Allowed

Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar v. S.M. Kantha Raju (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Anr.

Supreme Court16 Aug 20172017 INSC 748 · [2017] 7 S.C.R. 6762017 INSC 748

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Supreme Court interpreted the expression 'District Court concerned' in Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001. It held that since the special Act did not define 'District Court', the general law provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applied to determine its territorial jurisdiction.

What did the court decide?

Set aside the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and allowed the Civil Appeal.

What the court decided

Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar versus S.M… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Supreme Court (2017)

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[2017] 7 S.C.R. 676

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR

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S.M. KANTHA RAJU (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR.

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(Civil Appeal No. 3215 of2010)

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AUGUST 16,2017

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[R. F. NARIMAN AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.J

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Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001:

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s.23 - Petition under - Territorial jurisdiction for - C Determination of - Held: s.23 enables the person aggrieved to file an application in the "District Court concerned" - The-expression "District Court" having not been defined in the 2001 Act (i.e. special Act), it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along with a District Court that is established under the general law (i.e. C.P. C.) - Therefore, for determining territorial jurisdiction of District D Court, provisions of C.P.C. would apply - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 20.

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Allowing the appeal, the Court

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HELD: 1. Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001

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E is a consolidating statue which applies to the whole of the State of Andhra P/adesh on and from 10.12.2001. Prior to this Act, the Societies Registration Act, 1860 applied to the Andhra Region of the State, whereas the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Public Societies Registration Act, 1940 applied to the Telangana Area. Section 11 of the 1940 Act is pari materia with Section 23 of the

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F 2001 Act. The scheme of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 on the one hand, and that of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Act, 1840 and the consolidating Act, 2001 on the other is completely different. On the one hand, the 1860 Act refers the dispute that arises under Section 13 only to the Principal Court

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G of original civil jurisdiction of the District in which the chief building of the Society is situate. Under this Act therefore, jurisdiction is confined to one court and one court only : that is the principal court of original civil jurisdiction where the actual physical main building of the society is situate. On the other hand, Section 11 of the 1940 Act and Section 23 of the 2001 Act

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67G

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR v. S.M. KANTHA RAJU 677 (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR.

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enable the person aggrieved to file an application in the "District A Court concerned". [Paras 10, 12) [681-E; '682-E, Fl

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Where the expression "District Court" is not defined by the special enactment in which it occurs, it must necessarily take with it all theJrappings that go along with a District Court that is established under the general law. This would necessarily mean that the provisions applicable to District Courts generally would apply, and that therefore, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it comes to determining the jurisdiction of such District Court, would necessarily apply. [Para 13) [682-G; 683A)

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The impugned judgment is wrong on two counts. First, in applying the definition of "the Court" to "District Court" mentioned in Section 23, and then concluding that it would refer only to the principal Court of original .iurisdiction of one particular place. It is also wrong in staling that as the 2001 Andhra Pradesh Act is a special enactme11t, general principles applicable under D the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply. [Para 18) (685-G, H; 686-A)

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National Sewing Thread Col Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. [1953) SCR 1028 - relied on. Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. and Others v. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages (P) Ltd., and Others (1994) 1 SCC 34 : [1993) 2 Suppl. SCR 645 - held inapplicable.

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Case Law Hcfcrence

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(1953) SCR 1028 relied on Para 14 [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR645 held inapplicable Para 15 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3215 of2010.

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From the final Judgmmt and Order dated 19.09.2006 of the G High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Civil Revision Petition No. 791 of2005.

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Sridhar Potaraju, Prabhat Kumar, Ms.Ankita Sharma, Siddhartha Thalukdar, Advs. for the Appellant.

[2017] 7 S.C.R.

678

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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A Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Y. Vismai Rao, K. Sharat Kumar, Ms. Savita Singh, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Ab hay Pratap Singh, Vi pin Nair, P.B. Suresh, Advs. for the Respondents.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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R.F. NARIMAN, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of a B judgment oftheAndhra Pradesh High Court dated 19.09.2006, in which it has construed Section 23 oftheAndhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 200 l, as referring only to the Principal District Court of the place where the society is registered. The correctness of this judgment is assailed before us by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant.

Sometime in June, 2004, the appellant filed a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 in which it asked for the following reliefs:

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"(a) For a declaration that none of the respondents, their men or agents have any legal right whatsoever to call, hold or organize the annual convention of the members ofCBCNC (No.16/48-49) or conduct elections for the office bearers of CBCNC (No.16/ 48-49) or its various boards, at any place including at Kakinada or Visakhapatnam u!lder any notification or in pursuance of the notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed to be passed or issued either by themselves or through their nominees, privies etc;

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(b) For a consequential relief for permanent injunction restraining the respondents their men and agents, from proclaiming or projecting as Office bearers of CBCNC (No.16/48-49) or from organizing the annual convention of the members of the CBCNC F (No.16/48-49) or election of office bearers of CBCNC (No.16/ 48-49) members or its various boards at any place including at Kakinada or Visakhap:itnam under any notification or in pursuance of the notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed to be passed or issued either by themselves or through their G nominees, privies etc:

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(c) To appoint an Advocate: Commissioner for the purpose of holding an annual convention for all the members of the CBCNC (No.16/48-49), either in the month of January 2004 or immediately thereafter, as per the constitution and bye-laws of the CBCNC

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR v. S.M. KANTHA RAJU 679 (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

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(No.16/48-49), and entrust the administration and management ofall assetsofCBCNC (No.16/48-49) to the office bearers so elected in the said elections, who shall be the rightful body to represent the CBCNC (No.16/48-49);	A
(d) For Costs; and
(e) For such other relief or reliefsasyour Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the circumstancesofthe case."	B
3.A preliminary.objection was raised by meansofan I.A.being_
I.A. No. 234of2004in which it was contended that the petition filed at Visakhapatnam was filed in the wrong Court and hence was without jurisdiction.	C
4. The learned District Judge, by his judgment dated17.01.2005,
first observed that the expression "District Court" was not defined by the 200 l Act, and that this being so, he opined:
"Now, the law is well settled that when the special enactment did not specify the limits territorial jurisdictionofany Court prescribed under the said Act to entertain the litigation, the general provisions ofC.P.C., regarding the said territorial jurisdiction, can be take into consideration. As can be seen from the A.P. Societies Act, it has not ousted the application ofC.P.C., specifically. Therefore, when the Act is silent regarding the limitsofterritorial jurisdiction, and when the Act did not oust C.P.C., specifically, undoubtedly, the provisions ofC.P.C., can be taken into consideration to decide the territorial jurisdictionofDistrict Court concernedasenvisaged U/sec.23ofthe Act. Sec.20 C.P.C., envisages that the proceedings can be instituted in a Court within the local limitsofwhose jurisdiction, the causeofaction wholly or in part arises. Therefore, the present petition can also be filed within the jurisdictionofthe Court where a partofcauseofaction arose."	D E F
Havingheldthis, the learnedDistrictJudge dismissed the . preliminaryobjection.

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A Revision Petition filed before the High Court was, however, allowed, and the judgment of the District Judge was set aside by the High Court observing thus:

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"On a comparative look at the expression used in the provisions of the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 200 I as already pointed H

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[2017) 7 S.C.R.

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680

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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A out, a dispute as under Section 23 of the said Act has to be raised in the District Court concerned. Even though the District Court concerned in its comprehensive term bodily does not find place in the definition clause. However, it is to be noted that the expression "the Court" finds its place amongst definition clauses in the Section 2( d) to mean that principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. These B two provisions have to be read together and gather not only the meaning but also the object. Thus, the Court having been specifically defined in the very same legislation it can only be looked on for the purpose of finding out the competent District Court as referred to under Section 23 of the said Act. It refers to c that Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The District Court or Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction are one and the same and interchangeable expressions. The comi of concerned can only be that it exists or created or formed and registered. Necessarily it means that the District Court of that place and not otherwise. It is needless to mention that the said legislation is a D special enactment and therefore, the general principles as applicable could not be brought in and therefore, no reliance as such can be brought in, in respect of the various situations contemplated under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The theory of part cause of action will not find place either to the E facts of the case or very scope and object of the legislation under this Act. Hence, it has to be necessarily held that it is only concerned District Court, where the society is registered that which will have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of the said Act and not otherwise."

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed before us the difference in phraseology between Section 23 of the 2001 Act and Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Further, he has argued that since this distinction has not been kept in mind, the judgment of the Division Bench is obviously incorrect and that of the District Judge is correct.

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has, however, submitted before us that the question today is academic inasmuch as the prayers in the petition were confined to certain persons who are no longer relevant. Further, fresh elections have already taken

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR v. S.M. KANTHA RAJU 681 (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

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place in the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 and, therefore, the appeal has . A become infructuous.

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We are inclined to observe that what learned counsel for the · respondents has argued before us is correct. However, in view of the recurring nature of the question that arises before us, it is important to settle the law once and for all for future guidance in cases like the present B one. 9. Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, with which we are concerned, reads thus: "23. Dispute regarding management:- In the event of any dispute c arising among the Committee or the members of the society, in respect of any matter relating to the affairs of the society, any member of the society may proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (Central Act 26 of 1996) or may file an application in the District Court concerned and the said Court shall after necessary inquiry pass D such order as it may deem fit. 10. It may be noted that this statute is a consolidating statute . which applies to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh on and from 10.12.2001. Prior to this Act, the Societies Registration Act, 1860 applied to the Andhra Region of the State, whereas the Andhra Pradesh E (TelanganaArea) Public Societies Registration Act, 1940 applied to the TelanganaArea. Section 11 of the 1940Act is pari materia with Section 23 of the 2001 Act, and reads as under:- . "11. Dispute regarding management: - In the event of any dispute arising among the Managing Committee or the members of the F Society in respect of any management or dissolution of the Society, any member of the Society may file an application in the District Court concerned, and the said Court shall after necessary inquiry pass such order as it shall deem fit." 11. On the other hand, Section 13 of the Societies Registration G Act reads as under:"13. Provision for dissolution of Societies and adjustment of their affairs: -Any number not less than three-fifths of the members of any Society may determine that it shall be dissolved, and thereupon,

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[2017] 7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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A it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time then agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the Society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the said Society applicable thereto if any, and if not, then as the governing body shall find expedient, provided · that, in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing B body or the members of the Society, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the Society is situate, and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite:

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Provided that no Society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members shall have expressed a wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person or by proxy at a general meeting convened for the purpose:

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Provided that whenever any Government is a member of, or a D contributor to, or otherwise interested in any Society registered under this Act, such Society shall not be dissolved, without the 9 consent of the Government of the State of registration. "

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It will be apparent that-the scheme of the Societies Registration Act on the one hand, and that of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) E Act and the consolidatingAct of200 l on the other is completely different. On the one hand, the 1860 Act refers the dispute that arises under Section 13 only to the Principal Court oforiginal civil jurisdiction of the District in which the chief building of the Society is situate. Under this Act therefore,jurisdictionis confined to one court and one court only: that is F the principal court of original civil jurisdiction where the actual physical main building of the society is situate. On the other hand, Section 11 of the 1940 Act and Section 23 of the 2001 Act enable the person aggrieved to file an application in the "District Court concerned". It is this expression that has to be construed by this Court in the present case.

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G 13. As the District Judge correctly states in the impugned judgment dated 17.01.2005, where the expression "District Court" is not defined by the special enactment in which it occurs, it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along with a District Court that is · established under the general law. This would necessarily mean that the

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR v. S.M. KANTHA RAJU 683 (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.] .

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provisions applicable to District Courts generally would apply, and that A therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it comes to determining the jurisdiction of such District Court, would necessarily apply.

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In fact, the said conclusion is in consonance with National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. vs. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. [1953] SCR 1028. The question that arose before this Court was in the context of Section 76(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 which provided an appeal from any decision of the Registrar to "the High Court havingjurisdiction". This Court held that the Trade Marks Act does not provide for or lay down any procedure for the conduct of an appeal in the High Court. This being so, this Court held:

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"The Trade Marks Act does not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the High Court, indeed section 77 of the Act provides that the High Court can ifit likes make rules in the matter. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. This rule was very .succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General [1913] A.C. 546, in these terms: -

"When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches."

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The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.M.kR.A. Adaikappa Chettiar V. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar (1947) 74 I.A. 264, wherein it was said:-

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[2017) 7 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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A "Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal."

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Again in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (1916) l.L.R. 39 Madras 617, when dealing with the case under the Madras Forest Act their Lordships observed as follows:-

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"It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further c proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships' opinion this objection is not wellfounded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the qr4inary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, D orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply."

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Though the facts of the cases laying down the above rule were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case, the principle enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite E application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized at such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by section 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the F same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act."

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The same position obtains in the present case as Section 23 of

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G the 2001 Act also does not provide for any procedure for the conduct of the application in the District Court concerned. This judgment would therefore apply on all fours to the facts in the present case. However, learned counsel for the respondent brought to our notice a judgment in Stridewell Leathers (P) Ltd. and Others vs. Bhankerpur Simbhaoli Beverages {P) Ltd.. and Others. (1994) 1 SCC 34. The question for

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TERAPALLI DYVASAHATA KUMAR v. S.M. KANTHA RAJU 685 (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ANR. [R.F. NARIMAN, J.]

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decision in the appeal before this Court was the meaningofthe expression "the High Court" in Section 10-Fofthe Companies Act, 1956. The Companies Act defined "the Court" in Section 2(11)as follows:-	A
"(11)'the Court' means,- (a) with respect to any matter relating to a company (other than any offence against this Act), the Court havingjurisdiction under this Act with respect to that matter relating to that company, as provided in Section 1O."	B
and then went on to speakof"the court having jurisdiction" in Section lO(l)(a) as follows:
10.JurisdictionofCourts.- (1) The Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be-(a) the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the registered officeofthe company concerned is situate, except to the extent to which jurisdiction has been conferred on any District Court or District Courts subordinate to that High Court in pursuanceofsub-section (2)"	C
16.This being the case, this Court came to the conclusion that the	D
High Court in Section 10-F means the High Court having jurisdiction in relation to the place at which the Registered Officeofthe Company concerned is situate, as indicated by Section 2(11) read with Section lO(l)(a)oftheCompanies Act.
17.This judgment would be relevantifthepari materia provision under Section13ofthe Societies Registration Act, 1860 had fallen for . decision.Ashas been pointed out above, this provision gives only one court jurisdiction - the principal courtoforiginal civil jurisdictionofthe District in which the chief buildingofthe society is situate, somewhat like Section 10-Fofthe Companies Act. Inasmuch as this Section is completely distinct from Sections23ofthe 2001 Act and11ofthe earlier Telangana Act,itis clear that the judgment in James Chadwick's case squarely applies to the present case, and not the aforesaid judgment.	E F

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D E F

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In this view of the law, we set aside the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dated 19.09.2006. We must indicate that the impugned judgment is wrong on two counts. First, in applying the definition of "the Court" to "District Court" mentioned in Section 23, and then concluding that it would refer only to the principal Court of original jurisdiction of one particular place. It is also wrong in stating that as the 2001 Andhra Pradesh Act is a special enactment, general

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686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2017] 7 S.C.R.

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