Remanded¶107

B.K. Sri Harsha (D) by L.R. & Anr. v. M/S Bharath Heavy Electricals Ltd.

Supreme Court8 Feb 20082008 INSC 155 · [2008] 2 S.C.R. 5982008 INSC 155

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

B.K. Sri Harsha (D) by L.R. v. M/s Bharath Heavy Electricals Ltd., Civil Appeal Nos. 6329-6330 of 2004 (Supreme Court of India, 08-02-2008, Dr. Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam, JJ.). Keywords: specific performance; adverse possession; triable issues; summary disposal of First Appeals; Order 41 Rule 1 CPC; Section 96 CPC; remittal to High Court for fresh consideration; Karnataka High Court R.F.A. 608/2002 C/W 609/2002; OS No.285/1984 and OS No.286/1984; Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria (2005) 7 SCC 60; Specific Relief Act Ss. 10, 16, 20; Limitation Act Art. 54; readiness and willingness; laches; novation.

What did the court decide?

Impugned High Court judgment set aside; matter remitted to the High Court to consider afresh; appeals disposed of with no order as to costs. ¶107

B.K. Sri Harsha (D) by L.R. & Anr. versus M/S… — Specific Performance | Supreme Court (2008)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Impugned High Court judgment set aside; matter remitted to the High Court to consider afresh; appeals disposed of with no order as to costs.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the High Court's disposal of the First Appeals constituted improper summary dismissal, given that triable issues (including the Trial Court's findings on adverse possession in a suit for specific performance) were involved. +1 more

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Court's answer

Though the High Court's judgment was not a limine dismissal, when triable issues are involved - as here, where a suit for specific performance drew Trial Court findings about adverse possession - the appeals should not be summarily dismissed or disposed of in the manner done; the manner of disposal of the First Appeals left much to be desired.

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Ratio / Principle

A bare reading of the High Court's judgment shows no serious effort to analyse the various points raised; the High Court gave a finding regarding adverse possession in a suit for specific performance, evidencing total non-application of mind, so the manner in which the appeals were dismissed cannot be said to be proper.

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Key takeaways

The impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to consider it afresh; the appeals are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.ratio¶107

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Ss. 16 & 20; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - S. 96, Order 41 Rule 1: Two suits for specific performance of agreements for sale were decreed by the Trial Court (respondent-company in possession from 2.5.1974, willing to perform, major portion of consideration paid, agreements never revoked, suit within limitation). The learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the First Appeals (R.F.A. Nos. 608 & 609/2002) largely by reproducing the Trial Court's judgment. The Supreme Court (Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.) held: though not a limine dismissal, the manner of disposal left much to be desired; the suit being for specific performance with Trial Court findings on adverse possession, triable issues were involved and such appeals should not be summarily dismissed; a bare reading showed no serious effort to analyse the points raised, evidencing total non-application of mind. Relying on Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria (2005) 7 SCC 60 on the nature of a specific-performance suit (readiness and willingness under S.16, discretion under S.20, laches, limitation under Art. 54, novation), the Court set aside the impugned judgment, remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, and disposed of the appeals with no order as to costs.

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[2008] 2 S.C.R. 598

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B.K. SRI HARSHA (D) BY L.R. & ANR.

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MIS BHARATH HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD: (Civil Appeal Nos. 6329-6330 of 2004)

FEBRUARY 8, 2008

(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.)

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Specific Relief Act, 1963; Ss. 16 & 20:

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Suit for specific performance of contract of sale of certain c properties - Decreed by trial Court holding that Vendee was in adverse possession of suit property, willing to perform his part of contract and paid major portion of consideration amo_unt - Appeal dismissed by High Court in exercise of power u/o. 41 r. 1 CPC - On appeal, Held: Though suit was for specific D performance but the trial Court recorded finding of adverse possession - Thus, triable issues involved - When triable issues involved, appeal should not be summarily dismissed/ disposed of - Issues arose were not analysed seriously by the High Court - Hence, matter remitted to High Court for E^{COfJSiderationafresh-}^{Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0.}⁴¹ i: 1 - Appeal - Summary disposal """ Triable issue.

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Respondent-company filed two suits for specific performance of the contract in respect of certain properties which were allegedly agreed to be sold by the F appellants under the agreements. The validity and the genuineness of the agreements were not disputed before the Trial Court. The Trial Court decreed the suits holding that the respondent-company was always ready and willing to perform its part of the contract; that agreements G were never revoked or cancelled by the appellants at any time; that the suit for specific performance was filed within the period of limitation. Since, the respondent-company was in possession of the suit property from 2.5.1974, equity lies in its favour in granting specific performance, H 598

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B.K. SRI HARSHA (D) BY L.R. & ANR. v. MIS BHARATH HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD.

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more so, when major portion of the consideration amount A had already been paid by the company. Appeals filed against the order of the trial Court were dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeals.

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Disposing of the appeals, the Court

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HELD: 1.1 Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeals in purported exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 1 CPC. Though, the judgment cannot be said to be limine dismissal of the appeals, yet the manner of disposal of the First Appeals leaves much to be desired. c The suit was for specific performance and the Trial Court recorded findings about adverse possession. That being so, triable issues are involved. When triable issues are involved, the appeals should not be summarily dismissed or disposed of in the manner done. (Para - 6) [601-D, E]

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1.2 A bare reading of the High Court's judgment shows that there was no serious effort made by it to analyse the various points raised. (Para - 7) [601-G]

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Rajeshwari v. Puran lndoria (2005) 7 SCC 60 - relied E on.

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1.3 The High Court has given a finding regarding. adverse possession in a suit for specific performance. There is total non-application of mind by the High Court. The manner in which the appeals were dismissed cannot F be said to be proper. Hence, the matter is remitted to the High Court to consider the same afresh. (Para - 8, 9) [603-C, DJ

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6329-6330 of 2004

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From the Judgment and final Order dated 4.6.2003 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 60812002 C/W R.F.A. No. 609/2002.

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K. Parasaran, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar and Vijay H

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600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2008] 2 S.C.R.

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A Kumar for the Appellants.

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4: ...;

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B. Dutta, A.S.G. B.K. Satija and.Banamali Shukla for the Respondent.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. _Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court ismissing the First Appeals filed under Section 96 of theGode of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'CPC'). The First Appeals were filed against the judgment and decree passed in c OS No.285/1.984 and. OS No.286/1984 on the file of XXXI Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, decreeing the suit for specific performance.

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· 2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

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D Two suits were filed by the respondent, which were consolidated. The respondents as plaintiff sought specific performance in respect of certain properties which were allegedly agreed to be sold by the appellants Smt. B. Saroja Devi'and her husband Sri B.K. Harsha under the contract. Since E^{the'validity and the genuineness of two agreements Exhibits P-} 1 and P-2 were not disputed, the Trial Court was of the view that the only question which arises for consideration was whether the respondent was entitled to the relief of specific performance. The Trial Court came to hold that the respondent-company was F^{always ready ·and willing to perform its part of the contract. It} was also found that the two agreements were never revoked or cancelled by the appellants at any time. Further, it was held that the suit for specific performance was filed within the period of limitation. The Trial Court further came to hold that the G^{respondent-company beinginpossession of the suit property} from 2.5.1.974, equality lies in its favour in granting specific performance and more so, when major portion of the agreement consideration had already been paid. Therefore, both these suits were decreed. The High Court as noted above, dismissed the H^{First Appeals.}

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B.K SRI HARSHA (D) BY L.R.. & ANR. v. M/S 601 BHARATH HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]

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Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that. A though the judgment and decree impugned run to several pages, major part of it consists of the averments and reproduction of the part of the trial Court's judgment.

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It is submitted that this was not an appropriate way ·for disposal of the First ~ppeals. It was also submitted that some '⁸ of the conclusions were legally unsupportable. It was submitted · that when the suit is for specific performance, the special features ' of such a suit have to be kept in view, which has not been done. ·

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Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand · c submitted that the High Court had referred to the factual and ' legal position in detail and, therefore, the judgment and decree do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

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It is to be noted that pages 4 to 18 of judgment (in the paper book) are quotations from the Trial Court's judgment. The · D quotation was made after briefly referring to the major issues. Upto page 21 contentions were noted. Learned Single Judge dismissed the appeals in purported exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 1 CPC. Though strictly speaking, the judgment cannot be said to be in limine dismissal of the appeals, yet the E manner of disposal of the First Appeals leaves much to be desired. When triable issues are involved, the appeals should not be summarily dismissed or disposed of in the manner done. The suit was for specific performance and the Trial Court recorded findings about adverse possession. That being so, F according to learned counsel for the appellants, triable issues are involved. It was pointed out that the stand of the appellants was relatable to lack of readiness, alleged latches, limited novation.

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A bare reading of the High Court's judgment shows that G there was no serious effort to analyse the various points raised. It was submitted that there was notice terminating the agreement. It was categorically stated that plaintiffs were never ready and willing to fufil their part of contract.

[2008] 2 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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602

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A 8. The nature of suit for specific performance of contract has been. highlighted by this Court in several cases. In Rajeshwari v. Puran lndoria (2005 (7) SCC 60), it was interalia observed as under:

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"5. Normally, a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale of immov;:ible property involves, the question whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, whether it was a case for exercise of discretion by the court to decree specific performance in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and whether there were laches on the part of the plaintiff in approaching the court to enforce specific performance of the contract. In some cases, a question of limitation may also arise in the context of Article 54 of the Limitation Act on the terms of the agreement for sale. Other questions like the genuineness of the agreement, abandoning of the right to specific performance, a novation and so on, may also arise in some cases. No doubt, a finding on the three · primary aspects indicated earlier would depend upon the appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence in the case. in the light of the surrounding circumstances.

The right to specific performance of an agreement for sale of immovable property, when filed, raises questions of substantial importance between the parties as to whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, whether it is a case in which specific performance of the contract is enforceable in terms of Section 10, whether in terms of Section 20 of the Act, the discretion to decree specific performance should be exercised by the court and in some cases, whether the suit was barred by limitation and even if not, whether the plaintiff has been guilty of negligence or laches disentitling him to a decree for specific performance. These questions, by and large, may not be questions of law of general importance. But they cannot also be

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8.K. SRI HARSHA (D) BY L.R. & ANR. v. MIS BHARATH HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. [PASAYAT, J.]

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considered to be pure questions of fact based on an A appreciation of the evidence in the case. They. are questions which have to be adjudicated upon, in the context of the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the Limitation Act (if the question of limitation is involved). Though an order in exercise of discretion may not involve B a substantial question of law, the question whether a court could, in law, exercise a discretion at all for decreeing specific performance, could be a question of law that substantially affects the rights of parties in that suit."

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The High Court has also given a finding. regarding^c adverse possession in a suit for specific performance. Above being the position, there is total non-application of kind. The manner in which the appeals were dismissed cannot be said to be proper.

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Above being the position, the impugned judgment^D deserves to be set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to consider the matter afresh. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

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S.K.S.

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Appeals disposed of. E.

B.K. Sri Harsha (D) by L.R. & Anr. v. M/S Bharath Heavy Electricals Ltd.

Case brief

What is this about?

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B.K. Sri Harsha (D) by L.R. & Anr. v. M/S Bharath Heavy Electricals Ltd.

Case brief

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What the court decided

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