared before him on 24.03.2011; after hearing both the petitioner and the third respondent, and on perusal of the documents submitted by them, he had noted that the help of a technical expert, to localize the road

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and the property of the petitioner, was necessary; as such a survey was ordered to be conducted on 25.03.2011 in the presence of the petitioner and the third respondent; on 25.03.2011 the City Planner, along with the Surveyor, and the Town Planning Supervisor, had conducted survey of the site in question as per the FMB records in the presence of the third respondent, and the representative of the petitioner, with the help of the documents submitted by the parties; since the petitioner had raised some objections, the survey was once again conducted on 26.03.2011; and the surveyor had submitted his report dated 28.03.2011 reiterating his earlier survey report dated 21.07.2010, according to which the compound wall was constructed on the road margin encroaching upon the road to an extent of 3.98 sq. mts. It is stated that, based on the said report, the Corporation had removed the encroachment on the road, i.e., the compound wall with the platform, gate and shahabad flooring constructed by the petitioner, with the assistance of the police on 30.03.2011. No reference is, however, made by the respondent – contemnor, in his counter affidavit dated 18.7.2011, to any endorsement having been made by him on 29.03.2011, which goes to show that his endorsement dated 29.3.2011 was created, after the counter affidavit was filed on 18.7.2011, only to avoid being punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

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In compliance with the order of this Court, in W.P.No.12305 of 2009 dated 26.4.2010, the petitioner was put on notice by his proceedings dated 13.05.2010. The very fact that the petitioner submitted his objections thereto on 26.05.2010 would show that he was also given an opportunity of being heard. However no orders were passed on the petitioner’s objections, much less any decision taken by the respondent being communicated to the petitioner. The notice dated 28.07.2010, issued under Sections 405 and 406 of the Act, makes no reference either to the earlier notice dated 13.05.2010 or to the petitioner’s objections in reply thereto dated 26.05.2010. It does not even indicate the opinion/views of the respondent –

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contemnor on the objections raised by the petitioner.

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It is not in dispute that no action was taken pursuant to the proceedings dated 28.07.2010 as O.S.No.522 of 2010 was filed by the petitioner. The respondent-contemnor would contend that, after the interim injunction was vacated on 17.3.2011, a resurvey was conducted on two occasions i.e., on 25^th and 26^th of March 2011; and, only thereafter, was the compound wall demolished on 30.03.2011. While the conduct of the petitioner, in failing to refer to the order passed by this Court, in W.P.No.12305 of 2009 dated 26.04.2010 in O.S.No.522 of 2010, is blameworthy, that, by itself, does not justify the respondent – contemnor violating the aforesaid order of this Court.

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This Court had, in its order dated 26.4.2010, directed the respondent contemnor to take action in accordance with the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. As the respondent – contemnor contends that the demolition of the compound wall, on 30.03.2011, was in compliance with the provisions of Sections 405 and 406 of the Act, it is necessary to examine whether, ex-facie, Sections 405 and 406 have been followed. Section 405 of the Act enables the Commissioner, without notice, to remove encroachments on a public street, and Section 406 requires the Commissioner to put the petitioner on notice, calling upon him to remove the encroachments. W.P.No.12305 of 2009 was filed by the petitioner contending that the compound wall constructed by him was not on a public road, but on the land belonging to him. In order to take action, under Section 405 of the Act, it was incumbent upon the Commissioner to record a finding that the documents placed before him, and the objections raised by the petitioner, did not show that the compound wall was constructed on his private land or that the said construction was on a public street; and, only after recording such a finding, could the respondent contemnor have taken action under Section 405 of the Act. Section 406, as noted hereinabove, required the Commissioner to issue a written notice to the petitioner which, admittedly, was not done after the re-survey was conducted on

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25/26.03.2011, and the compound wall was straight away demolished on 30.03.2011. As the respondent has not taken action in accordance with the provisions of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, before demolishing the compound wall on 30.03.2011, the order of this Court dated 26.4.2010 has been violated.

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Rule of law is the foundation of democratic society and the judiciary is its guardian. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, as such, is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect its dignity against insult or injury as the expression ‘contempt of court’ may seem to suggest, but to protect and vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. If orders of the Court are disobeyed with impunity by those who owe an obligation to society to preserve the rule of law, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. (Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries^[1] ; Bijay Kumar Mahanty v. Jadu^[2] ) . Every one, howsoever high he may be, is bound to implement orders of Court. Those who disregard Court's orders do so at their own peril for no one

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is above the law. (Court on its own motion v. N.S. Kanwa r^[3] ) .

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Disobedience of an order of Court, whether prohibitive or mandatory, whether made ex-parte or upon hearing both parties, or interim or perpetual, amounts to contempt, if it is calculated or tends to interfere with the administration of justice, or brings it into disrespect or disregard, (Jagarlmudi Chandramouli v. K. Appa Rao^[4] ) , for it strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based. Right or wrong, the order has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party liable for contempt. (Director of Education, Uttaranchal v. Ved Prakash Josh i^[5] , Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV^[6] , Prithawi Nath

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Ram v. State of Jharkhand^[7] ) . Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of an effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah v. State of Biha r^[8] ) . Once a direction is issued by a competent Court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without reservation. The only remedy available to a party, who suffers an order, is to challenge it in accordance with law. The order cannot be rendered ineffective by not complying with the directions on specious pleas as it would seriously affect and impair administration of justice.

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(Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah^[9] ; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabha i^[10] ) .

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The power to punish for contempt of Court exists to ensure that justice shall be done. The public at large, no less the individual litigant, have an interest, and a very real interest, in justice being effectively administered. Unless it is so administered the rights, and indeed the liberty, of the individual shall perish. (Jennison v. Bake r^[11] ) . The Contempt of Courts Act secures confidence of the people in the administration of justice. If an order passed by a competent court is clear and unambiguous, disobedience or breach of such an order would amount to contempt of court. There can be no laxity, as otherwise court orders would be the subject of mockery.

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(A n i l Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh^[12] ; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ).

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The following conditions must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed civil contempt: (i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court (or an undertaking given to a court); (ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court (or breach of undertaking given to a court); and (iii) such disobedience of judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court (or

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breach of undertaking) must be wilful. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ). Civil contempt arises where the power of the Court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders of the court. (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction^[13] ) .

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Learned Government Pleader would, however, submit that, after conducting resurvey on 25/26.03.2011, the respondent - Commissioner was under the bonafide belief that the earlier proceedings dated 28.07.2010, calling upon the petitioner to remove the encroachment, would suffice and, even if this Court were to be satisfied that there is a violation of its orders, such a violation cannot be said to be wilful and deliberate.

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Mere disobedience of an order is not enough to hold a person guilty of civil contempt. The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ; S.S. Roy v. State of Orissa^[14] ; Indian Airports Employees' Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee^[15] ; Anil Ratan Sarkar¹² ). If a party who is fully in the know of the order of the Court, or is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the Court's order, ignores it or acts in violation thereof, it must be held that the disobedience is wilful. It may not be possible to prove the actual intention behind the act or omission. A Court can approach the question only objectively and it may presume the intention from the act done as every man is presumed to intend the probable consequence of his act. (N.S. Kanwar³ ). Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. Whether or not disobedience is willful depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah⁸ ).

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“Wilful” means an act or omission which is done voluntarily, and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the

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specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with the purpose of either disobeying or disregarding the law. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ; Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha^[16] ) . The element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act. (Anil Ratan Sarkar¹² ). In the purposes of judging 'civil contempt' intention or mens rea is not relevant. The question is only whether the breach was on account of wilful disobedience i.e, whether it was not casual or accidental and unintentional. (V.C. Govindaswami Mudali v. B. Subba Reddy^[17] ) . To establish a contempt of court, it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was willful and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the order. It is not necessary to prove that he appreciated that it did breach the order. (St. Helen’s Ltd. v. Transport & General Workers’ Union^[18] ; Adam Phones Ltd v. Goldschmid t^[19] ) . Where there has been willful disobedience of an order of the Court, and a measure of contumacy on the part of the defendants, then “civil contempt”, what is called “contempt in procedure” bears a two fold character, implying as between the parties to the proceedings merely a right to exercise and a liability to submit to a form of civil execution, but as between the party in default and the State, a penal or disciplinary jurisdiction to be exercised by the Court in the public interest. (Jennison¹¹ ). Effective administration of justice would require some penalty for disobedience to the order of the Court if disobedience is more than casual, accidental or unintentional. (Heatons Transport Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers Union^[20] ; N.S. Kanwar³ ).

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As noted hereinabove, the earlier proceedings dated 28.07.2010 makes no reference either to the notice dated 13.05.2010 issued by the respondent – contemnor, or to the petitioner’s reply thereto dated 26.05.2010, or even to the documents submitted by the

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petitioner. The record placed before this Court does not reflect any consideration of the petitioner’s objections by the respondent - contemnor. It was only after a resurvey was conducted on 25/26.03.2011, that he now claims to have made the endorsement dated 29.03.2011, a day prior to the demolition of the building on 30.03.2011. In the counter affidavit filed by him on 18.07.2011, which was much after his alleged endorsement dated 29.03.2011, no reference is made by the respondent-contemnor to his so-called endorsement dated 29.03.2011 though he had referred to the survey conducted both on 25^th and 26^th of March 2011. It is evident, therefore, that the endorsement dated 29.03.2011 is an after thought, and has been brought into existence much after 30.3.2011 when the compound wall was demolished. Reference by the respondent-contemnor to the endorsement dated 29.3.2011, made for the first time in the additional counter affidavit dated 17^th June, 2012, is only to avoid being punished under the Contempt of Courts Act.

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I am satisfied that the violation of the order of this Court, in W.P.No.12305 of 2009 dated 26.4.2010, by the respondent, is wilful and deliberate. While the respondent – contemnor chose not to tender an apology in his earlier counter affidavit dated 18.07.2011, it is only in his additional counter affidavit dated 17.06.2012, has he tendered an apology. Learned Government Pleader would submit that, since the petitioner has tendered apology, this Court should take a lenient view, and not punish him under the Contempt of Courts Act.

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A mere statement made by a contemnor before the court that he apologises is hardly enough to amount to purging himself of contempt. The court must be satisfied of the genuineness of the apology. If the court is so satisfied, and on this basis accepts the apology as genuine, it has to make an order holding that the contemnor has purged himself of contempt. (Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Al i^[21] ) . An apology is not intended to operate as a universal panacea. (M.Y. Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Cour t^[22] ; Pravin C. Shah²⁴ ; T.N.

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Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) through the Amicus Curiae v. Ashok Kho t^[23] ) . It is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of the offence but is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted, and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer’s power. (Delhi Development Authority¹³ ). Only then is it of any avail in a court of justice. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it also ceases to be a full and frank admission of a wrong done, which it is intended to be. (Hiren Bose, In Re^[24] ; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ). The apology tendered by the contemnor, to be accepted by the Court, should be a product of remorse. (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India^[25] ) . Public interest demands that when a person has interfered with the judicial process, the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented merely by a conditional or an unconditional apology. While it is open to the Court, in an appropriate case, to accept an unconditional apology based on the factual position, dropping the proceeding of contumacious acts deliberately done, after accepting the apology offered, would be a premium for the flagrant abuse of the judicial process. (R am Autar

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Shukla Vs. Arvind Shukla^[26] ) .

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I n L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P .^[27] , the Supreme Court

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observed:-

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“………We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the “slap—say sorry—and forget” school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying “sorry” does not make the person taking the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to “say” sorry—it is another to “feel” sorry……” (emphasis supplied).

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The apology tendered by the respondent is neither a product of remorse nor is there any evidence of real contrition on his part. It is but a lofty expression used only to avoid being committed for contempt. Accepting such an apology, in the facts of the present case, would

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result in the contemnor going scot free after committing gross contempt of Court. It would be wholly inappropriate for this Court to permit a person, who has violated its order wilfully and deliberately, to walk away with a mere apology. The apology tendered by the respondent is neither genuine nor is it a sincere expression of regret. It is a mere ruse to avoid being punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. This Court would not, therefore, be justified in accepting such a belated apology.

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The next question which arises for consideration is the nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on the respondent-contemnor on his being found guilty of contempt. There is an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of a Court of law can be disregarded with impunity. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ; Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd^[28] ) . The power to punish for contempt is intended to maintain an effective legal system, and is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. (Kapildeo Prasad Sah⁸ ; Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ). There are certain well recognized principles which govern the exercise of power and jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The power to commit for contempt will not be used for the vindication of a Judge as a person but only with a view to protect the interests of the public for whose benefit, and for the protection of whose rights and liberties, the courts exist and function. Another factor which a High Court will take into consideration, in exercising its contempt jurisdiction, is to ascertain whether the Contempt is merely technical, slight or trifling in character. If it is so the Court will be satisfied with an expression of genuine regret and will not proceed to inflict punishment on the contemnor. (Advocate General,

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Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad v. V. Ramana Rao^[29] ) . It is not only the power but the duty of the court to uphold and maintain the dignity of courts and majesty of law which may call for the extreme step of punishing the person for contempt of court. For proper administration

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of justice, and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by it, the Court would not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ). The summary jurisdiction, exercised by Superior Courts, in punishing contempt of their authority, exists in order to prevent interference with the course of justice; to maintain the authority of law as is administered in the Court; and thereby protect the public interest in ensuring the purity of administration of justice (Hira Lal Dixit v. State of U.P .^[30] ) .

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While awarding sentence on a contemnor, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of the law and to ensure that the unflinching faith of people in Courts remains intact. If the guilty are let off, and their sentence remitted on grounds of mercy, people would lose faith in the administration of justice. The Court is duty-bound to award proper punishment to uphold the rule of law, however high the person may be. (J. Vasudevan v. T.R. Dhananjaya^[31] ) . There cannot be any laxity, as otherwise law courts would render their orders to utter mockery. Tolerance of law courts there is, but not without limits and only upto a point and not beyond. (Anil Ratan Sarkar¹² ). The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek its protection lose hope. (Jennison¹¹ ).

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Under Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act or any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. Under Section 12(3), notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12, where a person is found guilty of civil contempt the Court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. Section 13(a) postulates no punishment for contemptuous conduct in

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certain cases and, unless the Court is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that the act complained of substantially interferes with the due course of justice, the question of imposing punishment would not arise. It is evident from Section 12(3) read with Section 13(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine should be imposed in normal circumstances, (Smt. Pushpaben v. Narandas V. Badian i^[32] ) , and a sentence of imprisonment should be restricted to cases where the contumacious act is of such magnitude that a mere sentence of fine would not suffice. In the present case, the respondent has not only violated the order of this Court wilfully and deliberately, but had also made a false averment, in the additional counter affidavit dated 17.06.2012, that he had made an endorsement on 29.03.2011. The jurisdiction in contempt is seldom exercised by Courts except when they find that, in addition to failure to comply with their orders, obstruction has been caused to their primary function of administering justice as authorities charged with that function. (Dulal Chandra Bhar v. Sukumar Banerjee^[33] ) . It is not enough that there should be some technical contempt of court. It must be shown that the act of contempt had substantially interfered with the due course of justice which has been equated with “due administration of justice”. Substantial interference with the course of justice is the requirement for imposition of punishment. The Contempt of Courts Act places an obligation on to the Court to assess the situation itself as regards the factum of any interference with the due course of justice or of obstructing the administration of justice. (Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia^[34] ) . Anyone who deflects the course of judicial proceedings, or sullies the pure stream of the judicial process, must be held to have interfered with the due course of justice, and to have obstructed administration of justice. Such persons must be punished not only for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts, which shake the

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faith of people in the system of administration of justice. (Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma^[35] ; Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana^[36] ) . Any interference with the course of justice, or any obstruction caused in the path of those seeking justice, is an affront to the majesty of law and the conduct of interference/obstruction is punishable as Contempt of Court. Law of contempt is one way in which the due process of law is prevented from being perverted, hindered or thwarted. If the act complained of causes hindrance in the discharge of due course of justice, or tends to obstruct the course of justice or interferes with the due course of justice, the conduct complained of constitutes contempt of court. (Ram Autar Shukla²⁶ ). Whenever an act adversely affects administration of justice, or tends to impede its course, or shakes public confidence in a judicial institution, the power of contempt can be exercised to uphold the dignity of the court of law and protect its proper functioning. (ITAT v. V.K. Agarwa l^[37] ) . The process of due course of administration of justice must remain unimpaired. Public interest demands that there should be no interference with the judicial process, and the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented. (Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. ,^[38] ) . Filing of false affidavits or making false statement on oath in Courts aims at striking a blow at the rule of law, and no court can ignore such conduct which has the tendency to shake public confidence in judicial institutions. It would be a public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements or fabricating false evidence in a court of law. The stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message percolates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the administration of justice.

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(Dhananjay Sharma³⁶ ; Chandra Shashi³⁵ ). To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any court to administer justice. (Chandra Shashi³⁵ ). If a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and willfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of the judicial proceeding and thus amount to contempt of court. (Naraindas Vs. The Government of Madhya Pradesh^[39] ; Afzal Vs. State of Haryana^[40] ) . The false assertion made on oath, in the additional counter affidavit filed before this Court dated 17.6.2012, regarding the endorsement dated 29.3.2011 would amount to interference with the due course of justice. The respondent has, thus, not only violated the orders of this Court willfully and deliberately, but has also interfered with the due administration of justice. While Courts are not hypersensitive, and ordinarily impose a sentence of fine as punishment for contempt, the respondent, in the present case, has made a mockery of the order of this Court. Such open defiance of the order of the Court is contempt of such a nature as to have substantially interfered with the due course of justice for which imposition of a sentence of fine alone would not meet the ends of justice. Such flagrant violation of the orders of the Court must be dealt with sternly. On the facts, and in the circumstances of this case, imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment will not meet the ends of justice. (Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai¹⁰ ). Where public interest demands the Court will not shrink from exercising its power to impose punishment even by way of imprisonment, in cases where a mere fine may not be adequate, to let people know that they cannot, with impunity, hinder or obstruct or attempt to hinder or obstruct the due course of administration of justice. (Hira Lal Dixit³⁰ ).

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In these facts and circumstances, imposition of punishment of

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fine would not suffice. I consider it appropriate to sentence the respondent, under Sections 12(3) read with 13(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, to detention in civil prison for a period of fifteen days. As required under Rule 32(1) of the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 the respondent shall be entitled to subsistence allowance during the period of his detention in civil prison. The subsistence allowance is fixed at Rs.250/- per day. The State Government shall bear the cost of the subsistence allowance payable to the respondent.

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Learned Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the respondent –contemnor, would submit that, since the Contempt of Courts Act provides a right of appeal against the order of this Court, execution of the sentence of imprisonment should be suspended to enable him to pursue his appellate remedies. The order, in the Contempt Case sentencing the respondent to undergo imprisonment for 15 days, is suspended for a period of one month from today.

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The Contempt Case is, accordingly, disposed of.

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RAMESH RANGANATHAN,J Date:10.09.2012 Note: Furnish copy within ten days. b/o usd

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[1] (1980) 3 SCC 311

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[2] (2003) 1 SCC 644

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[3] 1995 Cri.L.J.1261 (Punjab & Haryana HC DB

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[4] 1967(1) An.W.R.129

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[5] 2005(6) SCC 98

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[6] 2006(1) SCC 613

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[7] (2004) 7 SCC 261)

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[8] (1999) 7 SCC 569

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[9] (2007) 7 SCC 689

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[10] (2008) 14 SCC 561

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[11] 1972(1) All.E.R 997

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[12] 2002(4) SCC 21

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[13] (1995) 3 SCC 507

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[14] AIR 1960 SC 190

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[15] (1999) 2 SCC 537

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[16] (2003) 11 SCC 1

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[17] 1986 (2) A.L.T. 131

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[18] (1972) 3 All ER 101

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[19] (1999)4 All ER 486 [20] (1972) (3) All ER 101 (House of Lords [21] (2001) 8 SCC 650 [22] AIR 1955 SC 19 [23] (2006) 5 SCC 1 [24] AIR 1969 Cal 1 [25] (2003) 5 SCC 376 [26] 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 130 [27] (1984) 3 SCC 405 [28] 1974 AC 273 [29] AIR 1967 AP 299 [30] AIR 1954 SC 743 [31] (1995) 6 SCC 249 [32] AIR 1979 SC 1536 [33] AIR 1958 Calcutta 474 [34] (2000) 2 SCC 367 [35] 1995(1) SCC 421 [36] (1995) 3 SCC 757 [37] (1999) 1 SCC 16 [38] (1988) 4 SCC 592 [39] (1975) 3 SCC 31 [40] 1996(7) SCC 397

V. Nagamuni Reddy v. Sri Jhon Samson (Commissioner)

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V. Nagamuni Reddy v. Sri Jhon Samson (Commissioner)

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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