Before proceeding to examine the decided cases referred to at the time of the arguments, let us proceed to examine the question 8 on first principles. It is true that by a fiction of law-well settled by decided cases-that an adopted son is deemed to have been adopted on the date of the death of his adoptive father.. He is the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son and an adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, has a retrospective effect. Whenever the adoption may be made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line. From that it follows that the appellant must be deemed to have be,,;n adopted in 1912. Consequently he is deemed to have been a coparcener in his adoptive father's family when Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao partitioned the properties. The partition having been effected without his consent, it is not binding on him. But from this it does not follow that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao did not separate froni the family at the time of the partition. It was open to Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao to separate themselves from the family. Once they did separate, the appellant and his adoptive mother alone must be deemed to have continued as the members of the family. It is true that because the plaintiff's adoptive mother was alive, the family cannot be said to have come to an end on the date of partition. But that does not mean that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao did not separate from the family. When the partition took place in 1933, the appellant even if he was a coparcener on that day could have only got I/3rd share. We fail to see how his position can be said to have improved merely because he was adopted subsequent to the date of partition. It is true that because he was not a party to the partition, he is e.tititled to ask for reopening of the partition and have his share worked out without reference to that partition. But so far as the quantum of his share is concerned, it must b determined after taking into consideration the fact that Krishna Rao and Lakshmana Rao separated from the family in 1933. The alternative contention of the appellant referred to earlier is also untenable firstly because Krishna Rao disposed of his share of the properties by means of a will and secondly even if he had not disposed of his share of the property, the same would have devolved on Lakshmana Rao by succession and the property that had once. vested by succession cannot be divested as in that property the plaintiff's adoptive father had no right of his own. The doctrine of relation back is only a legal fiction. There is no justification to logically eXtend that fiction. In· fact the plaintiff had nothing to do with hfa adoptive .father's family when Krishna Rao died. On that day
