Directed transfer of a Sessions case from Ujjain to Nagpur to ensure fair trial due to witness inconsistencies and allegations of coercion. Emphasized active judicial role under CrPC 311 and Evidence Act 165.
Transferred Sessions Case No.291 of 2006 from Sessions Judge, Ujjain to Sessions Judge, Nagpur. Permitted petitioner to suggest public prosecutor names.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
[2008) 4 S.C.R. 783
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HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL
v.
STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
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(Tra,psfer Petition (Crl.) No.175 of 2007)
MARCH 12, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.406 - Criminal proceedings - Transfer of, from one State to another--Death of College Professor due to brutal assault by certain persons c in presence of police personnel, media persons and members of public - Sessions Court, Ujjain conducting trial - Several eye witnesses resiling from statements made by them during investigation - Three police witnesses also resiling from their earlier statements - Deceased Professor's son seeking D transfer of the proceedings on ground of coercion and threat to witnesses; doubtful sincerity of the Investigating Officer and non cross-examination by Public Prosecutor of persons who resiled from statements made during investigation - State not objecting to transfer of proceedings but pleading that such E transfer should not to be construed as acceptance of the allegations made by petitioner about impartiality of the investigating agency or the Public Prosecutor or the manner of trial - In view of the stand of State, without examining the correctness of the allegations made, Supreme Court directed that the case in question pending in the Court of Sessions F Judge, Ujjain be transferred to the Court of Sessions Judge, Nagpur.
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Criminal Trial - Necessity of fair trial - Failure to hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial - State has a G definite role to play in protecting the witnesses, to start with at least in sensitive cases - Legislative measures to emphasise prohibition against tampering with witness, victim or informant have become the imminent and inevitable need of the day
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783
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784
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A Criminal Trial - Role and power of the Courts - Held: Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial - They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses - s.311, CrPC and s.165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Court to elicit all B necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process - Power of Court under s. 165 of the Evidence Act is in a way complementar1 to its power under s.311, CrPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.311 - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 165.
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C The Petitioner's father, a Professor in Government College, was brutally beaten up by certain persons for taking rigid stand in the College union elections, which resulted in his death. The incident allegedly occurred in the presence of several police officials, media persons D and members of the public. FIR was lodged and after investigation, charge sheet was filed and charges framed against Respondent nos.2 to 7. Trial commenced in the Court of Sessions Judge, Ujjain, during which several eyewitnesses resiled from the statements made by them E during investigation. Three potice1 witnesses, PWs. 32, 33 and 34, also resiled from their earlier statements.
Petitioner prayed before this Court for transfer of the Sessions case, contending that the witnesses were coerced and threatened; that the role of the Investigating F Officer gave ample scope to doubt the impartiality and.the sincerity of the investigating age!ncy and that the Public Prosecutor did not cross-examine the persons who had resiled from their statements mc1de during investigation. According to the Petitioner, the Sessions Court was not G acting as required under law.
The State stated that in the larger interest of justice and transparency, it has no objection in case the Sessions case is transferred to some othiar State, but this should H not be construed to be acceptance of the allegations made
HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
785
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by the petitioner about the impartiality of the ·investigating A agency or the public prosecutor or the manner of trial. Similar stand was also adopted by the counsel appearing for the accused-respondents. To show their bona tides, it was stated that the police officials PWs 32, 33 and 34 may be recalled for cross examination even without any B application in terms of s.311,CrPC being filed.
Disposing of the transfer petition and the connected writ petition, the Court
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HELD: 1.1. A trial which is primarily aimed at c ascertaining truth has to be fair to all concerned. Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which D bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is being tried is eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give false evidence that also would not result in a fair trial. The failure to hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial. E [Para 9] [794-E, G; 795-A]
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1.2. If the witness himself is incapacitated from acting as eyes and ears of justice, the trial gets putrefied and paralysed, and it no longer can constitute a fair trial. The incapacitation may be due to several factors like the F witness being not in a position for reasons beyond control to speak the truth in the Court or due to negligence or ignorance or some corrupt collusion. Time has become ripe to act on account of numerous experiences faced by Courts on account of frequent turning of witnesses as G hostile, either due to threats, coercion, lures and monetary considerations at the instance of those in power, their henchmen and hirelings, political clouts and patronage and innumerable other corrupt practices ingenuously adopted to smoother and stifle truth and realities coming
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786
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
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A out to surface rendering truth and justice, to become ultimate casualties. Broader public and societal interests require that the victims of the crime who are not ordinarily parties to prosecution and the interests of State represented by their prosecuting agencies do not suffer B , even in slow process but irreversibly and irretrievably, which if allowed would undermine and destroy public confidence in the administration of justice, which may ultimately pave way for anarchy, oppression and injustice resulting in complete breakdown and collapse of the C edifice of rule of law, enshrined and jealously guarded and protected by the Constitution. There comes the need for protecting the witness. Time has come when serious and undiluted thoughts are to be bestowed for protecting witnesses so that ultimate truth is presented before the Court and justice triumphs and the trial is not reduced to 0 mockery. [Para 14] [799-D-H; 800-A]
1.3. The State has a definite role to play in protecting the witnesses, to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, who has political patronage and E ·could wield muscle and money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As a protector of its citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in Court the witness could safely depose truth without any fear of being haunted by those against whom he has F deposed. Some legislative enactments like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 have taken note of the reluctance shown by witnesses to depose against dangerous criminals-terrorists. In a milder form also the reluctance and the hesitation of witnesses to G depose against people with muscle power, money power or political power has become the ord_er of the day. If ultimately truth is to be arrived at, the eyes and ears of justice have to be protected so that the interests of justice do not get incapacitated in the sense of making the H/ proceedings before Courts mere mock trials as are usually
787
HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
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seen in movies. [Para 14] [800-8, C, D, E]
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1.4. Legislative measures to emphasise prohibition against tampering with witness, victim or informant have become the imminent and inevitable need of the day. Conducts which illegitimately affect the presentation of B evidence in proceedings before the Courts have to be seriously and sternly dealt with. There should not be any undue anxiety to only protect the interest of the accused. That would be unfair to the needs of the society. On the contrary, the efforts should be to ensure fair trial where the accused and the prosecution both get a fair deal.c Public interest in the proper administration of justice must .be given as much importance if not more, as the interests of the individual accused. In this courts have a vital role to play. [Para 15] [800-F, G, H]
D
1.5. The Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. 5.311, Cr.P.C and s.165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of Court to elicit all E necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into. record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that ultimate F objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the Court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The Court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious G to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system, and Courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency H
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
788
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A showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness. [Para 16] [801-A, 8, C, D]
1.6. The power of the Court under s.165 of the Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power under s.311 of the Cr.P.C. The section consist:S of two parts i.e (i) B giving a discretion to the Court to examine the witness at any stage and (ii) the mandatory portion which compels the Court to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the Court. Though the discretion given to the Court is vert wide, the very width c requires a corresponding caution. [Para 17] [801-E, F]
1.7. The very usage of the word such as, 'any Court' 'at any stage', or 'any enquiry or trial or other proceedings' 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that Dthe Section has expressed in thewidestpossibleterms and do not limit the discretion .of the Court in any way. However the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with Ecircumspectionandconsistently withtheprovisionsof the Cr.P.C. The second part of the section does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the Court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case - 'essential', to an active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to F abandon or abdicate. Object of the Section is to enable the Court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some evidence whic!i is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is exercised and the G evidence is examined neither to help the prosecution nor the defence, if the Court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of s.311 Cr.P.C. but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is done with an object ofgetting the evidence in aid of ajust decision and to uphold Hthe truth. [Para 17] [801-G; 802-A,8, C,D]
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789
HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.
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Mrs. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Anr. v. Ms. Rani A Jethma/ani (1979 (4) SCC 167); Mohan Lal v. Union of India (1991) Supp (1) SCC 271 and Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2004 (4) SCC 158) - relied on.
B
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 175of2007.
WITH
G
Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 173 of 2006)
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Vivek K. Tankha, Anurag Sharma, Prashant Kumar and Arjun Harkauli (for MIS. AP & J Chambers) for the Appellant.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
790
•
'· A Soli J. Sorabjee, Raju Ramachandran, Uday U. Lalit, Vibha Datta Makhija, Vinay Navare, Virender Parmar, Abha R. Sharma, K.L. Janjani, Krishnan Venugopal, D. Bharat Kumar, Anand, M. lndrani,Abhijit Sengupta, Bhupendra Yadav, Sharabh Samsheri, P.K. Kaurav, Vishwa Pal Singh and Shibashish Misra B for the Respondents.
_The Judgment o\the Court was ~folivered by
· DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.175 of 2007 has been filed by one Himanshu Singh Sabharwal who c is the son of late Prof H.S. Sabharwal. The background facts as projected by.the petitioner who is also the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.173 of •2006 are as follows:
· .. Late Prof. H.S. Sacharwal was a profssor in Govrnment . College·, Ujja_in, M.P.· He was brutally beateri up by certain D persons, for taking a rigid stand in the college u-nion elections. Tnough the assaults were made in the presenc~ of seyeri=JI police. officials, media persons· and members of public, attempt has been made to ·project as if his death was· as a result of an acddent. lnitiafly, First Information Report was lodged and after_ E investigation charge sheet was f!ld and charges have been framed against several persons who are repondents 2 to 7 in the Tran·ster Petition. The trial commenced in the Court of· Sessfons Judge, Ujjain being Sssions Case No.291 of 2006. During examination of several witnesses who were sta.ted to F be eyewhnesses, such witness.es resiled from the statements made··during investigation. There were· even three police witnesses who also resiled from their earlier statements. They are Ohara Singh (PW-32), Sukhnandan (PW-33) and Dilip Tripathi (PW-34).
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G Grievance of the petitioner is that the witnesses have been coerced, threatened and ultimately justice is a casualty. Role of the investigating officer-gives ample scope to doubt, impartiality and the sincerity 9f the investigating agency. Similar is the position of the public prosecutor. It is also highlighted that the . H trial Court also did not make a serious effort to see that justice
HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
791
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is done. In this connection it is pointed out that public prosecutor A did not cross-examine the persons who had resiled from their statements made during investigation. This according to the petitioner also shows that the trial Court did not act as is required under law.
B
By order dated 11. 7 .2007 the proceedings in the sessions case were stayed. In pursuance of the notice the respondentState and accused respondents have appeared.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
792
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
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The Vice-Chancellor went on to refer to paying "too great D a price ... for truth". This is a formulation which has subsequently been frequently invoked, including by Sir Gerard Brennan. On another occasion, in a joint judgment of the High Court, a more expansive formulation of the proposition was advanced in the following terms: "The evidence has been obtained at a price E which is unacceptable having regard to prevailing community standards."
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"It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards ... It is only after a series of determination on the same subject-matter, that it becomes necessary to "reconcile the cases", as it s called, that is, by a true induction to state the principle which has until then been obscurely felt. And this statement is often modified more than once by new decisions before
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HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.],
793
the abstracted general rule takes its final shape. A well A settled legal doctrine embodies the work of many minds, and has been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics whose practical interest is to resist it at every step."
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"It is desirable that the requirement of fairness be E separately identified since it transcends the content of more particularized legal rules and principles and provides the ultimate rationale and touchstone of the rules and practices which the common law requires to be observed in the administration of the substantive criminal law". F
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[2008) 4 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
794
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A an over-riding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of ·justice - often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold the 'majesty of the law'. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its B ability to function as a Court of law in the future as in the case before it. If a criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and C elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the community it serves. Courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair trial is still possible, except 0 at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the judges as impartial and independent adjudicators. ·
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HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. 795 AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
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and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is being tried is eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give false evidence that also would not result in a fair trial. The failure to hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial.
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"Assurance of a fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not .the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of a party or D easy availability of legal services or like mini-grievances . Something more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal principle E although the circumstances may be myriad and vary from case to case. We have to test the petitioner's grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court having jurisdiction and the accused cannot dictate where the case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justiceF should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may weigh the circumstances .
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A more serious ground which disturbs us in more ways than one is the alleged absence of congenial atmosphere G for a fair and impartial trial. It is. becoming a frequent phenomenon in our country that court proceedings are being disturbed by rude hoodlums and unruly crowds, jostling, jeering or cheering and disrupting the judicial hearing with menaces, noises and worse. This tendency H
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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A of toughs and street roughs to violate the serenity of court is obstructive of the cmJrse of justice and must surely be stamped out. Likewise, the safety of the person of an accused or complainant is an essential condition ,-I for participation in a trial and where that is put in peril by B commotion, tumult or threat on account of pathological conditions prevalent in a particular venue, the request for a transfer may not be dismissed summarily. It causes disquiet and concern to a court of justice if a person see.king justice is unable to appear, present one's case, bring one's witnesses or adduce evidence. Indeed, it is c the duty of the court to assure propitious conditions which conduce to comparative tranquility at the trial. Turbulent ' . conditions putting the accused's life in danger or creating chaos inside the court hall may jettison public justice. If this vice is peculiar to a particular place and is persistent D the transfer of the case from that place may become necessary. Likewise, if there is general consternation or atmosphere of tension or raging masses of people in the entire region taking sides and polluting the climate, vitiating the necessary neutrality to hold det~ched judicial trial, the E situation may be said to have deteriorated to such an extent as to warrant transfer. In a decision cited by the counsel for the petitioner, Bose, J., observed :
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.... But we do feel that good grounds for transfer from Jashpurnagar are made out because o_fthe bitterness of local communal feeling and the tenseness of the atmosphere there. Public confidence in the fairness of a trial held in such an atmosphere would be seriously undermined, particularly among reasonable Christians all over India not because the Judge was unfair or biased but because the machinery of justice is not geared to work in the midst of such conditions. The calm detached atmosphere of a fair and impartial judicial trial would be wanting, and even if justice were done it would not be "seen to be done". (G X.
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HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P. 797 AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
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Francis v. Banke Behari Singh, AIR 1958 SC 309) A
Accepting this perspective we must approach the facts of the present case without excitement, exaggeration or eclipse of a sense of proportion. It may be true that the petitioner attracts a crowd in Bombay. Indeed, it is true of many controversial figures in public life that their presence B in a public place gathers partisans for and against, leading to cries and catcalls or 'jais' or 'zindabads'. Nor is it unnatural that some persons may have acquired, for a time a certain quality of reputation, sometimes notoriety, sometimes glory, which may make them the cynosure of C popular attention when they appear in cities even in a court. And when unkempt crowds press into a court hall it is possible that some pushing, some nudging, some brash ogling or angry staring may occur in the rough and tumble resulting in ruffled feelings for the victim. This is a far cry D from saying that the peace inside the court has broken down, that calm inside the court is beyond restoration, . that a tranquil atmosphere for holding the trial is beyond accomplishment or that operational freedom for judge, parties, advocates and witnesses has creased to exist. E None of the allegations made by the petitioner, read in the pragmatic light of the counter-averments of the respondent and understood realistically, makes the contention of the counsel credible that a fair trial is impossible. Perhaps, there was some rough weather but it subsided, and it was F a storm in the tea cup or transient tension to exaggerate which is unwarranted. The petitioner's case of great insecurity or molestation to the point of threat to life is, so far as the record bears out, difficult to accept. The mere word of an interested party is insufficient to convince us G that she is in jeopardy or the court may not be able to conduct the case under conditions of detachment, neutrality or uninterrupted progress. We are disinclined to stampede ourselves "into conceding a transfer of the case on this score, as things stand now.
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798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
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Nevertheless, we cannot view with. unconcern the potentiality of a flare up and the challenge to a fair trial, in · the sense of a satisfactory participation by the accused in the proceedings against her. Mob action may throw out of gear the wheels of the judicial process. Engin-eered fury may paralyse a party's ability to presenf his case or participate in the trial. If the justice system grinds to a halt through physical manoeuvres or sound and fury of the senseless populace the rule of law runs aground. Even the most hated humari anathema has a right to be heard without the rage of ruffians or huff of toughs being turned · against him to unnerve him as party or witness or advocate. Physical violence to a party, actual or imminent, is.reprehensible· when he seeks justice before a tribunal. ManageabJe solutions must not sweep this Court off its feet into granting ari easy transfer but uncontrollable or perilous deterioration will surely persuade us to shift the venue. It depends. The frequency of mobbing manoeuvres in court precincts is· a bad omen for social justice in its wider connotation. We, ·therefore, think it necessary to make a few cautionary observations which will be sufficient, as we see at present, to protectthe petitioner and ensure for her a fair trial.
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799
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• HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P.
AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2008] 4 S.C.R.
800
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A rule of law, enshrined and jealously guarded and protected by the Constitution. There comes the need for protecting the witness. Time has come when serious and undiluted thoughts are to be bestowed for protecting witnesses so that ultimate truth is presented before the Court and justice triumphs and the Btrial is not reduced to mockery. The State has a definite role to play in protecting the witnesses, to start with at least in sensitive cases involving those in power, who has political patronage and could wield muscle and money power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed and truth becoming a casualty. As a protector of cits citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in Court the witness could safely depose truth without any fear of being haunted by those against whom he· has deposed. Some legislative . enactments like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short the 'TADA Act') have taken note Dofthe reluctanceshownbywitnessestodeposeagainst dangerous criminals-terrorists. In a milder form also the reluctance and the hesitation of witnesses to depose against people wit'1 muscle power,. money power or political power has ·become the order of the day. If ultimately truth is to be arrived at, the eyes and ears of justice have to be protected so that _the E interests of justice do not get incapacitated in the sense of making the proceedings before Courts mere mock trials as are usually seen in movies.
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801
• HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL v. STATE OF M.P.
AND ORS. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
· [2008] 4 S.C.R.
SUPREME ·COURT REPORTS
802
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A that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require· and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow any· discretion but obligates and binds the Court to take necessary steps if the B. fresh evidence to be obtainedis· essential to the just ·decision of the case - 'essential', to an active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to abandon or abdicate. Object of the Section is to enable the Court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the. prosecution or the defence has failed to produce csome evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case; The power is exercised and the evidence is examined neither to heli:> the prosecution northe defence, if the. Court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is Ddone with an object ·of getting the evidenceinaidof a just decision and to uphold the truth.
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803
•HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL_v._STATE OFM.P. AND ORS. [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
shall be borne by the State of M.P. It shall be open to the public prosecutor to be appointed to seek recall of any witness already examined in terms of Section 311 of Code. This shall be in addition to PWs. 32, 33 and 34 about whom directions have been given earlier in this order.
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8.8.8. Transfer Petition & Writ Petition disposed of. c
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the Sessions case pending in Ujjain should be transferred to maintain a fair trial atmosphere given alleged witness coercion and lack of impartiality.
What is the scope of the Court's power under Section 311 CrPC to examine witnesses or assess its own conduct under Section 165 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the State has a definite role in protecting witnesses in sensitive cases involving those in power.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Mrs. Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Anr. v. Ms. Rani JethmalaniRelied on¶170
(1979 (4) SCC 167) · Who else cites this
Mohan Lal v. Union of IndiaRelied on¶239
(1991 Supp (1) SCC 271) · Who else cites this
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.Relied on¶239
(2004 (4) SCC 158) · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 2 enactments
HIMANSHU SINGH SABHARWAL
STATE OF M.P.
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT
P. SATHASIVAM
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
