Writ appeal by an appellant who was acquitted in a criminal case and reinstated, seeking full wages for suspension period. Court held that acquittal does not confer automatic right to full wages as respondents have power to regulate suspension duration.
No order as to costs.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND NINE
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI and THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT APPEAL NO : 719 of 2009
(Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order dated 21/10/2007 in WP NO : 3391 OF 1999 on the file of the High Court.)
Between: B.Kameswara Rao S/o.late B.Butchi Raju R/o.202, Classic Court Apts, Erramanzil Colony Hyderabad-500 082
..... APPELLANT
AND
.....RESPONDENTS
Counsel for the Appellant: MR.G.VIDYASAGAR
Counsel for the Respondents: MR.K.MADHAVA REDDY (SC FOR APSRTC)
The Division Bench of this Court made the following : Judgment follows 2nd page
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI
and
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
WRIT APPEAL NO : 719 of 2009
J U D G M E N T : (Per the Hon’ble Smt. Justice T.Meenakumari).
The writ appeal is filed against order dated 21-10-2007 passed in WP.No. 3391 of 1999 by the learned single Judge, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the respondents have all the powers to regulate the period for which the writ petitioner was kept out of employment, even if the crime arose outside employment.
2. The main writ petition is filed seeking mandamus to declare the Proceedings No. EA/20(8)/92-PD, dated 03-7-1998 as illegal and arbitrary, declare the action of the respondents in not paying the full wages for the period from 19-3-1983 to 30-6-1989 as illegal and arbitrary, declare Regulation 21 (3) of APSRTC CCA Regulations, 1967 are not applicable to the writ petitioner and consequently to direct the respondents to pay the full salary for the period from 193-1983 to 30-6-1989 with all consequential benefits, as if the petitioner is in service during the above period.
3. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is
that Regulation 21 (2) (a) enables the employee to get full salary and allowances, however, this aspect was not considered by the learned single Judge. Secondly, in the APSRTC Employees (CCA) Regulations there is no provision to treat the period of suspension as leave due, when the suspension order was only on the ground of
pendency of CC.No.5 of 1985, which ended in acquittal. Aggrieved of the said judgment, Criminal Appeal No.148 of 1987 was filed before this Court and the same dismissed by judgment dated 08-6-1988, therefore, the entire period of suspension has to be treated as on duty.
4. On the other hand, the learned standing counsel for the respondents contended that after acquittal of the charges framed against the appellant-writ petitioner, he was reinstated into service and the period for which he was kept under suspension was regulated as per Regulation 21 of APSRTC Employees (CCA) Regulations. In view of Regulation 21 of APSRTC Employees (CCA) Regulations the relief sought for by the appellant to pay full wages for the period from 19-3-1983 to 30-6-1998 cannot be considered on the ground that he was acquitted in criminal case.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as
the learned standing counsel, even though if the appellant was acquitted in CC.No.5 of 1985 by the Special Court for ACB Cases and consequently Criminal Appeal No.148 of 1987 filed by the State against the acquittal of the appellant entails in dismissal does not ipso facto for the appellant to claim full wages for the period from 19-3-1983 to 30-6-1998 because the respondents have all powers to regulate the period for which the appellant was kept out of employment. We
express our disinclination to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. The writ appeal fails and is liable to be
dismissed at the stage of admission.
6. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances,
there shall be no order as to costs.
_______________________ JUSTICE T.MEENA KUMARI
_____________________ JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR
08-6-2009. I s L
2 issues framed by the court
Whether an employee acquitted in a criminal case is ipso facto entitled to full wages for the entire suspension period despite regulatory provisions allowing suspension.
Whether the Tribunal has the power to regulate the period for which an employee was kept out of employment even after acquittal.
B.Kameswara Rao
The Chairman A.P.S.R.T.C.
T.MEENA KUMARI
SANJAY KUMAR
As recorded by the court registry
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