State of Bihar & Ors. versus Pandey Jagdishwar Prasad

Service Law- Retirement- Superannuation- Two dates of birth (DOB) of employee recorded in his service book - Employee superannuated on the basis of the later DOB -^c Thereafter held by Court that the employee was to be superannuated on the basis of previous DOB as the same was based on matriculation certificate - Order of employer directing recovery of the amount paid as salary beyond his due date of superannuation - Propriety of - Held : The D employee is Jo be superannuated on the basis of DOB as mentioned in matriculation certificate - However, the deduction of amount paid beyond the due date of superannuation is not permissible as the employee was allowed to work beyond the date of superannuation and there E is no allegation of misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the employee - Direction for fixing retiral benefits without taking into account the period beyond due date of superannuation.

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In the service book of the respondent-employee, two dates of birth were recorded viz. 11-2-1944 and 11.:2-1946 . Respondent retired' on reaching superannuation according to the date of birth 11-2-1946, i.e. on 29.2.2004. Pursuant to an order that the respondent should have been retired on 28-2-2002 on the basis of his date of birth 11-2-1944 which was based on his matriculation' certificate, the appellant passed an order directing recovery of the excess amount drawn by the respondent. Respondent filed a writ petition challenging the order 297

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A directing deduction. The petitioh was dismissed by High Court. The Division Bench of High Court allowed the intra-court appeal and directed the appellant to return the amount already recovered with interest. Hence the present appeal.

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Dismissing the appeal, the Court

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HELD: 1.1. It is true that the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate should be treated as the date of birth of the respondent. But it would be open to c the employee to place documents before the authorities that the date of birth shown in ~he service book taken from the matriculation certificate was incorrect. There has been no such document placed on' record to corroborate the same, except an affidavit sworn-by the respondent, which D is on record. Therefore, the respondent ought to have retired on 28th of February,, 2002, on the basis of his matriculation certificate which shows his date of birth as 11th of February, 1944 as recorded in his service book. [Para 9] [303-D-F]

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1.2. The Division Bench of High Court had mentioned that there was no allegation qf misrepresentation or fraud purported to have been perpetrated by the appellant. Such being the position and in the absence of any allegation ofthe misrepresentation or fraud made by the appellant, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise-the allegation of misrepresentation or fraud for the first time in this Court. Moreover, even if it is considered that the respondent had fraudulently'entered another date I of birth in his service book, as had .been alleged, it should have come to the notice of the authorities during his course of service, and not after ~e had attained the age of superannuation after the expiry of the date mentioned in the service book which was based on the affidavit of the I respondent. [Paras 9 and 1 O] [304-B-C-D]

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STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. v. PANDEY JAGDISHWAR PRASAD

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1.3. The respondent cannot be held responsible to work beyond his date of birth as mentioned in the matriculation certificate when admittedly in the service book after affidavit, some other date of birth was also evident. [Para 1 O] [304-F]

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2.1. The appellant alleged that the respondent had entered a second date of birth in his service book at a later period of time. If .at all the respondent entered the second date of birth at a subsequent period of time, the authorities concerned should have detected it and there should have been a detailed enquiry to determine whether the respondent was responsible for the same . Even if by mistake, higher pay scale was · given to the employee, without there being misrepresentation or fraud, no recovery can be effected from the retiral dues in the monetary benefit available to the employee. [Para 1 OJ [305-A-C]

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2.2. Since the respondent had worked during the period after completion of two years from the actual date of retirement, without raising any objection from the side of the appellant and the appellant had got works done by the respondent, it was not proper at this stage to allow deduction from his retiral benefits, the amount received by him as salary, after his actual date of retirement. [Para 11] [306-C-D]

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2.3 Since the respondent was allowed to work and was paid salary for his work during the period of two years after his actual date of retirement without raising any objection whatsoever, no deduction could be made for that period from the retiral dues of the respondent. [Para 11] [306-E-F]

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Sahib Ram vs. State of Haryana and Ors., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 18; Kai/ash Singh vs. State of Bihar and Ors. 2005 (13) sec 5'16 and Hari Singh vs. State of Bihar and Ors. 2000

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[2008) 17 S.C.R.

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A (10) sec 284, Relied on.;

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Radha Kishun vs. Union of India and Ors. (1997) 9 SCC )"'-" ' 239, Distinguished '

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Although the exce~s amount paid for two years to B the respondent as sala..Y cannot be recovered from the respondent, but for fixing the retiral benefits, the period of two years in respect of which salary was received by the respondent cannot b,e taken into consideration and the respondent would b{e ·entitled to fixation of retiral C benefits as on the date of his superannuation i.e. 28th February, 2002. [Para 15)' (308-E-F] '

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Case Law Reference:

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1995 Suppl. (1) SCC 18 Relied on Para 10 2005 (13) sec s1s Relied on Para 12 2000 c1.o) sec 284 Relied on Para 12 1997 (9) sec 239 Distinguished. Para 14

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7237 . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. of 2008. - I

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From the final Judgment and Order dated 24.5.2007 of the F High Courtof Judicature at Patna in LP.A. No. 648 of 2006.

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Gopal Singh-and Manish Kr. for the Appellants.

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Saket Singh and Niranjana Singh for the Respondent.

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G The Judgment of the Co,urt was delivered by

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TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted.

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This appeal is directed against an order passed by _a H which the respondent had questioned the legality and validity Division Bench of the High Court ! of Judicature at Patna, by , •

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STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. v. PANDEY JAGDISHWAR 301 PRASAD [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

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of an order dated 22nd of August, 2006 passed by a learned A Judge of that Court, whereby the learned Judge had· rejected the Writ Petition filed by the respondent.

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The Writ Petition was filed by the respondent raising grievances against the order of the appellant dated 4th of December, 2004 directing recovery of the amount of salary for B two years paid to the respondent on account of a dispute with regard to his date of birth despite the fact that the respondent had worked during that period. The appellant, by the order dated 4th of December, 2004, as noted herein earlier, directed recovery of the salary on the basis of that order, which was c affirmed by a learned Judge of the High Court. Therefore, the only question that was raised before the Division Bench was whether the order passed by the State Authority dated 4th of December, 2004 and affirmed by the learned Judge was justified or not. The Division Bench, by the impugned order, had D allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Judge and quashed the order of the authority effecting recovery from the retiral dues and also directed the appellant to return and repay the amount recovered till the date of payment. It is this order, which is now under challenge before us by way of a E Special Leave, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned counsel for the parties.

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Before we consider the questions raised before us in support of the appeal, let us narrate the relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal.

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The respondent, at the relevant point of time, was working as a Correspondence Clerk (class Ill) in the office of the Executive· Engineer, Rural Engineering Organisation: Works Division, Sasaram in the State of Bihar. On 14th of August, G 1973, the service book of the respondent was opened and two dates of birth of the respondent viz. 11th of February, 1944, and 11th of February, 1946, were recorded simultaneously_ in his service book. It may be mentioned here that inspite of two dates of birth having been entered into service of the respondent, the H

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SUPREME COURT R~PORTS

[2008] 17 S.C.R.

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A State Authorities did not correct or delete any of the dates mentioned above for the entire· period the respondent was in

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.. employment with the State Authorities. According to the first mentioned date of birth, the respondent ought to have retired on 28th of February, 2002. But he retired on 29th of February,

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B 2004 according to the other mentioned date of birth in his service book. As noted herein earlier, on 4th of December, 2004, a reasoned order was passed vide. memo no. 340, in the context of an order dated 11th of October, 2004, passed in C.W.J.C. No. 12886 of 2004, in which the respondent claimed

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c for payment of retirement benefit such as pensi_on, gratuity, leave encashment, etc.

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By this order, the respondent was ordered to be retired

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on 28th of February, 2002, on the basis of his date of birth mentioned in his service book ,'i.e. 11th of February, 1944, which

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D was based on his matriculation certificate. As noted herein earlier, by the order dated 4th of December, 2004, the appellant passed an order directing recovery of the excess amount drawn by the respondent.

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E 7. Thereafter, on 12th of February, 2005, by the memo Nos. 30 and 31 of the Executive Engineer, Work Division, Sasaram sanctioned the amount of gratuity and also ordered for deduction of excess amount from group insurance of the respondent in twenty equal installments. The Executive Engineer R.E.O. Works Division, Sa.saram through the memo no. 05

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F dated 4th of March, 2005, made a refixation of the amount paid to the respondent under, Bihar Government Employees Essential Group Insurance ,Scheme. Aggrieved thereafter, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Patna and the High Court, by an order dated 2nd

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G of August, 2006, dismisse~ the writ petition of the respondent, in which it was observed that he was not entitled to refund 1as he had worked .beyond the ;date of his superannuation fo~ which he alone was responsible.

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H 8. Feeling aggrieved by this order of the learned Judge of

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STATE OF BIHAR &. ORS. v. PANDEY JAGDISHWAR PRASAD [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

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the High Court, the respondent filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court which quashed the recovery order issued by the appellant, as "Vell as the orders of the learned Judge. The Division Bench, as noted herein earlier, directed n~fund of the amount already recovered from the respondent with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of recovery till the date of payment. Being thus aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal before this Court.

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We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the materials on record as well as the impugned judgment. It appears that the department raised a controversy in regard to the date of birth after about 31 years of service of the respondent. It is an admitted position now that the amount directed to be recovered, has already been recovered from the retiral dues of the respondent which has been ordered by the Division Bench to be refunded to the respondent with interest @6%. It is true th~t the date of birth mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate should be treated as the date of birth of the respondent. But it would be open to the employee to place documents before the authorities that the date of birth shown in the service book taken from the matriculation certificate was incorrect. There has been no such document placed on record to corroborate the same except an affidavit sworn by the respondent, which is on record. Therefore, the respondent ought to have retired on 28th of February, 2002, on the basis of his matriculation certificate which shows his date of birth as 11th of February, 1944 as recorded in his service book. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that since the service book of the respondent was in custody in which one of the date was mentioned as 11th of February, 1944, he ought to have retired on 28th of February, 2002, and therefore, he had fraudulently continued to serve the appellant till 29th of February, 2004 thereby receiving undue payment of salary and other allowances. We find no merit in this argument. It is to be noted that there was no question of fraud committed by the respondent before the learned

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A Judge or even before the Divisi~n Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench, ir1 the impugned judgment, had on this aecount subsequently mentioned-this, which is quoted as under:-

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c"ln the present case, there was no dispute about the fact that there is no a/legation of misrepresentation or fraud B purported to have been perpetrated by the appellantoriginal writ petitioner. "

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Such being the position and in the absence of any allegation of the misrepreser:itation or fraud made by the c^{appellant, the appellant cannotbepermitted to raisethe} allegation of misrepresentation 1^{or fraud for the first time in this} Court .. Moreover, for the sake of argument, even if we consider that the respondent had fraud~lently entered another date of birth in his service book, as had been alleged, it should have D^{come to the noticeof the au,thorities during his courseof} service, and not after he had attained the age of superannuation after the expiry of the date mentioned in the service book which was based on the affidavit of the respondent. To the contrary, none of the officials responsible had noticed this during h.is E^{service period, even during his time of promotions when the} service book was required toi be inspected by the officials. Therefore, it clearly points out to the gross negligence and lapses on the part of the authorities concerned and in our view, the respondent cannot be held, responsible to work beyond his F^{date of birth as mentioned in the matriculation certificate when} admittedly in the service book,after affidavit, some other date of birth was also evident. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant ought to have deleted the date of birth entered in the service book of the respondent on the basis of his affidavit as the appellant had already accepted the date G of birth of the respondent on the basis of his matriculation certificate which was also produced by the respondent. The appellant alleged that the respondent had entered a second date of birth in his service book at a later period of time. The respondent vehemently negated this.contention stating that two H dates of birth were entered simultaneously in his service book

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STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. v. PANDEY JAGDISHWAR 305 PRASAD [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

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by the department officials. It is _not needed for this Court to A verify the veracity of the statements made by the parties. If at all the .respondent entered the second date of birth at a subsequent period of time, the authorities concerned should have detected it and there should have been a detailed enquiry to determine whether the respondent was responsible for the B same. It has been held in a catena of judicial pronouncements that even if by mistake, higher pay scale was given to the employee, without there being misrepresentation or fraud, no recovery can be effected from the retiral dues in the monetary benefit available to the employee. This Court in the case of c Kai/ash Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Ors., [2004 ( 1) PLJR 289 (SC)], held that recovery sought to be made from the salary of the employees on the ground of alleged over stay in service on the basis of age assessed or considered, despite the fact that the employee has worked during the period of alleged over D stay could not be made. In Sahib Ram vs. State of Haryana & Ors., [1995 Supp. (1) SCC 18], this Court has held that even if by mistake, higher pay scale was given to the employee, without there being misrepresentation or fraud, no recovery can be effected from the retiral dues in the monetary benefit available to the employee. E

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As noted hereinearlier, in the service book of the respondent, two dates of birth have been mentioned, which is not permissible. It cannot be conceived of that the authorities could not exai:t'line the possibility of two dates of birth to be F entered in the service book of the respondent. They ought to have deleted the initial date of birth based on the matriculation certificate if the appellants were of the view that the affidavit sworn by the respondent was correct and the date of birth appearing in the matriculation certificate must be found to be G incorrect, it is needless to say that the affidavit sworn by the respondent must be on the basis of documents produced by the respondent to show that the date of birth entered in the service book initially was incorrect. Instead, the appellant had not issued any notice of retirement of the respondent on 28th

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A of February, 2002, which was the date for retirement of the respondent on his attaining superannuation, i.e. on the basis of the date of birth shown in the matriculation certificate. On the other hand, the appellant allow~d the respondent to work and got works from him and paid salary. I Only for the first time, the ·B appellant took note of two dates of birth after he had completed two years from the.date of hi_s actual date of retirement. Without going into the question whether the appellant was justified after completion of two years from the actual date of retirement to deduct two years' salary ar:id other emoluments paid to the c^{respondent, we may say that since the respondent had worked} during that period without raising any objection from the side of the appellant and the appellant had got works done by the respondent, we do not think that it was proper at this stage to allow deduction from his retira,I benefits, the amount reqeived D^{by himassalary, after his actual dateofretirement.} Considering the fact ttiat 1 there was no allegation of misrepresentation or fraud, which could be attributed to the respondent and considering the fact that the appellant had allowed the respondent to work and got works done by him and E^{paid salary,it wouldbe unfair, at this stage to deduct the said} amount of salary paid to him. J.Xccordingly, we are in agreement with the Division Bench decision that since the respondent was allowed to work and was paid salary for his work during the period of two years after his ~ctual date of retirement without raising any objection whatsoever, no deduction could be made F for that period from the retiral' dues of the respondent.

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In Kai/ash Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2005 (13) SCC 576], this Court observe 1 d that the employer-State would not be entitled to recover the salary paid in excess after the due G dat~ of superannuation. In ounview, !his decision was practically · based on the concession made I by the State before this Court Again in Harl Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [2000 (10) SCC 284], this Court held that since the Gove~nment had never put the employee on notice to indicate that the date of birth as H^{entered in the service book was incorrect though it could have}

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STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. v. PANDEY JAGDISHWAR PRASAD [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.]

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done so and since no notice had been given to the employee A concerned for accepting a date of birth other than the one entered in the service book, the order of retirement could not be sustained. From the aforesaid_ decision, it is evident that it was the duty of the State to put the employee on notice about his date of retirement and not having done so, the appellant was B not entitled to recover the excess amount paid to the respondent.

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A further argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the parties before the High Court as well as before us on the applicability of Rule 96 of the Bihar Finance Rules c for settlement of dispute regarding.the date of birth. In view of our discussions made herein above and in view of the fact that we have accepted the observations of the Division Bench of the High Court that since the appellant had allowed the respondent to work beyond his due date of superannuation D without raising any objection and in the absence of misrepresentation and fraud to ·be attributed to the respondent, it is not necessary for us in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case to go into the question of interpretation of Rule 96 of the Bihar Finar)ce Rules which is kept open for decision in E . an appropriate case.

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Before parting with this order, we may refer to a decision of this Court strongly relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, Radha Kishun vs. Union of India and Ors., ((1997) 9 SCC 239]. Learned counsel for the appellant F relying on this decision sought to argue that even if the respondent had worked after his due date of superannuation without having any objection from the appellant, the appellant was entitled to deduct the amount already received by the respondent from his retiral benefits. This case, in our view, is G clearly distinguishable from the present case. In the abovementioned case, there was no dispute as to the date of retirement of the appellant in that appeal, as there was no controversy in the date of birth of that appellant. There was only one date of birth mentioned, and he had not retired on the basis H

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[2008) 17 S.C.R.

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A of his date of birth so entered.· 1"herefore, he had wrongly extended his service beyond the date of his superannuation. But in the present case, there \Rere two dates of birth recorded in the service book of the respondent. Therefore, there was a clear confusion in the mind of the respondent as to whether the B^{appellant had accepted his corre:Cteddate of birth as entered} in his service book when admittedly authorities concerned did not serve any notice of retirement on the basis of the initial entry of date of birth in his service book. It should also be kept in mind that the respondent might have expected that second date c^{of birth shown in the service book was acceptedbythe} authorities for that reason he was allowed to continue in his service and was paid salary. In the absence of any proof that the respondent had manipulated. his date of birth by entering a second date at a later stage, a:nd that he had any malafide D^{intentions to continue his service, beyond his dateof his} retirement, w.e are of the view that the decision in the case of Radha Kishun vs. Union of /ndif1 and Ors. (Supra), would not b.e- applicable in the facts of the present case.

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There is another aspect in this matter. Although we E have directed that the excess aount paid for two years to the respondent as salary cannot be recovered from the respondent, . but we make it clear that for fixi"g the retiral benefits, the period of two years in respect of which salary was received by the respondent cannot be taken into consideration and the F^{respondent. would be entitledt}fixation of retiral benefits as on the d9te of his superannuation i.e. 28th of February, 2002.

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Accordingly, we do not find it necessary to interfere with the order of the Division Bench of the High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in the exercise G o(our power under Article 136 bf the Constitution accepting the directions made in paragraph , 15 of this judgment.

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For the reasons afoesid, the appeal is dismissed subjectto above directions. There will be no order as to costs. H K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.

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Appeal dismissed.

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State of Bihar & Ors. v. Pandey Jagdishwar Prasad

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State of Bihar & Ors. v. Pandey Jagdishwar Prasad

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