The learned Judicial Commissioner, however, thought that apart from the evidence about the marriage ceremonies earlier mentioned there was other evidence which would prove the second marriage. He first referred to a statement by the appellant Kanwal D Ram that he had sexual relationship with Kubja. We are entirely unable to agree that this, even if true, would at all prove his marriage with Kubja. Then the learned Judicial Commissioner relied on a statement filed by Kubja, Hira Nand and Hiroo in answer to an application for restitution of conjugal rights filed by Sadh Ram against Kubja and others, in which it was stated that Kubja married E Kanwal Ram after her marriage with Sadh Ram had been dissolved. Now the statement adffiitting the second marriage by these persons is certainly not evidence of the marriage so far as Kanwal Ram and Seesia are concerned; they did not make it. Nor do we think, it is evidence of the marriage even as against Kubja. First, treated as an admission, the entire document has to be read as a whole and F that would prove the dissolution of the first marriage of Kubja which would make the second marriage innocent. Secondly, it is clear that in law such admission is not evidence of the fact of the second marriage having taken place. In a bigamy case, the second marriage as a fact, that is to say, the ceremonies constituting it, must be proved: Empress v. Pitambur Singh(2 ), Empress v. G Kal/u(3 ), Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (35th ed.) Art. 3796. In Kallu's(8 ) case and in Morris v. Mill er(') it has been held that admission of marriage by the accus. ed is not evidence of it for the purpose of proving marriage in an adultry or bigamy case : see also Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice (35th ed.) Art. 3781. We are unable,