Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax versus State Bank of India and Ors.

Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to transactions c in Securities) Act, 1992 - s.11(2)(a) and (b) - Discharge of tax liabilities under - Of notified person - Priority claim of Revenue . -- Creditor Banks seeking scaling down the claim of Revenue - ·Allowed by Special Court - On appeal, plea of Banks that the amount for which decree was passed in their p favour against the notified person prior to issuance of Notification uls.3 could not have been assessed as the income of the notified person without showing nexus between the decreed amount and the amount included in income for statutory period - Duplication of amount in the order of scaling E^{down also disputed-}^{Held: Priority in payment of tax liability} is only for statutory period and not beyond that - Question of nexus required to be decided - Issue of nexus and issue of duplication, since not decided by Special Court, the matter is remitted to Special Court for finding on these issues - If F^{nexus is found, the amount shall be disbursed tothe Banks.}

¶11

_.,

¶12

,,.

¶13

Income Tax Officer passed assessment order in ,,. respect of the assessment years 1992-93 and 1993-94 at Rs.2014 crores and Rs.1396 crores respectively in respect of person notified u/s. 3 of Special Court (Trial of G Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. CIT (Appeals) appeals against the order are pending with Income Tax confirmed the assessment order. The • Appellate Tribunal. In terms of s.11 (2) (a) of the Act, Income Tax Department was having first right on H 1146

¶14

H

¶15

•

¶16

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1147 OF INDIA AND ORS.

¶17

appropriation of assets of the notified persons. The A 1 custodian released a sum of Rs.686.22 crores to the Department,· pursuant to various orders-passed by Special Court confirmed by Supreme Court.

¶18

In Harshad S. Mehta vs Custodian & Ors. (1998) 5 SCC 1, this Court held that priority could be restricted to the tax component of the demand for priority period relevant 1 to Assessment Years 1992-1993 and 1993-1994; tnat Special Court could not sit in appeal over the order of tax assessment, but 1n case of any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in assessment proceedings where tax assessed is disproportionately high in relation to funds available, Special Court could scale down the tax liability to be paid in priority.

B

C

)

Respondent-Banks filed applications before Special D Court seeking direction to scale down the priority demand of the appellate-Department on the ground that there was gross miscarriage of justice in making an order of assessment in the case of the notified person. They contended that decree passed in their· favour against the E notified person, proved that the money in question which was assessed as income of the notified person was, in fact, money of the Banks and hence could not have been assessed as income of the notified person; that miscarriage of justice also crept iri, in r~spect of, F additions on account of oversold securities, unexplained stock and unexplained deposits in Banks etc. Special Court accepting the plea of the Banl<s, scaled down the priority demand. It directed the appellant-Department to refund Rs.546.22 crores out of the already received G amount of Rs.686.22 crores to the custodian, because in view of the plea of the Banks, the tax liability of ttle notified person was only Rs.140 crores. It further oirected the custodian to disburse the available amount to tfle Banks in respect of the principal amount against their H

D

E

H

SUPREME . \ 'COURT REPORTS

¶27

(2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶28

A decrees. Hence, the present appeals. . -. ·

¶29

\

¶30

The question for CQO$ideration J;>efore this Court was whether the Special Court w~~ ri~~t in scaling down the priority tax demand by delving intg th~ merits of the 8^{assessment orders and by decidingth~ mtter san} appellate authority which directions according tg the appellant were in violation of the decision of the CQurt in Harshad Mehta's case. Revenue contended inter alia that there was duplication of two amounts which were scaled C down, as both the amounts were with rnpet <? the oversold securities and were one and the same .

¶31

'

¶32

. Disposing of the appeals, and remitting the matter to the Special Court, the Court

¶33

. 0 f:IELO: 1.1. There could be no dispute with rgFtrcl to .the priority clai.m of the Income Tax Department in releasing the tax due. At the same time ther coMld lo be no di,spute with regard to the fact that if any party other than .the l'.IQtified person has any right, title or E interest. in the attached property on the date of the. notification u/s. 3 of.Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act; 1992, the said right of the third party did not and could not have been held to be extinguished. [Para 22] [1170-D·E]

¶34

F 1.2. There could be no <;lisagreenient with regard to the fact that if any amount is found due and payable by the Sanks towards_, amount advanced by it as loan to the notified person in that event the right of the Ba.nk to the extent of the said amount,_ must be held to be the existing · G right of the bank on the property which is attached. It also carll'.lof be ignored that the said amount could not have been asses$ed in the hands of the notified person as his Income, for the Banks continued to have an existing right on the aforesaid amount which is required to be released

H

. r

~

( .

-{ '

(

t

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1149 OF INDIA AND ORS.

¶43

• in terms of the decrees which are obtained by the Banks A and the non-relee~e of the said amount would amount to miscarriag@ of h4stice. [Para 24) (1170-H; 1171-A-B]

¶44

1.3. As the priority in payment of tax liability u/s. 11 (2)(a) 1$ only for the statutory period and not for any 8 ather period, the appellant is justified while contending that if _the banks have a right, title or interest in the attached property on the. date of the notification u/s. 3 of . the Act, for which decrees have been obtained and if the ·. Banks are claiming that the said amount has wrongly C been included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period, then the banks are required to show the nexus between the said decreed amount and the amount wflich is Included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period. [Para 24] ~1171-E-G]

¶45

D

¶46

1.4 . .The issue with respect to duplictation is correlated to the first is~ue and a finding on the said issue . can be given, only once· the finding with respect to the first issue is arrived at. There is no finding either on the issue of nexus or on the issue of duplication by the E Special Court in the impugned judgment. All the disputed questions are required to be decided by the Special Court after giving an opportunity to the parties to place all the relevant documents so as to enable it to come to a proper and considered finding. If the nexus is shown by the F banks between the amounts for which decrees have been obtained, which have become final and binding and the amount which is included in the income in the hands of the notified person by the Department, the same will have to be disbursed to the banks by the Special Court. On account of oversold securities if the delivery has been G · given by the notified person and the transaction is complete, only the difference between the payable and receivable will be taken and not the gross amount. However the issue as to whether the decrees are on

¶47

H

¶48

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶49

$UPREME COURT REPORTS

¶50

1150

¶51

A account of oversold securities and, if so, is there any duplication or whether the decrees ar~ on ~ccount of siphoning of the funds, is required to be adjudicated by the special Court on appreciation of the releyan! documents. [Paras 26 and 29) [1173-D-G]

¶52

B

¶53

. 2. So far as the amounts of Rs. 253 crores and Rs; 101 crores are concerned, the appellants have not staied th~t the said amount were not included in the in.come of the notified party for the statutory period. The. consent decrees obtained. in respect of Rs. 253 crores were not C challenged by the appellant which led the Special Court

¶54

to believe that the·.appellant has accepted the settlement and accordingly scaled down the said amount from the income of the notified person. Similar is the cas.e with the .amount of Rs. 101 crores. Thus the scaling down of the D said amount is upheld and will not be disturbed. [Para 31) [1174-C:_!:]

¶55

Harshad S. Mehta vs. Custodian and Ors. ·19~8 (5) SCC 1, relied on.

¶56

E

¶57

Case· Law Reference:

¶58

1998· (5) ·sec 1 Relied on, Para 20

¶59

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal D.No. F 32945 of 2007.

¶60

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.2007 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating To Transactions In Securities) at Bombay in Report of the C.ustodian No.· 15 of 2006 with Misc. Application Nos. 210, 51 and 365 of 2003.

¶61

G

¶62

WITH

¶63

Ci.vii Appeal Nos. 326-329 of 2008 ~nd Civil Appeal No. 0:1537 of 2008.

¶64

H G.E. Vahanwati, S.G. Mohan Parasaran, A.S.G., K.K.

¶65

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1151 OF INDIA AND ORS.

¶66

Venugopal, Janak Dwarka Das, Jaideep Gupta, Daryus A Khambatta, C.A. Sundaram, Beni Chatterjee, Raghavendra Rao, Benu Chatterjee, Arijit Prasad, D.D. Karnath, Rahul Kaushik, T.A. Khan, D.L. Chidanand, B.V. Balaram Das, Vijaya Lakshmi Menon, Shashi Kapila, Priya Bansal, Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Tushad Cooper, Rohini Musa, Rohma s Hameed, Mahesh Agarwal, E.C. Agrawala, Rishi Agrawala, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar lnayat, Kamini Jaiswal, Shomila Bakshi Abhimanue Shreshta, Subramonium Prasad, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Sumit Goel and Nitin Thukral (for M/s. Parekh & Co.) for the appearing parties. . c

¶67

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

¶68

DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. The present appeals were filed against the judgment and order of the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of D Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') for conducting trial of offences related to transactions in securities. By the impugned judgment and order the Special Court allowed the application filed by the respondent No. 1, the State Bank of India and dfrected the E appellant to deposit an amount of Rs. 546.22 crores with the Cl_Jstodian alongwith interest at 9% per annum. The Special Court while issuing the said direction held that the income tax liaqility for the statutory period of the notified party, namely, Mr. Harshad S. Mehta under Section 11 (2)(a) did not at that stage F appear to be in excess of Rs. 140 crores approximately, subject to further orders that the Court might pass at a later stage. In the impugned judgment and order a further direction was issued that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the amount lying deposited with the Custodian and, therefore, G a direction was also issued to the Custodian to pay to the banks, namely, the State Bank of 1lndia and the Standard Chartered Bank against their decrees the principal amount, from the amounts in deposit with the Custodian as also from the amount that was likely to be coming back from the Income

E

F

G

H

I ~'

1152

:[2008] 16 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶77

A Tax Department. As the said amount was indequate to fully satisfy the claims of the Banks wit respect to the principal amount it was further held that the same wquld be disbursed by the Custodian on pro.,rata basis and after receiving an undertaking from the banks to the Court that they would bring 8^{back the amount; if so required, on such terms and conditions} as may be directed. by the Court.

¶78

As this Court in an order i!l an interim application recorded the directions of the committee of the . .Union· of India regarding the State Bank of India not requesting for any interim · C payment, the aforesaid orders and directions were made subject to the condition of the Custodian seeking clarification from this Court and releasing such payment in favour 9f the concerned parties, only if, permitted by this Court.

¶79

o 3. The issue which is particularly sought to be raised by the appellant, Income Tax Department by filing the prese!lt appeal is whether the Special Court constituted under the aforesaid Act was right in scaling down thepriority.·tax dmand by delving into the merits of the asses§ment orders and by E deciding the matter as an aP,pellate authority which directions according to the appellant are in violation of the decision of this Court in the case of Harshad S. Mhta v. Custodian & Ors . . [(1998) s sec 11.

¶80

The subject matter of the present appeal relates to the F security scam of Harshad S. Mehta and the perioq relevant to the said scam relates to assessment yea.rs 1992-1993 and 1993-194. The Assessing Officer completed thE! assessment proceedings for both the aforesaid years in respect of Harshad s, Mehta after gathering information from many sources and G after giving an opportunity to the assessee to furnish details/ explanations on the same. The Income Tax Officer passd an assessment order assessing the income for the assessment year 1992.-1993 at Rs. 2014 crores and for the assessment year 1993.-1994 at Rs. 1396 crores. The assessment orders

¶81

. ;

¶82

H

¶83

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1153 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶84

were challenged before CIT (Appeals) by the assessee and were largely confirmed. Cross appeals have been filed by the Revenue as also by the assessee for the assessment year 1992-1'993, which are pending with the lncom·e\Tax Appellate Tribunal, whereas for assessment year 1993-1994 appeal file~ by the a,ssessee is pending for admission. The orders of assess~ent. largely confirmed by CIT (Appeals) resulted in raising ax demand of Rs. 1743 crores by the Income Tax Departmt.

¶85

A

¶86

B

¶87

In terms of the provisions of Section 11 (2) (a) of th~ Act the Income Tax Department has first right on appropriation of the assets of Harshad S. Mehta lying in the custody of the Custodian against his tax demand for the assessment year 1992-1993 and assessment year 1993-1994 as tax component. Therefore the Income Tax Department is required to be paid in priority over the liabilities payable to the banks,, financial institutions and other creditors particularly for the aforesaid relevant_ two years which were considered as statutory period.

¶88

C

¶89

D

¶90

In terms of the aforesaid provisions and at the request, of the Income Tax Department, the Custodian had earlier released a sum of Rs. 686.22 crores to the Departmenf pursuant to various 'orders passed by the Special Court which, were confirmed by this Court. The said interim release of funds of Rs. 686.22 crores to the Department was subject to filing of an affidavit/undertaking by Secretary (Revenue), Government, of India that the amount would be brought back to the Court/ Cu~todian alongwith interest within a period of four weeks, if so directed by the Special Court.

¶91

E

¶92

F

¶93

In Harshad S. Mehta v. Custodian & Ors. (Supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that such priority would be restricted . to the tax component of the demand for priority period relevant to assessment year 1992-1993 and assessment year 19931994. This Court also held that Special Court cannot sit in

G

H

·'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶98

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶99

1154

¶100

A appeal over the order of tax assessment but in case of any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in the assessment proceedings where tax assessed is disproportionately high in relation to funds available, the Special Court could scale down the tax liability to be paid in priority.

¶101

B

¶102

Applications were filed by the State Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as 'SBI') and also by other banks including Standard Chartered Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'SCB.') before the Special Court seeking for direction tc;> scale down the priority demand on the ground that there was gross C miscarriage of.justice in making an order of assessment in the case of the notified party, namely, Harshad Mehta. In the said applications reference was also made to the decrees on admission passed in favour of the banks against Harshad S. Mehta which according to the banks have become final and D binding. Relying on the said decrees it was contended on behalf of the banks that passing of decrees prove that the concerned money which are assessed as income in the hands of Harshad S. Mehta as his income was, in fact, money belonging to the banks and therefore there is a miscarriage of justice as the E Income Tax Department has considered the said amount/sum to be the income of Harshad Mehta. It was also submitted that miscarriage of justice also crept in, in respect of, additions on account of oversold securities, unexplained stock and unexplained deposits in banks etc. The aforesaid applications F were heard by the Special Court wherein the Income Tax Department refuted the aforesaid submissions that there has been any miscarriage of justice in making the order of assessment in the case of Harshad Mehta. However, the Special Court under the impugned order dated 29.09.2007 G accepted the pleas raised by the SBI and other ban.ks in part with a direction to scale down the priority demand in the case of Harshad ·s. Mehta in the following terms and on following grounds:

H

A

B

c

D

, !

E

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1155 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶111

Amount inCrores	AddedinIncome undertheHead	Groundonwhichdeductedby theSpecialCourt
1688		DecreedAmountinfavourofbanks.
1080	Over-sold Securities	Astheassessing.officerstatedthat thesecuritieshavebeendelivered bythenotifiedparty,therefore,only thedifferenceinpurchaseandSC!lle pricecanbetakenandnotthe entireamount.
253	Unexplained Stocks	Consentdecreespassedbythe, SupremeCourtwerenotchallenged by theappellant.
101	Unexplained money/Deposits inBanks	ForanamountofRs.18.75crores decreeofSpecialCourtinfavourof SBI,w.r.t64.94and17.77crores, Bankfilingaffidavitstatingthatthe amountnevertransferredintothe, accountofHarshadS.Mehta.

¶112

Consequently, it was held that if the above amounts ae excluded from total assessed income of the statutory perio, the total income would be reduced to approximately Rs. 277 crores, arid therefore, it was held by the Special Court that th,e tax liability of Harshad S. ·Mehta for the aforesaid twp assessment years payable under Section 11 (2) (a) of the A<;:t in no case would exceed Rs. 140 crores. In terms of the aforesaid findings and conclusions arrived at by the Special Court directions were issued directing the Income Tax Department to deposit with the Custodian an amount of Rs,. 546.22 cror~s with interest at 9% per annum from the date of receipt of the amounts amounting Rs. 686.22 crores, with a further direction that the said amount which is to be deposited by the Income Tax Department alongwith other amount lying deposited with the Custodian would be released in favour of the banks in terms of observations made in the impugned order.

¶113

F

¶114

G

¶115

In the light of the aforesaid facts and issues we now H

¶116

(2008] 16 s.C.R.

¶117

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶118

1156

¶119

F

¶120

A^{proceedtodeal with the various contentions raisedonbehalf} of the parties who in support of theit contention have referred to various documents on record.

¶121

11 ·. DL!ring the course of hearing our attention was drawn B^{to tWopending applications which were for the deletion of the} name of respondent No. 11 namely, State Bank of Saurashtra from array of parti:es 8$ .the said bank was liioC1uired by respondent No. 1, State Barik of India undet Notification No. G.S .. R. 589 (E) d~ted 13.08.2008. In view of the aforesaid position, both the applications which were filed for deletion of c the name of respondent No. 7 in the aJ)peals are allowed. · Ordered accordingly.

¶122

Mr. G.E. Vahanvati; the Solicitor General of India appearing for the Income Tax Department submitted that the D^{- order of the Special CourtisperverseastheSpecialCourt} while scaling down the figures of Rs. 1688 rores, with respect to the decreed amount in favour .of the banks\hs failed .to even consider the fact that whether or not the said ameunts which have been decreed in favour of the batik were cually included E^{in the income of the assessee/notified person for the Statutory} period. It was further submitted that unless it was demonstrated and established by the banks that there is a nexus between the amounts vyhich have been decreed in their favour and the amount which has been included in the income of the assessee/notified person for the statutory period, the said F amount cannot be scale down. Elaborating the. argument it was submitted that as the banks have failed to prove an~ establish that the amounts have been wrongly assumed to be the income of the assessee as per the decrees, the Special Courts was neither justified nor legal in assuming that the said am?unts -G were part _and parcel of the assessment for the statutory period and thereby directing for the scaling down of the said amounts ..

-G

~

1

... )-" > ) L .• -~ tf~

¶127

~

¶128

)- r

¶129

+-

¶130

The learned Solicitor General further submitted that the impugned judgment is erroneous not only. to the_ aforesaid H extent but also on account of the fact that there has been

¶131

-OY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME iAX v. STATE BANK 1157 - OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

'>

•

"

-<

_duplication of amount while scaling down the figures of R$. A 1688 and Rs. 1080 crores. The amount of Rs. 1080 crores was scaled down by the Special court on account of oversold securities and the said amount'is arrived at after deducting a11 amount of Rs: 601.22 crores credited to SBI from an amount of Rs. 1681.79 crores. With regard to the said amount it was B submitted that the said amount is arrived at by the assessing officer after taking note of various suits flied by the banks with respect to oversold securities, but he agreed that as at that point of time the suits were pending and there was no decree the claims of the banks were declined by the assessing officer, c except the amount of Rs. 601.22 crores for which the credit was given to the SBI. Thus, acc~rding the learned _Solicitor General - the figure of Rs; 1080 crores is an integral part of Rs. 16_88 crores which is the alleged suit amount claimed by the banks.

¶137

D

¶138

On the question of refund and disbursement it was D submitted that the application of Section 11 (2)(a) can arise only at the stage of final distribution. of assets and ari order under, the said section can be passed orjty after examining the claims: 1 by the Scial Court under Section 9(a) ofthe Act. It.was further submitted th-at even otherwise as per Section 11 (2)(a) of the. E Act the claim of the Income Tax Department on account of taxes due will have priority over ihe claims of the bank. In order to' support the said contention the learned Solicitor General has, referred to paragraph 15 of the above mentioned decision of this Court in Harshad S. Mehta v. Custodian & Ors. (Supra)' F wherein it was held by this Court that before the amounts can be paid to the banks or financial institutions under Section 11 (2)(b), the liabilities under Section 11 (2)(a) are rquired to be discharged.

¶139

G

¶140

On the other hand, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel appearing for. the respondent No. 9, SCB supported the judgment and order of the Special Court. Negating the abovesaid claims of the appellant, it was submitted by the learned senior counsel that the· decrees in the

¶141

H

¶142

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶143

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶144

1158

¶145

t

¶146

A favour of the banks were with respect to siphoning of funds from the bank and not on account of the oversold securities. As per the learn.ad ·senior counsel the assessing officer has placed reliance on Annexi.Jre - M2 as comprising a list containing such oversold seci.Jritie·s and accordingly added the amount into the B income of Harshad Mehta. It was further submitted that the · department, merely on the fact that the assessing officer has credited an amouht of Rs. 601.22 crores in favour of SBI while arri'.ting at the· figure of 1080 crores, has come to the conclusion that the decrees for the entire amount of Rs. 1688 crores are c on account of over sold securities, which is ex-faci~ wrong and misconceived and thus the entire contention that there is an duplication is fanciful. In support to the said submission it was · submitted that a bare perusal of the said Annexure M-2, which is· neither a trading account nor an account which show the purchases and sales effected by the assessee, would make it 0 ~bundantly clear that the entries reflected therein have nothing ·to· do with any of the claims made by the banks in any of the sui.t filed by the b_anks. ·

¶147

--1

¶148

· In response to the contention of the appellant department E that there is no nexus between the am·ounts which have been decreed in.favour of the banks and the amount which has been included in the inconie of the assessee/notified person, it was ·submitted that it is not the case of the bank that there is a direct nexus between the amount of the decrees and the individual F items· added to the income of the notified party but what is submitted is that.the·decretal amount represents the liability which ought to have been deducted whilst arriving at a conclusion of the tax liability of the notified party.

¶149

G 14. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for the·respondent No. 1, SBI while concurring.with the above said submissions of the learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that the amount of Rs. 1681.78 crores, i.e. 1080 crores plus 601.22 crores credited to SBI, was against the oversold securities delivery of which was made by Harshad

¶150

H

¶151

D

¶152

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1159 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶153

Mehta, the fact which has been accepted by the assessing A officer in the Assessment order. It was submitted that as the assessing officer has included the gross amount ·with6.ut deducting the payable from the receivable, thus, the entire addition per se is wrong and invalid and therefore the same is liable to be. deducted from the assessment. On the question of . B duplication he submitted that the entire contention is frivolous and misconceived as the decrees for an amount of Rs. 1688 crores were in regard to the transactions which were not complete or concluded whereas the amount of Rs. 1080 crores was in respect of the transactions which were satisfied, c concluded and complete and in which case the deliveries were made. It was also submitted that the issue of duplication is an after thought as the Income Tax Department never raised the same before the Special Court and it is raised for the first time before this Court.

¶154

"

¶155

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Special Court with regard to scaling down both the learned senior counsel submitted that though the Special Court cannot sit in appeal over the assessment of tax authorities and that there can be no question of reopening of any tax assessment before the Special Court as the same has to be determined under the mechanism provided under the relevant tax law, but that it is within the authority and jurisdiction of the Special Court to decide as to how much of the liability would and could be discharged out of the funds in the hands of the Custodian and th~t in coming to the said decision it will also be within the authority and jurisdiction of the Special Court to direct. for making payment either in full or in part. It was further submitted that for this purpose the Special Court can examine whether there is any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in assessment proceedings and that since in the present case the revenue has raised a fanciful claim of an alleged income of the assessee, to the tune of Rs. 3400 crores, on the basis of "Best Judgment" assessment without disclosing material thereof there has been miscarriage of justice. The learned

E

F

G

H

,..., ~ ~

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1160

"

~ r 1·

A counsel in support of their contention placed reliance on the observations made by this Court in paragraph 35 of the abovementioned decision of this Court in Harshad S. Mehta v. Custodian & Ors. (Supra) wherein it was held that where the

¶167

. assessment 'is based on proper material and pertains to .the

¶168

B^{"statutory period", the Special Court may not reduce the tax} claimed and pay it out in full. _It was also held that if the assessment is a "best judgment" assessment, the Special Court may examine whether, for example, the income which is so assessed to tax bears comparison to the amounts.attached

¶169

c^{by the Custodian, or whether the taxes so assessed are grossly} · disproportionate to the properties of the assessee in the hands . of the Custodian, applying the Wednesbury Principle of Proportionality. hi such cases it was held that, the Special Court may, scale down the tax liability to be paid out of the funds in

¶170

D^{the handsof the Custodian. Reference was also made to} paragraph 36 wherein it is held that although the liability of the assessee for the balance tax would subsist, .and the taxing autho,rities would be entitled_to real.ise the remaining liability fr()m the assessee, the same will not be paid in priority· over th~ claims of everybody else under Section 11 (2)(a).

E

~

t

'f

,)

~-

·111 ·order to arrive at a finding it would be essential for us to extract the relevant provisions of the Act and the judicial interpretation of the said provisions.

¶178

F 17. The Special Court (TORTS) Act, 1992 was enacted : to provide for the establishment of a Special Court for the trial of offences relating to transactions in securities and for matters connected therewith or: incidental thereto. Section 3 of the Act requires the appointment of a Custodian thereunder who is, G^{inter. alia, required to deal with the propertiesof the persons} notified in such manner as .the Special Court may direct. The said section reads as under:

¶179

.,

¶180

"3. Appointment and functions of Custodian - ( 1) lhe ··Central Government may appoint one or more Custodian H as it may deem fit for the purposes of this Act.

¶181

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1161 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶182

(2) The Custodian may, on being satisfied on information received that any person has been involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities after the 1st day of April, 1991 and on and before 6th June, 1992, notify the name of such person in the Official Gazette.

¶183

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, on and from the date • of notification under sub-section (2), any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under that sub-section shall stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification.

A

B

C

(4) The property attached under sub-section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct.

¶188

D

¶189

(5) The Custodian may take assistance of any person while exercising his powers or for disGharging his duties under this section and Sec. 4."

¶190

The Special Court has jurisdiction, under Section 7 of the Act, exclusively to hear and decide prosecutions in respect of E offences under the said Act, that is to say, offences relating to transactions in securities after 1-4-1991 and on or before 6-61992. By reason of the amendment of the said Act and the inclusion of Sections 9-A and 9-B, the Special Court is invested with civil jurisdiction in regard to such transactions. Section 11 F of the Act provides the manner in which the liabilities are . required to be discharged. The said section reads as under: 1

¶191

"Section 11. Discharge of liabilities. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, the Special Court may make such order as it may deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachm~nt.

¶192

G

¶193

(2) The following liabilities shall be paid or

¶194

H

¶195

· SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶196

[2008] 16 S.C.R

¶197

1162

¶198

A . · discharged ih full, as far as may be, in the order as under: , .· (a).11,revenues, taxe. cesses_ and rates due from : the persons· notified by the Custodian· under sub.,section · (2) of Section· 3 to the Central .(3overnment or any State · · Government or any local authority;

¶199

B

¶200

~-

¶201

(b) all amounts due from the person so notified by the Custodian.to any bank or financial institution or mutual )' fund; and

¶202

c (c) any. other liability as may be speci~ed by the Special Gourt from time to time."··

¶203

In the case of CIT v. A.K. Menon, L\ 1995) 5 sec 200) this Court discussed the jurisdiction of the Special Court with respect to tax liability of the notified persons. In paragraph 4 of D the judgment it was held as under:

¶204

'.

¶205

appeal over or overrule "It 'is cle.ar that the Special Court has ' the orden~ of the no tax authorities, power to sit ' in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the courts in regard

¶206

E to the tax liabilities of notified persons. The only power of ·the. Special Cqurt is to- determine the priorities in which claims upon the property under attachment shall be paid. The .claims relating-to the tax liabilities of a notified person

¶207

· are.1 along with revenues, cesses and rates entitled to be

¶208

F · paid first in the order_ of priority and in full, as far as may be: In relation to: a claim for payment of the tax liability of

¶209

, a notifi~d person, the Special Court has, therefore, only the. limited power to determine what; having regard to the funds availaole, 'can be pa.id; that is to say, whether the claim can

¶210

be satisfied in full or ·only in part. If a particular tax claim

¶211

G cannot at any time· be paid in full, provision would have to be made for the balance, so far as may be, so that it is not jeopardized."

¶212

·19. Subsequently, the aforesaid section of the Act was

-r

+-

~~

H

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1163 · OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶218

discussed in detail by this Court in the case of Harshad S; Mehta v. Custodian & Ors. (supra). In paragraph 11 of the said judgment it was held as follows:

¶219

A

¶220

"11. This section obviously deals with disbursement of properties attached under Section 3(3). Since the property 8 (moveable or immovable or both) which is attached is of the person notified, the liabilities which are to be paid or · discharged under Section 11 (2) are also liabilities of the person notified - whether these liabilities be in respect of payment of revenues, taxes, cesses or rates, or whether they be the liabilities to any bank, financial institution or C mutual fund."

¶221

In paragraph 12, however, this Court held that before the Special Court proceeds to make an order under Section 11 (1), the said court must be fully satisfied that the property which is attached and is being disposed of is the, property belonging to " the notified person. If any person other than the notified person has any share, or any right, title or interest in the attached property on the date of notification under Section·3 of the Act that right of a third party cannot be extinguished. After having held thus this Court proceeds to observe as follows in paragraph 13:

¶222

D

¶223

E

¶224

"13. The directions, therefore, for disposal under Section 11 ( 1) can be. given only after the Special Court has satisfied itself that. the property under attachment is the property which belongs to the notified person. The directions for disposal can only be in respect of the right, title and interest of the notified person in the attached property. If, therefore, any application is filed before the Special Court by a .third party claiming the property so attached and/or for releasing the right, title and interest of a third party in the property from attachment, the Special Court wit! have to decide the application before proceeding under Section 11." •

F

G

H

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶230

1164

¶231

B

¶232

A This Court thereafter proceeded to interpret the phrase "taxes due" as used in Section 11 (2) (a) and after analyzing the same held as follows in paragraph 23 and 24 :-

¶233

"23. "Tax due" usually refers to an ascertained liability. However, the meaning of the words "taxes due" will ultimately depend upon the context in which these words are used.

¶234

In the present case, the words "taxes due" occur in a section dealing with distribution of property. At this sta·ge c the taxes "due" have to be actually paid out. Therefore, the phrase "taxes due" cannot refer merely to a liability created by the charging section to pay the tax under the relevant law. It must refer to an ascertained liability for payment of taxes quantified in accordance with law. In other words, D taxes as assessed which are presently payable by the notified person are taxes which have to be taken into account under Section 11 (2)(a) while distributing the . property of the notified person. Taxes which are not legally assessed or assessments which have not become final E and binding on the assessee, are not covered under Section 11 (2)(a) because unless it is an ascertained and quantified liability, disbursement cannot be made, In the context of Section 11 (2), therefore, "the taxes due" refer to "taxes as finally assessed"."

¶235

F

¶236

In paragraphs 25 the Court dealt with the question that whether the taxes relate to a specific period or to all the taxes due from the notified party. The said question was answered in the following manner:

¶237

G "25 .......... The Special Court Act is q·uite clear in its intent. It seeks to cover all criminal and civil proceedings rela~ing to transactions in securities of a notified person between 1-4-1991 and 6-6-1992. The Special Court is empowered to examine all civil claims and to try all offences pertaining H to such transactions during the said period. Under Section

¶238

H

¶239

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1165 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶240

3(2), it is the property of such offenders which is attached A by the Custodian and which is disbursed under the directions of the Special Court under Section 11 (2). Clearly, therefore, as the Special Court is empowered to examine all transactions in securities during the period 1- 4-1991 to 6-6-1992, as also all claims relating ~o the B '. property attached, the Special Court will also have to examine the tax liability of the notified person arising during the period 1-4-1991 to 6-6-1992. As the purpose of the Special Court Act, inter alia, ·is as far as practicable, to safeguard the funds to which the banks and financial c institutions may be entitled, and to ensure that these funds are not done away with, there are provisions for attachment, ascertainment of claims and distribution of funds. However, before the liabilities of a notified person to banks and financial institutions can be discharged, 0 Section 11 (2)(a) requires the tax liability of the notified person to be paid. In this context the tax liability can properly be construed as tax liability of the notified person arising out of transactions in securities during the "statutory period" of 1-4-1991 to 6-6-1992. If, for example, any income tax is required to be paid in connection with the E income accruing to a notified person in respect of transactions in security during the "statutory period", that liability will have to be paid before the funds are made available to the banks and financial institutions. Similarly, in respect of any property which is attached, if any rates F or taxes are payable for the "statutory period" those rates and· taxes will have to be paid before the proceeds of the property are distributed to banks and financial institutions. In the same manner, the liabilities to banks and financial institutions in Section 11 (2)(b) are also liabilities pertaining G to the statutory period ........... "

¶241

G

¶242

What will be the fate of the tax liability of the notified person for any other period was mentioned in para 26, which is as under:

¶243

H

¶244

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

1166

y

A "26. Every kind of tax liability of the notified person for any .other period is not covered by Section 11 (2)(a), although the liability may continue to be the liability of the notified person. Such tax liability may be discharged either under the directions of the Special Court under Section 11 (2)(c),

¶249

B or the taxing authority may recover the same from any subsequently acquired property of a notified person (vide

¶250

. Tejkumar Balakrishna Ruia v. A.K. Menon [(1997) 9 SCC '1'23]} "or in any other manner from the notified person in accordance with law. The priority, however, which is given

¶251

c $ under Section 11 (2)(a) to such tax liability only covers such liability for the period 1-4-1991 to 6-6-1992."

¶252

After having held thus, this Court proceeded to determine the· jurisdiction of the Special Court with respect to discharge df tax liability out of the funds in the hands of the Custodian. In D para 34 and 35 the Court qualified the observation of this Court in the case of CIT v. A.K. Menon (Supra) and held that the Special Court can, for the purpose of discharging tax liability, examine whether there is any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice· in assessment proceedings. The said aspect was E furth'er elaborated in para 36. The said paras are as under:

¶253

"34. While we respectfully agree with the finding that the Special Court cannot sit in appeal over the assessment .of taxes by ~h.e tax authorities, we would like to qualify the Court's subsequent observations relating to payment in full F of ~II· assessed taxes under Section 11 (2)(a). There is undqubtedly no question of any reopening of tax .assessments before the Special Court. There is also no provision under the Special Court Act for proof of debts as in insolvency. The provisions in the Special Court Act G for examination of claims are under Section 9-A. A claim in respect of tax assessed, therefore, cannot be reopened by the Special Court. The liability of the notified person to pay the tax will have to be determined under the machinery provided by the relevant tax law. The extent of liability,

¶254

H

¶255

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1167 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶256

¶257

therefore, cannot be examined by the Special Court.

¶258

But the Special Court can decide how much of that liability will be discharged out of the funds in the hands of the Custodian. This is because the tax liability of a notified person having priority under Section 11 (2)(a) is only tax liability pertaining to the "statutory period". Secondly payment in full may or may not be made by the Special Court depending upon various circumstances. The Special Court can; for this purpose, examine whether there is any fraud, cdllusion or miscarriage of justice in assessment proceedings. The assessee who is before the Special Court, is a person liable to be charged with an offence relating to transactions in securities. He may not, in these circumstances, explain transactions before the Income Tax authorities, in case his position is prejudicially affected in defending criminal charges. Then, on account of his property. being attached, he may not be in a position to deposit the tax assessed or file appeals or further proceedings under the relevant tax law which he could have otherwise done. Where the assessment is based on proper material and pertains to the "statutory period", the Special Court may not reduce the tax claimed and pay it out in full. But if the assessment is a "best judgment" assessment, the Special Court may examine whether, for example, the income which is so assessed to tax bears comparison to the amounts attached by the Custodian, or whether the taxes so assessed are grossly disproportionate to the properties of the assessee in the ·hands of the Custodian, applying the Wednesbury Principle of Proportionality. The Special Court may in these cases, scale down the tax liability to be paid out of the funds in the hands ofthe Custodian.

¶259

Although the liability of the assessee for the balance tax would subsist, and the taxing authorities would be entitled to realise the remaining liability from the assessee,

A

8

C

D

E

F

G

H

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

1168

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶271

A the same will not be paid in priority over the claims of \ everybody else under Section 11 (2)(a)~ If the Special Court so decides, it may direct payment of the balance liability under Section 11 (2)( c). Otherwise the taxing authorities may recover the same from any other subsequently B acquired property of the assessee or in any other manner in accordance with law. Such scaling down, however, should be done only in serious cases of miscarriage of justice, fraud or collusion, or where tax assessed is so disproportionately high in relation to the funds in the hands c of the Custodian as to require scaling down in the interest of the claims of the banks and financial institutions and to further the purpose of the Act. The Special Court must have strong reasons for doing so. In fact, the Income Tax authorities have also accepted that exorbitant tax demands D can be ignored, applying the Wednesbury Principles."

¶272

D

¶273

From the above mentioned legislat.ive provisions and judicial interpretation in the decision of Harshad S. Mehta v. Custodian & Ors. (supra), in our considered opinion, the following general principles regarding the powers ~f the Special E Court while discharging the tax liability emerge:

¶274

F

¶275

(i) Special Court has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the assessment of the tax liability of a notified person by the authority or tribunal or c6urt authorised to perform that function by the statute under which the tax is levied. A claim in respect of tax assessedcannot be reopened by the Special Court and the - extent of liability, therefore, cannot be examined by the Special Court.

¶276

G (ii) The claims relating to the tax liabilities of a notified person are, along with revenues, cesses and rates entitled, for the statutory period, to be paid first in the order of priority and in full, as far as may be, depending upon various circumstances.

¶277

H

¶278

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1169 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶279

(iii) The 'taxes due' refer to 'taxes as finally assessed'. A The tax liability can properly be construed as tax liability of the notified person arising out of transactions in securities during the "statutory period" of 1-4-1991 to 6-6-1992.

"

-1

B

(iv) The priority, however, which is given under Section 11 (2)(a) to such tax liability only covers such liability for the period 1-4-1991 to 6-6-1992. Every kind of tax liability of the notified person for any other period is not covered by Section 11 (2)(a), although the c liability may continue to be the liability of the notified person. Such tax liability may be discharged either under the directions of the Special Court under Section 11 (2)(c), or the taxing authority may recover the same from any subsequently acquired property of a notified person or in any other manner from the^D notified person in accordance with law.

¶284

(v) The Special Court can decide how much of the tax liability will be discharged out of the funds in the hands of the Custodian and the Special Court can, for the purpose of disbursing the tax liability, examine whether there is any fraud, collusion or miscarriage of justice in assessment proceedings.

¶285

E

¶286

(vi) Where the assessment is based on proper material and pertains to the "statutory period", the Special^p Court may not reduce the tax claimed and pay it out in full, but if the assessment is a "best judgment" assessment, the Special Court may examine whether the taxes so assessed are grossly disproportionate to the properties of the assessee G in the hands of the Custodian, applying the Wednesbury Principle of Proportionality and other issues of the said nature. The Special Court may in these cases, scale down the tax liability to be

¶287

H

¶288

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶289

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶290

1170

¶291

A paid out of the funds in the hands ofthe Custodian. Such scaling down, however, should be done only in s&rious cases of miscarriage of justice, fraud or collusion, or where tax assessed is so disproportionately high in relation to the funds in the B hands of the Custodian as to require scaling down in the interest of the claims of the banks and financial i.nstitutions and to fµrther the purpose of the Act. The Special Court must have strong reasons for doing so. ·

¶292

c

¶293

In the light of the abovementioned general principles which are culled out from the legislative provision and the decisions referred to above regarding the powers of the Special Court while discharging the tax liability we proceed to analyse the merit of the contentions.

¶294

D

¶295

So far.as the claims are concerned, there could be no dispute with regard to the priority claim of the Income Tax Department in' releasing the tax due. At the same time there could also·be no dispute with regard to the fact that if any party E other than the notified person has any right, title or interest in the attached property on the date of the notification under Section 3 of the Act the said right of the third party did not and could not have been held to be extinguished.

¶296

The banks on the basis of the decrees in their favour F have contented that there right, title and interest respectively in the attached property on the date of the notification has been extinguished,· as the said amount has been included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period and the payment of the same is claimed in priority over the claims of G the banks. ·

¶297

There could be no disagreement with regard to the fact that if any amount is· found due and payable by the banks towards amount advanced by it as loan to Mr. Harshad Mehta,·

H

G

H

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATf: BANK 1171 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶302

in that event tne right of the bank to the extent of the said amount, must be held to be the existing right of the bank on the property which is attached. It also cannot be ignored that the. said amount could not have been assessed in the hands · of Harshad S. Mehta as his income, for the banks continued to have an existing right on the aforesaid amount which is required to be released in terms of the decrees which are obtained by the banks and the non-release of the said amount would amount to miscarriage of justice.

¶303

A

¶304

B

¶305

However, the fact that decrees have been obtained by the banks in respect of the certain dues of Harshad S. Mehta could·. not be disputed by the Income Tax Department. It also could not be disputed by the Income Tax Department that the amounts. for which decrees have been obtained by the banks have become final and binding. But then, it was submitted that the . taxes due have been ascertained and arrived at in terms of the provisions of the Act and that the banks have failed to establish by producing the relevant documents on record that the said · amount, which is decreed in favour of the bank, has been wrongly included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period. As the priority in payment of tax liability under Section 11 (2)( a) is only for the statutory period and not for any other period, we find that the appellant is justified while contending that if the banks have a right, title or interest in the attached property on the date of the notification under Section 3 of the Act for which decrees have been obtained and if the banks are claiming that the said amount has wrongly been included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period, then the banks are required to show the nexus between the said decreed amount and the amount which is included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period.

C

D

E

F

The second disputed question of fact which is also sought to be raised by the Income Tax Department is with regard to the duplication of amount while order for scaling down the amount of Rs. 1688 crores and Rs. 1080 crores. It was

¶311

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶312

[2008] 16 S.C.R.

¶313

1172

¶314

A contended by the Department that both the aforesaid amounts are with respect to the oversold securities and are one and the same. As mentioned earlier the amount of Rs. 1080 crores was arrived at after taking out the amount of,Rs. 601.22 crores from the amount of Rs. 1681. 79 crores. The said amount of Rs. B 601.22 crores appears to have been recognised as a claim under a pending suitfiled by SBI. Consequently, the said amount was credited in favour of the SBI by the Assessing Officer while making the order of assessment.

¶315

On the other hand it was submitted by the learned counsel C . for the respondents that the said contention is untenable in law as the reliance on Annexure M-2 is itself erroneous.

¶316

· 26. The said second issue with respect to duplication is correlated to the first issue and a finding on the said issue can D be given, only once the finding with respect to the first issue is arrived at. There is no finding either on the issue of nexus or on the issue of duplication by the Special Court in the impugned judgment. Probably the reason for the same as also mentioned by Mr. Sundaram is that the said issues were not E raised before the Special Court and even if they were raised before the Sp'ecial Court the same were not addressed or considered in the manner in which they should have been so done.

¶317

For the adjudication of the disputes which are raised F in the present appeal a finding on the said issues and questions would be mandatory and the same cannot be dispensed with under any circumstances. It was submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that at this point the matter should not be· remanded back to the Special Court for G a finding on the said issues and questions and the said finding should also be given by this Court. We considered the said submission. But we find that it would not be possible for us to give any finding on such disputed questions of fact without the same having been looked into by the Special Court after giving

¶318

H

¶319

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1173 OFINDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J]

¶320

opportunity to the parties to file all relevant documents and A papers in support of their contention relating to the aforesaid two issues. Even otherwise, neither the decrees in favour of the banks nor the documents with respect to the suits filed by the banks which indicate the claims of the banks in the suits have been placed before us. Therefore we are not in a position to B give any conclusive finding at this stage.

,,-

·.._

'

~

In the absence of the relevant documents neither would it be possible nor would it be appropriate for us to give a finding on the said issues and questions. Therefore as a c Hobson's choice we are of the opinion that all such disputed questions are required to be decided by the Special Court after giving an opportunity to the parties to place all the relevant documents so as to enable it to come to a proper and considered finding.

¶326

D

¶327

However, while remanding the matter for a finding on the said issues and questions we decide the issue that if the nexus is .shown by the banks between the amounts for which decrees have been obtained, which have become final and binding and the amount which is included in the income in the E hands of Harshad S. Mehta by the Department, the same will have to be disbursed· to the banks by the Special Court. We also hold that on account of oversold securities if the delivery has been given by Harshad S. Mehta and the transaction is complete, only the difference between the payable and F receivable will be taken and not the gross amount. However the issue as to whether the decrees are on account of oversold securities and, if so, is there any duplication or whether the decrees are on account of siphoning of the funds, is requii'ed to be adjudicated by the special Court on appreciation of the G, relevant documents.

¶328

To be specific, the Special Court will give its finding on the two below mentioned issues in addition to the other issues, if any :

¶329

H

¶330

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2-008] 16 S.C.R.

1174

,..,.

A

Whether-there is any nexus between the decretal amount and the income included in the assessment of the notified person for the statutory period.

¶336

~

¶337

Whether the decrees are with. re.gard to the

¶338

B . Oversold_Securities, and if so, whether there is any duplication of amount while scaling down the tax liability.

¶339

1"

¶340

After giving its finding on the said issues, the Special Court will dispose of the matter in the light of the observations G made herein above. We may however clarify that so far as the amounts of Rs. 253 crores and Rs. 101 crores are concerned, · the. appellants have not stated that the said amount were not included in the income of the notified party for the statutory period. The consent decrees obtained in respect qf Rs. 253 D crores were .not challenged by the appellant which ler:t the ~ Special Court.to believe that the appellant. hasaccepted the settlement and accordingly scaled 'down .the said amount from the income of Harshad Mehta. Similar is the case with the amount of Rs. 101 crores. Thus the scaling down of the said E^{amount is upheld and will not be disturbed.}

¶341

It is needless to say that the orders of disbursement made during the pendency of the disputes tetween the parties cannot be said to be final and the same will have to be interim F^{in nature and would finally get settled and take shape on the} determination of the final liabi'lity· after final adjudication of the disputes by the appropriate forums.

¶342

In the light of the aforesaid observations and directions and till ~ decision is taken with regard to the aforesaid issues G which are remanded back to the Special Court we direct that the said amount which was directed to be deposited by the Income Tax Department with the Custodian may not be refunded. We therefore set aside the directions of the Special Court, except to the extent mentioned in para 31 and remit the "H^{entire matter and claims of the parties to be decided afresh in}

;..

./...

!

.. 1

DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. STATE BANK 1175 OF INDIA AND ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]

¶348

terms of the observations made in this order. We also make it A clear that none of the observations made in this order would be construed as any observations made by this Court on the merit of the claims. We request the Special Court to decide the aforesaid issues as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from today and while doing so B give an opportunity to the parties to file such documents which are required or desired to be filed in support of the appeals.

¶349

Accordingly, all the appeals stand disposed in terms of the aforesaid observations and directions.

¶350

K.K.T .

¶351

Appeals disposed of.

¶352

c

Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax v. State Bank of India and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax v. State Bank of India and Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta & Ors. versus Avijit Kumar Ray & Ors.

Narayan Prasad Lohia versus Nikunj Kumar Lohia

Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi versus L. H. Patel & Anr.

K. Laxmanan versus Thekkayil Padmini & Ors.

Punj Lloyd Limited versus Corporate Risks India Pvt. Ltd.

State of Bihar & Ors. versus Pandey Jagdishwar Prasad