made in the present case was a nullity because Sivayya and his transA fcree who had purchased an undivided share in coparcenery property were not entitled to any possession at all. We agree that the order cannot be supported in law but we do not see that it was for this reason a nullity. It is not a case where the order was without jurisdiction. It was a case where the learned Judge making the order had, while acting within his jurisdiction, gone wrong in law. • Such an order has full effect if it is not set aside, as it was not in this case. Yelumalai Che/Ii v. Srinivasa Che/Ii(') to which we were referred, docs not support the contention that the order was a nullity. There a purchaser of an undivided share in coparcenery property at an execution sale had applied for possession under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 which corresponds to C 0 21, r. 95 of the present Code. That application was dismissed as barred by limitation. Later, the purchaser who had subsequently acquired the interest of the other coparceners in the property under a private sale, filed a suit for p<>ssession of the whole. It was contended that the suit was barred under s. 244 of the oid Code D (= s. 47 of the present Code) as the purchaser could only proceed by way of execution. In dealing with that contention it was said that though the purchaser of an undivided share in coparcenery property was only entitled to ask for a partition, it was not competent to a court on a mere application for execution by a purchaser of such a shCJre at a court sale. to order a partition and, therefore, the disE missal of the application under s. 318 of the old Code had no effect by way of res j11dicata on the second suit for possession. This case said r;othing about the legality of an order under 0. 21, rr. 35, 95 or 96.
