State appeal against acquittal in a kavadi procession murder case; the High Court had convicted two accused under Sections 302 and 324 r/w 34 IPC. The Supreme Court restated principles governing appeals against acquittal, found the trial court's reasons for acquittal untenable, and dismissed the accused's appeal.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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[2008] 11 S.C.R. 642
A
VALSON AND ANR.
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 572 of 2001)
B
AUGUST 1, 2008
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.)
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 378 - Appeal cagainst acquittal-Power of appellate court-Ambit and scope of - Stated - On facts, in appeal against acquittal; High Court convicted two accused uls. 302 and s. 324 rlw s. 34 /PC and awarded imprisonment for life - Interference with - Held: Order of High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant Dinterference-High Court rightly found the reasons indicated by trial court to direct acquittal to be vulnerable - Trial coun'. discarded the otherwise cogent and credible evidence ~ Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 324 rlw s. 34.
According to the prosecution case, a minor dispute Ebetween accused persons and the prosecution witnesses along with S, resulted in death of S and injuries to the prosecution witnesses. The accused persons were tried for the commission of offences punishable u/s 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324 ands. 302 r/w s. 149 IPC. However, the Ftrialcourt acquitted them. In appeal, the High Court con- victed accused no. 1 and 2 u/s 302 and s. 324 r/w s. 34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life: Hence the present appeal.
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Dismissing the appeal, the Court
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HELD: 1.1 The principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an Qrder of acquittal are: (1) An appellate court has full power to revj~w, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 643
which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of Ianguage" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonabie conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. [Para 32] [664-E,F,G,H, 665 A,B,C,D]
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Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007 (4) SCC 415 - relied on.
Shea Swarup v. R. Emperor 1934 (61) IA 398; Nur Mohd. v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151; Prandas v. State AIR 1954 SC 36; Surajpal Singh v. State 1952 SCR 193; Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab 1953 SCR 418; Atleyv. State of UP AIR 1955 SC 807; Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra 1955 (2) $CR 1285; Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1961 (3) SCR 120, M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra 1963 (2) · SCR 405; H
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644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2C08] 11 S.C.R.
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1.2 Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afc ford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an overemotional response~ Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague D apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. [Para 34] [666-8,C,D]
1.3 The concepts of probability, and the degrees of E it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. ForenF sic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities G would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. (Para 35) [666-E-F]
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State of UP v. Krishna Gopal 1988 (4) SCC 302; Krishnan and Anr v. State represented by Inspector of Police 2003 (7) Hsec 56-relied on.
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA
645
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"Tha Mathematics of Proof 11": Glanville Williams A Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, pp.340342 - referred to.
2.1 The trial court's judgment appears to be bundle of confusions. The trial court did not attach any importance to Ext.P-12 to Ext.P-14 and did not rely on the same f3 but attached undue importance to the portion therein states "unknown persons". It is of significance that the trial court found that "the version does not appear to have been given and recorded very carefully and cautiously". The trial court noted that the injuries definitely show that C they could not have been as a result of beating. PW-1 had incised injuries though only skin deep. It further observed that the Court should not be "pedomtic" (did the trial Court mean "pedantic'?) in matters like this. It was always possible according to the trial court that PWs 1, 2 and 4 may D have loosely referred to and PW-16 may have recorded an attack by "unknown persons" as "beaten by unknown persons". Thereafter, the trial court held that the crucial emphasis was on 'unknown persons'. PWs 1, 2 and 4 stated that there was a wrong recording by PW-16 of what E they said while recording version in English. PW 1 's statement was give"'! to the police at 5.00 a.m. i.e. immediately after the incident and the names of Ap1 and A-2 had been specifically mentioned along with overt act attributed to them. At 8.00 a.m. PW-14 registered crime 34/1994 as per F Ext.P-9, FIR wherein the names of A-1 and A-2 were men· tloned. Ext. P-1 and Ext.P-9 reached the Magistrate immediately. [Paras 38 and 39] [667 B, 667 C,D]
P. Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1994 (1) SCC 388 - referred to.
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2.2 The trial court referred to the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 4 to 7. The trial court came to the conclusion that PWs 1, 2 and 4 to 7 were present at the scene of occurrence and PWs 1, 2, 4 and 6 have suffered injuries. It ob-
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Aserved that the victimsmusthave suffered injuries as a result of pre-meditated attack on PW-1. It further observed that the evidence clearly show that the prime attack was on J'.>VV-1 and. others including the deceased sustained injuries· only because the_y· interfered to save PW-1 and it 6was beyo_nddoubt that attack on PW:-1waspre-.mditated. After that the trial court recorded the following findings tht .the.re was an incident ·1n the morring in which 'PW-1 and others had taken· objection to the conduct of A-1 and A-2 and others in' the kavadi procession at Gandhigram cand that ·A-1and A-2 were enraged and had left adminis- tering a warning that they will avenge the conduct against them. PWs 1 ~ 2, 4 and 6 and the deceased had suffered· injuries involun.tarily at the time and 'place as alleged by the p·rosecution. Such injuries must have been inflicted on them by a group of persons with weapons like M.Os 1 D to 5. Such infliction myst have·been done by members of an unlawful assembly who erite·rtained the common object to attack and do away with deceased and remove · obstruction if any caused by· anyone. {Paras 41 and 42] [668 C,D 668 G,H, 669 A,B,C,D,E]
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. 2.3 After having so concluded the. trial court imagined. certain irrelevant aspects to discard the othe.rwlse cogent anct credible evidence qf eye.-witnesses. One of the most untenable conclusions recorded by the trial court Fis as to why only witnesses from a particular locality were chosen, as in a procession ''there .must have been persons other than the inhabitants of . Gandhigram". Same ~· , cannot eertainly be a ground to discard the otherwise cogent and credible evidence. The reasons indicated by the trial Court to direct acquittal have been rightly found G to be vulnerable by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. [Para 43] [669 E,F,G]
Case Law Reference
1934 (61) IA 398 Referred to. Para 9
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 647 [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
| AIR1945PC151 | Referred to. | Para 13 | A |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIR1954SC36 | Referred to. . |
Para14 | |
| 1952SCR193 | Referred to. | Para16 | |
| 1953SCR418 | Referred to. | · Para17 | |
| AIR1955SC807 | Referred to. | Para19 | B |
| 1955 (2)SCR1285 | Referred to. | Para20 | |
| 1961.(J) SCR120 | Referred to. | Para21 | |
| 1963(2) SCR405 | Referred to. | Para22 | c |
| 1973 (2)sec793 ' |
Referred to, . | Para23 | |
1979 (1)sec355 |
Referred to. | Para25 | |
| 1996 (9)sec225 | Referred to. | Para26 | |
| 2002 (3)sec57 | ·Referred to. | Para_27 | D |
| 2002 (4)sec85 | Referred to. | Para28 | |
| 2002 (6)sec470 | Referred to. | Para29 | |
| 2003 (12)sec606 | Referred to. | Para30 | |
| 2ooa(1o)sec313 | Referred to. | Para31 | E |
| 2001(4)sec415 | Relied on. | Para32 | |
| 1sss(4)sec302 | Relied on. | Para36 | |
| 2003(7)sec66 | Relled on. | Para 36 | |
| 1994c1)sec388 | Referred to. | Para40 | F |
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 572 of 2001 From the final Judgment dated 15/2/2001 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in C.R.A. No. 306of1999
E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant. G
P.V. Dinesh and Sindhu T.P. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Thirteen persons faced trial
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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A for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). All accused persons except A-8 faced trial before the Sessions Judge, Thrissur. By judgment dated 16.2.1998 all of them were found Bto benot guilty of the charges and were acquitted. The State of Kerala filed an appeal questioning the acquittal. By the impugned judgment, the High Court found that accused 1 and 2 were guilty and directed their conviction for offences punishable under Section 302 and Section 324 read with Section 34 cIPC and were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each with default stipulation.
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"378. Appeal in case of acquittal.-(1) Save as otherwise
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649
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
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provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions A of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court, or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in B revision.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of . acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under subsection (2).
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] .
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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A conviction. Though several authorities were cited revealing different views by the High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal, the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.
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"There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in c cases in which the lower court has 'obstinately blundered', or has 'through ;ncompetence, stupidity or. perversity' reached such 'dis~orted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice', or has in some other way so conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the D ; defence so as to produce a similar result."
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"Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code."
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F 12. The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and stated: (IA p.404)
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"But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court sho.uld and will always give proper weight and G consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused H to the benefit of any doubt; and ( 4) the slowness of an
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice."
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(emphasis supplied)
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"6. It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot F support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate court has in some way or other misdirected G itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice."
(emphasis supplied)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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A appeal under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court had full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded. But it was equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial Bcourt which had the advantageof seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.
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"We think this criticism is well founded. After an order of acquittal has been made the presumption of innocence is further reinforced by that order, and that being so, the trial court's decision can be reversed not on the ground that the accused had failed to explain the circumstances appearing against him but only for very substantial and compelling reasons."
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(emphasis supplied)
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"In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 655 [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
Procedure Code came to the conclusion that the judgment A of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.
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It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to B review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the.judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidencec have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.
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If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated."
(emphasis supplied)
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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"This Court obviously did not and could not add a condition to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The words were intended to convey the idea that an appellate court not only shall bear in mind the principles laid down by the PrivY Council but also must give its clear reasons for coming to the conclusion that the order of acquittal was wrong." The Court concluded as follows:
"9. The foregoing discussion yields the following results: ( 1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Shea Swarup case afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (1) 'substantial. and compelling reasons', (ii) 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons', and (iii) 'strong reasons' are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified."
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 657 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
of this Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed as follows:
"17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasising the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, 'the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons': vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the interference of the High Court in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified only if there are 'very substantial and compelling reasons to do so'. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an order of acquittal can be reversed only for 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' or for 'strong reasons'. In appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be remembered that these observations were not intended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They were not intended, and should not be read to have intended to introduce an . additional condition in clause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended to emphasize is that the approach of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because as Lord Russell observed in Shea Swarup the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused 'is not certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial'. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression 'substantial and compelling reasons' should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case. That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp 1· SCR
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[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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(emphasis supplied)
B 23. Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the powers of appellate court. "In law there are no fetters on the plenary power of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on cwhich the order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative material de nova, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted into an acquittal the hornage our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the Dhigher court not to upset the holding without very convincing rea- sons and comprehensive consideration."
"6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro' the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. AR1JIT PASAYAT, J.]
659
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accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will A then breakdown and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville Williams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited B acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted 'persons' and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may c lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that 'a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent. ... ' In short, our jurisprudential D enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability E to punish marginal innocents."
(emphasis supplied)
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"9. The principles are now well settled. At one time it was thought that an order of acquittal could be set aside for 'substantial and compelling reasons' only and courts used G to launch on a search to discover those 'substantial and compelling reasons'. However, the 'formulae' of 'substantial and compelling reasons' I 'good and sufficiently cogent reasons' and 'strong reasons' and the search for them were abandoned as a result of the pronouncement of this
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Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1961) 3 SCR 120. In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked back to the principles enunciated by the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v. R. Emperor and reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently recognised the right of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to ·its own conclusion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned bythe Privy Council in Shea Swarup case. Occasionally phrases like 'manifestly illegal', 'grossly unjust', have beP.n used to describe the orders of acquittal which warr2n interference. But, such expressions have been used more as flourishes of language, to emphasise the reluctance, the appellate court to interfere with an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to revievv the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy v. State of A.P, (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1974 SC 286), it has been said that to the principles laid down in Sanwat Singh case may be added the further principle that 'if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court'. This, of course, is not a new principle. It stems out of the fundamental principle of. our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If th~ preponderance of probability is all one way, a bare possibility of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA 661 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
of the evidence in favour of the accused must be A reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable."
(emphasis supplied)
"While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly-erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the c appellate court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then onlyD reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions."
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"7. The paramount consideration of the court should be to E avoid miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from the acquittal of guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where the trial court has taken a view based upon conjectures and hypothesis and not on the legal evidence, a duty is cast F upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the accused has committed any offence or not. Probable view taken by the trial court which may not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view which is based G upon legal and admissible evidence. Only because the accused has been acquitted by the trial court, cannot be made a basis to urge that the High Court under all circumstances should not disturb such a finding."
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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of A.P (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said:
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
663
order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal A has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the s accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to C examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity."
"21. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with E because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable F to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible G evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". H
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A 31. Again in Kallu v. State of M.P (2006) 10 SCC 313, th.is Court stated:
(emphasis supplied)
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VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
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against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to i.nterfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
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"The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the G separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with H
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[2008] 11 S.C.R.
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A the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, B and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other."
667
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
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case, the primary ground which appears to have weighed with the High Court is the endorsement on the injury certificate to the effect that injury was caused by unknown persons.
A
B
E
G
"Ex.PG is the injury certificate. It appears that it was noted in Ex.PG against an entry that the injured was said to have been stabbed by somebody. Placing much reliance on this entry PW-10 was asked in the cross examination as
H
)
[2008] 11 S.C.R.
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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4·1. The trial Court has referred to the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 4 to 7. After referring to the evidence it formulated the following points for consideration:
D
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F assembly of which the ac·cused or any one of them were members.
..,
VALSON AND ANR. v. STATE OF KERALA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
669
clearly show that the prime attack was on PW-1 and others ineluding the deceased sustained injuries only because they interfered to save PW-1 and it was beyond doubt that attack on PW-1 was pre-meditated. After that the trial Court recorded the following findings:
A
c
E
N.J.
Appeal dismissed.
H
2 issues framed by the court
What is the ambit and scope of an appellate court's power in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC?
Whether the High Court rightly reversed the trial court's acquittal and convicted accused nos. 1 and 2 under Sections 302 and 324 r/w 34 IPC?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of KarnatakaRelied on¶32
2007 (4) SCC 415 · Who else cites this
Shea Swarup v. R. EmperorReferred¶9
1934 (61) IA 398
Nur Mohd. v. EmperorReferred¶13
AIR 1945 PC 151 · Who else cites this
Prandas v. StateReferred¶14
AIR 1954 SC 36 · Who else cites this
Surajpal Singh v. StateReferred¶16
1952 SCR 193 · Who else cites this
Ajmer Singh v. State of PunjabReferred¶17
1953 SCR 418 · Who else cites this
Atley v. State of UPReferred¶19
AIR 1955 SC 807 · Who else cites this
Aher Raja Khima v. State of SaurashtraReferred¶20
1955 (2) SCR 1285 · Who else cites this
Sanwat Singh v. State of RajasthanReferred¶21
1961 (3) SCR 120 · Who else cites this
M. G. Agarwal v. State of MaharashtraReferred¶22
1963 (2) SCR 405 · Who else cites this
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of MaharashtraReferred¶23
1973 (2) SCC 793 · Who else cites this
K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.PReferred¶25
1979 (1) SCC 355 · Who else cites this
Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of GujaratReferred¶26
1996 (9) SCC 225 · Who else cites this
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of GujaratReferred¶27
2002 (3) SCC 57 · Who else cites this
Bhagwan Singh v. State of MPReferred¶28
2002 (4) SCC 85 · Who else cites this
Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.PReferred¶29
2002 (6) SCC 470 · Who else cites this
Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath JhaReferred¶30
2003 (12) SCC 606 · Who else cites this
Kallu v. State of MPReferred¶31
2006 (10) SCC 313 · Who else cites this
State of UP v. Krishna GopalRelied on¶35
1988 (4) SCC 302 · Who else cites this
Krishnan and Anr v. State represented by Inspector of PoliceRelied on¶36
2003 (7) SCC 56 · Who else cites this
P. Babu v. State of Andhra PradeshReferred¶40
1994 (1) SCC 388 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 3 enactments
Valson
State of Kerala
Arijit Pasayat
Mukundakam Sharma
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
